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Summary 
Ownership, and especially the ownership of land, consists of rights as well as duties. 
The social responsibilities of the owner depend on the prevailing needs of the public (as 
expressed in legislation) and are subject to change. Section 25(1) of the Constitution 
impliedly recognises the social obligations of the property owner insofar as it confirms 
that ownership can be regulated by the state in the public interest. Section 25(1) also 
sets requirements for the interference with property rights and, in so doing, recognises 
that the social obligations of the property owner are not without boundaries.   
In its landmark FNB decision the Constitutional Court gave content and structure 
to a section 25(1) challenge. The Constitutional Court held that deprivations will be 
arbitrary for purposes of section 25(1) if the law of general application does not provide 
sufficient reason for the deprivation or is procedurally unfair. The Constitutional Court 
elaborated that ‘sufficient reason’ had to be determined with reference to eight 
contextual factors which reflect the complexity of the relationships involved in the 
dispute.  
With reference to section 25(1) and FNB this dissertation considers the 
constitutional implications of two types of statutory interference with the owner’s right to 
use, enjoy and exploit his property. Firstly, the dissertation considers the owner’s 
statutory duty in terms of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 
103 of 1977 to demolish unlawful and illegal building works in certain instances. 
Secondly, the dissertation considers the limitations imposed by the National Heritage 
Resources Act of 25 of 1999 and the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) on the owner’s right to demolish historic or 
unlawfully occupied structures.  
This dissertation argues that building and development controls, historic 
preservation laws and anti-eviction legislation are legitimate exercises of the state’s 
police power. Generally, these statutory interferences with ownership will not amount to 
unconstitutional deprivation of property. Nevertheless, there are instances where 
regulatory laws cannot be applied inflexibly if doing so results in excessive interferences 
with property rights. The FNB substantive arbitrariness test indicates when the law 
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imposes disproportionate burdens on land owners. Furthermore, the non-arbitrariness 
tests shows when it might be necessary to mitigate disproportionate burdens, imposed 
in terms of otherwise legitimate regulatory laws, by way of German-style equalisation 
measures, which are comparable to the constitutional damages granted by South 
African courts.  
This dissertation concludes that in the past century the South African legal system 
has progressed from the apartheid regime, which protected the rights and interests of 
the white minority, to a constitutional regime which safeguards the rights of all South 
Africans. There are two legal developments that may lead to positive change in the next 
century, namely active pursuance of the notion that ownership consists of rights and 
duties and the development of equalisation-style measures, incorporated into 
legislation, to alleviate excessive burdens imposed on property owners in the public 
interest.   
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Opsomming 
Eiendomsreg, veral eiendomsreg op grond, bestaan uit regte sowel as pligte. Die 
sosiale verantwoordelikhede van die eienaar word bepaal deur die heersende 
behoeftes van die publiek (soos in wetgewing beliggaam) en is onderhewig aan 
verandering. Artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet erken implisiet die sosiale verpligtinge van 
die eienaar in soverre dit bevestig dat eiendomsreg nie ŉ absolute reg is nie en dat dit 
deur die staat in die openbare belang gereguleer kan word. Artikel 25(1) koppel 
vereistes aan statutêre beperkings wat op die eienaar se regte geplaas kan word en 
erken daardeur dat die sosiale pligte van die eienaar nie onbegrens is nie.  
In die invloedryke FNB-beslissing het die Grondwethof inhoud en struktuur aan 
grondwetlike analise ingevolge artikel 25(1) gegee. Die Grondwethof het bepaal dat ŉ 
ontneming arbitrêr sal wees vir die doeleindes van artikel 25(1) as die algemeen 
geldende reg nie genoegsame rede vir die ontneming verskaf nie of as die 
ontnemingsproses prosedureel onbillik was. Die Grondwethof het uitgebrei dat 
‘genoegsame rede’ bepaal moet word met verwysing na agt kontekstuele faktore wat 
die kompleksiteit van die verhoudinge wat in die geskil betrokke is, weerspieël.  
Met verwysing na artikel 25(1) en FNB oorweeg hierdie proefskrif die grondwetlike 
implikasies van twee tipes statutêre beperkinge wat deur wetgewing op eienaars se 
regte geplaas word. Eerstens neem die proefskrif die eienaar se statutêre plig ingevolge 
die Wet op Nasionale Bouregulasies en Boustandaarde 103 van 1977 om onwettige en 
onregmatige geboue en bouwerke te sloop, in oënskou. Tweedens oorweeg die 
proefskrif die beperkinge ingevolge die Wet op Nasionale Erfenishulpbronne 25 van 
1999 en die Wet op die Voorkoming van Onwettige Uitsettings en Onregmatige 
Besetting van Grond 19 van 1998 op die eienaar se reg om historiese en onregmatige 
bewoonde strukture te sloop.  
Die proefskrif betoog dat bou- en ontwikkelingsbeheermaatreëls, historiese 
bewaringswette en uitsettingsvoorkomingswetgewing legitieme uitoefening van die staat 
se polisiëringsmag is.  In die algemeen sal hierdie statutêre inmenging nie uitloop op 
ongrondwetlike ontneming van eiendom nie. Nietemin is daar gevalle waar die 
regulerende wette nie onbuigsaam toegepas kan word nie indien dit tot uitermatige 
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inmenging met die eienaar se regte lei. Die FNB-toets vir substantiewe arbitrêre 
ontneming dui aan wanneer ‘n wet ŉ disproporsionele las op grondeienaars plaas. 
Verder wys die FNB-toets wanneer dit nodig mag wees om oneweredige laste, wat deur 
andersins  regmatige regulerende wette opgelê is, te versag. Dit kan gedoen word deur 
middel van ŉ statutêre maatreël, geskoei op Duitse voorbeeld, wat vergelykbaar is met 
grondwetlike skadevergoeding wat deur Suid-Afrikaanse howe toegeken is.  
Hierdie proefskrif kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel oor 
die afgelope eeu  ontwikkel het van die apartheidsbestel, wat die regte en belange van 
die wit minderheid beskerm het, tot die huidige grondwetlike bestel wat die regte van 
alle Suid-Afrikaners beskerm. Twee ontwikkelinge kan tot positiewe verandering in die 
volgende eeu lei, naamlik aktiewe bevordering van die gedagte dat eiendomsreg uit 
regte en verpligtinge bestaan en ontwikkeling van statutêre maatreëls  wat die 
uitermatige las wat in die openbare belang op eienaars geplaas word, te verlig. 
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Chapter 1: 
A hundred years of demolition orders: a constitutional 
analysis 
 
1 1 Introduction 
Section 34(1) of the National Heritage Resources Act of 25 of 1999 (the Heritage 
Resources Act) provides that ‘no person may alter or demolish any structure or part of a 
structure which is older than 60 years without a permit issued by the relevant provincial 
heritage resources authority’.1 In Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western 
Cape and another (Qualidental)2 the applicant (a land owner and developer of 
immovable property) applied to the heritage authority for a section 34(1) permit 
authorising the complete demolition of two structures, the villa and the annex, situated 
on its land. It was necessary to demolish these structures so that the applicant could 
proceed with its plans to construct two apartment blocks on the site. The heritage 
authority issued a permit for demolition of the annex, but not for the villa and it further 
imposed conditions pertaining to the demolition in terms of section 48(2) of the Act. 
These conditions stated, amongst other things, that building plans for new 
developments on the property had to be submitted to the heritage authority for approval. 
Furthermore, any new developments on the property had to be ‘subsidiary to the main 
building [the villa] in terms of massing, siting, scale and location.’3 The applicant 
subsequently submitted its development plans to the heritage authority for approval, but 
they were rejected on the ground that one of the apartment blocks would have obscured 
the main view of the villa. The heritage authority was also of the opinion that the new 
developments would not have blended in with the historic milieu created by the villa and 
other historic buildings in the vicinity. Undeterred, the applicant proceeded with its 
developments even though its building plans had not been approved by the local 
                                                            
1 Section 34(1) of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999. 
2 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 27. 
3 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 28. 
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authority as required by section 4 of the National Building Standards and Building 
Regulations Act 103 of 1977 (the Building Standards Act).4 When the heritage authority 
arrived on the site, it discovered that the annex had been demolished and that the 
applicant had excavated parts of the property. The applicant had laid concrete flooring 
and slabs and the principal external walls of the apartment blocks had already been 
built up to ground level. Moreover, the applicant had installed steel reinforcements so 
that it could proceed with the construction of concrete columns.5 The heritage authority 
issued a stop works order, but this too was ignored by the applicant, who considered 
the order invalid. Consequently, the applicant approached the court for review and 
correction of the demolition permit. In particular, the applicant requested the court to 
delete the conditions from the demolition permit and it further sought the setting aside of 
the stop works order.6  
The court purposively interpreted the provisions of the Heritage Resources Act and 
decided that heritage authorities have wide, rather than narrow, powers to pursue the 
goals set out in the Act. It was therefore within the heritage authority’s power to impose 
conditions – designed to safeguard an historic structure (the villa) not yet formally 
protected under the Heritage Resources Act – when issuing a section 34(1) demolition 
permit for another building (the annex) situated on the property.7 In reply, the applicant 
argued that the court’s interpretation of the Heritage Resources Act would ‘erode’ its 
ownership entitlements. The court explained that ownership in South Africa could no 
longer be viewed as an absolute and inviolable right. In the constitutional era, ownership 
entitlements can only be exercised ‘according to the social function of the law and in the 
interests of the community’.8 Moreover, increasing emphasis has been placed on the 
notion that the owner has certain inherent responsibilities toward his community when 
exercising ownership entitlements. The court also underscored that it is necessary to 
balance and reconcile the protection of ownership, the effect that exercise of ownership 
                                                            
4 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 29. 
5 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 29. 
6 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 27. 
7 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 36. 
8 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37. 
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entitlements might have on third parties and the interests of the community.9 In 
conclusion, the court held that the Heritage Resources Act formed part of the framework 
within which the right of ownership in South Africa should function.10 As a result, the 
court dismissed the application.11 The land owner was accordingly bound by the 
conditional demolition permit issued by the heritage authority. Furthermore, the local 
authority could apply to the court for a demolition order for the illegal building works 
constructed on the applicant’s property. 
It is evident that in Qualidental two types of statutory interference with property 
rights were at stake, namely the limitation imposed on the owner’s right to demolish the 
villa and the owner’s duty to demolish the illegal buildings once the local authority 
obtained a demolition order from the court. The case therefore shows that state 
regulation of the exercise of ownership entitlements could result in either preventing an 
owner from demolishing a building or forcing him to do so. Qualidental also shows that 
the limitation on property rights authorised by the regulation of demolition can be quite 
extensive. It is therefore necessary to determine, with reference to the precedent set in 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service and another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 
(FNB),12 when these types of interference with property rights are in conflict with section 
25(1) of the Constitution. The point of departure is that the state has the power to 
regulate property rights in the public interest. There are, however, instances where 
regulatory laws impose disproportionate burdens on the land owner. Laws regulating 
the exercise of ownership entitlements are pervasive, yet comparatively little academic 
research has been done to explore the constitutional ramifications of these statutory 
measures. Furthermore, there has not been dedicated research on how the 
enforcement or non-enforcement of these laws affect the constitutional rights of, for 
instance, neighbouring land owners. This dissertation analyses the constitutional 
                                                            
9 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37. 
10 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37. 
11 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37. This decision was confirmed on appeal in Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v 
Heritage Western Cape and another 2008 (3) SA 160 (SCA). 
12 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
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implications of three types of limitations on the exercise of ownership entitlements 
pertaining to demolition. Firstly, chapter 2 describes the limitations on the owner’s right 
to demolish unlawfully occupied structures on his land, imposed by the Prevention of 
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE). Secondly, 
chapter 3 explores the nature and extent of the land owner’s duty to demolish unlawful 
or illegal structures on his land. Finally, chapter 4 analyses the limitations imposed by 
the Heritage Resources Act on the land owner’s right to demolish historic structures on 
his land. With reference to the most prominent cases, the section below outlines the 
research field, research questions and hypotheses.  
 
1 2 Research field, research questions and hypotheses 
1 2 1 The regulation of demolition: three categories of limitations 
1 2 1 1 Chapter 2: Unlawfully occupied buildings 
Chapter 2 describes the nature and extent of statutory limitations on the land owner’s 
right to demolish unlawfully occupied and decaying inner-city structures on his land, 
imposed by anti-eviction legislation. Specifically, PIE authorises a court to order the 
eviction of unlawful occupiers if it finds, after considering all the relevant circumstances, 
that it is just and equitable to grant the eviction order. PIE was enacted to give effect to 
the values set out in section 26(3) of the Constitution, which was drafted in direct 
response to the abuses of eviction and demolition orders during the apartheid era. It is 
therefore clear that eviction disputes in South Africa should be resolved in light of the 
relevant constitutional and historical context. In the watershed case, Port Elizabeth 
Municipality v Various Occupiers (Port Elizabeth Municipality)13 the Constitutional Court 
emphasised that when it comes to eviction disputes ‘the Constitution imposes new 
obligations on the courts concerning rights relating to property not previously recognised 
by the common law’.14 The Constitution has created a new right that can conflict with 
ownership entitlements, namely the right not to be arbitrarily evicted from one’s home. 
                                                            
13 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
14 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 23. 
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In disputes of this kind, the function of the court is not to automatically prefer ownership 
above the interests of unlawful occupiers. Rather, it is expected of a court to:  
‘balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner as possible 
taking into account all the interests involved and the specific factors relevant in 
each particular case’.15  
The implication of Port Elizabeth Municipality is that there may be instances 
where the land owner will not obtain an eviction order. This can have far-reaching 
consequences for the land owner, since the continued unlawful occupation of land 
can, for example, affect the owner’s plans to firstly, demolish the occupied 
structures and, secondly, to develop the property. In this chapter, the focus 
therefore falls on statutory restrictions that will prevent a land owner from 
demolishing unlawfully occupied and possibly dilapidated buildings on his land, 
purely because the granting of the demolition order is subject to the granting of an 
eviction order, which in turn is limited by anti-eviction legislation.  
There is no clear indication of when the unlawful occupation of property will 
result in an unconstitutional interference with property rights in the form of 
preventing the owner from demolishing unwanted structures on his land. This 
dissertation draws from case law on eviction to delineate the instances when the 
continued unlawful occupation of property might disproportionately burden the 
land owner. Explained differently, this dissertation describes the instances where 
the continued unlawful occupation of land, and the subsequent limitation on the 
land owner’s demolition rights, may amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property. 
Chapters 2 and 5 determine whether there are methods to protect the land 
owner’s interests when the continued unlawful occupation of a building results in 
an excessive interference with his property rights. This chapter raises the 
hypothesis that, although land owners are generally not entitled to an immediate 
eviction order whenever their property becomes unlawfully occupied, there are 
instances where preventing them from terminating the unlawful occupation of their 
land and demolishing unlawfully occupied structures can result in an arbitrary 
                                                            
15 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 23. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
6 
deprivation of property. PIE does not cater for the protection of ownership 
entitlements in instances where it is neither just nor equitable to order the eviction 
of unlawful occupiers or where the courts are obliged, in terms of anti-eviction 
legislation, to allow the continued unlawful occupation of private land. It is 
accordingly necessary to develop South African law so that it can mitigate 
otherwise excessive interferences with property rights caused by lawful state 
action in the form of preventing a land owner, in terms of anti-eviction legislation, 
from demolishing unlawfully occupied structures on his land. 
 
1 2 1 2 Chapter 3: Unlawful and illegal buildings 
Van der Walt argues that a body of encroachment cases have created the impression 
that the courts are unwilling to demolish illegal16 or unlawful17 building works if the 
structures are valuable, or if demolition would cause undue hardship for the owners.18 
For example, in Trustees of the Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale,19 the court explained 
that it has a natural aversion against the demolition of costly structures. Moreover, the 
demolition of an encroaching structure can in some instances lead to unjust results. A 
court thus has a wide and equitable discretion to order the payment of compensation 
instead of the removal.20 However, case law has more recently confirmed the standing 
of neighbouring land owners, and voluntary associations acting on behalf of land 
                                                            
16 Illegal buildings refer to buildings or building works erected in conflict with statutory requirements. 
Specifically, a building will be illegal and liable for demolition if it was constructed without approved 
building plans as required by section 4(1) of the Building Standards Act. Cases such as High Dune House 
(Pty) Ltd v Ndlambe Municipality and others [2007] ZAECHC 154 (29 June 2007) para 2 and Searle v 
Mossel Bay Municipality and others [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 10 confirmed that a 
structure is also illegal if it was built in accordance with building plans that were set aside on review.  
17 A building is unlawful when its construction conflicts with the property rights held by other persons, 
such as the limited real rights held by neighbouring land owners. This dissertation specifically refers to 
case law where the court ordered the demolition of structures built in conflict with limited real rights 
created by restrictive conditions registered against the title deeds of properties in a neighbourhood.   
18 Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 34. 
19 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
20 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) para 38. 
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owners, to approach the court for relief when unlawful or illegal structures have been 
built in their neighbourhood.21 In some instances, the courts elected to order the 
demolition of illegal and unlawful structures.22 In so doing, the respective courts 
protected the various interests affected by unregulated development and building works.  
In the series of Van Rensburg23 cases, the demolition orders were granted for 
buildings that had been built in conflict with conditions of title. For example, in Van 
Rensburg NO v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality,24 the court ordered the 
demolition of an additional storey of a garage and an entire double-storey building 
erected in conflict with conditions of title.25 Similarly, in Camps Bay Ratepayers and 
Residents Association and others v Minister of Planning, Culture and Administration, 
Western Cape, and others,26 the court ordered the setting aside of the minister’s 
decision to remove conditions of title registered against the title deed of the third 
respondent’s property. This meant that the nine apartments built by the third respondent 
were unlawful insofar as they conflicted with these conditions. The buildings were also 
illegal, since the building plans had been approved despite the existence of conflicting 
                                                            
21 BEF (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality and others 1983 (2) SA 387 (C); Bedfordview Town Council 
and Strydom R and another v Mansyn Seven (Pty) Ltd and others 1989 (4) SA 599 (W); Pick and Pay 
Stores Ltd and others v Teazers Comedy and Revue CC and others 2000 (3) SA 645 (W); PS 
Booksellers (Pty) Ltd and another v Harrison and others 2008 (3) SA 633 (C) paras 16-20 and Tergniet 
and Toekoms Action Group and 34 others v Outeniqua Kreosootpale (Pty) Ltd and others [2009] 
ZAWCHC 6 (23 January 2009) para 22. 
22 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Swartland Municipality and others [2010] ZAWCHC 103 (31 May 
2010) Van Rensburg NO v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE); Van Rensburg 
NO and another v Equus Training and Consulting CC and another [2009] ZAECPEHC 50 (25 September 
2009); Van Rensburg NO v Naidoo NO [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010) and Barnett and others v 
Minister of Land Affairs and others 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA). 
23 Van Rensburg NO v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE) confirmed in Van 
Rensburg NO v Naidoo NO [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010). See further Van Rensburg NO and another 
v Equus Training and Consulting CC and another [2009] ZAECPEHC 50 (25 September 2009).  
24 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE). 
25 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE) paras 4 and 12. 
26 2001 (4) SA 294 (C). 
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conditions of title.27 Accordingly, neighbouring land owners could apply to have the 
unlawful and illegal buildings demolished. Collectively, these cases confirm that the 
efficiency of conditions of title as a planning tool is dependent on adequate enforcement 
mechanisms such as the demolition order. Moreover, these cases show that the courts 
are prepared to order the demolition of unlawful structures as a measure to safeguard 
both the limited real rights sui generis28 held by neighbouring land owners and the 
public interest in safe and healthy urban areas.  
The courts have adopted a similar attitude in instances where structures were built 
without approved building plans. In Barnett and others v Minister of Land Affairs and 
others (Barnett),29 the Supreme Court of Appeal upheld a demolition order in respect of 
holiday cottages erected without building plans and violated the provisions of an 
environmental conservation decree. The court found that the construction of the 
cottages caused irreparable harm to the already fragile environment. Demolition and the 
removal of the illegal structures was the only way in which the area could to some 
extent be rehabilitated.30 Decisions such as Barnett show that the courts will not shy 
                                                            
27 Section 7 of the Building Standards Act prohibits the approval of a building plan if it will trigger one of 
the disqualifying factors listed in either section 7(1)(b)(i) or (ii) of the Act. Section 7(1)(b)(i) of Act 103 of 
1977, for example, proscribes the approval of a plans if it does not comply with the requirements of the 
Act or any other applicable law. Walele v The City of Cape Town and others 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) 
para 56 confirmed that if building plans are approved despite the existence of a disqualifying factor, ‘the 
process becomes invalid and can be set aside on that ground’. Case law indicates that building plans will 
be set aside on review if they were, for instance, approved in conflict with the provisions of the Building 
Standards Act, conditions of title, zoning schemes and environmental conservation laws. 
28 See in this regard Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments 
unpublished LLD thesis Unisa (1990) 153 and to the same effect Van Wyk J ‘The nature and 
classification of restrictive covenants and conditions of title’ (1992) 25 De Jure 270-288 at 288. 
29 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA). 
30 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA) at 315 and 326. Correspondingly, in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v 
Swartland Municipality and others [2010] ZAWCHC 103 (31 May 2010) the court had to determine 
whether it could set aside a demolition order for an illegal structure at the instance of the bank that held a 
security interest in the property. The court decided that the third respondent had acted contrary to public 
policy when he erected an illegal structure. As a result, the court held that it could not condone the 
actions of the third respondent and it refused to set aside the demolition order.  
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away from granting a demolition order, especially in instances where the land owner 
constructed a building in blatant disregard of the law.31 Furthermore, when a court 
orders the demolition of an illegal structure, it upholds the principle of legality and it 
protects the public interest in, for instance, the conservation of the environment and the 
orderly and sustainable development of urban areas.  
Finally, there are instances where buildings will be demolished if they were built in 
accordance with building plans set aside on review. Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality 
and others32 made it explicit that the local authority will be forced to obtain a demolition 
order if the building plans are set aside on review and the ‘resultant position cannot be 
lawfully remedied.’33 The court explained that: 
‘[t]he primacy in our constitutional order of the principle of legality makes it unlikely 
that the building owner’s convenience will prevail if the structure is in fact 
irremediably unlawful’.34 
Crucially, Camps Bay Ratepayers and Resident’s Association v Harrison (Camps Bay)35 
shows that there are instances where the courts are unwilling to order the demolition of 
illegal, or partially illegal, buildings or building works. In this decision the Supreme Court 
of Appeal relied on a range of factors, including the impact of the Oudekraal36 delay 
principle, to find that it would not set aside the first respondent’s building plan even 
though it was in conflict with certain provisions of the zoning scheme. The implication 
was that the applicants could not apply to have the respondent’s partially illegal building 
                                                            
31 The same line of reasoning was adopted  in City of Tshwane v Ghani 2009 (5) SA 563 (T) at 567, 
where the court held that it was obliged to ‘set its face sternly against actions that are as blatantly and 
brazenly in conflict with the law as those the respondents have committed’. In this case the respondent 
had constructed a retail store without approved building plans on land which he did not own. The court 
interdicted the respondent from taking occupation of the property and prohibited him from trading from the 
premises.     
32 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 10. 
33 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 10. 
34 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 10. 
35 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010). 
36 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and others 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA). 
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demolished. Camps Bay suggests that that there are circumstances where regulatory 
laws cannot be applied inflexibly because it will lead to unjust and inequitable results.  
Demolition is a practical solution in instances where the property rights of others 
(such as the limited real righs sui generis created by conditions of title) cannot be 
properly vindicated by compensation. Likewise, demolition is an efficient way to enforce 
compliance with, for example, the provisions of the Building Standards Act. To date, a 
land owner has not yet challenged the constitutionality of a demolition order granted 
with respect to unlawful or illegal buildings situated on his property. This raises the 
question whether there are instances where it would be unconstitutional to compel a 
land owner to demolish the illegal or unlawful structures that he had built on his land. 
The central hypothesis in chapter 3 is that it is within the state’s police power to regulate 
building and development on private land, if necessary by ordering the demolition of 
illegal and unlawful buildings. Likewise, neighbouring land owners, and specifically the 
holders of limited real rights, generally have the right to insist that local authorities 
enforce compliance with the law by demolishing irremediably illegal or unlawful 
structures situated in their neighbourhood. However, as the Camps Bay decision 
indicates, there may be instances where the demolition of an unlawful or illegal structure 
will impose a disproportionate burden on the offending land owner. Insisting on the 
demolition of technically illegal or unlawful buildings might, in those instances, result in 
an arbitrary deprivation of the land owner’s property, just as not ordering or effecting the 
demolition of illegal or unlawful buildings would, in most instances, establish arbitrary 
deprivation of the property rights of neighbours and others who hold limited real rights or 
other, similar interests that are offended by the building.  
 
1 2 1 3 Chapter 4: Historic buildings 
As explained in section 1 1 above, section 34(1) of the Heritage Resources Act  
proscribes the demolition of any structure that is older than 60 years without a 
demolition permit awarded by the heritage resources authority. A heritage authority 
must consider placing the structure under formal protection within three months of 
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denying the application for a demolition permit.37 Once a building is formally protected 
‘no one may destroy, damage, deface, excavate, alter, remove from its original position, 
subdivide or change the planning status of any heritage site’ without a permit issued by 
the relevant heritage authority.38 It is also within the heritage authority’s power to issue a 
compulsory repair order in circumstances where the land owner neglects to maintain a 
heritage resource placed under formal protection in terms of the Act.39  
Case law has indicated that the courts enforce strict compliance with section 34(1) 
of the Heritage Resources Act.40 Qualidental41 illustrated that the courts afford wide 
rather than narrow powers to the heritage authority to realise the goals set out in the 
Act.42 Case law also shows that unless there is some procedural irregularity, the courts 
are generally reluctant to hold that the heritage authority’s decision to refuse a section 
34(1) demolition permit is wrong.43 For instance, in Corrans v MEC for the Department 
of Sport, Recreation, Arts and Culture, Eastern Cape, and others, the court determined 
that it would not set aside the heritage authority’s decision to deny a demolition permit 
for a simple wood and iron structure, which – in the view of the court – could hardly be 
described as a ‘monument to our own forebears' architectural achievement’.44 The court 
                                                            
37 Section 34(2) of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999. 
38 Section 27(18) of Act 25 of 1999. Section 27, a formal protection measure, regulates the declaration 
and protection of provincial or national heritage sites. The other formal protection measures are contained 
in sections 28-32 of the Act and they place restrictions similar to those listed in section 27(18) on the 
exercise of ownership entitlements.  
39 Section 45 of Act 25 of 1999. 
40 Provincial Heritage Resources Authority, Eastern Cape v Gordon 2005 (2) SA 283 (E); Qualidental 
Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2007 (4) SA 26 (C); Qualidental 
Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2008 (3) SA 160 (SCA) and Corrans v MEC 
for the Department of Sport, Recreation, Arts and Culture, Eastern Cape, and others 2009 (5) SA 512 
(ECG). 
41 Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) and 
Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2008 (3) SA 160 (SCA). 
42 Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 27. 
43 In Corrans v MEC for the Department of Sport, Recreation, Arts and Culture, Eastern Cape, and others 
2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG). 
44 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) para 2. 
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explained that it was required to respect the findings of a decision-making body, 
particularly where the decision ‘appears to conform to the overall scheme of the 
legislation.’45 As a result, the land owner had to drastically alter her plans to build a 
guesthouse on the plot where the historic structure was situated. Both Qualidental and 
Corrans illustrate the extent of the limitations that heritage preservation laws, such as 
the Heritage Resources Act, can impose on the land owner. In the South African context 
these limitations have not yet been subjected to constitutional scrutiny. It is accordingly 
unclear whether the Heritage Resources Act has the potential to authorise an arbitrary 
deprivation of property in the form of denying a land owner the right to demolish 
structures on his land. 
The constitutionality of the limitation placed on the land owner’s right to demolish 
an historic structure has been considered by the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America (the Supreme Court) as well as the German Federal Constitutional Court. In 
both jurisdictions the respective courts confirmed the general constitutional validity of 
heritage preservation laws. In particular, they held that a limitation on an owner’s right to 
demolish an historic structure is not unconstitutional. There are, however, instances 
where such a limitation can result in an unconstitutional interference with property 
rights. Interestingly, both jurisdictions incorporate mechanisms to alleviate burdens that 
are imposed on the land owner by historic preservation laws. These jurisdictions serve 
as valuable comparative sources since they provide an indication of when the limitations 
imposed on the land owner’s right to demolish historic structures may be 
unconstitutional on the grounds of section 25(1). Furthermore, these jurisdictions show 
how to mitigate potentially disproportionate burdens imposed by the Heritage 
Resources Act. Accordingly, Chapter 4 determines, with reference to case law 
emanating from South Africa, Germany and the United States of America (US), when 
the limitation on the land owner’s right to demolish historic structures might amount to 
an arbitrary deprivation of property. The central hypothesis of this chapter is that historic 
preservation forms part of the state’s police power. However, the limitations imposed on 
the land owners by historic preservation statutes can be far-reaching. It is therefore 
                                                            
45 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) para 21. 
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necessary to determine when these limitations would go too far and amount to arbitrary 
deprivation of property. Moreover, it might be useful to explore the operation of German-
style equalisation measures in the South African context to mitigate the otherwise 
excessive burdens imposed on land owners by legislation such as the Heritage 
Resources Act. On the basis of the comparative material, this chapter analyses the 
conditions under which denial of a demolition order in terms of historic preservation 
legislation might impose an excessive burden upon the owner and thus constitute 
arbitrary deprivation of property, and also whether the imposition of burdens in terms of 
this legislation may be alleviated by legislative and other measures that could prevent 
the deprivation from being excessive and thus arbitrary. 
 
1 2 2 Chapter 5: The constitutional context 
Section 25(1) of the Constitution provides that: 
‘[n]o one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, 
and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property’. 
In the authoritative FNB decision the Constitutional Court formulated a methodology in 
terms of which all constitutional property challenges should be assessed.46 The court 
declared that a deprivation will be ‘arbitrary’ if the law of general application provides 
insufficient reason for the deprivation or is procedurally unfair.47 ‘Sufficient reason’, the 
Constitutional Court explained, has to be established with reference to eight contextual 
factors that direct a court to conduct an in-depth analysis of, amongst other things, the 
relationships between the affected property owner, the extent of the interference with 
property rights and the purpose of the deprivation.48 The FNB methodology and its 
substantive arbitrariness test is therefore the point of departure for conducting a 
constitutional property enquiry. 
                                                            
46 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 46. 
47 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
48 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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In his most recent work,49 Van der Walt emphasises two facets of a constitutional 
property challenge that has largely gone unnoticed. Firstly, Van der Walt notes that 
generally the courts and legal practitioners have failed to properly consider the ‘law of 
general application’ component of a section 25(1) enquiry. More specifically, when 
faced with a constitutional property dispute, the courts neglect to enquire whether the 
specific interference with property rights is actually authorised by the law of general 
application.50 Van der Walt explains that if a court establishes that the interference with 
property rights is not authorised by the law of general application, the deprivation will be 
unlawful.51 However, a court can proceed with the substantive arbitrariness enquiry if 
the law of general application in fact authorises the deprivation in question. The 
implication is that many deprivations will already fall foul of this important requirement. 
As a result, it will be unnecessary in those cases to determine whether the deprivation is 
substantively arbitrary and therefore unconstitutional.  
Secondly, Van der Walt reasons that too little consideration is given to the 
‘procedural fairness’ aspect of the FNB definition of ‘arbitrary’. Some Constitutional 
Court decisions have merely touched on the issue,52 while others have only superficially 
engaged with this concept.53 Van der Walt argues that from FNB one can deduce that, 
in addition to substantive arbitrariness, procedural fairness is a separate ground on 
which a deprivation can be arbitrary.54 He further explains that to fully comprehend the 
meaning of this concept, it is necessary to distinguish between deprivations caused by 
legislation and deprivations caused by administrative action.55 The full extent of Van der 
                                                            
49 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 
50 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 235-236. 
51 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 236. 
52 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and another; Bisset and others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 
2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) paras 1-2 and 65-67. 
53 Reflect-All 1025 CC v Member of the Executive Council for Public Transport, Roads and Works, 
Gauteng Provincial Government 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). 
54 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 264-265. 
55 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 266-267. 
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Walt’s argument is set out in chapter 5. It suffices to say that if a deprivation is caused 
by administrative action, ‘procedural fairness’ must be assessed with reference to the 
principles that apply in administrative law under the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA).56 A deprivation caused by administrative action does not raise a 
section 25(1) issue. Van der Walt explains that in this instance, the administrative action 
should be challenged and the procedural fairness issue decided on the basis of PAJA.57 
By contrast, if legislation imposes a deprivation directly, without administrative action, 
and in a procedurally unfair manner, the deprivation will also be arbitrary, but then PAJA 
does not apply. As a result, the legislation can then be challenged on the basis of 
section 25(1) insofar as the legislation permits arbitrary deprivation of property.58 
However, the land owner may have two remedies if the deprivation – caused by 
administrative action – is also substantively arbitrary.59 Van der Walt suggests that a 
PAJA remedy is preferable if the deprivation is substantively arbitrary because of a 
procedural irregularity or the manner in which the administrative discretion was 
exercised. Section 25(1) is the more suitable basis for litigation if the deprivation is 
substantively arbitrary because of the impact that it has on the land owner.60 
Against this background, chapter 5 analyses the constitutional implications of the 
regulation of demolition in the context of building and development controls, historic 
preservation statutes and anti-eviction legislation. In particular, chapter 5 establishes 
whether land owners are deprived of property when they are compelled to demolish 
illegal and unlawful structures. Furthermore, chapter 5 analyses the nature of the 
deprivations imposed on neighbouring land owners when a local authority fails to 
demolish illegal or unlawful buildings. With reference to historic preservation and 
unlawfully occupied buildings, chapter 5 describes the nature of the deprivations 
imposed on land owners and other property rights holders by the regulatory denial of 
the right to demolish certain structures.  
                                                            
56 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 267. 
57 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 267. 
58 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 267. 
59 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 267. 
60 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 267. 
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The central hypothesis of this chapter is that the FNB substantive arbitrariness test 
enables a court to ascertain when a limitation on the exercise of ownership entitlements 
amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of property. This test specifically requires of a court 
to firstly consider the interaction between the relationships involved in the dispute and 
secondly to balance and reconcile opposing interests. In so doing, the court can 
ascertain when a statutory regulation goes too far in its interference with ownership 
entitlements. Furthermore, the FNB non-arbitrariness test shows when it might be 
necessary to mitigate the effect of potentially arbitrary deprivations of property by way of 
an equalisation measure.  
 
1 2 3 Chapter 6: The social obligation of the land owner  
Even before the coming into operation of the Constitution, South African authors have 
argued that ownership, and especially the ownership of land, consists of rights as well 
as duties.61 The social responsibilities of the owner are conceptualised according to the 
prevailing needs of the public and they are subject to change as society evolves. Some 
of these duties are defined in the common law, while others are circumscribed in 
legislation.62 The notion of the social responsibility of the land owner is arguably also 
rooted in section 25(1) of the Constitution, which has two broad functions. Firstly, it 
confirms that ownership is not an inviolable right and it can be regulated by the state in 
the public interest.63 This means that ownership cannot be classified as an ‘absolute 
and individualistic right without any qualification attached thereto’.64 It is this aspect of 
                                                            
61 Lewis C ‘The modern concept of ownership of land’ 1985 Acta Juridica 241-266 at 243-244; 248-249 
and 260-262, Visser DP ‘The absoluteness of ownership: the South African common law perspective’ 
1985 Acta Juridica 39-52 at 43-48 and Van der Walt AJ ‘The effect of environmental measures on the 
concept of landownership’ (1987) 104 SALJ 469-479 at 476-479. 
62 Lewis C ‘The modern concept of ownership of land’ 1985 Acta Juridica 241-266. 
63 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 13. 
64 Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37. Davies 
J reasoned that ‘this individualistic concept of ownership is ostensibly found in the fact that the owner’s 
rights is enforceable against the whole world and therefore includes exclusive entitlements in respect of 
the disposition and enjoyment of such property.’ 
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section 25(1) where one can read in the social responsibility component of ownership. 
Secondly, section 25(1) ensures that regulatory limitations on property rights are not 
arbitrarily or unfairly enforced, since it prescribes that these limitations should meet 
certain constitutional requirements.65 This implies that the obligations imposed on 
ownership by legislation are not without boundaries. The limitations imposed on an 
owner’s right to use, enjoy and exploit his property will be constitutionally valid, provided 
they are imposed in terms of law of general application, for a legitimate public purpose, 
and they are not arbitrary. 
Like the South African authors, Alexander holds the view that property owners 
have certain social obligations.66 Alexander has formulated what he refers to as the 
social obligation norm to explain why in the US certain limitations are imposed on the 
exercise of ownership entitlements. Alexander’s social obligation norm is useful since it 
can also provide a theoretical justification for the regulation of demolition in the context 
of illegal and unlawful buildings, historic preservation and unlawfully occupied inner-city 
structures. Importantly, section 25(1), and in particular the FNB substantive arbitrariness 
enquiry, indicates when legislative or regulatory limitations imposed in the name of the 
social obligation of the land owner amount to an unconstitutional interference with 
property rights. Furthermore, the analysis of the non-arbitrariness test shows when it 
would be necessary and possible to mitigate otherwise disproportionate burdens 
imposed on land owners by lawful state action.  
The central hypothesis of this chapter is that the social obligation provides a 
theoretical framework in terms of which one can assess the outcome of an FNB 
substantive arbitrariness analysis. More specifically, the social obligation norm explains 
why, on the one hand, certain interferences with property rights will not amount to an 
arbitrary deprivation of property. This theory also explains why, on the other hand, some 
regulatory interference with property rights amounts to disproportionate burdens 
imposed on land owners in conflict with section 25(1). Finally, the social obligation norm 
                                                            
65 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 13. 
66 See in this regard Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American 
takings jurisprudence (2006) and Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ 
(2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820. 
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provides a theoretical basis for understanding why, in some instances, it may be 
necessary to protect owners from excessive interference with property rights by way of 
an equalisation measure, instead of simply declaring the authorising law invalid and 
unconstitutional.  
Broadly speaking, the research question investigated in this dissertation and the 
hypotheses that structure the analysis can be summarised as follows: section 25(1) of 
the Constitution authorises the state to regulate the exercise of ownership entitlements 
in the public interest. This aspect of section 25(1) impliedly recognises the 
responsibilities that accompany the ownership of property, and especially the ownership 
of land. These responsibilities are often circumscribed in legislation, such as building 
and development controls, anti-eviction laws and historic preservation statutes. Section 
25(1) also confirms that the responsibilities of the land owner are not unconditional and 
it prescribes two standards (law of general application and non-arbitrariness) against 
which regulatory interferences with property rights should be tested. Generally the 
regulatory control of demolition will meet the two requirements set in section 25(1). 
However, there may be instances where the limitation on the owner’s right to demolish 
certain structures may result in an arbitrary deprivation of property. Likewise, there may 
be instances where the owner’s duty to demolish illegal or unlawful buildings may 
amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property. The FNB substantive arbitrariness test 
enables a court to establish when the regulation of demolition will amount to an 
excessive interference with property rights. The non-arbitrariness test will also show 
when a regulatory interference with property rights will be arbitrary but for an 
equalisation measure that mitigates the disproportionate burden imposed on the land 
owner in the public interest.  
 
1 3 Qualifications 
The title of this dissertation, A hundred years of demolition: a constitutional analysis, 
was selected as nearly a century has passed since the first South African legislative 
measures authorised (albeit indirectly) the demolition of structures, especially residential 
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structures, along racial lines.67 During the past 100 years, South African law has 
undergone many changes impacting on demolition. These changes include the 
enactment of apartheid legislation, which expressly authorised draconian demolitions 
and evictions to further the political ideals of the minority government and later, during 
the constitutional era, a new body of legislation rooted in constitutional values such as 
equality and non-discrimination, justice and human dignity. The Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) expressly incorporates two provisions, 
section 25(1) and section 26(3), that have a direct bearing on demolition disputes. It is 
therefore necessary to analyse demolition in light of the changes of the past 100 years.  
Chapter 4 incorporates a comparative law analysis to determine the circumstances 
when historic preservation laws disproportionately burden the land owner. As explained 
in section 1 2 1 3, South African case law has not yet indicated when the land owner’s 
preservation duties under historic preservation laws might amount to an unconstitutional 
interference with property rights. This issue has been addressed by both the German 
Federal Constitutional Court and the US Supreme Court. It is thus beneficial to analyse 
these decisions to determine to what extent historic preservation statutes may lawfully 
interfere with property rights. Both jurisdictions also incorporate measures (equalisation 
measures)68 that alleviate what might otherwise have been excessive burdens imposed 
on land owners by historic preservation statutes. Similar measures might, in their robust 
form, exist in South African law. These foreign jurisdictions shows that when assessing 
the impact of a deprivation for purposes of section 25(1), South African courts should 
consider whether there are equalisation measures that would mitigate potentially 
arbitrary deprivations of property. 
Historic preservation statutes are quite common worldwide and they generally 
operate in more or less the same way. It is therefore unproblematic to compare foreign 
historic preservation cases with the South African legal position as set out in case law. 
                                                            
67 The Black Land Act 27 of 1913 for example proclaimed certain areas for the exclusive occupation of 
black South Africans. It is likely that many dwellings, occupied by black South Africans, were demolished 
if they were located in ‘white-only’ areas. 
68 See in this regard Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 277-282 and 366-367. 
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Another consideration is that although historic preservation laws are universal, there are 
only a few authoritative decisions on the topic, two of those being the US and German 
cases discussed in chapter 4. While these considerations render the comparative 
analysis on chapter 4 useful, they should not be seen as an effort to cast the 
dissertation in a general comparative mould. 
Chapter 3 (unlawful and illegal buildings) and chapter 2 (unlawfully occupied 
structures) do not incorporate a comparative law component. The reason for this is that 
building and development laws operate in divergent ways in different jurisdictions and 
are often enforced on the municipal level. It would have been impractical (and probably 
not very useful) to research the intricacies of these laws as they operate in their 
respective legal systems. Moreover, chapter 2 assesses the issue of unlawfully 
occupied inner-city structures within the apartheid and constitutional context. Eviction 
disputes in South Africa are quite unique, given this rich background. Comparative 
research in this field would not necessarily have enriched the discussion of the 
limitations imposed on the owner’s right to demolish unlawfully occupied structures.  
Finally, this dissertation refers to ‘demolition’ or ‘partial demolition’ to describe the 
complete or partial destruction of buildings or building works.69 The word ‘preservation’, 
in the context of chapter 4, indicates that a person cannot alter, destroy, or change in 
any way a building without the permit issued by the heritage authority. It further means 
that the land owner will have to bear the financial burden of keeping an historic building 
in good repair. 
                                                            
69 The term ‘buildings’ refers to larger structures such houses, apartments or shopping centres while 
‘building works’ refers to smaller structures such as balconies or walls.  
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Chapter 2:  
The right to demolish unlawfully occupied buildings 
 
2 1 Introduction 
The right to destroy or to demolish is one of the entitlements that an owner enjoys in 
relation to his property.1 Like other ownership entitlements, the right to demolish 
buildings is not unfettered, and in a modern society this right is regulated by legislation 
in the public interest. Historic preservation laws, for example, impose extensive 
limitations on the owner’s right to demolish historic or culturally valuable buildings.2 In 
the South African context, the regulation of an owner’s demolition rights did not always 
have such a seemingly neutral function. During the apartheid era property owners’ 
private law demolition powers were exploited by the then government to further its ideal 
of a racially segregated society. This was mainly done through legislation that 
compelled property owners to demolish structures on their property, if they were 
considered unhealthy and unsafe, or because they did not comply with building 
regulations. Similarly, local authorities were granted extensive powers to demolish 
unsafe, unhealthy or illegal structures, usually occupied by black citizens.  
Legislation such as the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 (PISA), 
enabled the forced removal of poor black South Africans who often dwelled in structures 
that did not comply with the applicable regulations. Together, the private property 
owners’ and local authorities’ statutorily inflated eviction and demolition powers further 
entrenched the socio-economic divide between mostly affluent white and mostly 
marginalised3 black people.   
                                                            
1 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 173. Lewis C ‘The modern concept of ownership of land’ 1985 
Acta Juridica 241-266 at 250 explains that whether an owner actually has the right to destroy property 
depends on the nature of the object owned.  
2 The impact of historic preservation laws on an owner’s right to demolish historic buildings is discussed in 
chapter 4. 
3 The term ‘marginalised’ is derived from Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009). 
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After the demise of apartheid, the new constitutional era brought with it a shift in 
the treatment of unlawful occupiers. Specifically, section 26(3) was included in the 
Constitution in a response to the arbitrary nature of apartheid evictions and demolitions. 
Section 26(3) of the Constitution recognises the principle of eviction, but it restricts the 
manner in which unlawful occupiers are evicted. Section 26(3) also explicitly prohibits 
the arbitrary demolition of a person’s home. The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and 
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) was promulgated to give effect to the 
rights enshrined in section 26(3) of the Constitution. This Act indirectly impinges on the 
owner’s right to demolish an unlawfully occupied building as it limits his right to evict 
unlawful occupiers from that building. Such a limitation can have far-reaching 
consequences as it can, for instance, interfere with the owner’s plans to use or to 
develop the property. Owners would also have to maintain that property so that it 
complies with the health and safety standards set in legislation. Essentially, this means 
the owner would have to incur what could be considerable expenses in relation to a 
building that he may be unable to use for any purpose, including to generate income 
from it. It is further possible that the value of the property could decline, perhaps 
drastically, because it is unlawfully occupied. This in turn could impact on the possibility 
of selling the property.  
This chapter describes, primarily with reference to case law, how apartheid-era 
legislation incorporated rigorous demolition powers to promote race-based spatial 
segregation, especially in urban areas. The second part of the chapter contrasts this 
abuse of the power to demolish with post-apartheid case law, to show how property 
owners’ and local authorities’ demolition powers have been drastically limited in the 
constitutional era.   
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2 2 The abuse of demolition powers in the pre-constitutional era 
2 2 1 Introduction 
Lewis explains that South African laws have designated separate living areas for blacks 
since 1855.4 The Black Land Act 27 of 1913 and the Development Trust and Land Act 
18 of 1936 are some of the more well-known laws that proclaimed separate reserves for 
the exclusive occupation of black persons in rural areas.5 These acts further prohibited 
black persons from acquiring land that fell outside the designated areas. Olivier explains 
that the Black Land Act and later the Development Trust and Land Act were enacted to 
ensure the territorial segregation of black and white South Africans, and to entrench the 
notion that black people were only temporary residents in areas situated outside the 
reserves.6 Similar measures were introduced in urban areas, first by the Native (Urban 
Areas) Act 21 of 1923, and later by the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 
1945. However, it was only after 1948, with the coming into power of the National Party 
government, that a formal policy of apartheid was adopted. This policy envisaged, 
amongst other things, the creation of separate reserves or independently governed 
homelands where black citizens were expected to reside permanently.7 The apartheid 
government pursued this vision by, amongst other things, relocating large groups of the 
black population to the designated areas. It is estimated that during 1960-1983 
                                                            
4 Lewis C ‘The modern concept of ownership of land’ 1985 Acta Juridica 241-266 at 261. Lewis 
specifically refers to laws that were in operation in the Transvaal in 1855 and laws that were in operation 
in Natal in 1895.  
5 For an explanation of the purposes of the Act, refer to Davenport THR ‘Some reflections on the history 
of land tenure in South Africa, seen in light of attempts by the state to impose political and economic 
control’ 1985 Acta Juridica 53-76 at 61-62. 
6 Olivier N ‘Urbanisation: policy/strategy with particular reference to urbanisation and the law’ (1988) 53 
Koers 580-590 at 588-589. See further O’ Regan C ‘No more forced removals? An historical analysis of 
the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act’ (1989) 5 SAJHR 361-394 at 363-364. 
7 Albertyn C ‘Forced removals and the law: the Magopa case’ (1986) 2 SAJHR 91-99 at 92 explains that 
87% of South Africa (which included the industrial areas and major cities) was inhabited by white, Asian 
and coloured people while blacks people (who comprised of 73% of the population) were restricted to 
13% of the land.  
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approximately 3,5 million people were forcibly removed to areas demarcated as 
homelands.8 
Black urban South Africans were treated as temporary visitors in the white areas, 
and their presence was only tolerated insofar as they provided cheap labour to 
predominantly white households and white-owned enterprises. In its 1948 election 
manifesto, the National Party accused the Smuts government of being indifferent to the 
threats posed to the white population by the mixed circumstances in unprotected 
suburbs, on buses, trains, resorts and even universities. It further accused the Smuts 
government of being unresponsive to the overflowing source of crime, which in their 
opinion was caused by the influx of ‘natives’ into the cities. The National Party pledged 
that it would protect the European character of South African cities and, accordingly, a 
stringent influx control policy was implemented when it came into power.9 Influx control 
was aimed at regulating the movements of black citizens to and from urban areas.10 
Various methods were employed to manage the influx of black persons into cities, 
including the creation of the so called TBVC states,11 pass laws, the regulation of 
migrant labour forces12 and the National Party government’s failure to provide sufficient 
                                                            
8 Albertyn C ‘Forced removals and the law: the Magopa case’ (1986) 2 SAJHR 91-99 at 92. 
9 O’ Regan C ‘No more forced removals? An historical analysis of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act’ 
(1989) 5 SAJHR 361-394 at 367. 
10 In Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and others 2009 (9) BCLR 
847 (CC) para 192, Ngcobo J sketches a brief, but comprehensive history of the operation of influx 
control measures in especially the Western Cape. He explains that in the Western Cape preference was 
given to coloured labourers, which made it even more difficult for black people to reside in the city. 
11Transkei, Boputhatswana, Venda and Ciskei. Budlender G ‘Incorporation and exclusion: recent 
developments in labour law and influx control’ 1985 (1) SAJHR 3-9 at 4 explains that these four states 
were known as the independent homelands. The so-called TBVC states were granted constitutional 
independence by the following statutes: Status of Transkei Act 100 of 1976; Status of Bophuthatswana 
Act 89 of 1977; Status of Venda Act 107 of 1979 and Status of Ciskei Act 110 of 1981. 
12 For a detailed account of how these measures collectively regulated the influx of black people to urban 
areas refer to Schoombee H and Davis D ‘Abolishing influx control – fundamental or cosmetic change?’ 
(1986) 2 SAJHR 208-219. 
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housing for black citizens.13 Legislation such as the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 
52 of 1951 (PISA); the Slums Act 53 of 1934 (the Slums Act) and the Groups Areas Act 
40 of 1950 were also employed to regulate the influx of black people to urban areas. 
This policy remained in place for almost four decades.  
However, during the 1980s the government realised that its influx control 
measures were unsuccessful.14 The apartheid government subsequently promulgated 
the Abolition of Influx Control Act 68 of 1986, indicating its acceptance of the fact that 
black citizens would permanently be present in urban areas. Furthermore, the 
government replaced its influx control policy with an orderly urbanisation policy, which it 
maintained through the use of existing legislative instruments such as the Group Areas 
                                                            
13 Schoombee H and Davis D ‘Abolishing influx control – fundamental or cosmetic change?’ (1986) 2 
SAJHR 208-219 at 211 explain that severe housing shortages in areas that were set aside for occupation 
by black or coloured persons, served as a deterrent for those that wanted to move from rural to urban 
areas. They provide the example of Cape Town, where from 1972-1981 the government failed to build 
any form of housing for African citizens. The housing shortage in Cape Town was exacerbated by the 
destruction of squatter villages in the Crossroads area. O’ Regan C ‘No more forced removals? A 
historical analysis of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act’ (1989) 5 SAJHR 361-394 at 370 estimates 
that in 1975 about a thousand squatters in the Cape Town area were prosecuted for the illegal occupation 
of land. Van der Vyver JD ‘Qu’ils mangent de la brioche!’ (1981) 98 SALJ 135-148 at 142 explains that 
housing shortages in urban group areas (designated for occupation by Indian, coloured or black persons) 
led to violations of the Groups Areas Act 40 of 1950, which in turn resulted in forced removals and 
criminal prosecutions.  
14 O’ Regan C ‘No more forced removals? An historical analysis of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act’ 
(1989) 5 SAJHR 361-394 at 374. 
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Act,15 PISA as amended and the Slums Act.16 This new urbanisation policy was 
designed to enable the apartheid government, by way of legislation to control where, 
                                                            
15 Schoombee JT ‘Group Areas legislation - the political control of ownership and occupation of land’ 
(1985) Acta Juridica 77-107 at 99. The Group Areas Act facilitated on a national scale the creation of 
group areas that were set aside to be exclusively owned or occupied by members of a certain race group. 
It is evident that the most affluent and wealthy areas were set aside for ownership and occupation by 
white citizens. The areas set aside for occupation by coloured, Indian and black citizens were often 
marked by acute housing shortages, little or no amenities and slum-like circumstances. Established group 
areas were often re-allocated for use and occupation by another race group. Schoombee provides the 
example of District Six in Cape Town, which was occupied by approximately 30 000 coloured persons 
when it was designated as a white area. The original occupants of District Six were forcibly removed and 
their homes were demolished, to make way for the new white inhabitants. He explains that the 
implementation of the Groups Areas Act contributed to the housing shortage since thousands of homes – 
and often entire neighbourhoods – were demolished in the creation and re-allocation of group areas. In 
1977 alone, about 12104 houses were demolished in the course of establishing group areas. Lockhat and 
other v Minister of the Interior 1960 (3) SA 765 (D) 786C-E is one of the most infamous cases decided 
under the Groups Areas Act. In this case Henochsberg J attempted to circumvent the consequences of 
the Act, by stating that the power to discriminate against persons had to be either expressly or impliedly 
authorised in the Act. The court held that it could not find express or implied authority to discriminate in 
the Act, and that the power to establish group areas had to be exercised in a manner that would not result 
in the considerable unequal treatment of individual race groups. This finding was overruled in Lockhat 
and other v Minister of the Interior 1961 (2) SA 587 (A) 602D-F, where the Appellate Division explained 
that the colossal experiment that constituted apartheid was far more important than the hardships 
endured by citizens under the regime. See further S v Adams; S v Werner 1981 (1) SA 187 (A), where the 
court expressed the sentiment that persons who were unable to find decent accommodation in their group 
area could always return to wherever they had come from. Fortunately, the state was not always 
triumphant in group areas disputes. In S v Govender 1986 (3) SA 969 (T) 971B-972C, the court held that 
the Act conferred a wide discretion (which had to be used with circumspection) on a court to order the 
eviction of the appellant. An eviction order could only be granted if the court was expressly requested to 
do so, and only after relevant circumstances had been taken into account. Accordingly, the eviction order 
was not granted. 
16 Section 2 2 3  below briefly refers to those provisions of the Slums Act 53 of 1934, as amended, which 
were employed to further the apartheid ideal of a racially segregated society.  
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and how urban black South Africans lived.17 It has been argued by academic 
commentators that collectively these acts continued to fulfil, albeit to a lesser extent, 
influx control functions because they criminalised the occupation and ownership of land 
in certain instances.18 Despite these measures, persons still flocked to the cities in 
search of employment and a better life. Urban areas were overcrowded and, as the 
demand for housing far exceeded the housing supply, informal settlements continued to 
grow. As a result, local authorities became increasingly reliant on the eviction and 
demolition powers created by legislation such as PISA19 and the Slums Act.20 
It is evident that in urban areas the use of group areas legislation, the PISA and 
the Slums Act, culminated in a vicious cycle of discrimination, distress and human 
misery. Persons who were unable to find suitable, affordable accommodation in their 
own group areas either turned to unlawful squatting on vacant land, where they faced 
the threat of imminent demolition, or to the occupation of overcrowded buildings, where 
they risked possible conviction by the slum clearance court. Once their shacks and the 
buildings were demolished, the occupiers would set out to find alternative land or 
premises, only to be evicted yet again. Furthermore, the act of demolition itself greatly 
contributed to the housing shortage and to general homelessness, which in turn 
contributed to the informal settlement problem. 
Against this broader background, and with reference to case law, the remainder of 
section 2 explains how property owners’ and local authorities’ demolition powers were 
augmented by the PISA, and by subsequent amendments to PISA. The section 
describes how these powers were employed to further the apartheid ideal of a racially 
                                                            
17 Schoombee H and Davis D ‘Abolishing influx control-fundamental or cosmetic change? (1986) 2 
SAJHR 208-219 at 218 and to the same effect O’ Regan C ‘No more forced removals? An historical 
analysis of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act’ (1989) 5 SAJHR 361-394 at 374. Schoombee and 
Davis explain that the term ‘orderly urbanization’ was introduced to mask sensitive political issues as 
technical issues which called for ‘technocratic’ answers.  
18 Van der Walt AJ ‘Towards the development of post-apartheid land law: an exploratory survey’ (1990) 
23 De Jure 1-45 at 26. 
19 Act 52 of 1951. 
20 Act 53 of 1934. 
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segregated society. This section also shows how the legislation increasingly ousted the 
jurisdiction of the courts to hear demolition and eviction cases in certain instances. 
Furthermore, this section explains how PISA deprived so-called unlawful occupiers of 
common law remedies in circumstances where they were evicted and their homes 
demolished. Finally, the section briefly refers to those provisions of the Slums Act 53 of 
1934 that supplemented the local authorities’ power to demolish slum-like informal 
settlements and buildings mostly occupied by indigent black South Africans. 
 
2 2 2 The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 
2 2 2 1 The 1940s squatter movement and the 1944 War Measure 
As mentioned above, the notorious Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, otherwise known 
as PISA, played a prominent role in apartheid history because it promoted, and 
authorised, the forced removal of unlawful occupiers from private and state-owned land. 
This section refers to the legislative predecessor of PISA, namely the 1944 War 
Measure, which was enacted under the War Measure Act,21 and describes the historic 
events that led up to the promulgation of PISA.  
The 1940’s squatter movements resulted in the enactment of legislation to 
preserve the affluent, western facade of South African cities. It is estimated that during 
this period between 60 000-90 000 people were encouraged by rebellion leaders to 
occupy vacant land in Johannesburg.22 Various factors contributed to the influx of 
people from the rural areas to the cities. Industrial growth during the Second World War, 
as well as a maize shortage that persisted throughout the war, persuaded the rural poor 
                                                            
21 Proclamation 76 of 1944 in the Government Gazette Extraordinary 3325 of 6 April 1944. The 1944 War 
Measure was enacted under the War Measures Act 13 of 1940. 
22 O’ Regan C ‘No more forced removals? An historical analysis of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act’ 
(1989) 5 SAJHR 361-394 at 366. 
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to seek sustenance in the city.23 The war also caused other food items to become 
increasingly scarce, especially in rural areas.24 Another factor that contributed to 
urbanisation in South Africa was the ‘land hunger’ experienced by the black rural 
population, as a direct consequence of the imposition of the Black Land Act,25 and later 
the Development Trust and Land Act.26 These circumstances motivated thousands of 
unskilled workers and their families to flock to Johannesburg, in the hope of earning 
higher wages as labourers in the city’s industries.   
In the urban areas, a severe housing shortage, low wages and considerable 
transportation costs encouraged unlawful occupiers to take control of vacant land.27 The 
first squatting movement, named the Mpanza or Sofasonke movement, under the 
leadership of James ‘Sofasonke’ Mpanza, was initiated during March 1944, when a 
group of sub-tenants from townships moved onto a vacant piece of land in Orlando. At 
first 250 shacks were erected and later, at the height of the movement, the camp 
                                                            
23 Stadler AW ‘Birds in the cornfield: squatter movements in Johannesburg, 1944-1947’ Paper, History 
workshop: The Witwatersrand: Labour, Townships and Patterns of Protest, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 3-7 February 1978 1-22 at 3, and to the same effect, O’ Regan C ‘No 
more forced removals? An historical analysis of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act’ (1989) 5 SAJHR 
361-394 at 365. 
24 Stadler AW ‘Birds in the cornfield: squatter movements in Johannesburg, 1944-1947’ Paper, History 
workshop: The Witwatersrand: Labour, Townships and Patterns of Protest, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 3-7 February 1978 1-22 at 3. 
25 Act 27 of 1913. 
26 Act 18 of 1936. Stadler AW ‘Birds in the cornfield: squatter movements in Johannesburg, 1944-1947’ 
Paper, History workshop: The Witwatersrand: Labour, Townships and Patterns of Protest, University of 
the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 3-7 February 1978 1-22 at 3 and to the same effect O’ Regan C ‘No 
more forced removals? An historical analysis of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act’ (1989) 5 SAJHR 
361-394 at 346. 
27 For a detailed account of the factors that contributed to the unlawful occupation of land in 
Johannesburg refer to Stadler AW ‘Birds in the cornfield: squatter movements in Johannesburg, 1944-
1947’ Paper, History workshop: The Witwatersrand: Labour, Townships and Patterns of Protest, 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 3-7 February 1978 1-22 at 3-11. 
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housed 20 000 people.28 Various other movements were initiated (with varying degrees 
of success) during the following years.  
The 1944 War Measure was enacted in an attempt to control the alarming rate of 
urbanisation in South African cities during and after the war.29 This measure prescribed 
the eviction of unlawful occupiers, and the subsequent demolition of the structures that 
they had built on vacant land.30 Interestingly, the national government and the local 
government of Johannesburg were in disagreement as to when and how the War 
Measure should have been implemented to remove unlawful occupiers from land. The 
national government was sensitive to the industries’ need for cheap labour, and it 
preferred to ignore the ever-growing townships on the outskirts of the city.31 By contrast, 
the Johannesburg City Council (the City Council), became increasingly desperate to 
evict the Mpanza squatters and other unlawful occupiers, in an effort to preserve the 
character of the city. Eventually, on 18 February 1946, the City Council obtained the 
eviction order, and with the assistance provided by 750 policemen and women, the 
settlement was disbanded. Later – after the conclusion of the eviction and demolition 
proceedings – 200-300 families simply moved to another empty plot in the area.32 The 
Fagan Commission was appointed to conduct an investigation to determine why the 
War Measure had failed to control the process of urbanisation. It determined that 
                                                            
28 Stadler AW ‘Birds in the cornfield: squatter movements in Johannesburg, 1944-1947’ Paper, History 
workshop: The Witwatersrand: Labour, Townships and Patterns of Protest, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 3-7 February 1978 1-22 at 11. 
29 Proclamation 76 of 1944 in the Government Gazette Extraordinary 3325 of 6 April 1944. 
30 Specifically, the War Measure enabled a magistrate to order the immediate eviction of persons (who 
were considered unlawful occupiers) and the demolition of their homes, if he was of the opinion that their 
living circumstances posed a health and safety risk to the unlawful occupiers or to the public in general. 
31 Stadler AW ‘Birds in the cornfield: squatter movements in Johannesburg, 1944-1947’ Paper, History 
workshop: The Witwatersrand: Labour, Townships and Patterns of Protest, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 3-7 February 1978 1-22 at 10. 
32 Stadler AW ‘Birds in the cornfield: squatter movements in Johannesburg, 1944-1947’ Paper, History 
workshop: The Witwatersrand: Labour, Townships and Patterns of Protest, University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 3-7 February 1978 1-22 at 13 and to the same effect O’ Regan C ‘No 
more forced removals? An historical analysis of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act’ (1989) 5 SAJHR 
361-394 at 367. 
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oppressive measures such as the War Measure could not be implemented in isolation 
to fight urban squatting, and other measures had to be introduced.33 The War Measure 
remained in operation, despite its inadequacies, until the Prevention of Illegal Squatting 
Act was promulgated by the National Party government in 1951. 
 
2 2 2 2 The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 
The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 (PISA), enacted to replace the War 
Measure, formed part of the newly elected National Party government’s influx control 
policy.34 PISA adopted some of the War Measure’s provisions, albeit with significant 
differences. Like the War Measure, PISA required of the courts to order the demolition 
of structures as part and parcel of eviction proceedings initiated by the local 
authorities.35 This section enabled the courts to eject from land and buildings persons 
who had been convicted of an offence in terms of section 2 of the Act, and encouraged 
the courts to ‘issue such further orders, give such instructions, and confer such authority 
as may be reasonably necessary … to ensure the demolition and removal from the said 
land, building, native location, village or area of all buildings or structures which may 
have been erected thereon by any person or on his behalf’.36 PISA differed from the 
War Measure in that it stipulated that unlawful occupiers should be given three days 
                                                            
33 O’ Regan C ‘No more forced removals? An historical analysis of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act’ 
(1989) 5 SAJHR 361-394 at 367. 
34 O’ Regan C ‘No more forced removals? An historical analysis of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act’ 
(1989) 5 SAJHR 361-394 at 367. As explained in 2 2 1 above, the influx control policy was only abolished 
in 1986. This means that the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951, as amended, was employed 
as an influx control measure, as well as a measure to ensure the orderly urbanization of South African 
cities. 
35 Sections 3(1)(a) and 3(1)(b)(iii) of Act 52 of 1951. 
36 Section 3(1)(b)(iii) of Act 52 of 1951. Section 5(1)(b)(iii) bestowed similar demolition powers on the 
magistrate of a district or the native commissioner. The demolition provision in the 1944 War Measure 
differed slightly from section 3(1)(b)(iii) of Act 52 of 1951 in that the former expressly provided an 
additional ground for the demolition of structures, namely that the structure posed a risk to the safety or 
health of the public in general, or any other class of persons, including the person that was residing 
unlawfully on the land.  
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notice prior to the granting of eviction and demolition orders by the magistrate, to afford 
the occupiers the right to be heard.37 PISA also pioneered the imposition of criminal 
liability on any person who contravened the provisions contained in section 1 of the 
Act.38 S v Peter,39 one of the more famous cases decided under the demolition 
provisions of PISA, is discussed below. 
 
2 2 2 3 S v Peter 1976 
The appellant in S v Peter40 appealed against a conviction in terms of section 2 (read 
together with section 1) of PISA, as well as against a demolition order granted by the 
court a quo in terms of section 3 of the Act.41 Ms Peter was one of 1000 unlawful 
occupiers who were evicted from a vacant stand, known as Crossroads in the Cape 
                                                            
37 Section 5(1)(b)(aa) and (bb) of Act 52 of 1951; O’ Regan C ‘No more forced removals? An historical 
analysis of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act’ (1989) 5 SAJHR 361-394 at 367. 
38 Section 1(a) of Act 52 of 1951 provided that no person could enter upon land, or remain on land, 
without the consent of the owner of the land, unless said person was authorised by law to be on the 
property, or unless he was an employee of the government or the local authority. Similarly, section 1(b) of 
Act 52 of 1951 provided that a person could not enter upon, or remain on or in any native location, native 
village, or other area demarcated by the administration of native affairs, unless he had the consent of the 
local authority, or of the person who was in control of such an area. Section 2(1) of the Act stated that any 
person who contravened the provisions of section 1 would be ‘guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not 
exceeding twenty-five pounds, or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding three months, or to both 
such fine and imprisonment’. R v Zulu 1959 (1) SA 263 (A), confirmed that section 1 created two 
offences, namely the entering on property without lawful reason, and the remaining on property without 
lawful reason. Roos J ‘On illegal squatters and spoliation orders’ (1988) 4 SAJHR 167-178 at 171 
explains that the implication of the two offences was that a lessee, who lawfully entered upon land in 
terms of a lease contract, who breached the contract provisions, and who did not evacuate the premises 
immediately (on receipt of notice that the contract had been cancelled), could have been found guilty of 
contravening section 1 of PISA. This illustrates the wide powers that were bestowed on owners and local 
authorities by the Act. 
39 1976 (2) SA 513 (C). 
40 1976 (2) SA 513 (C). 
41 1976 (2) SA 513 (C) 513. 
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Peninsula, on the basis of PISA.42 The court a quo determined that the state had 
succeeded in proving that the appellant had wrongfully and unlawfully entered and 
resided on the land, without the consent of the owner.43 In the subsequent appeal, the 
court determined that the Bantu Affairs Administration Board (the Board) was not the 
owner or the lawful occupier of the land in question, and that the owner was in fact the 
Cape Divisional Council (the Council).44 The court concluded that no statutory authority 
was conferred on the Board, and that it therefore did not have the power to evict the 
unlawful occupiers from the land. Consequently, the conviction, sentence, eviction and 
demolition orders were set aside by the court.45  
As a result of the Board’s failure to secure the eviction of the occupiers, the 
Council approached the Chief Magistrate of Wynberg (the Magistrate) to initiate an 
enquiry in terms of section 5 of PISA.46 This section envisaged the removal of unlawful 
occupiers from land or occupied buildings, and the concomitant demolition of their 
structures on account of health and safety considerations.47 The Council argued that 
Crossroads posed certain health risks and that it should be demolished.48 In response, 
counsel for the occupiers contended that Crossroads had to be declared an emergency 
camp as prescribed by section 6 of PISA. The Magistrate determined that Crossroads 
                                                            
42 1976 (2) SA 513 (C) 514. In the case it is explained that during 1975 about a 1000 occupiers were 
found guilty of unlawfully occupying the site. However, this was a futile exercise because during that year 
the number of occupiers increased to about 7000 people. Budlender G ‘South African legal approaches to 
squatting’ (1988) 242 De Rebus 160-164 at 161 explains that many of the occupiers at Crossroads had 
moved onto the site on the instructions of officials that wanted to centralise the so-called squatting 
problem.    
43 1976 (2) SA 513 (C) 513H.  
44 1976 (2) SA 513 (C) 516H and 517H. 
45 1976 (2) SA 513 (C) 518A. 
46 O’ Regan C ‘No more forced removals? An historical analysis of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act’ 
(1989) 5 SAJHR 361-394 at 370 explains that this section was originally adopted from the 1944 War 
Measure, but it was amended in 1951 to provide the unlawful occupiers with legal representation 
throughout the enquiry. 
47 Refer to section 5(1)(a), (b)(i) and (iii) of Act 52 of 1951. 
48 O’ Regan C ‘No more forced removals? An historical analysis of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act’ 
(1989) 5 SAJHR 361-394 at 371. 
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did indeed represent a health hazard, but the number of occupiers had increased to 
nearly 10 000 people, and he was hesitant to conclude that the legislature envisaged 
the removal of so many people at the same time. Consequently, on 29 June 1976, the 
Council designated Crossroads as an emergency camp.49 
 
2 2 2 4 Reaction to S v Peter: summary powers of demolition 
The first amendment to PISA, introduced by the Prevention of Illegal Squatting 
Amendment Act 92 of 1976 (the 1976 Amendment Act), was a consequence of the 
state’s failure to secure a conviction, together with an eviction and demolition order, in 
the Peter case.50 Essentially, these amendments compelled land owners and lessees to 
summarily demolish structures that had been built on their land, if these structures were 
erected without building plans that had been approved by the local authority.51 Failure 
on the part of the land owner or lessee to demolish structures, and to evict squatters 
(provided the circumstances as described in sections 3A(1)(a)(i) and (ii) were present), 
amounted to an offence punishable by the imposition of a fine, or imprisonment, or 
both.52 Once an owner or lessee was convicted of an section 3A(2) offence he was 
obliged, upon the expiry of seven day period (during which he could lodge an appeal), 
                                                            
49 O’ Regan C ‘No more forced removals? An historical analysis if the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act’ 
(1989) 5 SAJHR 361-394 at 371. 
50 Budlender G ‘South African legal approaches to squatting’ (1988) 242 De Rebus 160-164 at 161 and to 
the same effect O’ Regan C ‘No more forced removals? An historical analysis of the Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act’ (1989) 5 SAJHR 361-394 at 371. 
51 Section 3A(1)(a)(i) of Act 92 of 1976. In a similar vein, section 3A(1)(a)(ii) of Act 92 of 1976 provided 
that the owner shall not permit the occupation of structures (erected without his approval on his land) if, in 
the opinion of the health authority, the said occupation would have endangered the health and safety of 
the public generally, or of a particular group or class of persons, including the persons that resided in 
those structures. Moreover, section 3A(1)(c) of Act 92 of 1976 inferred the land owner’s or the lessee’s 
consent, if it was proven in prosecution proceedings that the unlawful occupiers resided on land under the 
circumstances envisaged in section 3A(1)(a)(ii) of the Act. 
52 Section 3A(2) of Act 92 of 1976. 
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to demolish structures erected on his land at his own expense.53 Alternatively, the local 
authority was authorised to demolish the structures at the owner’s expense.54  
Section 3A of the 1976 Amendment Act was a particularly vicious provision, 
because it coerced property owners to evict occupiers, and to demolish their homes by 
extending criminal liability to those land owners who chose to turn a blind eye to the 
unlawful occupation of their land.55 Nevertheless, this feature was deemed inadequate 
to make an impact on the growth of informal settlements by itself and, as a result, the 
legislature introduced an additional provision, section 3B. This section enabled land 
owners to demolish buildings and structures that had been built on their land without 
their consent, without obtaining a court order.56 An owner was entitled to remove the 
materials from his land, once he had demolished the structures.57 Similar demolition 
powers were afforded to local authorities in relation to structures that were situated 
within their jurisdiction. Section 3B(1)(b) provided that an officer of the local authority 
had the power, without a court order, and at the expense of the owner, to demolish 
                                                            
53 Section 3A(3) of Act 92 of 1976. 
54 Section 3A(4)(b) of Act 92 of 1976. Section 3A(4)(a) imposed criminal liability on any person who failed 
to comply with the provisions as contained in section 3A(3). Such a person was liable to pay a maximum 
amount of R30 for each day that he failed to demolish the structures or, alternatively, he faced 
imprisonment for a period of seven days. Accordingly, the land owner or lessee could be held criminally 
liable under section 3A(2), as well as under section 3A(4)(a) of the Act. 
55 As explained above, section 2(1) and (2) read with section 1 of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 
52 of 1951 only imposed criminal liability on unlawful occupiers.  
56 Section 3B(1)(a) of Act 92 of 1976. Roos J ‘On illegal squatters and spoliation orders’ (1988) 4 SAJHR 
167-178 at 171 argues that the provisions of PISA were drafted with a wide scope. Roos explains that, in 
addition to the two offences created by section 1 of PISA, section 3B(1)(a) of 1976 Amendment Act could 
be interpreted to mean that a property owner would have been entitled to demolish any structure erected 
on his property by a lessee, without his consent. The court in Vena v George Municipality 1987 (4) SA 29 
(C) confirmed that property owners are not afforded similar powers under the common law.  
57 In Beyers and others v Mlanjeni and others 1991 (2) SA 392 (C) 396E-I, the court confirmed, on the 
basis of Kwanobuhle Town Council v Andries and others 1988 (2) SA 796 (SE), that PISA, as amended, 
did not deprive the owner of any common or civil law remedies normally available if property is unlawfully 
occupied.   
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structures that had been erected without the consent of the land owner.58 The only 
safeguard provided to the unlawful occupiers was a seven day notice (given by the 
abovementioned parties) of the intended demolition.59 
 
2 2 2 5 Fredericks and another v Stellenbosch Divisional Council 1977 
Fredericks and another v Stellenbosch Divisional Council (Fredericks),60 is one of the 
more famous cases decided under the 1976 amendments to PISA. This case is 
significant because it not only illustrates the distress that unlawful occupiers 
experienced when faced with imminent demolition, but also the courageous attempts of 
legal representatives and some courts to circumvent the consequences of the 
provisions of PISA as amended.  
The first and second applicants erected shacks on a vacant piece of land owned 
by the respondent, the Divisional Council of Stellenbosch (the Council).61 Without 
notifying the applicants, employees of the Council demolished their shacks and 
                                                            
58 Likewise, section 3B(1)(c) provided that the officer of the Department of Community Development 
(nominated by the Minister of Community Development), or a officer of the Bantu Affairs Administration 
Board (nominated by the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development) could, without a court order, 
and at the expense of the owner of the land, demolish unlawfully occupied buildings and structures 
erected on the property without the owner’s consent. Furthermore, section 3B(3)(a) stipulated that the 
owner was compelled to inform the Department of Community Development in writing of any structure 
erected on his land and, in terms of section 3B(3)(b), failure of the owner to do so amounted to a criminal 
offence punishable by a fine, imprisonment or both. Both sections 3B(1)(b) and (c) were amended by the 
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 33 of 1980 to enable the respective authorities to 
demolish occupied structures, situated in their respective jurisdictions, if those structures were not built in 
accordance with approved building plans. It seems that this amendment enabled the demolition of 
structures, even if they were built with the consent of the owner of the land. Act 33 of 1980 also 
incorporated a measure, section 3D, which extended the jurisdiction of the local authorities for purposes 
of the Act. 
59 Section 3B(2) of Act 92 of 1976. 
60 1977 (3) SA 113 (C). 
61 1977 (3) SA 113 (C) 115. 
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removed their possessions to unknown premises.62 Both applicants asserted that they 
had been spoliated of their property. They sought an order compelling the Council to 
restore to them the possessions of which they had been deprived and, further, to rebuild 
their shacks as they stood before the demolition.63 
In the opposing affidavit, the Council acknowledged that it did not have the legal 
right to demolish the houses, as it had failed to provide the applicants with notices as 
required by section 3B(2) of 1976 Amendment Act. The respondent attempted to justify 
its actions by arguing that the applicants were in unlawful occupation of the land, which 
amounted to trespassing. Moreover, the shacks were built in violation of building 
regulations, and the applicants had not obtained the necessary approval from the local 
authority to build the said structures.64 
The court admonished the respondent for relying on the unlawful actions of the 
applicants, when the Council itself had acted ‘in flagrant contempt of the law’ by 
disregarding the modest protection that PISA afforded to unlawful occupiers in 
general.65 It further expressed shock at the cruel treatment of the applicants and their 
families during the process of demolition.66 The court held that the respondent’s conduct 
could not be condoned and, accordingly, it granted the mandament van spolie to the 
applicants. In so doing, the court reversed the eviction and demolition proceedings 
undertaken in terms of PISA.67 
 
                                                            
62 1977 (3) SA 113 (C) 115. 
63 1977 (3) SA 113 (C) 115-116. The applicants further sought an order calling upon the respondent to 
show why it should not have been interdicted from demolishing the shacks (again) after the re-erection. 
64 1977 (3) SA 113 (C) 116-117. 
65 1977 (3) SA 113 (C) 116-117. 
66 1977 (3) SA 113 (C) 117. 
67 1977 (3) SA 113 (C) 118. The respondent’s arguments and the court’s findings in relation to the 
mandament van spolie are considered in section 2 2 2 7 below. 
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2 2 2 6 Reaction to Fredericks: ousting the jurisdiction of the court 
2 2 2 6 1 Introduction 
It is evident from the Fredericks decision that some legal representatives and judges 
relied on common law remedies and technicalities to evade the consequences of PISA. 
These attempts were deemed as attacks on the honour of the National Party 
government.68 In response to the outcome of the Fredericks case, the legislature 
amended section 3B(2) to exclude the seven day notice previously granted to unlawful 
occupiers prior to the demolition of their homes.69 Consequently, to avoid criminal 
prosecution, land owners were compelled to immediately demolish all structures that 
were built or occupied70 on their land without their consent, without giving any form of 
notice to the unlawful occupiers.71 The legislature also introduced an ouster provision, 
section 3B(4)(a), which was designed to exclude the courts’ discretion in instances 
where homes were demolished in accordance with section 3B of PISA, unless the 
occupier could prove that he had a right or a title to land.72 Section 3B(4)(a) had two 
                                                            
68 O’ Regan C ‘No more forced removals? An historical analysis if the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act’ 
(1989) 5 SAJHR 361-394 at 372-373. 
69 Section 3B(2) of Act 92 of 1976 was replaced with section 3B(2) of Act 72 of 1977, which read ‘[a] 
building or structure referred to in subsection (1) may be demolished, and the material and contents 
removed from the land in question, without any prior notice of whatever nature to any person’. 
70 Section 3B(1)(a) of Act 72 of 1977. 
71 As explained above, section 3B(3)(b) of Act 92 of 1976 imposed criminal liability on land owners who 
failed to demolish structures built on their land.  
72 Section 3B(4)(a) of the Prevention of the Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 72 of 1977. This section was 
later amended by the Prevention of the Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 104 of 1988 and an additional 
requirement was added, namely that a person (who sought the protection of the court in the instance of 
demolition proceedings) had to prove that mala fide action had been taken against him. Stated differently, 
a person not only had to prove that he had a right or title to the land, but also that the demolition (or the 
intended demolition) of his house was an action taken in bad faith.  
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interrelated purposes, namely to prevent the court from hearing demolition cases, and 
to prevent occupiers from relying on the mandament van spolie to assert their rights.73   
As a result of their far-reaching consequences, sections 3B(1)(a) and (4)(a) 
received the most judicial consideration of all the PISA provisions. With reference to 
three renowned cases, the section below describes the various interpretations that were 
afforded to these provisions. The discussion below further refers to how section 
3B(4)(a) impacted on occupiers’ ability to assert their rights on the basis of the 
mandament van spolie. 
 
2 2 2 6 2 Vena and another v George Municipality 1987  
In Vena and another v George Municipality (Vena),74 the court firstly had to determine 
whether section 3B(4)(a) of PISA precluded it from granting a spoliation order for the 
restoration of the applicants’ homes that were demolished by the respondent 
                                                            
73 Budlender G ‘South African legal approaches to squatting’ (1988) 242 De Rebus 160-164 at 161 
explains that in addition to the two traditional requirements of a spoliation order – peaceful possession 
and unlawful deprivation of possession – PISA added another requirement, namely that a person had to 
prove that he had a right or title to the land of which he had been spoliated. The promulgation of the 
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 104 of 1988 introduced yet another requirement to the 
mandament van spolie, namely that a person had to prove that he was deprived of his property in bad 
faith. Roos J ‘On illegal squatting and spoliation orders’ (1988) 4 SAJHR 167-178 at 176-177 suggests 
that many applications for spoliation orders might not even have reached the courts, since these 
provisions created new statutory defences that weighted the law in favour of the state. Litigants who did 
succeed in accessing the courts were faced with the daunting onus of proving, in addition to the 
requirements for a spoliation order, that they had a right or title to the land, and that they had been 
dispossessed of that land in bad faith. However, this heavy onus was only triggered once the respondent 
had proven the jurisdictional fact, namely that the demolition was founded on section 3B. The respondent 
also had to provide evidence in support of his belief that the occupation of the property was unlawful. 
Roos is of the view that once the merits of the applicant’s case (with reference to the section 3B(4)(a) 
enquiry) had been decided, the possibility for ancillary relief would have become more likely. The reason 
for this is that after the section 3B(4)(a) enquiry, the court would have been in a better position to order 
ancillary relief than it would have been to grant a spoliation order at the initial stages of the application.  
74 1987 (4) SA 29 (C). 
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municipality.75 The court further had to determine whether the respondent had acted 
within the scope of section 3B(1)(a) of PISA. Vena, the first applicant, was a resident on 
the property since 1970, but her house was destroyed by fire in 1987. She undertook to 
immediately restore her home to its former condition on the original foundation, only to 
have the new structure demolished by the respondent. The respondent municipality also 
demolished an extension that the second applicant had built onto his house.76 The 
respondent argued that section 3B(1)(a) of PISA enabled it to demolish these buildings 
as the applicants did not have a right to reside on the property. It contended that the 
right to lawfully reside on the property had been terminated some time before the 
demolition of the buildings. Moreover, the respondent had not consented to the building 
of structures on its land.77 
The court established that both applicants were tenants of the respondent at the 
time of the demolition, which meant that they had a right or title to the land, as required 
by section 3B(4)(a) of the Act.78 Accordingly, the court did have the jurisdiction to hear 
the case. In the second part of the enquiry, the court set out to determine whether the 
respondent had acted in its capacity as a local authority or as a land owner.79 The court 
decided that the respondent acted as a land owner, and that it could rely on section 
3B(1)(a) of PISA. With regard to the first applicant’s house, the court concluded that it 
had stood on the premises for years, during which time the respondent had failed to 
raise any objection. Consequently, the only inference to be drawn was that the 
respondent had tacitly consented to the erection of the first applicant’s house on its 
                                                            
75 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 33C-H. 
76 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 31F-G and 53A-F. Both applicants approached the Cape Provincial Division of the 
High Court for a spoliation order, calling upon the respondent to restore their houses to their previous 
condition, and for an interdict prohibiting the respondent from demolishing the homes again. The first 
applicant also sought a declaration of right to enable her to complete the restoration of her house. 
77 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 33F-H. 
78 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 47B. 
79 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 47.This enquiry was necessary to determine whether the respondent should have 
based its defence on either section 3B(1)(a) or on 3B(1)(b) respectively. The latter provision enabled the 
local authority to demolish structures, while the former enabled the owner to demolish structures on its 
property. 
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property.80 Similarly, the second applicant’s house had stood on the premises for years 
without objection from the respondent.81 Both applicants admitted that they did not 
obtain prior consent to proceed with the re-erection of the house and building of the 
additional room respectively. The court held that it had to determine whether the lack of 
consent in this regard was sufficient to justify demolition under section 3B(1)(a) of the 
Act.82  
A strict literal interpretation of section 3B(1)(a) indicated that every structure built 
without consent could be demolished by the owner,83 but the court held that this 
interpretation did not correspond with the intention of the legislature, as the purpose of 
the Act was to prevent the unlawful occupation of land.84 The correct interpretation of 
section 3B(1)(a) was that an owner would be compelled to demolish buildings that had 
been built on his land, without his consent, by unlawful occupiers.85 Lawful occupiers 
(like the applicants) should not have been subjected to the same treatment, even when 
they had built their houses without obtaining the prerequisite consent, because their 
occupation was not unlawful as envisaged by PISA.86 The court held that it is a 
fundamental principle of our law that a person should not resort to self help. Legislation 
must be read in a manner that interferes with this principle as little as possible.87 The 
court was of the view that section 3B(4)(a) meant that a person who faced pending 
demolition proceedings, would be able to turn to the court for protection, if it was proven 
that he had a right or title to the land in question.88 This interpretation indicated that the 
legislature did not intend the summary demolition of buildings built by lawful occupiers, 
and in such instances the court would invoke the ordinary measures to prevent self 
                                                            
80 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 48C. 
81 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 48E. 
82 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 48I. 
83 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 50F. This interpretation was later followed in Port Nolloth Municipality v Xhalisa and 
others; Luwalala and others v Port Nolloth Municipality 1991 (3) SA 98 (C). 
84 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 50F-J. 
85 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 50H-J. 
86 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 51D.  
87 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 51D. 
88 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 51E-F. 
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help.89 The court referred to the title of the Act as well as to the preamble, and 
concluded that section 3B(1)(a), read within the context of the statute as a whole, was 
only aimed at regulating cases where buildings had been erected on land by unlawful 
occupiers.90  
The court held that the first applicant was simply restoring a house that had initially 
been erected lawfully.91 Moreover, her house was situated on the property for such a 
long time that one could infer that if there were any building contraventions, such 
contraventions had been waived by the respondent.92 As a result, the respondent could 
not rely on section 3B(1)(a) to justify the demolition of the first applicant’s house. In a 
similar vein, the second applicant had at the time of the demolition lawfully occupied his 
plot, which effectively precluded the respondent’s reliance on section 3B(1)(a) of 
PISA.93 The court held that the respondent had erred in proceeding to demolish both 
applicants’ homes without a court order, and that it should have followed one of two 
possible approaches. Firstly, certain by-laws or regulations might have been applicable 
to the property, and the respondent should have complied with the regulations if they 
were binding on the area.94 Secondly, provided the regulations did not apply to the 
property, the relationship between the respondent and the applicants was that of a 
lessor and lessees. In terms of this common law relationship, the respondent could not 
demolish structures that had been built by the applicants without a court order.95 In light 
of these considerations, the court held that the respondent had acted unlawfully in 
demolishing the homes of the applicants and, in line with the Fredericks case, the court 
granted the spoliation order, including an order compelling the respondent to restore the 
homes as they stood before the demolition.96 
                                                            
89 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 51G-H. 
90 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 51G-H. 
91 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 52A. 
92 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 52B. 
93 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 52C. 
94 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 49I-51E. 
95 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 50E. 
96 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 52D. 
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2 2 2 6 3 George Municipality v Vena and another 1989 
The court of appeal in George Municipality v Vena and another (George Municipality v 
Vena),97 overturned the court a quo’s finding in relation to the second respondent (the 
second applicant in the court of first instance). More specifically, the court of appeal 
concluded that the second respondent had not proven that he was a tenant of the 
appellant prior to the demolition. As a result, section 3B(4)(a) of PISA prevented the 
court from assisting the second respondent by granting a spoliation order.98 The court 
agreed with the conclusion reached by the court a quo, namely that a spoliation order 
had to be granted to restore the first respondent’s house to its former condition. 
However, the court relied on a different interpretation of the provisions of the PISA in 
support of its finding. More specifically, the court disagreed with the court a quo’s finding 
that section 3B(1)(a) was only applicable to buildings that were erected by unlawful 
occupiers, without the land owner’s consent.99  
The court explained that the long title indicated that the main purpose of the 
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 was to prevent, and regulate, the illegal 
occupation of land. It further explained that inferences drawn from the long title had to 
yield to the ordinary meaning of the language.100 The court reasoned that it was 
undoubtedly the legislature’s intention to require the land owner to ‘demolish or remove 
any building or structure erected or occupied on the land without his consent …’.101 
Moreover, in addition to relying on the long title of PISA, one had to consider the long 
                                                            
97 1989 (2) SA 263 (A). 
98 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 269C-270D. 
99 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 270F-G.  
100 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 269G-I.  
101 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 269H-I. This is a reference to section 3B(1)(a) as amended by Act 72 of 1977. 
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titles of the amending acts.102 The court concluded, with reference to these long titles, 
that it could not find support for the notion that section 3B(1)(a) only applied to buildings 
occupied without the owner’s consent.103 Section 3B(4)(a) did not support such a finding 
                                                            
102 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 269-270F. To illustrate its argument the court referred to section 3B(1)(a) as it 
stood in the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 92 of 1976, where it was stated that ‘the 
owner of land may without an order of court demolish any building or structure erected on the land without 
his consent, and remove the material from the land …’. The court also referred to the long title of Act 92 
of 1976, which indicated that the purpose of the amending Act was, amongst other things, to provide for 
the demolition of buildings or structures erected without the consent of the owner of the land. Section 
3B(1)(a) was further amended by the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 72 of 1977, where 
the words ‘or occupy’ were inserted after the word ‘erected’. Furthermore, the long title of Act 72 of 1977 
indicated that the purpose of the amending Act was to extend the owner’s power of demolition to 
buildings that had been occupied on his land without his consent. 
103 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 270F-H. 
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either, since it was not the intention of the legislature to exclude the operation of section 
3B(1)(a) once it was proven that the occupier had a right or title to the land.104 
The court was also critical of the effect that the court a quo’s interpretation of 
section 3B(1)(a) would have on the operation of section 3B(1)(b) of PISA. It argued that 
section 3B(1)(b) clearly afforded the municipality the power to demolish buildings that 
were erected or occupied with the consent of the owner, including buildings erected by 
the owner himself. A local authority could only exercise its section 3B(1)(b) power if it 
did not own the property in question.105 The construction of section 3B(1)(a) favoured by 
the court a quo had the implication that a local authority that was also the owner of the 
land would not be able to demolish buildings that had been built on its land, without its 
                                                            
104 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 270F-H. Similar sentiments were expressed in Port Nolloth Municipality v Xhalisa 
and others; Luwalala and others v Port Nolloth Municipality 1991 (3) SA 98 (C) 116C-E, where the court 
held that section 3B(1)(a) enabled the demolition of structures that were erected or occupied without the 
owner’s consent. In this case the court further stated that ‘it is not without significance that the words 
“erected and occupied” are in the past tense – it could never have been the intention of the Legislature to 
permit the owner of land, who had some time in the past consented to a building being erected thereon 
and to its occupation by another, and who now revokes that consent, to enter upon it and without a “by 
your leave” set about demolishing it’. Roos JW ‘On squatters and spoliation orders II’ (1989) 5 SAJHR 
395-405 at 402 argues, with reference to the Xalisa/Luwalala decision, that a land owner could not revoke 
his consent if he had on a previous occasion consented to the erection and the occupation of a structure 
on his property. Similarly, the land owner could not proceed to demolish buildings if in the past he had 
given his consent for the erection of the structures. The reason provided by the court in Xalisa/Luwalala 
was that if the law was any different, land owners would not have had to resort to court orders to remove 
tenants who defaulted on the payment of their rent. However, Roos argues that there is one difficulty, 
namely that at the time when the Xalisa/Luwalala case was decided, section 3B(4)(a) stipulated that the 
applicant had to prove that he ‘has a right or a title to land’. This provision was formulated in the present 
tense, and it may lead one to the conclusion that demolition was permitted (in terms of section 3B(1)(a)) if 
the owner had revoked his permission. Roos argues that when hearing a PISA case, a court first had to 
establish whether the demolition was founded on section 3B(1)(a) or section 3B(1)(b) of the Act. If the 
owner had not consented to the erection of structures on the land, the demolition would have been 
authorised by PISA. If the consent was granted and later revoked the demolition would not have been 
permitted, and the owner would not have been able to rely on section 3B(4)(a) to oust the jurisdiction of 
the court. 
105 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 270F-J. 
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consent, by lawful occupiers.106 However, if the municipality did not own the land it 
would have been able to demolish buildings built with the owner’s consent as well as 
buildings built by the owner himself.107 Accordingly, the court a quo’s interpretation of 
section 3B(1)(a) created an inconsistency, which in the opinion of the appeal court could 
not have been intended by the legislature.108 
The court agreed with the court a quo’s finding that it was a widely accepted 
principle that a person’s possession of property could only be interfered with by due 
process of law. This principle could, nevertheless, be altered by Parliament.109 The 
court confirmed that a provision had to be construed restrictively if it enabled a property 
owner – without first resorting to the due process of the law – to demolish a building that 
was built without his consent.110 In light of this consideration, the court held that section 
3B(1)(a) meant that the owner could have consented to the construction of a building 
before, during, or even after it had been completed. The consent could have been 
granted expressly, impliedly, orally, in writing or even by way of conduct, and further it 
could have been granted in broad terms.111 If the owner granted his consent for the 
construction of a building and the building varied from what he had anticipated, that 
would not amount to sufficient reason for him to allege that he had not consented to the 
construction of that specific structure. Naturally, if the owner had consented to a specific 
building, such as a house, and something entirely different had been built instead, he 
would have been able to argue that he had not given his consent in that regard.112 The 
court concluded that it would have to refer to the facts of each individual case to 
                                                            
106 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 270H-J. 
107 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 270H-I. 
108 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 270J. 
109 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 271F. 
110 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 272D. This principle was later confirmed in Port Nolloth Municipality v Xhalisa and 
others; Luwalala and others v Port Nolloth Municipality 1991 (3) SA 98 (C) 115A-B.  
111 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 272F-H. The court explained that the consent granted by the owner was different 
from the consent granted by the local authority because different factors would have been taken into 
account in the respective scenarios. The type of consent required by the local authority was that 
envisaged in section 3B(1)(b) and section 3A of PISA. 
112 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 272I-273A. 
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ascertain whether consent had been granted.113 Furthermore, the owner bore the onus 
of proving that he had not consented to the construction of the building on his land.114 
The court held that there was no evidence in support of the finding that appellant’s 
consent did not extend to the re-erection of the first respondent’s house after the fire.115 
It further held that the purpose of section 3B(1)(a) would not have been frustrated by the 
continued existence of buildings that were erected on the land with the owner’s 
consent.116 As a result the appeal was dismissed.117 
 
2 2 2 6 4 Mpisi v Trebble 1992/1994 
In the Mpisi v Trebble118 cases, the respective courts set out to determine whether 
demolition included the destruction of personal belongings and building materials. This 
was a relevant enquiry because of the operation of the section 3B(4)(a) ouster 
provision. The courts’ jurisdiction would have been ousted if ‘demolish’ as intended in 
PISA included the destruction of the abovementioned goods. By contrast, a narrow 
interpretation of ‘demolish’, would have meant that an unlawful occupier could at least 
have approached the court for a damages claim, based on destruction of its belongings 
and building materials. 
In this case the respondent, acting on behalf of the owner of the property, 
demolished the shacks that were occupied by the appellants. The respondent also 
                                                            
113 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 273B. 
114 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 273C-D. 
115 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 273F. 
116 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 274F-H.  
117 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 275. 
118 1992 (4) SA 100 (N) and 1994 (2) SA 136 (A). 
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caused all building materials and the contents of the shack to be set alight and 
destroyed.119 
The Natal Provincial Division (the court a quo) determined that section 3B(4)(a) 
only excluded actions founded on the demolition of a structure and on the removal of 
the material from the property as envisaged in section 3B of PISA. This section did not 
exclude destruction of the contents of a shack as there was ‘no statutory justification for 
demolition or burning of the contents of the structure’.120 The court a quo concluded that 
the appellant was entitled to a damages award for the contents of the shack that had 
been destroyed.121  
With reference to the destruction of the building materials, the appellants argued 
that demolition only implied the ‘pulling or throwing down of the structure’, and that it did 
not entail ‘greater damage to the material constituting the structure than that necessarily 
inflicted in the act of demolition pursuant to the Act’.122 The court a quo disagreed with 
this interpretation and held that there was no justification for ascribing such a restricted 
meaning to the word ‘demolish’.123 It held that the correct meaning of ‘demolish’ was ‘to 
destroy by disintegration of the fabric of the structure and to reduce to ruin’, and that 
section 3B(1)(a) did not imply that the property owner should have dismantled the 
structure or should have taken it apart gingerly.124 The court a quo further held that the 
appellant failed to allege that his shack was a movable, and that he did not provide 
evidence that proved that he was the owner of the structure. Moreover, the appellant 
                                                            
119 1994 (2) SA 136 (A) 140D-G. Initially, the appellant approached the magistrate’s court for a damages 
order. In response, the respondent raised a special plea, namely that because of the operation of section 
3B(4)(a) of PISA, the court did not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. The respondent also 
requested that the appellant prove the damages, which had been suffered by him. The magistrate upheld 
the respondent’s plea, and dismissed the damages claim, and the appellant appealed to the Natal 
Provincial Division. 
120 1992 (4) SA 100 (N) 102H. 
121 1992 (4) SA 100 (N) 102H-J. 
122 1992 (4) SA 100 (N) 103A-B. 
123 1992 (4) SA 100 (N) 103C. 
124 1992 (4) SA 100 (N) 103C-D. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
49 
failed to prove that he suffered damages as a result of the destruction of the shack.125 
Accordingly, the court was unable to grant a damages order in respect of the building 
materials that had been destroyed.126 
In the subsequent appeal,127 the Appellate Division (the court) held that it was 
evident that the court’s jurisdiction would only be ousted if the demolition proceedings 
were founded on the basis of section 3B(1)of PISA.128 Relying on Vena and another v 
George Municipality,129 the court decided that the purpose of the Act was to prevent 
unlawful occupation of land and buildings.130 It remarked that it was not unnatural to 
sympathise with a land owner faced with the dilemma of the unlawful occupation of his 
land, but such an owner could not take the law into his own hands.131 In light of this 
consideration, the court had to ascertain whether the respondent’s actions fell within the 
scope of section 3B(1)(a). This involved the interpretation of the word ‘demolish’ to 
determine whether the respondent’s conduct were contemplated by the Act.132  
With reference to Fredericks133 and George Municipality v Vena,134 the court 
explained that in the event of ambiguity, the word ‘demolish’ had to be interpreted in a 
manner that would be the least burdensome to the person that suffered loss.135 The 
court referred to English and Afrikaans dictionaries and decided that none of the 
definitions of ‘demolish’ or ‘sloop’ embodied the concept of destruction and, as a result, 
                                                            
125 1992 (4) SA 100 (N) 103G-J. The court stated that even if the appellant proved that he had suffered 
damage as a consequence of the demolition, no evidence was provided to the court concerning the value 
of the materials that had been lost.   
126 1992 (4) SA 100 (N) 104D. 
127 Mpisi v Trebble 1994 (2) SA 136 (A). 
128 1994 (2) SA 136 (A) 141G. 
129 1987 (4) SA 29 (C) 50J. 
130 1994 (2) SA 136 (A) 141J. 
131 1994 (2) SA 136 (A) at 141J-142A. In this regard, the court held that ‘it is a fundamental principle that 
he may only act in a manner, and within the limits, authorised by law, be it common law or statute’. 
132 1994 (2) SA 136 (A) 141H. 
133 Fredericks and another v Stellenbosch Divisional Council 1977 (3) SA 113 (C) 118D. 
134 George Municipality v Vena and another 1989 (2) SA 263 (A) 271E-G. 
135 1994 (2) SA 136 (A) 142G. 
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a narrower definition would suffice for the purposes of the PISA.136 Moreover, the 
wording in section 3B(1)(a) itself supported the notion of a restrictive interpretation of 
demolition, as the section enabled the land owner to ‘demolish any building or structure 
… and remove the material from the land’.137 Clearly, the legislature had not anticipated 
the overall destruction of structures, as section 3B(1)(a) required the owner to remove 
the building materials left over from the demolition from the land. The court was of the 
view that section 3B(1)(a) meant that the land owner was permitted to ‘demolish the 
appellant’s shack in the sense of pulling or tearing it down’ and that in the process of 
demolition, greater damage should not have been caused to the materials ‘than was 
reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, that purpose’.138 Consequently, the 
respondent’s actions had exceeded the limits of the Act as the section did not authorise 
indiscriminate destruction of all the appellant’s possessions. The result was that the 
respondent was excluded from relying on section 3B(4)(a) of the Act to oust the 
jurisdiction of the court in this matter.139 
 
2 2 2 6 5 Rikhotso v Northcliff Ceramics (Pty) Ltd and others 1997 
The court in Rikhotso v Northcliff Ceramics (Pty) Ltd and others140 had to determine 
whether section 3B(1)(a) authorised the respondents to burn building materials after the 
dwellings of the unlawful occupiers had been dismantled. It also had to determine 
whether it could grant a spoliation order to compel the respondents to rebuild structures 
that had been set alight and destroyed.141 Relevant to the present discussion is the 
court’s findings in relation to the scope of section 3B(1)(a) of PISA. The court’s findings 
in relation to the mandament van spolie are considered in greater detail in section 
2 2 2 7 below.  
                                                            
136 1994 (2) SA 136 (A) 142G-143D. 
137 1994 (2) SA 136 (A) 143C-D. 
138 1994 (2) SA 136 (A) 143D-E. 
139 1994 (2) SA 136 (A) 143E-G. 
140 1997 (1) SA 526 (W). 
141 1997 (1) SA 526 (W) 528A-529G. 
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The court explained that section 3B(1)(a) made serious inroads on the common 
law because a person is usually not permitted to take the law into his own hands.142 
This meant that section 3B(1)(a) had to be interpreted restrictively and that a land owner 
had to prove that he acted strictly within the parameters of the section to justify his 
actions.143 With reference to Mpisi v Trebble,144 the court held that section 3B(1)(a) did 
not authorise the respondents to burn the applicants’ homes. The section only 
authorised the respondents to dismantle the homes and to remove the building 
materials from the property. Consequently, the court concluded that the respondents’ 
actions were unlawful.145 
Not all the applicants suffered the same fate and the court had to determine 
whether the actions of the respondents were lawful in respect of those occupiers whose 
building materials had not been destroyed.146 The applicants argued that the 
respondents had tacitly consented to the erection of the informal dwellings on their land, 
which meant that they were barred from invoking section 3B(1)(a) in support of their 
actions. The applicants also relied on Mpisi v Trebble147 to argue that the section 
authorised contra-spoliation, and that the failure of the owners to act swiftly (once 
becoming aware of the unlawful occupation of their land) indicated that they had 
consented to the occupiers’ presence on their land.148 The court decided that Mpisi v 
Trebble did not support the applicants’ argument and that such an interpretation of 
section 3B(1)(a) would render owners’ rights obsolete. Section 3B(1)(a) enabled land 
owners to demolish structures that had been built without their consent and a time limit 
was not provided in the section. The court held that the delay of the land owners to act 
could do nothing more than give rise to an inference of consent.149 Furthermore, the 
respondents did give notice to the occupiers to remind them of prior oral warnings 
                                                            
142 1997 (1) SA 526 (W) 530A-J. 
143 1997 (1) SA 526 (W) 530F. 
144 1994 (2) SA 136 (A). 
145 1997 (1) SA 526 (W) 531C. 
146 1997 (1) SA 526 (W) 531D. 
147 1994 (2) SA 136 (A). 
148 1997 (1) SA 526 (W) 531F-G. 
149 1997 (1) SA 526 (W) 531H. 
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requesting them to vacate the property by a certain date.150 The court held that the 
respondents had acted lawfully, as they had acted well within their rights in terms of 
section 3B(1)(a) of PISA.151 
 
2 2 2 7 The mandament van spolie 
The applicants in Fredericks and another v Stellenbosch Divisional Council 
(Fredericks)152 successfully raised the mandament van spolie153 as a defence to 
demolitions, which did not fall exactly within the scope of PISA. In Fredericks the court 
decided that the demolitions were unlawful because the owner had failed to give the 
occupiers the seven day notice as required by section 3B(2) of the Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Amendment Act 92 of 1976.154 With reference to Yeko v Qana,155 the court 
explained that the purpose of the mandament van spolie is to restore the status quo 
ante, regardless of the lawfulness of the possessor’s prior possession.156 The court 
granted the mandament van spolie, and extended the remedy to cater for the situation 
where dwellings were purposefully destroyed during the process of demolition to avoid a 
                                                            
150 1997 (1) SA 526 (W) 531H-I. 
151 1997 (1) SA 526 (W) 532A. 
152 1977 (3) SA 113 (C). 
153 In the authoritative judgment of Nino Bonino v De Lange 1906 TS 120 at 122-123, the court explained 
that the mandament van spolie is a remedy to prevent self help. The court held that no one is allowed to 
take the law in his own hands by dispossessing another of property (movable or immovable). If a person 
unlawfully dispossesses another person of property, the court will summarily, before enquiring into the 
merits of the dispute, order the restoration of the status quo ante. Violence is not a prerequisite for the 
granting of the mandament; the only requirement is that a person was dispossessed of property without 
his consent. In Yeko v Qana 1973 (4) SA 735 (A) 516, the court explained that to obtain a spoliation 
order, an applicant has to prove that he was in possession of the property, and that he was unlawfully 
dispossessed. Possession does not necessarily mean possession in the juridical sense. It will be 
sufficient if the applicant proves that even though he was not the owner of the property, he was holding 
the property to secure a benefit for himself. See to the same effect Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert 
M Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 288-289, 292-293, 301-302.  
154 1977 (3) SA 113 (C) 116-117. Refer to 2 2 2 5 above for a discussion of the case. 
155 1973 (4) SA 735 (A). 
156 1977 (3) SA 113 (C) 116-117. 
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restoration order. In this regard, the court explained that the dwellings were built from 
generic materials and that it saw no reason as to why the owner could not recreate 
similar shelters from similar materials.157 As a result, the court ordered the respondent 
to rebuild the structures that it had destroyed.158  
As explained in section 2 2 2 6 above, in response to Fredericks the legislature 
specifically enacted section 3B(4)(a) of PISA159 to oust the jurisdiction of the courts, and 
to prevent occupiers from relying on the mandament van spolie in demolition cases, 
unless they could prove that their occupation was lawful. This provision did not deter the 
courts from restrictively interpreting the demolition provisions of PISA so that they could 
grant spoliation orders,160 or other remedies, for any action that was not specifically 
authorised by the Act.161 However, Rikhotso v Northcliff Ceramics (Pty) Ltd and 
others162 created uncertainty as to whether the mandament van spolie could be 
employed in instances where dwellings were completely destroyed as part of eviction 
and demolition. In this case the court had to decide whether it could order the 
                                                            
157 1977 (3) SA 113 (C) 117-118. 
158 1977 (3) SA 113 (C) 117-118. 
159 Section 3B(4)(a) of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Amendment Act 72 of 1977. 
160 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM & Mostert M Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
304-305 enumerate five possible defences to a spoliation order, namely (a) denial of the facts in issue; (b) 
restoration is impossible; (c) lapse of time; (d) counter-spoliation and (e) exceptio spolii. The defence of 
impossibility has been raised in eviction and demolition cases. See for example Ntshwaqela v Chairman, 
Western Cape Regional Services Council 1988 (3) SA 218 (C), where the respondenst coerced the 
occupiers to move to another piece of land by threatening them with criminal prosecution under PISA. 
The court decided that the occupiers had been spoliated of their possession of the land. In response, the 
respondents argued that as they were not the owners of the land, it was impossible for them to restore 
possession of the land to the occupiers. The court concluded that the mere fact that a person was not in 
possession of the property at the time of spoliation did not necessarily amount to the impossibility on the 
part of the spoliator to restore possession. As a result, the spoliator could be ordered to restore 
possession if it was reasonably possible for him to do so. The court held that the respondents could, with 
the assistance of their employees, restore possession of the land to the occupiers.  
161 See for example Mpisi v Trebble 1994 (2) SA 136 (A), where the court held that demolition for 
purposes of PISA did not include the burning of unlawful occupiers’ dwellings. The court ordered the 
respondent to pay damages to the appellant for the material that was destroyed.   
162 1997 (1) SA 526 (W). 
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respondents to furnish replacement of the houses that it had unlawfully destroyed.163 
The court explained that the mandament van spolie was a temporary measure designed 
to restore possession of the property. It reasoned that a spoliation remedy was not 
suitable in instances where property had been destroyed, since possession of the 
original could not be restored.164 Most academic authors support this view.165 Some 
authors argued that the purpose of the remedy is to restore peaceful possession, and 
that it was therefore not limited to restore possession of the original property. A court 
should order the restoration of property if it consisted of generic materials, and if it was 
deliberately demolished to avoid a restoration order.166 
The court explained that there was little support for the notion that a replacement 
should be provided as an extension of the spoliation remedy in cases where the 
                                                            
163 1997 (1) SA 526 (W) 532G. 
164 1997 (1) SA 526 (W) 532H-J. 
165 1997 (1) SA 526 (W) 533A-F. The court further explained that it is recognised principle that the court 
can order the spoliator to restore the object of spoliation to the state in which it was at the time of the 
spoliation. In support of this principle the court relied, amongst others, on the authoritative judgment of 
Zinmann v Miller 1956 (3) SA 8 (T). Furthermore, in decisions such as Vena and another v George 
Municipality 1987 (4) SA 29 (C); Jones v Claremont Municipality (1908) 25 SC 651 and Tshabalala v 
West Rand Administration Board and another 1980 (2) SA 520 (W), the courts ordered the spoliator to 
restore the property to the state in which it was before the spoliation. The court explained that the 
common factor in these cases was that in none of the instances had the property completely been 
destroyed. 
166 1997 (1) SA 526 (W) 533E-J. The court cites Blecher MD ‘Spoliation and demolition of legal rights’ 
(1978) 95 SALJ 8-16; Van der Walt AJ ‘Naidoo v Moodley: mandament van spolie’ (1983) 46 THRHR 
237-240 and Van der Walt AJ ‘Nogeens Naidoo v hMoodley – ‘n repliek’ (1984) 47 THRHR 429-439. Van 
der Walt AJ ‘Nogeens Naidoo v Moodley – ‘n repliek’ (1984) 47 THRHR 429-439 at 438 argues that there 
are instances where it would serve no purpose to order the spoliator to provide a substitute for the 
spoliated goods. An example of such an instance would be where a valuable painting was destroyed by 
the spoliator. Conversely, there are instances where the court should order the spoliator to provide a 
substitute for the destroyed goods. For example, the spoliator can be ordered to rebuild a shack with new 
generic materials such as corrugated iron sheets. Van der Walt argues that the nature of the property 
destroyed should be a relevant factor when determining whether it would be impossible to restore the 
spoliated goods. 
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property had been destroyed. It held that it could not grant a spoliation order if the 
property ceased to exist.167 The court concluded that:  
‘I do not suggest that the law countenanced wanton destruction, nor that it does not 
afford a remedy. Remedies to discourage such conduct exist in both civil and 
criminal law. My conclusion is only that the mandament is not that remedy’.168  
More recently, in Tswelopele Non-Profit Organisation and others v City of Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipality and others (Tswelopele),169 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
confirmed that it would not develop the mandament van spolie to provide for situations 
where shacks and dwellings had been destroyed. The court explained that to order the 
respondents to provide a replacement (on the basis of the mandament van spolie) 
would result in the creation of a different, much wider remedy than was originally 
received into South African law.170 Moreover, the focus of the remedy, as a possessory 
action, would be lost.171 Instead of developing the mandament van spolie, the court 
elected to craft a new constitutional remedy that enabled it to order the respondents to 
rebuild those structures that they had unlawfully destroyed.172 Whether or not the 
mandament van spolie should actually have been developed in Tswelopele remains a 
contentious issue.173  
 
                                                            
167 1997 (1) SA 526 (W) 535A-B. 
168 1997 (1) SA 526 (W) 535B-C. 
169 2007 (6) SA 511 (SCA). For a discussion of this case, refer to Van der Walt AJ ‘Property law’ (2007) 2 
JQR 2.1; Van der Walt AJ ‘Developing the law on unlawful squatting and spoliation’ (2008) 125 SALJ 24-
36.  
170 2007 (6) SA 511 (SCA) 521D-E. 
171 2007 (6) SA 511 (SCA) 521D-F. 
172 2007 (6) SA 511 (SCA) 522-523. 
173 There is a vast amount of academic work on the subject of whether the mandament van spolie should 
be developed to enable the restoration of especially shacks and dwellings that were demolished. Van der 
Walt AJ ‘Developing the law on unlawful squatting and spoliation’ (2008) 125 SALJ 24-36 refers to some 
of these academic works.  
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2 2 3 The Slums Act 53 of 1934 
Van der Walt explains that in urban areas other legislative measures such as those 
contained in the Trespass Act 6 of 1959, the Slums Act 76 of 1979 and the Health Act 
63 of 1977 were used in collaboration with the provisions of the Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act 52 of 1951 (PISA), to forcibly remove people from certain areas.174 This 
section briefly refers to those provisions of the Slums Act 53 of 1934 (the Slums Act), as 
amended, that were used to support the local authorities’ demolition powers in terms of 
PISA.  
Section 1(2) of the Slums Act authorised the local authority to declare certain 
areas or buildings as slums.175 Once an area was declared a slum, the local authority 
was authorised to request of the owner, in writing, to remove the nuisance within three 
months of receipt of the written notice.176 If, however, the local authority was of the view 
that the buildings situated on the property were so dilapidated or so defectively 
constructed that the nuisance could not be remedied, it could request the owner to 
demolish the buildings and to remove the material within a certain time stipulated in the 
notice.177 Failure of the owner to comply with the demolition notice constituted an 
                                                            
174 Van der Walt AJ ‘Toward the development of post-apartheid land law: an exploratory survey’ (1990) 23 
De Jure 1-45 at 32. 
175 Section 1(2) of Act 53 of 1934 required of a medical officer of health to inspect slum-like properties or 
buildings. In terms of section 3(1)(a) and (b) of Act 53 of 1934, the officer was obliged to report any 
nuisance that existed on the land to the local authority, that was required to take reasonable steps to 
remove the nuisances or slum-like conditions from the area. According to section 1(2)(a)-(e) of Act 53 of 
1934, the property would constitute a nuisance if the following circumstances existed: if the whole or part 
of the premises was in such a state or so situated or so dirty and verminous as to be injurious or 
dangerous to health or liable to favour the spread of any infectious disease; or if the premises were in 
such an state to be injurious and dangerous to health; or if any property was so congested with buildings 
as to be injurious or dangerous to health and if the premises did not have an adequate water supply 
available within a reasonable distance. 
176 Section 5(1)(a) of Act 53 of 1934. 
177 Section 5(1)(b) of Act 53 of 1934. The functions of the local authority were later to some extent taken 
over by the slum clearance court that ordered the demolition of the buildings. Section 4 of Act 76 of 1979 
stipulated that courts had to be established in the district of each local authority.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
57 
offence.178 The local authority was further authorised, upon the failure of the owner to 
comply with the notice, to remove the nuisance and to sell any materials in recovery of 
the expenses that it had incurred.179 
The Slums Act also stipulated that occupiers had to be removed from any area 
that had been declared a slum, and that continued occupation of premises earmarked 
for demolition constituted an offence.180 Furthermore, the Slums Act imposed criminal 
liability on any owner who failed to ensure that the premises remained unoccupied.181 
The court ordered the eviction of any person found guilty of the unlawful occupation of a 
slum, and such an order was not subject to an appeal.182 Finally, section 29(2) stated, 
amongst other things, that the owner would not be excused from his demolition duties 
on the grounds that no suitable accommodation was available to the occupants of the 
building.183  
It is plain to see how these provisions could have been employed in conjunction 
with the eviction and demolition provisions in PISA to deter rural black citizens from 
moving to or staying in urban areas. As explained above, housing shortages made it 
problematic for black citizens to find suitable accommodation in urban areas. Those 
who were able to find accommodation were forced to live in either informal settlements, 
                                                            
178 Section 5(2) and section 5(3) of Act 53 of 1934. The provisions of the Slums Act 53 of 1934, as 
amended, were challenged in some cases. Plaintiffs mostly relied on irregularities in the process of 
declaring property as a slum to avoid the demolition of their homes or buildings. See for example Rex v 
Vumisa 1950 (2) SA 585 (N), where the appellant narrowly escaped a demolition order because the 
Health Commission lacked the locus standi to grant such an order. See further R v Pillay 1958 (4) SA 141 
(T), where the appellant appealed against a demolition order granted in terms of section 5(1)(b) of the 
Act. The Transvaal Provincial Division overturned the decision of the magistrate’s court on the grounds of 
an irregularity, which invalidated the Council’s declaration of the premises as a slum.   
179 Section 9(1) and (2) of Act 53 of 1934. 
180 Section 11 of Act 53 of 1934 prohibited entering into a property set out for demolition. 
181 Section 12 of Act 53 of 1934 imposed a duty on the owner to ensure that the premises remained 
vacant. Section 12(4) of Act 53 of 1934 stipulated that non-compliance of the owner in this regard 
amounted to an offence. 
182 Section 28(1) and 28(7) of Act 53 of 1934. 
183 Section 29(2) of Act 53 of 1934. 
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or impoverished areas that were prone to slum-like conditions. Occupiers who resided 
in informal settlements faced eviction not only in terms of PISA, but also in terms of the 
Slums Act. Likewise, occupiers who resided in decaying buildings and homes were 
likely to be evicted in terms of the Slums Act. Evictees and other persons unable to find 
suitable accommodation were compelled to return to their impoverished homelands.  
 
2 2 4 Conclusion 
The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 (PISA) and the Slums Act 53 of 1934 
formed part of an intricate web of laws designed, amongst other things, to create racially 
segregated urban areas. These laws were mostly enforced by local authorities and 
private land owners. Local authorities were specifically authorised to evict already 
marginalised black people from private and public land and to demolish their dwellings 
under the auspices of health, safety and building laws and regulations.  
Likewise, private land owners were required to demolish structures on their 
property if they had been built without approved building plans, or if they had been 
declared a slum. PISA further bolstered land owners’ common law eviction and 
demolition powers as it enabled them to demolish structures that had been erected or 
occupied without their consent, without having to obtain a court order. Evidently, these 
provisions could easily have been abused by land owners who initially permitted the 
occupation of their land, only to revoke their consent at a later stage. Van der Walt 
explains that the Roman Dutch perception of property – received into South African law 
during the seveteenth and eighteenth centuries – was dominated by the belief that 
ownership was an absolute right ‘in the sense that it was the pinnacle of a hierarchy of 
rights in property, and in the sense that it was a fundamentally exclusive individual 
right’.184 Collectively, these characteristics created the impression that ownership would 
always be a stronger right, unless a person could prove that he possessed a real right in 
                                                            
184 Van der Walt AJ ‘Dancing with codes – protecting, developing and deconstructing property rights in a 
constitutional state’ (2001) 118 SALJ 258-311 at 271. 
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the property that was either created or assented to by the land owner.185 Apartheid 
legislation such as PISA perpetuated this perception of ownership as an absolute right 
by creating powers that far exceeded owners’ entitlements under the common law. 
PISA further ensured that land owners’ and local authorities’ actions would not be 
scrutinised in a judicial setting since section 3B(4)(a) of PISA ousted the jurisdiction of 
the courts to hear demolition disputes, unless the occupier could prove that he had a 
right or title to the land and, further, that his building was demolished in bad faith.186 It is, 
however, ironic that PISA created the impression that ownership was an inviolable right 
when it had, in actual fact, drastically interfered with ownership entitlements and 
imposed criminal liability on any owner who failed to comply with the provisions of the 
Act. The new constitutional dispensation recognises that ownership is not an absolute 
right and that it can be regulated in the public interest. Importantly, regulatory measures 
must be imposed in terms of law of general application and may not arbitrarily interfere 
with the exercise of ownership entitlements. This is a dramatic departure from the 
apartheid era where legislative measures such as PISA eroded ownership entitlements 
to further the political ideals of the government. The Constitution provides an objective 
standard against which all regulatory laws will be measured.  
 
2 3 Exercising demolition powers within the framework of the Constitution  
2 3 1 Introduction 
Apartheid laws such as PISA created the impression that ownership was an absolute 
right although they extensively regulated the exercise of ownership entitlements. The 
Constitution by contrast, expressly recognises that ownership can be regulated in the 
public interest, provided that the regulatory interference meets certain requirements. 
                                                            
185 Van der Walt AJ ‘Dancing with codes – protecting, developing and deconstructing property rights in a 
constitutional state’ (2001) 118 SALJ 258-311 at 271. 
186 As explained in section 2 2 2 7 above, this provision prevented occupiers from asserting their rights on 
the basis of the mandament van spolie, a common law remedy that would usually have been available to 
them in circumstances where they were summarily dispossessed of their property.  
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The limitations imposed on ownership by legislation reflect the prevailing needs of the 
broader public and they can change as society evolves. 
Poverty and homelessness is one of the greatest current problems in South Africa. 
This could in part be ascribed to the forced removals and demolitions of the apartheid 
era which, at the time, greatly depleted the housing stock and destroyed supporting 
social and economic networks. Apartheid legislation such as PISA and the Slums Act187 
enabled the creation of sprawling townships consisting of shacks and informal shelters 
right next to affluent white suburbs, and contributed to the overcrowded and squalid 
circumstances in impoverished black townships and informal settlements.188 These 
circumstances have in some instances prompted destitute black people to find 
alternative accommodation in dilapidated inner-city buildings; it is estimated that in 
Johannesburg alone there are about 235 occupied ‘bad buildings’.189 Some of these 
buildings have become unlawfully occupied because they were deserted by their 
owners.190 In other instances the buildings are simply not maintained because the land 
was purchased for development or speculation purposes. There are also rare instances 
where some of the units in decaying inner-city residential buildings are still occupied by 
owners who cannot afford to move to alternative accommodation. Finally, there are 
                                                            
187 Act 53 of 1934. 
188 See for example, Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and 
another [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) paras 114-116, where the court indicated how the 
apartheid evictions and demolitions impacted on the development of urban areas. This case is discussed 
in greater detail in section 2 3 3 1 below.  
189 Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction (COHRE) Any room for the poor? Forced eviction in the city of 
Johannesburg, South Africa (2005) http://www.escrnet.org/usr_doc/COHRE_Johannesburg_FFM_high_ 
res.pdf (accessed 3 February 2010) at 6. 
190 Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction (COHRE) Any room for the poor? Forced eviction in the city of 
Johannesburg, South Africa (2005) http://www.escrnet.org/usr_doc/COHRE_Johannesburg_FFM_high_ 
res.pdf (accessed 3 February 2010) at 6 and 17. This report explains that many of the buildings had been 
deserted by their owners during the late 1980s and early 1990s because of the abolition of influx control 
measures. These owners were apparently no longer willing to invest in the inner city and preferred to 
channel their money into newly established economic centres. The report further explains that the 
conditions in the inner city further deteriorated because of the municipalities’ failure to enforce health and 
safety by-laws.   
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buildings that were initially lawfully occupied by people who were either tenants or who 
had an informal arrangement with the owner. Their occupation later became unlawful 
because of changed circumstances.  
Section 25(1) of the Constitution now regulates any state interference with private 
property rights. This section recognises that property rights can be regulated by 
legislation in the public interest, provided that the regulation is imposed in terms of law 
of general application and may not result in an arbitrary deprivation of property. In 
essence, section 25(1) acknowledges that the ownership of property, especially land, is 
accompanied by certain obligations that can vary according to the prevailing needs of 
society. The notion that ownership consists of entitlements as well as obligations 
directly conflicts with the traditional view, namely that ownership is an absolute right.  
Section 26(3)191 was included in the Constitution as a direct result of the 
apartheid history of arbitrary evictions, forced removals and demolitions that were, to 
some extent, made possible by the weak tenure rights of black citizens.192 Van der 
Walt explains that these tenure rights will continue to become weaker, even though 
apartheid laws have been abolished, ‘unless they are strengthened by equally 
systematic and structural reforms in the Constitution and various land reform laws’.193 
He further explains that the tenure reform process to date employed two strategies, 
namely the adoption of anti-eviction provisions to prevent arbitrary evictions and 
demolitions, and ‘the implementation of individualised structural reforms to strengthen 
                                                            
191 Section 26 of the Constitution is divided into three subsections. Section 26(1) provides that ‘[e]veryone 
has the right to have access to adequate housing’. This subsection should be read with 26(2), which 
states that ‘[t]he state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation of this right’. 
192 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 310 (currently 3 ed (2011)), but the relevant 
chapter was omitted from the new edition).  
193 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 310 (currently 3 ed (2011)), but the relevant 
chapter was omitted from the new edition).  
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and support specific weak and unsuitable tenure forms’.194 The anti-eviction strategy 
is grounded in section 26(3), which states that: 
‘No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an 
order of the court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No 
legislation may permit arbitrary evictions’. 
Section 26(3) has three main purposes. Firstly, it recognises the injustices suffered by 
some South Africans under the apartheid eviction and demolition laws and, secondly, it 
upholds the constitutional values of human dignity, freedom and equality by prohibiting 
arbitrary eviction and demolition procedures. Thirdly, section 26(3) recognises that 
eviction and demolition can take place, provided that it is not arbitrary and that it is 
authorised by law of general application, and carried out in accordance with a court 
order. The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 
1998 (PIE)195 was enacted in response to the constitutional obligations embodied in 
section 26(3) of the Constitution, and its central function is to prevent the illegal eviction 
of unlawful occupiers.196 Illegal eviction refers to eviction procedures that do not comply 
with the provisions of sections 4, 5 or 6 of the Act. These sections ensure that eviction 
proceedings – and by implication demolitions – occur only when they are properly 
authorised by law and carried out in a manner that is procedurally and substantively fair. 
PIE, in direct contrast to PISA, requires of owners and local authorities to comply with 
procedural as well as substantive fairness requirements when seeking an eviction order 
from the court.197 The purpose of the substantive fairness requirements is to draw the 
                                                            
194 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 310 (currently 3 ed (2011)), but the relevant 
chapter was omitted from the new edition). The second strategy is based on section 25(6) and 25(9) of 
the Constitution, which stipulates that parliament must promulgate laws that provide those who, as a 
result of past discriminatory laws, have insecure tenure with tenure security or equitable redress. Van der 
Walt explains that various laws have been enacted in compliance with section 25(9) of the Constitution.  
195 Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 repealed the 
Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951. 
196 Act 19 of 1998 defines ‘unlawful occupier’ as ‘a person who occupies land without the express or the 
tacit consent of the owner or the person in charge, or without any other right in law to occupy such 
land...’. 
197 Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 149. 
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court’s attention to the unique circumstances of the occupier and to the historical and 
political circumstances that largely contributed to the housing shortage in South 
Africa.198 Special consideration is also given to the most vulnerable persons such as the 
elderly, women, or children whose rights were simply disregarded under apartheid.  
The section 26(3) rights of the occupiers of the informal townships and inner-city 
buildings have recently been judicially considered in disputes concerning the 
rejuvenation and redevelopment of occupied inner-city buildings. Two of the more 
interesting cases are discussed in greater detail below. This discussion shows the 
conflicting interests that arise when the owner or the local authority seeks the eviction of 
unlawful occupiers to enable the demolition or redevelopment of a structure, and how 
this conflict of interests is dealt with in terms of the new constitutional framework. More 
specifically, the Olivia Road199 cases show an underlying conflict between the 
demolition of supposedly dangerous or dilapidated existing housing structures, and the 
building of new housing stock. The series of Blue Moonlight Property200 cases illustrates 
the tension between the land owners’ rights in relation to their buildings; the duties of 
local authorities (that must observe section 25 rights and fulfil section 26 obligations) 
and the inner-city poor who fear the loss of their homes. Both these cases further raise 
the question: to what extent can one expect a land owner to tolerate unlawful occupiers 
on his property? The discussion in this section shows that the conflict between land 
owners, local authorities and unlawful occupiers is dealt with very differently in the new 
constitutional framework than was the case during apartheid. 
 
                                                            
198 Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 149. 
199 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 (1) SA 78 (W); City of 
Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) and Occupiers of 51 Olivia 
Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and others 2008 (3) 
SA 208 (CC). 
200 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another 2009 (1) SA 
470 (W); Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) and City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and another 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA). 
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2 3 2 The Olivia Road cases 
2 3 2 1 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) LTD and others 2007 
In City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) LTD and others,201 the City of 
Johannesburg (the applicant) instituted eviction proceedings to evict 300 occupiers (the 
respondents) from decaying inner-city properties. These buildings included residential 
houses, a high rise building and a double-storey retail building. The applicant was of the 
view that the buildings were unfit for human habitation as they were dangerous, 
unhygienic and extremely overcrowded. One building had already been partially 
destroyed in a fire.202 The applicant based its application on section 12(4)(b)203 of the 
National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (the Building 
Standards Act), section 20204 of the Health Act 63 of 1977 (the Health Act) and certain 
                                                            
201 2007 (1) SA 78 (W). For a discussion of this case, refer to Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional property 
law’ (2006) 1 JQR 2.4.  
202 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 18. 
203 Section 12(4)(b) of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 
stipulates that if the local authority deems it necessary for the safety of any person it may, by way of 
notice in writing, order a person who occupies a building to either vacate that building immediately or 
within the time period stipulated in the notice. Section 12(5) provides that no one is permitted to occupy a 
dangerous building once the local authority has delivered the notice in terms of section 12(4)(b). In terms 
of section 12(6), any person who contravenes the provisions of section 12 shall be guilty of an offence 
and shall be liable, on conviction, to a fine of R100 for each day he contravenes the provision. These 
sections should be read with section 12(1), which provides that if the local authority is of the view that a 
building is so dilapidated that it constitutes a threat to life or property, it may order the owner to either 
demolish the building, or to alter it so that it no longer poses a threat to the public. Alternatively, if the 
local authority is of the view that the building is so dangerous that it constitutes an imminent threat to life 
or property, it may without giving notice to the owner, proceed to demolish, or alter the building. In such 
circumstances, the local authority will recover the costs from the owner.  
204 Section 20(1) of the Health Act 63 of 1977 provides that ‘[e]very local authority shall take all lawful, 
necessary and reasonably practicable measures – (a) to maintain its district at all times in a hygienic and 
clean condition; (b) to prevent the occurrence within its district of – (i) any nuisance; (ii) any unhygienic 
condition; (iii) any offensive condition, or (iv) any other condition which will or could be harmful or 
dangerous to the health of any person within its district or the district of any other local authority, or where 
a nuisance or condition referred to in sub-paras (i) to (iv), inclusive, has so occurred, to abate, or cause to 
be abated, such nuisance, or remedy, or cause to be remedied, such condition as the cause may be’. 
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fire by-laws.205 Reasons advanced in support of the application were that the granting of 
an eviction order would ‘promote public health and safety’ and ‘reverse inner-city 
decay’.206 The applicant further requested of the court to not ‘place a stop sign on its 
difficult road to upliftment of the inner city’.207 This application was opposed on various 
grounds, including that it was unconstitutional for the applicant to rely on the Health Act 
and its fire by-laws to obtain an eviction order, and that some of the occupiers were 
unlawful occupiers, which meant that the applicant had to comply with the provisions of 
the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
(PIE). The respondents contended that the eviction would not be just and equitable as 
the city had failed to provide them with alternative accommodation as required by 
section 6 of PIE.208 Finally, the respondents argued that subsections 12(4)(b), 12(5) and 
12(6) of the Building Standards Act were unconstitutional as they violated the occupiers’ 
constitutional rights in section 26(3) and section 9 of the Constitution.209 
The court explained that the historical, social and political background set out in 
decisions such as Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers210 and Modderklip,211 
                                                            
205 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) paras 3-9. 
206 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 5. 
207 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 6. 
208 Section 6 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
regulates evictions at the instance of an organ of state.  
209 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 12. Section 9 of the Constitution is the equality clause and section 9(1), for 
example, states that ‘[e]veryone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit 
of the law’. The respondents further argued that an eviction order would unjustifiably interfere with the 
respondents’ right to access to adequate housing as embodied in section 26 of the Constitution. In this 
regard, the respondents contended that the applicant had failed to fulfill the positive obligation imposed 
on it by section 26(1) of the Constitution. 
210 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). For a discussion of this case, refer to Van der Walt AJ Property in the 
margins (2009) 153-154 and to Liebenberg S Socio-economic rights: adjudication under a transformative 
constitution (2010) 273-279. 
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coupled with the relevant legal provisions, indicated that eviction is fundamentally a 
constitutional matter.212 It further explained that it is necessary to reconcile 
municipalities’ health and safety duties with the state’s constitutional duty towards poor 
and destitute persons such as the respondents.213 Moreover, the Constitution 
‘emphasises the need for concrete and case-specific solutions’.214 With reference to 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and others v Grootboom and others,215 the 
court emphasised that it was no longer adequate to rely on rationality to justify state 
actions. Rather, the Constitution requires of all ‘stakeholders’ to act ‘reasonably to fulfil 
their constitutional duties regarding social and economic rights’.216 With reference to 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers,217 the court further explained that when 
resolving a dispute it could not mechanically give preference to ownership, and that it 
should instead balance and reconcile conflicting rights by taking all interests and 
relevant factors into account.218 A court should adopt a similar approach in a dispute 
where there is a conflict between the obligations of the local authority and the rights of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
211 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; (Agri SA and 
Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae); President of the Republic of South Africa and others v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2004 (6) SA 40 
(SCA) and President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). 
For a discussion of these cases, refer to Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 277-
280; Van der Walt AJ ‘The state’s duty to protect property owners v the state’s duty to provide housing: 
thoughts on the Modderklip case’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 144-161; Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building 
under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 43-47 and Liebenberg S Socio-economic rights: 
adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 439-442. 
212 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 26. 
213 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 26. 
214 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 26. 
215 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). 
216 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 27. 
217 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
218 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) paras 28 and 31-35. The court specifically referred to the apartheid abuses of 
eviction and demolition powers. It explained that the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 
granted local authorities and land owners wide powers to evict mostly marginalised people under the 
auspices of health, safety and planning regulation. The court further explained that under apartheid, the 
movement of people in the inner city was mostly regulated on the basis of race.  
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the unlawful occupiers.219 This implicates that proof of the health and safety risks 
associated with the occupation of a building would only trigger a court’s discretion to 
order eviction and that other circumstances – such as the personal circumstances of the 
occupier or the duration of occupation – will also be taken into account.220 The court 
reasoned that it would be more sympathetic to occupiers who had resided in the 
building for some time than to occupiers who deliberately invaded a property with the 
view to disrupt the municipality’s housing programme.221 In this regard, the court 
referred to Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers,222 where Sachs J explained 
that the phrase ‘all relevant circumstances’ was inserted into section 26(3) of the 
Constitution to emphasise ‘[h]ow non-prescriptive the provision is intended to be’. Sachs 
J further explained that:  
‘[t]he way in which the courts are to manage the process has, accordingly, been left 
as wide open as constitutional language could achieve, by design and not by 
accident, by deliberate purpose and not by omission’.223 
The court held that section 12(4)(b) of the Building Standards Act had to be read in 
line with section 26(3) of the Constitution.224 This meant that the applicant could not 
evict the occupiers without complying with the necessary procedural and substantive 
requirements set out in PIE.225 It was therefore not necessary to consider the 
constitutionality of section 12(4)(b) of the Building Standards Act.226 
In relation to the applicant’s duties under section 26(1) of the Constitution, the 
court explained that the right to adequate housing should not be misunderstood to 
mean that the state will provide housing for the entire population. Section 26(1) 
                                                            
219 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 28. 
220 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 29. 
221 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 29.  
222 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 22. 
223 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 38, with reference to Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 
(12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 22. 
224 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 36. 
225 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 37. 
226 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 37. 
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should instead be interpreted to mean that the state will, within its available 
resources, cultivate an environment where everyone would have access to adequate 
housing. It also means that the state ‘will protect and improve houses and 
neighbourhoods rather than damage or destroy them’.227 Furthermore, section 26(1) 
of the Constitution requires of the state, and of other persons or institutions (such as 
the applicant), to respect the access to housing that some people have arranged for 
themselves, even if such housing is inadequate.228 It is also the duty of the state to 
progressively realise the goal of creating a society where persons such as the 
occupiers are treated with equal concern and respect.229 The court emphasised that 
when performing some of its functions such as inner-city regeneration, the applicant 
could not ignore the rights of the occupiers.230 It was not disputed that the applicant 
had a legislative duty to eliminate unhealthy and dangerous environments that 
existed within its jurisdiction, but it could not do so in violation of the occupiers’ 
section 26(1) and section 26(3) rights.231 This was especially so in instances, as in 
this case, where the local authority failed to adhere to its constitutional duty to 
provide adequate alternative accommodation.232  
The court explained that even though the circumstances in the buildings were 
unsatisfactory, it at least provided the occupiers with shelter and access to water. If 
                                                            
227 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 50. 
228 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 54. 
229 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 54. 
230 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 54. 
231 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 58. 
232 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) paras 42-47 and 59. The court concluded that the city had failed to implement the 
Programme for Housing Assistance in Emergency Housing Circumstances as adopted in terms of the 
Housing Act 107 of 1997. Ultimately, this amounted to a failure on the part of the city to provide for those 
persons who stood to lose their home in an emergency. Furthermore, the existing housing programme 
was considered unreasonable as it did not cater for the poorest of the inner-city residents. The court 
explained that the failure of the applicant to provide access to adequate housing has forced the occupiers 
to live in dangerous buildings where they at least have access to basic shelter and water. Eviction from 
dangerous living conditions would exacerbate the circumstances of the unlawful occupiers. It could cause 
the unlawful occupiers to be deprived of their livelihood, which in turn could result in the loss of human 
dignity. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
69 
these occupiers were evicted they would be rendered homeless. Accordingly, the 
court called on the city, with the assistance of the provincial and national government, 
to devise a coherent plan that would provide these occupiers with access to 
adequate housing. It further confirmed that it was the responsibility of the applicant to 
engage with the occupiers and to clean the occupied buildings as part of its duty to 
render the city secure. In this regard the court referred to one of the buildings, which 
the occupiers had attempted to clean. This, the court stated, served as an example of 
how the applicant and the occupiers could ‘improve their respective lots in a mutually 
constructive fashion’.233 The court granted a declaratory order pronouncing that the 
applicant had failed to fulfil its statutory and constitutional obligations in respect of the 
inner-city poor. It ordered the applicant to create and implement a plan that would 
cater for the inner-city residents that are in need of adequate housing. The applicant 
was also interdicted from evicting the occupiers until a housing programme was 
implemented or until it could provide suitable adequate accommodation for those that 
faced eviction.234 
 
2 3 2 2 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others (SCA) 2007 
In City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others,235 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the court a quo, and it ordered the eviction 
of the occupiers from the inner-city buildings.236 It held that the central issue in the 
dispute was whether the applicant was prohibited from evicting occupiers from 
unsafe buildings in the exercise of its health and safety duties, without first providing 
them with adequate alternative accommodation.237 The Supreme Court of Appeal 
was of the view that the court a quo had confused the city’s duty to prevent unhealthy 
                                                            
233 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 61. 
234 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 67. 
235 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA). 
236 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 78. For a discussion of this case, refer to Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional 
property law’ (2007) 2 JQR 2.2.  
237 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 4. 
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and unsafe circumstances with the city’s constitutional duty to provide access to 
adequate housing as enshrined in section 26(1).238  
The court briefly explained what it believed to be the correct interpretation of 
section 26(1) and (3) of the Constitution. It reasoned that section 26(1) of the 
Constitution places a positive239 and a negative duty on the state.240 Section 26(1) 
imposes a negative obligation insofar as it requires of the state, other entities or 
persons, to desist from interfering with the right of access to adequate housing that 
persons might enjoy at present.241 The Constitutional Court has not yet defined the 
negative content of section 26(1). It is clear that anyone has the right to adequate 
housing, but this right can be justifiably limited on the basis of section 36 of the 
Constitution.242 The court further explained that section 26(3) of the Constitution has 
three effects. Firstly, section 26(3) does not condone the arbitrary seizure of land, 
which means that it creates a defensive rather than an affirmative right.243 Secondly, 
it acknowledges that eviction from land can occur since there is ‘no unqualified 
constitutional duty on local authorities to ensure that in no circumstances should a 
                                                            
238 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 17. The court was also critical of the court a quo’s finding in other 
respects. Specifically, the court referred to the failure of the court a quo to indicate whether PIE was 
applicable in the circumstances. Furthermore, the court a quo held that it would be arbitrary to grant an 
eviction on the basis of section 12(4)(b) of the Building Standards Act, but it did not find that the section 
was in conflict with section 26(3) and, therefore, unconstitutional. 
239 The court explained that the positive duty is circumscribed in section 26(2), which provides that the 
state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of the right to have access to adequate housing as embodied in section 26(1). 
Section 26(2) places an internal limit on the ambit of section 26(1). See the court’s explanation in City of 
Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 37. 
240 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 37. 
241 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 38. 
242 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 38. 
243 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 39. 
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home be destroyed unless alternative accommodation or land is made available’.244 
Finally, it requires of the court to consider all relevant circumstances, which 
‘underlines how non-prescriptive the provision is intended to be’.245 The court 
explained that the Constitutional Court has not yet determined the exact meaning of 
‘relevant circumstances’,246 nor has it confirmed whether a court would have a 
general discretion to evict once it has considered all the relevant circumstances of 
the dispute. PIE states in accordance with section 26(3) that all relevant 
circumstances must be taken into account, and it provides the additional criterion that 
the eviction must be just and equitable. This indicates that the court’s discretion to 
evict is based on what it deems to be just and equitable. The court would have to 
consider legally relevant circumstances in instances where the eviction dispute does 
not fall within the ambit of PIE.247 Furthermore, section 26(1) and (2) can place a 
limitation on the right to evict in instances where a state organ seeks an eviction 
order.248 The Constitutional Court has confirmed that ‘arbitrary’ within the context of 
section 25 of the Constitution means that the law does not provide sufficient reason 
for the deprivation or that the deprivation is procedurally unfair.249 Sufficient reason 
for purposes of section 26(3) will require an evaluation of the means employed 
                                                            
244 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 39. This is part of a quotation from Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 28 and should be read in context. In Port Elizabeth 
Municipality the court continued to state that ‘[i]n general terms, however, a court should be reluctant to 
grant an eviction against relatively settled occupiers unless it is satisfied that a reasonable alternative is 
available, even if only as an interim measure pending ultimate access to housing in the formal housing 
programme’. 
245 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 39 with reference to Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 
(12) BCLR 1268 (CC) paras 20-22. 
246 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 40. 
247 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 40. 
248 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 40. 
249 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 42, with reference to ‘arbitrary’ as defined in First National Bank of SA Ltd 
t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and another; First National Bank of SA Ltd 
t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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(eviction) and the end sought to be achieved, namely the purpose of the relevant 
law.250  
The Supreme Court of Appeal decided that the court a quo had failed to 
recognise that the occupiers did not have a core minimum right, but only a limited 
right to have access to adequate housing.251 It was further incorrect of the court a 
quo to find that to deprive the occupiers of their current access to inadequate housing 
would amount to a violation of their section 26(1) rights.252 Moreover, the assumption 
that the courts generally have the discretion to refuse to enforce legislation is rooted 
in the hypothesis that the PIE discretion has to be read into subsection 12(4)(b) via 
the Constitution.253 This assumption is incorrect as it contradicts the authority that 
binds the court.254 With reference to the constitutionality of section 12(4)(b), the court 
explained that section 12(1) enabled the local authority to request of the owner to 
either demolish his unsafe building, or to alter it so that it no longer constitutes a 
danger to the public. A section 12(4)(b) notice would only be issued if the owner 
failed to comply with the 12(1) notice, and if the local authority was of the view that it 
was necessary to vacate the dangerous building. Accordingly, it could not be said 
that the ensuing eviction in terms of a court order was arbitrary. The section 12(4)(b) 
notice would only be issued if continued occupation of an building constituted a 
safety risk. If a reasonable alternative to eviction was available it should be explored 
and adopted.255  
The respondents argued that section 12(4)(b) of the Building Standards Act was 
unconstitutional because it permitted eviction without a court order. This 
interpretation was incorrect, and the court explained that the section permitted the 
                                                            
250 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 42. 
251 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) paras 43-45. In this regard, the court explained that the court a quo had failed 
to consider the fact that the city did not have the resources to provide the occupiers with alternative 
accommodation in the city centre.   
252 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 46. 
253 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 49. 
254 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 49. 
255 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) paras 51-52. 
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local authority to issue an administrative order to vacate and a criminal sanction in 
the event of non-compliance with such an order.256 Section 12(4)(b) did not authorise 
self-help.257 The respondents further argued that section 12(4)(b) enabled the 
eviction of the occupiers in breach of section 26(3) because the relevant 
circumstances of the case would not be taken into account. This argument, the court 
pointed out, was incorrect because it was based on the belief that a section 12(4)(b) 
notice was equivalent to a court order. There is a duty on the local authority to 
consider all relevant circumstances. However, this duty is an administrative justice 
requirement and it does not flow from section 26(3) of the Constitution.258 
Furthermore, the amici argued that the Building Standards Act was unconstitutional 
because it does not stipulate that the court must authorise the local authority to issue 
a section 12(4)(b) notice. The court explained that administrative orders do not 
require court orders to be valid.259  
In the court a quo the respondents sought the review and setting aside of the 
city’s 12(4)(b) notice on, amongst other things, the grounds of ulterior purpose and 
                                                            
256 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 53. 
257 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 53. 
258 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 53. 
259 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) paras 54 and 57-61. The court further decided that PIE did not impact on the 
issuing of a section 12(4)(b) notice. In this regard, the court explained that the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) ensured that the issuing of such a notice would comply with 
the requirements for just administrative action. Moreover, one could infer that the occupiers had the tacit 
consent of the owners to occupy the buildings. This was so because the buildings had been abandoned 
by the owners. The inference of consent meant that PIE was not applicable to the dispute.  
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irrationality.260 More specifically, this argument was based on the assertion that the 
applicant was not really concerned with health and safety risks, and that the 12(4)(b) 
notice had to be viewed with scepticism because of the city’s inner-city regeneration 
scheme.261 The Supreme Court of Appeal explained that the question of how to avoid 
or ameliorate unsafe conditions was entirely unrelated to the question of what 
happened to the buildings once they had been vacated.262 The court concluded that 
section 12(4)(b) was not unconstitutional, and that it did not have the discretion to 
allow an unlawful state of affairs to continue. It further held that the occupiers of the 
buildings were obliged to comply with the section 12(4)(b) order, even if no 
alternative housing was made available to them, and even though they would not 
have access to adequate housing after the eviction.263 
 
                                                            
260 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) paras 62-64. The respondents further relied on the lack of opportunity to be 
heard and the city’s failure to take relevant circumstances into account. In this regard, the court 
determined that the right to be heard was embodied in section 3 of PAJA. Furthermore, the fairness of an 
administrative procedure depended on the circumstances of the case. The court held that the city was 
entitled to dispense with the hearing requirement, since it was difficult to determine the number of 
occupiers. The second ground was based on the argument that the city failed to consider the fact that 
there was no alternative accommodation available to the occupiers. The court explained that this 
submission presupposed that the section 12(4)(b) notice was dependant on the right of access to 
adequate housing. This submission was incorrect.  
261 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 66. 
262 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) para 67. 
263 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) paras 68-78. However, the court did find that the local government had failed 
to give due consideration to the needs of the poor. The court held that it was the duty of the city to provide 
some form of temporary shelter to those who would become homeless as a result of eviction, as required 
in Chapter 12 of the National Housing Code. 
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2 3 2 3 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, 
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and others (CC) 2008 
The Constitutional Court in Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 
Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and others264 confirmed the 
Supreme Court of Appeal’s finding that the issue of the section 12(4)(b) notice was 
not dependant or conditional on the right of access to adequate housing.265 However, 
it disagreed with the finding that the local authority could issue a section 12(4)(b) 
notice to vacate, without considering whether alternative accommodation was 
available to the occupiers.266 The Supreme Court of Appeal’s interpretation of section 
12(4)(b) postulated that the fact that a person will become homeless did not have a 
bearing on the local authority’s decision. This approach falsely implied that there was 
no relationship between section 12(4)(b) and section 26(2) of the Constitution.267 The 
Constitutional Court explained that it was imperative for the local authority to not 
make insulated decisions when performing its various duties. It is expected of the city 
to balance its duty to eliminate unsafe and unhealthy conditions within its jurisdiction 
with its duty to provide reasonable access to adequate housing within its available 
resources.268 The court further explained that the local authority could not make 
decisions on these issues separately, and that the housing provisions and safety 
provision had to be read together.269 Moreover, it is essential for the municipality – 
once it has engaged with the occupiers – to make an holistic decision in relation to 
eviction, which takes into account that people will be rendered homeless, and ‘the 
capacity of the city to do something about it.’270 The Supreme Court of Appeal failed 
to fully appreciate the interrelationship between section 12(4)(b) and section 26(2), 
                                                            
264 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC). For a discussion of this case, refer to Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional property 
law’ (2008) 1 JQR 2.1, Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 154-158 and to Liebenberg S 
Socio-economic rights: adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010) 293-303. 
265 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) para 43. 
266 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) para 43. 
267 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) para 43. 
268 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) para 44. 
269 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) para 44. 
270 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) para 44. 
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and it incorrectly decided that the municipality’s failure to consider the homelessness 
factor was unobjectionable.271 The Constitutional Court concluded that as part of its 
decision-making process, the city had to consider the fact that persons would be 
rendered homeless as a result of a section 12(4)(b) eviction.272 Consequently, it set 
aside the eviction order that had been granted by the Supreme Court of Appeal.273 
The Constitutional Court also decided that section 12(6) of the Building 
Standards Act was unconstitutional insofar as it made continued occupation of the 
buildings a criminal offence, even though a court had not ordered the eviction of the 
occupiers. It explained that section 26(3) of the Constitution had to be interpreted 
generously, and that it meant that no person could be evicted from his home without 
a court order.274 This protective measure would be rendered worthless if persons 
were compelled to vacate their homes to avoid criminal prosecution. The court 
explained that the continued occupation of land or buildings could only constitute an 
offence if a court had granted an eviction order. It agreed that it was necessary to 
encourage persons to vacate unsafe and dangerous buildings, and a criminal 
                                                            
271 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) para 45. 
272 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) para 46. 
273 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) para 54. The court held that the Supreme Court of Appeal should not have 
granted the eviction order because the city had failed to meaningfully engage with the occupiers. In this 
regard, the court explained that one of the circumstances that a court would have to consider, before 
evicting people at the instance of the state, was whether there had been meaningful engagement. The 
court ordered the city to meaningfully engage with the occupiers two days after the leave to appeal 
against the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision had been granted. An agreement was reached by the 
parties, which stipulated that the city would temporarily render the buildings safer and more habitable by, 
amongst other things, installing chemical toilets, cleaning and sanitising the buildings, providing refuse 
bags and fire extinguishers, and by closing up a lift shaft. It was also agreed that the city would provide 
the occupiers with suitable alternative accommodation in identified buildings. The accommodation 
provided to the occupiers was temporary, pending the provision of suitable permanent accommodation, 
which the city was in the process of developing in consultation with the relevant occupiers. Refer to 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg and others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) paras 9-36, for the court’s discussion on meaningful 
engagement. 
274 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) para 49. 
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sanction did have that effect. Therefore, section 12(6) had to be read to mean that 
the continued occupation would only constitute an offence once the eviction has been 
ordered by a court.275 
 
2 3 3  The Blue Moonlight Properties cases 
2 3 3 1 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue 
and another 2009/2010 
The applicant in Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga 
Avenue and another276 sought an eviction order against 62 adults and nine children who 
occupied its commercial property.277 These occupiers had resided on the property, 
which consisted of a factory, an office block and two garages, for about two years.278 
During this time they had continuously paid rent, first to the previous owner of the 
property, and later to other persons who supposedly collected the money on behalf of 
the applicant.279 The applicant purchased the property for redevelopment purposes that 
would involve the demolition of the existing structures.280 At the time when it purchased 
the property, the owner was aware of the fact that it was occupied. However, the 
applicant insisted that it had not received any form of rent from the occupiers.281 
Subsequently, it instituted eviction proceedings in terms of section 4 of PIE. The 
                                                            
275 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) paras 49-50. 
276 2009 (1) SA 470 (W). For a discussion of this case, refer to Pienaar JM ‘Land reform’ (2008) 3 JQR 
2.4.1. This case was the first hearing and the eviction order was granted by the South Gauteng High 
Court in Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010). In the latter case the court also awarded constitutional damages to the 
land owner but this aspect of the judgment was set aside in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and another 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA). 
277 2009 (1) SA 470 (W) para 7. One of the children was disabled and two other occupiers were 
pensioners. 
278 2009 (1) SA 470 (W) paras 7-9. 
279 2009 (1) SA 470 (W) paras 10-15. 
280 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 20. 
281 2009 (1) SA 470 (W) para 17. 
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buildings were clearly unsuitable to be used for residential purposes as it did not comply 
with various statutes such as health and safety legislation.282 The applicant contended 
that to restore the property to comply with these statutes would not be economically 
viable, and it urged the court to find a speedy solution as it suffered financially as long 
as the unlawful occupiers remained on the property.283 The court decided that it could 
not even hear the application to evict the unlawful occupiers because the city’s housing 
plan did not accommodate persons who were evicted from private property. In this 
regard, the court explained that it appeared as if the city was of the view that it was only 
obliged to assist occupiers that were evicted from public property.284 It further explained 
that it would not be able to determine whether an eviction would be just and equitable if 
it did not have the full assistance and cooperation of the municipality.285 The court 
decided to grant the city four weeks to report back on which steps it had taken, and 
would take in future, to provide unlawful occupiers with emergency shelter in 
circumstances where they had been evicted from private property.286  
The city did file a report, albeit not within the time period required by the court, 
explaining that it would not provide accommodation to persons evicted from private 
                                                            
282 In Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010), the court explained that the City of Johannesburg had issued the 
applicant with a warning that the building was dangerous and in violation of certain health and safety by-
laws. 
283 2009 (1) SA 470 (W) paras 9 and 41. 
284 2009 (1) SA 470 (W) paras 37-40. The court explained that Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and others v Grootboom and others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) confirmed that the state has a special 
duty towards persons who have ‘no access to land, no roof over their heads and who live in intolerable 
conditions.’ It further explained that the respondents would certainly fall within this category as 
circumstances had rendered their occupation of the building unlawful. The occupiers would probably have 
been willing to pay rent to the applicant. Furthermore, they have been in occupation of the building for 
quite some time and they have made it their home. A court would generally be less willing to evict settled 
occupiers. These circumstances would have a bearing on the outcome of the application for an eviction 
order.  
285 2009 (1) SA 470 (W) para 75. 
286 2009 (1) SA 470 (W) para 78. 
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property.287 As a result, the applicant in Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the 
Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another288 applied for the immediate and 
unconditional eviction of the unlawful occupiers. Alternatively, the applicant requested 
the court to evict the occupiers, and to order the city to provide them with 
accommodation. The applicant further requested the court – in the instance where the 
eviction could not be granted – to at least provide it with some form of relief that will 
alleviate the burden caused by the unlawful occupation of its building.289 This form of 
relief could include a monetary compensation order against the city. The occupiers 
brought a substantive application to have the city’s housing policy declared 
unconstitutional on the grounds that it was discriminatory and arbitrary. They requested 
the court to order the city to rectify its housing policy, and to report back to the court. 
The occupiers further sought an interdict to prevent the applicant from evicting them 
until the city could provide suitable alternative accommodation.290  
The court explained that this case raised the issue of whether private land owners 
are obliged to indefinitely provide housing for unlawful occupiers or, alternatively, 
whether this was a duty that should be borne by the city.291 This issue required of the 
court to consider the relationship between sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution, and 
the latter section’s implementation in terms of PIE.292 The court explained that there are 
two reasons why the right to property is ‘an essential foundational stone of a democratic 
                                                            
287 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 31 and 32. 
288 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010). For discussion of this case, refer to Pienaar JM ‘Land reform’ 
(2010) 1 JQR 2.7. 
289 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 38. 
290 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 38. 
291 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 6. A preliminary matter was whether the Gauteng 
Provincial Government should have been joined as a party to the proceedings. The court explained that 
the local authority, namely the city, was directly responsible to achieve the progressive realisation of the 
right to adequate housing in its area of jurisdiction. Moreover, the city had immediate control over 
‘housing and housing policy within its boundaries and in particular in relation to the attainment of the core 
rights under section 26 of the Constitution as read with the National Housing Act and the provisions of 
PIE’. See in this regard [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 68. 
292 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 6.  
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state’.293 Firstly, the arbitrary seizure of property without compensation ‘strikes at the 
core of democratic values’.294 Secondly, during the apartheid era people were stripped 
of the right to own private and commercial property, which undermined ‘the fabric of 
African society, stunted its economic growth and undermined dignity’.295 The court 
further explained that: 
 ‘[t]he right not to be deprived of property, except in terms of law of general 
application and subject to further limitations, which are always subject to just and 
equitable compensation is a constitutionally protected right under section 25 of the 
Constitution’.296 
Section 26 of the Constitution states that everyone has a right to have access to 
adequate housing, but this provision does not require private property owners to give up 
their land to achieve this purpose. The private sector does, however, have an obligation 
to provide the revenue that will enable the state to perform its section 26 obligations.297 
Furthermore, section 26 does not permit the state to abdicate its responsibilities to 
provide access to adequate housing on the private sector.298 The state cannot require 
the private sector to indefinitely provide unlawful occupiers with accommodation without 
compensation.299 Similarly, ‘reasonable legislative measures’ as envisaged in section 
26(2) of the Constitution do not include laws that require property owners to be 
                                                            
293 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 93. 
294 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 93. 
295 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 93. 
296 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 94. The court elaborated that one of the express 
limitations in the property clause concerns the ‘need to acquire privately owned land, subject to 
compensation’ for land reform purposes. The above-quoted passage incorrectly creates the impression 
that any state interference into property rights necessarily has to be compensated. This is inaccurate 
since the state is only obliged to compensate owners when it has expropriated property. Other regulatory 
interferences are uncompensated and constitutional provided that they are imposed by a law of general 
application and not arbitrary. See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 17-19 and the 
explanation in chapter 5, section 5 1 1 1.  
297 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 96. 
298 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 97. 
299 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 97. 
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indefinitely deprived of all uses of their property.300 Section 26(3) expressly limits the 
owner’s common law rights as it limits his right to evict unless he has obtained a court 
order.301 The court reasoned that generally, a land owner’s right to immediately evict a 
person upon default of rental payment is limited.302 Likewise, a court will have the 
discretion to temporarily delay the eviction of an unlawful occupier on the basis of PIE. 
The duration of the delay would depend on the circumstances of the case.303 
Nevertheless, a land owner ‘cannot be effectively deprived of his property without 
adequate compensation’ and he ought to retain the right to decide how he would like to 
use his property.304 The court explained that in this regard it was bound by precedent, 
and that it had to follow the Supreme Court of Appeal’s reasoning in the Modderklip305 
decision. Specifically, the court referred to the Supreme Court of Appeal’s finding in that 
decision, namely that a property owner’s right to equality, embodied in section 9(1) and 
(2) of the Constitution, would be infringed when he is expected to indefinitely bear the 
state’s burden of providing access to adequate housing to unlawful occupiers. The court 
further explained that it was also bound by the finding that in Modderklip the property 
owner’s section 25(1) rights had been breached as a result of the indefinite unlawful 
                                                            
300 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 98. 
301 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 99. 
302 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 99. In this regard, the court referred to rent control 
legislation that placed limitations on the landlord’s right to evict in certain instances.  
303 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 101. 
304 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 103. 
305 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; (Agri SA and 
Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae); President of the Republic of South Africa and others v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2004 (6) SA 40 
(SCA). 
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occupation of its property.306 On the basis of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s finding in 
Modderklip, the court concluded that ‘no tier of Government can transfer its 
constitutional obligations to private citizens on what, realistically, would be an indefinite 
basis effectively rendering ownership rights nugatory’.307 It further held that the 
applicant’s right to equality embodied in section 9 was breached insofar as the city’s 
housing plans did not make provision for accommodation of persons who had been 
evicted from private land.308 The city’s housing plan caused the owner to be deprived of 
all use of its property, without compensation. Moreover, the owner was precluded from 
realising its investment through the development of the property. The city adopted a 
policy that benefits the city to the detriment of the property owner.309 As to the remedy 
that should be granted to the property owner, the court held that it is ‘inappropriate if not 
incompetent to direct an expropriation of the applicant’s property’.310 The reason for this 
was that the court would impose its own solution on the city, which could interfere with 
broader planning considerations.311 Both the Supreme Court of Appeal and the 
Constitutional Court in Modderklip confirmed that the payment of constitutional 
damages, based on the loss of the use of the property, would be a suitable remedy in 
certain circumstances.312 In this case the property owner was deprived of its right to use 
                                                            
306 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 107. The court explained that the Constitutional Court in 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) considered 
it unnecessary to determine whether the Modderklip property owner’s section 25(1) rights were infringed. 
The Constitutional Court did not expressly state that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s finding that 
Modderklip’s section 25(1) rights had been infringed was wrong. Accordingly, the court in Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 
2010) deemed itself bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal. The court further referred to 
the Supreme Court of Appeal’s finding in Modderklip that section 7(2) of the Constitution imposed a duty 
on the state to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights’ of the Constitution, even if the damage was 
caused by third parties. 
307 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 135. 
308 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 152. 
309 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 153. 
310 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 159. 
311 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 159. 
312 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 161. 
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and develop its property. This was linked to the city’s breach of the owner’s right to 
equality, and its failure to draft a reasonable housing programme that would include 
persons that are evicted from private property.313 It was also necessary to consider the 
fact that the city had adopted the attitude that it had no obligation to assist the property 
owner or the unlawful occupiers.314 The city appeared to have a sufficient budget to 
provide emergency or temporary accommodation to unlawful occupiers of private land. 
Accordingly, the appropriate remedy under the circumstances would be constitutional 
damages based on the loss of rental income up and until the occupiers were evicted.315  
The final issue was whether it would be just and equitable to grant the eviction 
order. In this regard, the court stated that its principal finding was that a property owner 
could not be required to indefinitely provide housing to unlawful occupiers.316 It was 
clear that the continued occupation of the property would, in effect, cause the owner to 
lose its property.317 On the one hand the applicant was unable, as a result of the 
occupation of its building, to obtain any return on its investment for a period of five 
years. On the other hand the unlawful occupiers were extremely poor and they lived in 
squalid conditions. These occupiers could not afford to lose their accommodation, nor 
could they afford to lose any source of income that they might have had.318 One had to 
consider the fact that the property owner would obtain a reasonable return on its 
investment once it had redeveloped the property.319 Whether the eviction was just and 
equitable was dependant on the time period afforded to the occupiers to find alternative 
accommodation. The court was of the view that they would be able to find alternative 
                                                            
313 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 162. The court decided, in relation to the occupiers, that 
the housing policy also violated their right to equality insofar as it only catered for persons who were 
evicted from public land. This discrimination rendered the city’s housing policy constitutionally flawed, 
irrational and unreasonable. As a result, the court ordered the city to remedy its defective housing policy. 
See in this regard, the court’s decision in [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) paras 144-146 and 196. 
314 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 163. 
315 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 171. 
316 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) paras 191 and 194. 
317 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 190ff. 
318 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 190c. 
319 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 190d. 
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accommodation within two months. Accordingly, the court granted the eviction order but 
postponed its implementation for a period of two months.320 
 
2 3 3 2 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 
39 (Pty) Ltd and another 2011 
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s findings in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and another321 is only partially 
relevant to this discussion, since the major part of the judgment on appeal deals with 
the local, provincial and national government’s section 26(1) and (2) duties as 
delineated in legislation such as the Housing Act 107 of 1997.322 However, it is 
necessary to refer to the court’s findings in relation to the constitutional damages 
ordered by the court a quo.  
The court held that the unique facts relevant in Modderklip ‘rendered it 
distinguishable’ from Blue Moonlight.323 In this regard, the court explained that 
                                                            
320 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 195. 
321 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA). For a discussion of this case, refer to Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional property 
law’ (2011) 1 JQR 2.1.3. 
322 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA) paras 26-48. The court held that the city is directly responsible to progressively 
realise the right to access to adequate housing in its jurisdiction. It further decided that the court a quo’s 
finding that the housing policy discriminated against the occupiers, on the basis that it only provided 
alternative accommodation to persons who were evicted from public land, was incorrect. In this regard, 
the court explained that the housing policy only provided for the temporary accommodation for persons 
who were evicted from land on the basis of section 12(6) of the Building Standards Act. The city did not 
provide temporary accommodation to persons who were evicted from either public or private land for 
other reasons. The court explained that it had to determine whether this policy violated the occupiers’ 
right to equality as enshrined in section 9 of the Constitution. It explained that the policy drew an irrational 
and arbitrary distinction between those occupiers who would receive state assistance and those 
occupiers who would not. This policy was inflexible as it did not allow for the consideration of the personal 
circumstances of any of the occupiers. Accordingly, the court held that the policy was unconstitutional as 
it breached the occupiers’ right to equality. See in this regard the court’s findings in 2011 (4) SA 337 
(SCA) paras 59-69. 
323 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA) para 70. 
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Modderklip ‘certainly is not authority for the proposition that constitutional damages are 
always available, or ordinarily appropriate, as a remedy whenever a fundamental right 
has been breached’.324 In Modderklip the Supreme Court of Appeal decided that an 
order for constitutional damages was the only way in which the owner’s rights could be 
protected from excessive state interference. This finding was endorsed by the 
Constitutional Court. The court explained that Modderklip differed from Blue Moonlight 
in four respects. Firstly, the compensation order in Modderklip was not ancillary to an 
eviction order as was the case in Blue Moonlight. The Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Modderklip ordered the payment of constitutional damages, since the eviction order 
granted by the court a quo could not be enforced as a result of circumstances beyond 
the owner’s control. Secondly, the compensation order in Modderklip was necessary 
because the state had failed to assist the owner to enforce the eviction order. It was 
evident that because of the sheer number of occupiers, the owner would have been 
unable to enforce the eviction order without the assistance of the state. By contrast, 
there was no indication that Blue Moonlight would be unable to evict the 68 occupiers 
from its property. Thirdly, the number of occupiers in Modderklip made it practically 
impossible for the owner to evict the occupiers. The owner was, in effect, deprived of all 
economically viable use of his land. Blue Moonlight would have the full use and 
enjoyment of its property once the occupiers were evicted. Finally, Modderklip was an 
innocent victim of land invasion and it did take immediate steps to protect its interests. 
Blue Moonlight purchased its property with the knowledge that the buildings were 
unlawfully occupied. The court concluded that Modderklip was not authority for the 
granting of constitutional damages in the circumstances. It did, however, order the 
occupiers to evacuate the buildings on the expiry of a two-month period.325  
 
                                                            
324 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA) para 70. 
325 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA) paras 69-72. This two-month period was additional to the two months granted 
by the court a quo. 
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2 3 4  Conclusion 
The Olivia Road and Blue Moonlight cases show the transformation from apartheid-style 
evictions and demolitions to a more sophisticated and nuanced approach that seeks to 
maintain an equilibrium between the duties of the local authority, the rights of land 
owners, and the interests of unlawful occupiers who may be rendered homeless by 
eviction. A prominent feature of these cases is that the courts scrutinise disputes about 
eviction – and by implication demolition – against the backdrop of their social, historical 
and political context. It is also significant that in the constitutional era anti-eviction 
legislation imposes extensive duties on local authorities and land owners that are 
specifically designed to protect the interests of the unlawful occupier. This starkly 
contrasts with the apartheid-era legislation, which inflated the demolition and eviction 
powers of local authorities and land owners. Cases like Olivia Road and Blue Moonlight 
do not provide neatly packaged solutions to issues such as poverty, unlawful squatting 
and homelessness but they do to some extent delineate the constitutional and statutory 
obligations that are imposed on local authorities and private land owners.  
Both sets of cases have confirmed that section 26(3) of the Constitution will be the 
point of departure for all eviction and concomitant demolition disputes. Any action taken 
by a local authority or a land owner that is related to the eviction from or the demolition 
of a person’s home, must comply with section 26(3). If such an action does not comply 
with section 26(3), it will be unconstitutional unless it can be justified on the basis of 
section 36 of the Constitution.326 This was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in 
Olivia Road when it held that section 12(6) of the Building Standards Act was in 
violation of section 26(3) insofar as it rendered the continued occupation of a dangerous 
building a criminal offence in instances where the eviction was not sanctioned by a 
court.  
                                                            
326 Section 36(1) of the Constitution stipulates that a right in the Bill of Rights may be limited in terms of a 
law of general application and only if such limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an ‘open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality  and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors, including - (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the 
nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose’. 
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Likewise, Olivia Road made it explicit that section 12(4)(b) of the Building 
Standards Act has to be read in line with section 26(3) of the Constitution. This implies 
that the local authority must first obtain a court order on the basis of PIE before it can 
issue a section 12(4)(b) notice. Proof of unhealthy or unsafe circumstances will not 
necessarily persuade a court to order the eviction of unlawful occupiers. A court will 
take a range of factors into account, including the personal circumstances of the 
occupiers and the availability of alternative accommodation. Moreover, a court will also 
inquire whether there is an alternative to demolition, such as the restoration of the 
structure for social housing purposes. This is relevant because, in addition to 
maintaining health and safety standards in urban and peri-urban areas, the local 
authority is directly responsible to progressively realise the occupiers’ right to have 
access to adequate housing within its jurisdiction. It is expected of local authorities to 
balance and reconcile their responsibilities, and one can infer from Olivia Road that the 
local authorities’ various duties cannot be ranked in order of importance, although in 
specific circumstances one duty might take precedence. A factor that ought to have a 
bearing on the local authority’s decision to demolish an unsafe or unhealthy building is 
whether this will result in the unlawful occupiers becoming homeless. The High Court in 
Olivia Road explained that section 26(1) read with (2) of the Constitution does not only 
mean that the state (and the local authorities) should cultivate an environment where 
everyone would have access to adequate housing, but also that it will protect and 
improve houses rather than destroy them. Local authorities must further respect the 
access to housing that some people have arranged for themselves, even if it is 
inadequate. The restoration of a dilapidated inner-city structure is an apt example of 
how the local authority can resolve its health and safety concerns while simultaneously 
fulfilling its 26 duties. The implication is that courts will be unwilling to grant demolition 
orders, even when they seem otherwise justified, when doing so would deprive the 
occupiers of access to housing that they have at the moment and render them 
homeless.  
The series of Blue Moonlight decisions made it clear that the local authority cannot 
shift their section 26(1) and (2) duties onto private land owners. It remains the local 
authorities’ responsibility to provide access to adequate housing to the unlawful 
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occupiers of private land and buildings. Both Blue Moonlight and Olivia Road confirmed 
that it is imperative for local authorities to develop a housing policy or scheme that 
would cater for evictees. The respective courts in Olivia Road and in Blue Moonlight 
were reluctant to order the occupiers to vacate the properties because the city’s 
deficient housing policy did not provide alternative housing to those occupiers upon 
eviction. The lack of an adequate housing policy ultimately extends the burden placed 
on land owners who seek the eviction of unlawful occupiers from their land. This burden 
has the potential to amount to an arbitrary deprivation of the land owners’ property. The 
city’s ineptitude could further exacerbate deteriorating health and safety standards in 
the inner city. Occupiers move into overcrowded and decrepit urban buildings because 
they cannot access alternative housing. It is, therefore, clear that by not developing a 
suitable housing policy, the city shuns its section 26(1) and (2) responsibilities, and it 
indirectly contributes to those unhealthy and dangerous inner-city circumstances that it 
is compelled by law to prevent.  
Blue Moonlight and Olivia Road indicate that land owners have a range of 
obligations in relation to their inner-city structures. Firstly, a land owner has a statutory 
duty to maintain his building and to ensure that it does not pose a health or safety risk to 
any member of the public. Secondly, a land owner has the concomitant duty to ensure 
that his building is not unlawfully occupied. The reason for this is that the unlawful 
occupation of a structure can contribute to the general decay of the building. 
Furthermore, Blue Moonlight has shown that there is an obligation on the owner to 
temporarily tolerate unlawful occupiers until they are evicted from his property. This 
obligation is imposed on land owners by the courts that have the discretion to postpone 
the eviction of occupiers on the basis of PIE. The duration of the delay will depend on 
the unique circumstances of the case. Factors that will play a role in the court’s decision 
include the duration of the occupation, the personal circumstances of the occupiers and 
the circumstances under which the building became unlawfully occupied. Olivia Road 
confirmed that the courts would be less inclined to order the eviction of established 
occupiers. One can further assume that a court will be wary to evict occupiers whose 
occupation of the building became unlawful as a result of changed circumstances, as 
was the case in Blue Moonlight. By contrast, a court might more readily evict occupiers 
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who cynically took possession of a vacant property. Another relevant factor would be 
where, as in Modderklip, the owner actively attempted to evict the occupiers from his 
property, as opposed to an owner who ignored the fact that his building was unlawfully 
occupied. A court would also consider the nature of the building; the owner’s intended 
use of the building and the degree to which the unlawful occupation of the structure 
interfered with his investment-backed expectations. The industrial building in Blue 
Moonlight was not suited to any form of residential use, and the fact that it was 
unlawfully occupied interfered with the owner’s plans to demolish the structures and to 
develop the property. A court will also give consideration to the extent to which the 
building poses a threat to occupiers and to the public in general. Factors such as the 
personal circumstances of the occupiers and the availability of alternative 
accommodation will also be taken into account. 
It is only once the court has considered all these (and other) circumstances that it 
will be able to ascertain whether it would be just and equitable to order the eviction of 
the occupier. This approach does not automatically prefer ownership over the rights of 
the occupier. Nevertheless, there will be instances where, as in Modderklip, a court will 
find that it cannot evict the occupiers even though the unlawful occupation of the 
structure places an excessive burden on the land owner. In such instances it might be 
necessary for a court to order the local authority to pay the owner an amount that would 
to some extent alleviate this burden. This amount is similar to what is known in the 
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German legal system as Ausgleich or equalisation measures.327 Such a payment should 
not be confused with the payment of delictual damages or with compensation for an 
expropriated property. It is rather a measure to mitigate the burden that is imposed on 
the owner by legislation and enforced in the public interest. The authorising legislation 
should make provision for such a measure, and should describe the specific 
circumstances when a court would be able to grant this remedy. Judging from the Blue 
Moonlight decision, it seems as if the courts are moving toward accepting that there is a 
need for a remedy that is akin to the German equalisation measures, but perhaps find it 
difficult to determine when such a payment is required. There are two reasons why such 
a development is desirable. Firstly, a court does not have the authority to order 
expropriation if it finds that the unlawful occupation of a building places a 
disproportionate burden on the owner. Secondly, the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from 
and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) was enacted to protect both the 
rights of owners and occupiers. PIE does not currently cater for situations where it 
would not be just and equitable to evict but where it is also unreasonable to allow the 
continued occupation of the property. The inclusion of an equalisation measure in PIE 
will prevent the imposition of disproportionate burdens on the owner. This in turn will 
prevent future constitutional challenges on the basis that PIE imposes an arbitrary 
deprivation of property. Such a remedy would only be available in exceptional instances 
                                                            
327 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 277-282 and 366-367 explains that the 
German law equalisation measure does not amount to compensation for expropriation. It is designed to 
‘soften’ the impact of the burden that is placed on owners by legislation. Such a payment ensures that the 
burden is not rendered invalid because it is excessive on the basis of the proportionality principle. Van der 
Walt explains that the award granted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Modderklip is comparable to this 
equalisation measure. He further explains that an owner might have to be compensated when anti-
eviction legislation prevents him from obtaining an eviction order in circumstances where he otherwise 
would have been entitled to such an order. See further Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the 
Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 42-47 and Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional 
property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 236-239. Equalisation measures are 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 4, section 4 5 2 2 and in chapter 5, section 5 3 2 and section 5 4 2 
2. 
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and should not be considered a general solution to each instance where property rights 
are infringed. 
Finally, it will also be beneficial for the local authority if provincial or national 
legislation could be developed to address the issue of problem buildings in urban areas. 
This legislation should clearly delineate the owner’s duties in relation to the 
maintenance of the building. Owners should further be compelled to take active steps to 
prevent buildings from becoming unlawfully occupied.328 Such legislation should further 
make provision for the expropriation of buildings in instances where it would be 
impractical to evict the occupiers. More importantly, this legislation can even include a 
provision that would enable the forfeiture of buildings that have been ostensibly 
deserted by the owner. These buildings could be integrated into the city’s housing 
scheme.  
The effect of the developments described above is that it has become increasingly 
difficult to obtain demolition orders as a direct result of the anti-eviction provision in 
section 26(3) of the Constitution, the anti-eviction legislation developed in terms of it 
(especially PIE) and the interpretation and application of those provisions in case law. 
 
2 4 Conclusion 
This chapter shows how private land owners’ and local authorities’ demolition and 
eviction powers were employed to further the apartheid ideal of a racially segregated 
society. Apartheid legislation such as PISA created demolition and eviction powers that 
far exceeded owners’ rights under the common law as they were authorised to demolish 
structures that were erected or occupied without their consent, even though they had 
not obtained a court order. Similar powers were afforded to local authorities in relation 
to buildings that were erected or occupied without private land owners’ consent. PISA 
                                                            
328 Similar legislation was operative in the Netherlands to discourage land owners from allowing their 
buildings to become unlawfully occupied. See in this regard Van der Walt AJ ‘De onrechtmatige bezetting 
van leegstaande woningen en het eigendomsbegrip: een vergelijkende analyse van het conflict tussen de 
privaat eigendom van onroerende goed en dakloosheid’ (1991) 17 Recht en Kritiek 329-359.  Refer to 
chapter 6, section 6 5 3, footnote 142 for a brief discussion of the Leegstandwet 1986. 
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also justified evictions and demolitions on the basis of health, safety and planning 
regulations. Land owners and local authorities were compelled to demolish buildings 
that were erected without building plans and these structures were often occupied by 
marginalised black people who could not afford alternative accommodation. 
Furthermore, PISA notoriously ousted the jurisdiction of the courts to hear demolition 
disputes, unless the unlawful occupier could prove that he had a right or a title to the 
land and that his house was demolished in bad faith. This meant that most demolitions 
and evictions occurred without judicial oversight.  
 Homelessness and the unlawful occupation of land, two of the biggest socio-
economic problems currently in South Africa, can in part be ascribed to apartheid 
evictions and demolitions. More specifically, demolition greatly depleted the housing 
stock, and it destroyed the community networks that often supported poor black South 
Africans. Fortunately, the constitutional era has introduced a remarkably different 
approach to resolving eviction and demolition disputes. Two constitutional provisions 
are relevant in eviction disputes concerning the unlawful occupation of private land. 
Firstly, section 25(1) of the Constitution, which expressly recognises that ownership, 
and especially the ownership of land, can be regulated in the public interest. This aspect 
of section 25(1) confirms that ownership is not an absolute right. Section 25(1) further 
proscribes state interferences that are not imposed in terms of law of general 
application, or that result in an arbitrary deprivation of property. Regulatory laws, such 
as anti-eviction legislation, must meet these two requirements to be constitutional. 
Essentially, section 25(1) indicates that in addition to entitlements that they have in 
relation to their land, property owners have certain obligations towards their community. 
Secondly, section 26(3) of the Constitution prohibits the eviction from, or the demolition 
of, a home without a court order. Section 26(3) also proscribes arbitrary evictions. PIE 
repealed PISA and it was enacted to give effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution. PIE 
achieves this by enabling the courts to delay evictions if, after considering all the 
relevant circumstances, they find that it is neither just nor equitable to order evacuation 
of the property. Importantly, PIE makes eviction subject to certain procedural and 
substantive requirements. The substantive requirements draw the court’s attention to 
factors such as the personal and social circumstances of the occupier, the political 
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events that contributed to poverty and homelessness, and even the age of the occupier 
or whether he is disabled.329  
In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers330 the Constitutional Court 
explained that when deciding eviction disputes it could not automatically preferance the 
land owner’s rights over the rights of the unlawful occupiers. Rather, it is necessary for a 
court to balance and reconcile the opposed claims once it has taken all the relevant 
circumstances into account.331 This may mean that there will be instances where the 
court will not order the immediate eviction of occupiers from private land. However, Blue 
Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another332 
established that the state cannot abdicate its section 26 housing duties and shift them 
onto the private land owner. The implication is that it cannot be expected of the land 
owner to bear the burden of the indefinite unlawful occupation of his land. There should 
be a way to protect property rights in circumstances where it is not just or equitable to 
order the eviction of the occupiers or to allow the continued occupation of land. It is 
imperative to develop a statutory remedy that would enable the courts to better protect 
the rights of both the occupiers and private land owners. 
Finally, Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, 
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and others333 made it explicit that local 
authorities’ health and safety duties cannot automatically take precedence over 26(3) 
rights. Moreover, local authorities cannot perform health and safety duties in isolation 
from their duty to provide access to adequate housing. The practical effect of this 
judgment is that the existence of unhealthy and unsafe circumstances will not 
necessarily persuade a court to grant an eviction order. There will also be 
circumstances where local authorities would have to restore, rather than demolish 
unhealthy or dangerous buildings. In so doing, the local authorities will meet their health 
                                                            
329 Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 149. 
330 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
331 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 23. 
332 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010). 
333 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC). 
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and safety obligations as well as their constitutional obligations pertaining to social 
housing. 
As explained above, case law does not provide crystal clear solutions to eviction 
and demolition disputes. However, decisions such as Olivia Road and Blue Moonlight 
show that in the constitutional era there is an increased emphasis on the value that a 
person ascribes to his home. Furthermore, courts will not automatically prefer 
ownership or the statutory duties of local authorities over and above section 26(3) 
rights. There are instances where ownership will – at least temporarily – have to yield to 
the rights of unlawful occupiers. This is an obligation that accompanies the ownership of 
land in the constitutional era. Likewise, local authorities are expected to reconcile their 
various responsibilities. These responsibilities include their section 26(1) and (2) 
housing duties; their duty to protect property rights in certain instances and their other 
statutory responsibilities. 
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Chapter 3: 
The demolition of illegal building works 
 
3 1 Introduction 
It is generally presumed that the courts are reluctant to grant orders for the demolition of 
especially valuable buildings.1 This presumption was made explicit in a body of 
encroachment cases decided by the South African courts.2 The essence of these 
decisions is that in encroachment cases, the courts have the discretion to order the 
removal of the encroaching building or structure. In the case of Higher Mission School 
Trustees v Grahamstown Town Council,3 the court ordered the demolition of the 
encroaching structure. Sampson J concluded his judgment by stating that he wished to 
safeguard himself from being understood to  
‘hold without further argument that in a case where an extensive building has been 
erected at great expense partly upon land of little value belonging to a third party, 
the Court will be bound to order the removal of the encroachment even if it be 
established that the encroachment was made in ignorance’.4  
                                                            
1 Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 34. 
2 Building encroachments are excellent examples of illegal building works that can justify the granting of 
demolition orders. However, case law indicates that the courts are reluctant to order the demolition of 
encroaching structures in certain instances. This chapter does not discuss building encroachments in 
detail because this topic has recently been discussed elsewhere. See Temmers Z Building 
encroachments and compulsory transfer of ownership unpublished LLD thesis Stellenbosch University 
(2010), Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 132-203, Van der Walt AJ ‘Replacing property 
rules with liability rules: encroachment by building’ (2008) 125 SALJ 592-628, Pope A ‘Encroachment or 
accession? The importance of the extent of encroachment in light of South African constitutional 
principles’ (2007) 124 SALJ 537-556, O’Conner P ‘The private taking of land: adverse possession, 
encroachment by buildings and improvement under mistake’ (2006) 33 Univ of Western Australia L Rev 
31-62 and O’ Conner P ‘An adjudication rule for encroachment disputes: adverse possession or a building 
encroachment statute?’ in Cook E (ed) Modern studies in property law IV (2007) 197-217. 
3 1924 EDL 354. Refer to Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 146 for a discussion of this case. 
4 1924 EDL 354 at 366. 
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Similarly, after the court in De Villiers v Kalson,5 considered English as well as South 
African case law, it concluded that it could not find authority for the view that ‘under no 
circumstances can the court exercise such a discretion’.6 Accordingly, the court ordered 
the payment of monetary compensation instead of the removal of the building works. In 
exercising its discretion, the court took into account that the cost of the removal of the 
building would be excessive compared to the harm suffered by the plaintiff.  
In Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ‘n ander7 the court also ordered the respondent 
to pay compensation instead of removing the encroaching structures. The court 
explained that it has previously been assumed that the courts have a discretion to order 
the payment of damages in encroachment cases, although this point had never been 
decided by the courts. Consequently, the court set out to trace the historic origin of the 
discretion to order compensation instead of demolition in encroachment cases. It 
concluded that the discretion to order compensation is based on the ground of fairness.8 
With reference to the old authorities, the court held that fairness could be the foundation 
for the creation of a legal rule that sets out to resolve conflicting interests in a neighbour 
law relationship.9 A constant normative value can be ascribed to the principle of 
fairness, namely that in instances where a person causes harm to his neighbour, he has 
a duty to bear some of the harm. Fairness implies that a person must share in the harm 
that he caused his neighbour to bear.10 The court concluded that fairness, as an 
established legal rule, was recognised in the common law and that it was applicable in 
                                                            
5 1928 EDL 217. 
6 1928 EDL 217 at 231. 
7 1997 (3) SA 120 (O). Refer to Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 
De Jure 32-47 at 34 and Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 146-149 for a discussion of this 
case. 
8 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 132H-J. In this regard the court referred to arguments raised in relation to the 
English law principle of equity. The gist of these arguments was that it was incorrect for South African 
courts to rely on equity as intended in the English law, and that it could only be applied in accordance with 
the principles enunciated in Roman-Dutch law. 
9 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 136B-C. 
10 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 136C-D. 
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the context of the unique neighbour law relationship.11 Fairness dictated that prejudice 
had to be distributed equally and that both neighbours should be held accountable for 
the harm.12  
The findings in Rand Waterraad v Bothma en ’n ander were later confirmed in 
Trustees of the Brian Lackey Trust v Annandale.13 In that case the court held that it had 
a wide equitable discretion to order the payment of monetary compensation in 
encroachment cases, even if the encroachment was not small or trivial.14 However, 
such a discretion is not completely unfettered. The court held that the primary remedy 
for encroachment cases is the demolition of the encroaching building, but added that 
rigid enforcement of the remedy could lead to unjust results.15 It is for this reason that 
the court has the discretion in certain circumstances to order the payment of 
compensation instead of removal.16 The court stated that, in exercising its discretion, it 
had to take cognisance of the fact that the courts have a natural aversion to the 
demolition of valuable buildings.17 
Van der Walt explains that the series of encroachment decisions created the 
impression that the courts are unwilling to grant demolition orders (even in the instance 
of illegal buildings) if the buildings are valuable, and if demolition will result in great loss 
to the builder. He argues, with reference to recent case law, that this impression is 
wrong and that the courts are in fact willing to demolish unlawful as well as illegal 
buildings.18 In this context, buildings can be described as unlawful when they infringe 
upon the vested or acquired property rights of others and illegal when they have been 
erected in direct contravention of statutory prescriptions or requirements. A building that 
encroaches upon neighbouring land is therefore unlawful to the extent that it infringes 
                                                            
11 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 138C-D. 
12 1997 (3) SA 120 (O) 138E. 
13 2004 (3) SA 281 (C). 
14 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) para 30. 
15 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) para 32. 
16 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) para 32. 
17 2004 (3) SA 281 (C) para 38. 
18 Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 35. 
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upon the neighbour’s land, but it can also be illegal to the extent that it was erected in 
the absence of, or contrary to, approved building plans as required by applicable 
legislation. 
This chapter firstly refers to cases where the courts ordered the demolition of 
unlawful structures and in particular, structures that were built in conflict with restrictive 
conditions. Secondly, the chapter refers to cases where the courts ordered (or 
considered the possibility of ordering) the demolition of illegal structures. The second 
part of the chapter specifically refers to structures that were built without buildings plans 
and in blatant disregard of statutory provisions or requirements and, further, to 
structures that were built in accordance with building plans that were set aside on 
review. Illegal structures therefore comprise of structures that were built without building 
plans and that conflict with other relevant statutory provisions, such as environmental 
conservation legislation and, further, of buildings that were built on the basis of building 
plans that was subsequently set aside on review. In this regard the emphasis falls on 
the right of neighbouring land owners to have illegal buildings and building works 
demolished. Finally, this chapter determines the instances where the courts would be 
reluctant to order the demolition of an illegal structure. 
This chapter uses the terms ‘building’ and ‘building works’ interchangeably. Both 
terms are relevant in this chapter, depending on the unique factors of a specific building 
dispute. ‘Buildings’ refers to entire structures and ‘building works’ refers to parts of 
buildings or smaller structures such as walls or balconies. Finally, for purposes of this 
chapter ‘neighbouring land owners’ refers to land owners in the same township 
(neighbouring land owners in the broad sense) and not to owners of adjacent plots of 
land (neighbouring land owners in the narrow sense). Where necessary, the chapter 
specifies where a specific legal rule or principle will only apply to neighbouring land 
owners in the narrow sense. 
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3 2 Obtaining a demolition order in instances where restrictive conditions are 
breached 
3 2 1 General background: restrictive conditions 
The section below provides a brief background to conditions of title and restrictive 
covenants which forms part of the broader category of restrictive conditions. This 
distinction is important because, even though the practice of creating restrictive 
covenants has been abolished,19 it is still possible for plaintiffs to enforce restrictive 
covenants registered against the title deeds of their properties. However, this chapter 
refers to more recent case law concerning the strict enforcement of conditions of title by 
way of demolition orders.20 Nevertheless, the same line of reasoning adopted in these 
decisions applies equally in the instance of restrictive covenants as described below. 
Accordingly, the chapter refers to restrictive conditions as the overarching term and 
where necessary, it indicates the relevant differences or similarities between restrictive 
covenants and conditions of title. 
Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert divide restrictive conditions into the 
subcategories of restrictive covenants and conditions of title. They explain that even 
though the origins of these conditions differ, their effect on ownership remains the same 
in that both types of condition place a limitation on the exercise of ownership 
entitlements.21 Van Wyk also draws a distinction between restrictive covenants and 
conditions of title and points out that the courts have in the past confused the two 
                                                            
19 Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis 
Unisa (1990) 133 explains that the practice of inserting conditions into title deeds came into being when 
developers entered into agreements (restrictive covenants) with the purchasers of erven in newly 
established townships. At the turn of the century, this practice was taken over by legislation which 
authorised the insertion of conditions (conditions of title) into the title deeds of land. 
20 Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association and others v Minister of Planning, Culture and 
Administration, Western Cape, and others 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 324E-J; Van Rensburg and another NNO 
v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and others 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE); Van Rensburg NO and 
another v Equus Training and Consulting CC and another [2009] ZAECPEHC 50 (25 September 2009) 
and Van Rensburg NO v Naidoo NO [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010). 
21 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed (2006) 
345. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
100 
concepts.22 According to Van Wyk, the English law concept of restrictive covenants was 
first introduced into South African law during the latter half of the 19th century to 
regulate township establishment.23 Restrictive covenants are non-statutory limitations 
on the use of land, created by way of an agreement between the township owner and 
purchasers, for the purpose of protecting the unique character of the area.24 This type of 
agreement creates mutual benefits for all the property owners in the township25 and it 
becomes binding on other third parties once it is registered against the title deeds of the 
                                                            
22 Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis 
Unisa (1990) 57; Van Wyk J Planning law: principles and procedures of land-use management (1999) 16-
17; Van Wyk J ‘The nature and classification of restrictive covenants and conditions of title’ (1992) 25 De 
Jure 270-288 at 271-272, 279.  
23 Van Wyk J ‘The nature and classification of restrictive covenants and conditions of title’ (1992) 25 De 
Jure 270-288 at 271. 
24 Van Wyk J Planning law: principles and procedures of land-use management (1999) 16. Van Wyk AMA 
Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis Unisa (1990) 80-85 
and 93 explains that restrictive covenants are based on the construction of a contract for the benefit of a 
third party. The elements of this contract emanate from the English decision Elliston v Reacher (1908) 2 
Ch 374. In Elliston v Reacher the court listed four requirements to determine whether the limitations on 
the use of land were imposed to the benefit of all the owners in the township. The requirements are, 
firstly, that both the defendant and the plaintiff must have obtained ownership of their land from a 
common vendor. Secondly, prior to selling the plots, the original township owner must have laid out erven 
that were subject to restrictions in accordance with a general scheme of development. Thirdly, the original 
township owner must have created these restrictions with the intention that they benefit all other erven in 
that township. Finally, the defendant and the plaintiff (or predecessor in title) must have purchased their 
properties with the understanding that the restrictions were for the benefit of all the other properties in the 
township. Van Wyk further explains that these principles were adopted into South African law and that 
they were often employed as a guide to determine whether a contract for the benefit of a third party had 
been created.  
25 This agreement can also be concluded for the sole benefit of the township owner. Such an agreement 
is of a personal nature and it can only be enforced by the township developer and not by other owners in 
the township. See Pienaar JM Die regsaard van beperkende en dorpstigtingsvoorwaardes unpublished 
LLM thesis PU for CHE (1990) 36-37. 
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properties.26 Restrictive covenants are converted into limited real rights sui generis once 
they have been registered.27 
Conditions of title are the statutory successors of restrictive covenants. Legislation 
in the form of the provincial township ordinances was enacted to enable the 
administrators of the provinces to create and register conditions of title.28 Conditions of 
title can be interpreted in a broad or in a narrow sense. In the broad sense, conditions of 
title are all limitations that can be placed on ownership or title.29 This chapter considers 
case law concerning the enforcement of conditions of title in the narrow sense, namely 
conditions that were statutorily created and inserted into the title deeds of properties, 
                                                            
26 Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis 
Unisa (1990) 111. Restrictive covenants can be removed from the title deeds of properties by way of 
agreement, an application to a court or in terms of the Removal of Restrictions Act 84 of 1967. It is 
impractical to remove a restrictive covenant by way of an agreement if it is registered against the title 
deeds of a number of properties. The reason for this is that the consent of each owner will have to be 
obtained. The Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 enables land owners to cancel restrictive covenants by a 
notarial deed that is registered, once all the parties have agreed to remove that covenant. See Van Wyk 
AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis Unisa (1990) 
255-257. 
27 Van Wyk J ‘The nature and classification of restrictive covenants and conditions of title’ (1992) 25 De 
Jure 270-288 at 288, and to the same effect Van Wyk J Planning law: principles and procedures of land-
use management (1999) 17. Van Wyk explains that the courts and some authors have incorrectly 
classified restrictive covenants as either praedial or personal servitudes. She provides doctrinal reasons 
as to why restrictive covenants should not be classified as servitudes. See Van Wyk AMA Restrictive 
conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis Unisa (1990) 99-105 and Van 
Wyk J ‘The nature and classification of restrictive covenants and conditions of title’ (1992) 25 De Jure 
270-288 at 281-287. 
28 Van Wyk J ‘The nature and classification of restrictive covenants and conditions of title’ (1992) 25 De 
Jure 270-288 at 271-272, 279. One of the fundamental differences between restrictive covenants and 
conditions of title is that the latter are created in the public interest.  
29 Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis 
Unisa (1990) 57. According to Van Wyk, the term ‘conditions of title’ in the wide sense refers to all 
conditions, regardless of whether they are inserted into the title deed of properties or not, namely town 
planning conditions, restrictive covenants, servitudes and conditions of title (proper).  
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normally upon establishment of a new township.30 Van Wyk explains that conditions of 
title are one of two main tools to regulate the use of properties in a township, the other 
being zoning or town-planning schemes.31 It is generally accepted that the purpose of 
conditions of title is to ensure the preservation of the character of a neighbourhood.32 
They are further designed to assist in the ‘creation of a coordinated and harmonious 
layout’ of townships to the benefit of all the property owners in the area.33 Conditions of 
title are created in the public interest.34  
                                                            
30 Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis 
Unisa (1990) 27-32 and 53 explains that conditions of title in the narrow sense are usually applied in the 
context of the various town planning ordinances. Town planning ordinances that are still in operation 
include the Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (applicable in the area of the Western Cape); 
Townships Ordinance 9 of 1969 (applicable in the Free State) and the Town-planning and Townships 
Ordinance of 1986 (created for use in the area of the then Transvaal). These ordinances contain 
provisions in terms of which conditions can be created and imposed on new townships. The Town 
Planning Ordinance 27 of 1949 (created for use in the then Natal) has been repealed by the KwaZulu-
Natal Planning and Development Act 6 of 2008. 
31 Van Wyk J ‘Contravening a condition of title can result in a demolition order’ (2007) 70 THRHR 658-662 
at 660.  
32 Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis 
Unisa (1990) 135; Van Wyk J ‘Removing restrictive conditions and preserving the residential character of 
a neighbourhood’ (1992) 55 THRHR 369-385 at 372; Van Wyk J ‘Contravening a condition of title can 
result in a demolition order’ (2007) 70 THRHR 658-662 at 660. 
33 Van Wyk J ‘Removing restrictive conditions and preserving the residential character of a 
neighbourhood’ (1992) 55 THRHR 369-385 at 372. 
34 Van Wyk J ‘Removing restrictive conditions and preserving the residential character of a 
neighbourhood’ (1992) 55 THRHR 369-385 at 372. 
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South African law distinguishes between personal and praedial servitudes.35 
Likewise, a distinction is drawn between personal and praedial restrictive conditions.36 A 
personal restrictive condition is created for the benefit of the original township developer 
or owner. Upon registration, a praedial restrictive condition creates reciprocal 
obligations and mutual benefits for all the properties situated in the township.37 Praedial 
restrictive conditions are only registered against the title deed of the servient tenement 
and not against the title deed of the dominant tenements. Accordingly, there is often 
uncertainty as to who benefits from such a restrictive condition. Pienaar suggests that 
this manner of registration is a result of the fact that restrictive conditions are considered 
to be a unique form of servitude.38 By contrast, Van Wyk has convincingly argued that 
conditions of title and restrictive covenants have erroneously been forced into the 
                                                            
35 Praedial servitudes are registered over a piece of land (the servient tenement) for the benefit of a 
person in his capacity as the owner of the dominant tenement. Praedial servitudes are limited real rights 
and they are transferable since they can be enforced by the owner, or any subsequent owner, of the 
dominant tenement. Personal servitudes, by contrast, can be registered over either movable or 
immovable property and they grant certain entitlements to a specific person in his personal capacity. 
Personal servitudes are limited real rights, but they are not transferable. See Van der Merwe CG Sakereg 
2ed (1989) 459-461, Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property 5 ed (2006) 321-322 and Van der Walt AJ and Pienaar GJ Introduction to the law of property 5 
ed (2006) 233-238.  
36 Pienaar JM Die regsaard van beperkende en dorpstigtingsvoorwaardes unpublished LLM thesis PU for 
CHE (1990) 36. Pienaar uses the term restrictive conditions or ‘beperkende voorwaardes’ but does not 
specifically distinguish between conditions of title and restrictive covenants. Van Wyk J ‘The nature and 
classification of restrictive covenants and conditions of title’ (1992) 25 De Jure 270-288 at 271-272 
explains that the courts and some authors have failed to recognise the difference between restrictive 
covenants and conditions of title. These are two entirely different concepts since the former is created in 
terms of an agreement within a specific context, and the latter is created in terms of legislation.  
37 Pienaar JM Die regsaard van beperkende en dorpstigtingsvoorwaardes unpublished LLM thesis PU for 
CHE (1990) 37. 
38 Pienaar JM Die regsaard van beperkende en dorpstigtingsvoorwaardes unpublished LLM thesis PU for 
CHE (1990) 38. 
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servitude mould.39 She provides cogent reasons as to why these restrictive conditions 
should rather be categorised as limited real rights sui generis.40 Case law has confirmed 
that the limited real rights created by conditions of title and restrictive covenants amount 
to constitutional property for purposes of section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution).41  
When it comes to enforcement, restrictive conditions take precedence over the 
provisions of a zoning scheme.42 Moreover, a local authority cannot consent to the use 
of property in contravention of restrictive conditions.43 It is imperative for property 
owners to first remove such conditions from their title deeds before they can proceed to 
build in a manner that would be prohibited by that condition. Van Wyk argues that 
planning tools, such as conditions of title, have existed for more than a 100 years and 
that they have an important function insofar as they promote the orderly development of 
towns and residential areas.44 Many property owners have simply ignored restrictive 
conditions, and in particular, conditions of title registered against the title deeds of their 
properties. Unfortunately, it has also become general practice for some municipalities to 
                                                            
39 Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis 
Unisa (1990) 99-106 and 144-152, and to the same effect, Van Wyk J ‘The nature and classification of 
restrictive covenants and conditions of title’ (1992) 25 De Jure 270-288. Van Wyk provides doctrinal 
reasons why conditions of title should not be classified as servitudes. 
40 See in the regard Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments 
unpublished LLD thesis Unisa (1990) 153 and to the same effect Van Wyk J ‘The nature and 
classification of restrictive covenants and conditions of title’ (1992) 25 De Jure 270-288 at 288. 
41 Ex Parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) para 19. 
42 Malan v Ardconnel Investments (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 12 (A) 40E; Camps Bay Ratepayers and 
Residents Association and others v Minister of Planning, Culture and Administration, Western Cape, and 
others 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 325A and Van Rensburg NO v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 
2008 (2) SA 8 (SE) 10J. 
43 Enslin v Vereeniging Town Council 1976 (3) SA 443 (T) 447A-D; Malan v Ardconnel Investments (Pty) 
Ltd 1988 (2) SA 12 (A) 40E-F and Van Rensburg NO v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2008 
(2) SA 8 (SE) 11A-B. 
44 Van Wyk J ‘Contravening a condition of title can result in a demolition order’ (2007) 70 THRHR 658-662 
at 662. 
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consent to the use of property in blatant disregard of restrictive conditions.45 Van Wyk 
reasons that planning tools such as conditions of title will only be able to stave off illegal 
developments if there are effective remedies such as a demolition order available.46 
Recent case law has confirmed that conditions of title fulfil a unique function as a 
planning tool that cannot be replaced by zoning schemes.47 Furthermore, the courts 
have called on the local authorities to enforce compliance with restrictive conditions.48 
Together, these decisions indicate the circumstances under which the courts will 
apparently enforce strict compliance with restrictive conditions by ordering demolition of 
unlawful building works if necessary. 
 
                                                            
45 Van Wyk J ‘Contravening a condition of title can result in a demolition order’ (2007) 70 THRHR 658-662 
at 660. In Kotze v Haldon Estates (Edms) Bpk en andere [2010] ZAFSHC 102 (23 September 2010) 19, 
the court confirmed that an individual could not relinquish a public rights such as those created by a 
condition of title or registered servitude. In this case the court had to determine whether the municipality 
had waived its right to enforce compliance with a restrictive condition. The court held that the condition 
was registered against the title deed of the first respondent’s property and that the municipality was not 
the only beneficiary of the condition. Accordingly, the municipality could not abdicate its duty to enforce 
compliance with the condition. 
46 Van Wyk J ‘Contravening a condition of title can result in a demolition order’ (2007) 70 THRHR 658-662 
at 662. 
47 Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association and others v Minister of Planning, Culture and 
Administration, Western Cape, and others 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 324E-J; Van Rensburg and another NNO 
v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and others 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE) para 8; Van Rensburg NO 
and another v Equus Training and Consulting CC and another [2009] ZAECPEHC 50 (25 September 
2009) and Van Rensburg NO v Naidoo NO [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010) paras 34-37. 
48 Van Rensburg and another NNO v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and others 2008 (2) SA 8 
(SE) para 1 and Van Wyk J ‘Contravening a condition of title can result in a demolition order’ (2007) 70 
THRHR 658-662 at 662. Van Wyk explains that Van Rensburg v NMMM highlights the fact that conditions 
of title have a private as well as a public-law aspect. The private-law aspect relates to the relationship 
between the neighbours and the owner that contravenes conditions of title, whereas the public-law aspect 
relates to the relationship between the owner, the neighbours and the local authority that must enforce 
conditions of title. She argues that the court’s emphasis on the public-law aspect of conditions of title 
indicates that there is a duty on municipalities to act in accordance with such conditions. 
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3 2 2 Enforcement of restrictive conditions: mandatory and prohibitory interdict 
The courts enforce compliance with a condition of title and restrictive covenants either 
by way of a prohibitory interdict,49 a mandatory interdict,50 or a combination of both.51 
Usually, the courts will grant a prohibitory interdict to prevent the continuance of 
unlawful activities in contravention of the condition of title. The applicants would then 
apply for a demolition order by way of a mandatory interdict.  
                                                            
49 Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis 
Unisa (1990) 210-214. Van Wyk explains that the courts may either grant an interim interdict or a final 
interdict. The requirements for an interim prohibitory interdict are: (a) a clear or a prima facie right; (b) the 
apprehension of irreparable harm; (c) a balance of convenience in favour of the granting of an interdict 
and (d) no alternative remedy is available. See in this regard Setlogelo v Setlegelo 1914 AD 221 at 227; 
Gool v Minister of Justice 1955 (2) SA 682 (C) 688; Pietermaritzburg City Council v Local Road 
Transportation Board 1959 (2) SA 758 (N) 772 and Erikson Motors (Welkom) Ltd v Protea Motors, 
Warrenton 1973 (3) SA 685 (A) 691C-F. The requirements for a final prohibitory interdict are: (a) the 
applicant must be able to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he has a clear right; (b) actual injury 
committed or reasonable apprehension of harm and (c) no alternative remedy is available. The 
requirements for a final interdict have been set out in Setlogelo v Setlegelo 1914 AD 221 at 227 and they 
have been applied consistently by the courts. See for example Diepsloot Residents and Landowners 
Association v Administrator, Transvaal 1993 (3) SA 49 (T) 60B-C and 1994 (3) SA 336 (A) 344; Knox 
D’Arcy Ltd and others v Jamieson and others 1995 (2) SA 579 (W) 592H-593C and Sanachem (Pty) Ltd v 
Farmers Afri-Care (Pty) Ltd and others 1995 (2) SA 781 (A) 789B-D. The requirements for a mandatory 
interdict (a demolition order) are the same as for a final prohibitory interdict.  
50 Cilliers AC, Loots C and Nel HC Herbstein and Van Winsen The civil practice of the High Courts and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa Volume II 5 ed (2009) 1454-1455 explain that a mandatory 
interdict compels a person to do something so as to avoid injustice and hardship. A mandatory interdict 
also has the purpose of remedying the effects of unlawful action that has already been taken. Litigants 
will apply for a mandatory interdict if other remedies are not available or where the delay resulting from 
the use of other remedies will cause irreparable harm. 
51 Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis 
Unisa (1990) 210-216 explains that damages, instead of an interdict, can be awarded in limited 
circumstances. The circumstances are (a) if there is a minor infringement on the rights of the plaintiff; (b) 
a monetary value can be linked to the infringement; (c) the injury suffered by plaintiff can be compensated 
by way of a money payment; and (d) if the granting of an interdict is oppressive to the defendant. 
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In PS Booksellers v Harrison52 the applicants applied for an urgent interdict 
restraining the respondents from continuing with construction works in contravention of 
conditions of title and of the provisions of the zoning scheme. In support of their 
application, the applicants argued that it would be more difficult to obtain a demolition 
order once the respondent’s building was completed.53 The situation would be 
exacerbated if the property, together with the completed building works, was sold to an 
unknowing third party. The applicants argued that it would be even more difficult to 
obtain a demolition order against a bona fide purchaser, especially if the said purchaser 
was a foreigner.54 With reference to the grounds set out above, the applicants 
concluded that irreparable harm would follow if the court did not grant the urgent 
interdict. As will be shown below, these arguments now lack substance in light of the 
findings in the Van Rensburg decisions.55  
In the series of Van Rensburg decisions the respective courts had to determine 
whether they should order the demolition of buildings that had been built in blatant 
disregard of conditions of title. In Van Rensburg and another NNO v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality and others (Van Rensburg v NMMM),56 the applicants (the 
Hobie Trust) sought and obtained a demolition order with regard to works built by the 
                                                            
52 2008 (3) SA 633 (C). 
53 Similar arguments were made in Van der Westhuizen v Butler 2009 (6) SA 174 (C) 177A-G. In this 
case the applicants applied for an urgent interdict prohibiting the respondent from continuing with 
construction on the property pending the outcome of a review of, amongst other things, a decision to relax 
certain conditions of title. The applicants submitted that the application for an urgent interdict was 
prompted by the ‘fear that a completed building might render an eventual successful review brutum 
fulmen, in other words, no order for demolition would be granted, a successful review notwithstanding, 
due to a reluctance on the part of the court to order demolition of the completed building’.  
54 2008 (3) SA 633 (C) 653G. 
55 Van Rensburg and another NNO v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and others 2008 (2) SA 8 
(SE); Van Rensburg NO and another v Equus Training and Consulting CC and another [2009] 
ZAECPEHC 50 (25 September 2009) and Van Rensburg NO v Naidoo NO [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 
2010). 
56 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE). Refer to Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional property law’ 2009 ASSAL 218-258 at 
222, Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 35 and 
Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 342 footnote 15 for a discussion of this case. 
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respondents (the Shan Trust) in contravention of certain conditions of title.57 It was 
evident that the Shan Trust had a history of ignoring not only the rights of its 
neighbours, but also the land-use and building requirements laid down by the 
municipality for properties situated within its jurisdiction.58 The court confirmed, with 
reference to De Villiers v Kalson,59 that it has the discretion to either grant the 
demolition of offending buildings or order the payment of damages where a neighbour 
encroaches on the rights of other property owners in a township.60 Froneman J 
concluded that a demolition order was a more suitable remedy in this case because the 
payment of damages would not adequately compensate the applicants for the loss of 
their privacy. Moreover, the payment of damages would not restore the character of the 
neighbourhood.61  
Similarly, in Van Rensburg NO and another v Equus Training and Consulting CC 
and another (Van Rensburg v Equus Training and Consulting),62 Froneman J ordered 
the demolition of another building that was built in breach of a condition of title that was 
registered against the first respondent’s property and 71 other properties in the area. 
The first respondent had unsuccessfully applied for the removal of the condition of title 
from the title deed of his property and as result the applicants approached the court for 
a demolition order.63 It is apparent that it was the first respondent’s intention to convert 
the improved buildings into a guesthouse. The first respondent had obtained special 
consent to run a guesthouse on its property and it requested the court to exercise its 
discretion to refuse the interdicts. The following reasons were advanced in support of 
                                                            
57 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE) 11I-J and 12A-B. 
58 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE) 10F-H and 11E-H. 
59 1928 EDL 217 at 231. 
60 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE) 11C-D. 
61 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE) 11I-12A. 
62 [2009] ZAECPEHC 50 (25 September 2009). Refer to Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional property law’ 
2009 ASSAL 218-258 at 222-223 for a discussion of the case. 
63 [2009] ZAECPEHC 50 (25 September 2009) para 3. The applicants also applied for an interdict 
prohibiting the first respondent from building over the building line adjoining the street frontage of the 
bordering property. They further applied for a mandatory interdict compelling the first respondent to 
demolish the parts of the building that encroached over the building line. 
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the first respondent’s request: it had obtained special consent; other guesthouses were 
operated in the vicinity and the removal of the restrictive conditions might still occur.64  
Froneman J held that there were no exceptional circumstances in this case that 
would influence the court to not grant an interdict. Furthermore, the first respondent had 
continued with its unlawful activities for a prolonged period of time without considering 
the fact that its actions were unlawful pending the successful removal of the conditions 
of title.65 The court’s role as ‘enforcer of the law’ would be undermined if it allowed the 
respondent’s unlawful conduct (and concomitant consequences of the unlawful conduct, 
such as cost of the construction and of completed work) to stand in the way of the law 
taking its ordinary course.66 Froneman J explained that similar considerations as those 
in Van Rensburg v NMMM applied to this case and that there was no reason why it 
should not order the demolition of first respondent’s buildings.67  
In the most recent decision, Van Rensburg NO v Naidoo NO (Van Rensburg v 
Naidoo),68 the Supreme Court of Appeal (the court) ended the five year long battle 
between the Shan Trust and the Hobie Trust.69 The court had to hear two appeals. 
Firstly, it had to decide whether Van der Byl J was correct to set aside the demolition 
order granted by Froneman J in Van Rensburg v NMMM.70 Secondly, the court had to 
                                                            
64 [2009] ZAECPEHC 50 (25 September 2009) para 6. In response, the court referred to United Technical 
Equipment Co v Johannesburg City Council 1987 (4) SA 347 (T) 347G, where it was held that a court 
does not have the general discretion to postpone the operation of an interdict. The court further held that 
such a discretion only arises ‘in exceptional circumstances’. 
65 [2009] ZAECPEHC 50 (25 September 2009) para 6. 
66 [2009] ZAECPEHC 50 (25 September 2009) para 6. 
67 [2009] ZAECPEHC 50 (25 September 2009) para 7. 
68 [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010). For a discussion of this case, refer to Van der Walt AJ ‘Property’ 
(2010) 2 JQR 2.4.1 
69 These were the parties in Van Rensburg and another NNO v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 
and others 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE). 
70 [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010) para 1, with reference to Van Rensburg and another NNO v Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and others 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE).  
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decide whether the MEC had the power to remove conditions of title from the title deeds 
of properties.71 
With regard to the first appeal, the court held that there was no authority for the 
notion that property owners should not be afforded a hearing prior to the removal of 
conditions of title. In fact, such a proposition would be in conflict with the current 
constitutional structure.72 With reference to Malan v Ardconnel Investments73 the court 
confirmed that conditions of title enure to the benefit of all the erven in a township, 
unless there are indications to the contrary. These conditions are inserted in the title 
deed with the purpose of preserving the character of an area.74 The court stated that: 
‘[i]f landowners across the length and breadth of South Africa, who presently enjoy 
the benefits of restrictive conditions, were to be told that there rights, flowing from 
these conditions, could be removed at the whim of a repository power, without 
hearing them or providing an opportunity for them to object, they would rightly be in 
a state of shock’.75 
The nature of the condition of title indicated that the MEC could not remove it without 
consulting all the property owners in the area. Even if some changes have been 
allowed in the past, this does not mean that ‘further change is warranted or 
                                                            
71 [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010) para 1. This is an appeal against Dambuza J’s finding in Van 
Rensburg NO and another v MEC for Housing, Local Government and Traditional Affairs, Eastern Cape 
Province and others [2009] ZAECPEHC 27 (2 June 2009), to the effect that the MEC’s decision to 
remove conditions of title from the title deed of the property was invalid and had to be set aside. 
72 [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010) paras 32-33 The court further explained that in Garden Cities v 
Registrar of Deeds 1950 (3) SA 239 (C), it was decided that the administrator could amend or alter 
conditions of title without first consulting the affected property owners. However, this decision was 
decided 60 years ago and it would be unsustainable under the current constitutional dispensation.  
73 1988 (2) SA 12 (A) 38B-C and 39F-G. 
74 [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010) para 37. 
75 [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010) para 37. 
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unchallengeable’.76 Therefore, the MEC does not possess the power to remove the 
condition.77  
As to the second appeal the court decided that Froneman J had correctly 
concluded that a demolition order was the only way to protect the applicant’s and the 
neighbours’ rights.78 Froneman J reached this decision once he had considered the 
respondent’s flagrant disregard for the law over the years. He also considered the 
possibility of ordering the respondent to pay damages, but he correctly decided that this 
would not restore the neighbouring property owners’ rights.79 Moreover, the principle of 
legality is the ‘cornerstone’ of the Constitution and it applies to ‘government and 
governed alike’.80 Transgressors like the Shan Trust, that continuously flout the law, are 
undeserving of the protection afforded by Van der Byl AJ.81 As a result, the court upheld 
the demolition order.82 
Together, these cases show that the courts will order the demolition of structures 
built in conflict with restrictive conditions. In so doing the courts protect the character of 
the neighbourhood and the limited real rights held by other land owners in the township. 
These decisions make it clear that offending land owners will no longer be able to rely 
on the completion of building works as a fait accompli (completed building works) to 
avoid a demolition order. The value of the building works and the extent to which the 
illegal structure has been completed are generally irrelevant and will not have a bearing 
on a court’s decision to grant a demolition order. 
 
                                                            
76 [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010) para 40. 
77 [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010) paras 34 and 41. The court also stated that it was unacceptable for 
the municipality and the MECs to adopt the attitude that the zoning scheme trumped conditions of title.  
78 [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010) para 41. 
79 [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010) para 53. 
80 [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010) para 54. 
81 [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010) para 54. 
82 [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010) para 54. 
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3 2 3 Locus standi to enforce restrictive conditions 
It is generally accepted that it is the local authorities’ responsibility to enforce 
compliance with conditions of title. Pienaar explains that the unique method of 
registering restrictive conditions has led to some confusion pertaining to neighbouring 
land owners’ standing to enforce these conditions.83 Initially, the courts attempted to 
determine the question of locus standi by considering the four guidelines provided in 
Elliston v Reacher.84 In the authoritative case of Malan v Ardconnel Investments (Pty) 
Ltd (Malan v Ardconnel Investments),85 the court held that the plaintiff did not have to 
comply with the Elliston v Reacher requirements to establish locus standi. Furthermore, 
                                                            
83 Pienaar JM Die regsaard van beperkende en dorpstigtingsvoorwaardes unpublished LLM thesis PU for 
CHE (1990) 38.  
84 [1908] 2 Ch 374; see further Malan v Ardconnel Investments (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 12 (A); Pienaar JM 
Die regsaard van beperkende en dorpstigtingsvoorwaardes unpublished LLM thesis PU for CHE (1990) 
43. For a more comprehensive explanation of the arguments surrounding locus standi to enforce 
restrictive conditions refer to Van der Westhuizen JM ‘Locus standi in judicio van persone wat nakoming 
van beperkende voorwaardes eis; regsaard van beperkende voorwaardes: Malan v Ardconnel 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 12 (A)’ (1990) 53 THRHR 130-136 at 133. Refer to footnote 24 for an 
overview of the Elliston v Reacher requirements.   
85 1988 (2) SA 12 (A) 30I-33C. In this case the township owner applied to have a township established 
under the Townships and Town-Planning Ordinance 11 of 1931 (T). The application was successful and 
263 erven were created. Various restrictive conditions were registered against the title deeds of the 
properties. The respondent purchased erf 184, which fell into the category of a special business erf – a 
property that could only be used for trade and business purposes. Registered against the title deed of erf 
184 were restrictive conditions B1, B2, B3, B8 and B9. The appellant purchased erf 42, an industrial erf, 
with restrictive conditions B1, B2, B8 and B9 and B7. Restrictive condition B7 indicated that the property 
was an industrial erf, subject to certain limitations including the fact that the property could not be used for 
‘retail trading’. The appellant leased his property to the second appellant, who proceeded to conduct a 
retail food store on the premises, in contravention of the restrictive condition B7. The respondent 
approached the Witwatersrand Local Division for an urgent interdict prohibiting the use of the appellant’s 
property in contravention of the restrictive condition. The interdict was granted and subsequently the 
appellant appealed against the decision of the court a quo. Specifically, the appellants challenged the 
locus standi of the respondent to enforce compliance with the condition. In support of their challenge, the 
appellants relied on the fact that the restrictive condition was imposed for the benefit of the township 
owner. Furthermore, the appellants argued that the respondents did not comply with the requirements of 
Elliston v Reacher [1908] 2 Ch 374 as restrictive condition B7 was not common to both properties.  
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the court held that South African law has the advantage that restrictive conditions86 ‘run 
with the land in townships as registered servitudes’.87 It held that the restrictive 
conditions (described as registered servitudes) were of a praedial nature as they 
created reciprocal obligations that operated for the benefit of all the properties in a 
township.88 Different restrictive conditions were registered against the various properties 
in the case, but in the court’s view this did not detract from the fact that a praedial 
servitude was created with the concomitant consequence that it could be enforced by 
                                                            
86 The court does not use the term ‘restrictive conditions’ but rather restrictive title conditions. See Malan v 
Ardconnel Investments (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 12 (A) 36J.  
87 1988 (2) SA 12 (A) 36J and 37A-J. The court explained that in South African law a distinction is drawn 
between personal and praedial servitudes. It explained that normally the details of the servitude holder (in 
the case of a personal servitude) or the dominant tenement (in the case of a praedial servitude) are 
registered against the title deed of the servient tenement. For the sake of convenience the details of the 
praedial servitude are also inserted in the title deed of the dominant tenement. In the instance of 
restrictive conditions, the condition is registered against the deed of the servient tenement, but the details 
of the beneficiaries of the condition are not indicated on the title deed of the servient tenement. Compare 
fn 39 above. 
88 1988 (2) SA 12 (A) 39F. 
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any property owner in the township.89 Stated differently, Malan v Ardconnel Investments 
is authority for the principle that a property owner can enforce restrictive conditions that 
are of a praedial nature, registered against the property of a neighbour, even if that 
specific restriction does not appear on the title deed of his own property.90  
This position has since been confirmed by a series of cases where the respective 
courts found that land owners in a township, and voluntary associations acting on behalf 
                                                            
89 1988 (2) SA 12 (A) 38A-C, 39H. The court held that it is a ‘matter of interpretation to establish whether 
the restrictive conditions were made pursuant to a general scheme for the reciprocal benefit of the erven’. 
The court further explained that one had to consider all the surrounding circumstances as well as the 
nature of the restrictive conditions to ascertain whether a restrictive condition is of a praedial or a 
personal nature. Similarly, in Kotze v Haldon Estates (Edms) Bpk en andere [2010] ZAFSHC 102 (23 
September 2010) the court had to determine whether a neighbouring property owner (the applicant) had 
the locus standi to enforce compliance with restrictive conditions registered against the title deed of the 
first respondent. The municipality was indicated as the beneficiary of the condition. The court explained 
with reference to Ex Parte Rovian Trust (Pty) Ltd 1983 (3) SA 209 (D) 213B-C that all the owners in a 
town-planning scheme (dorpaanlegskema) have the right to enforce compliance with restrictive 
conditions. A court cannot allow deviation from the restrictive condition even if only one owner objects to 
such a change. This is so regardless of the fact that the owner’s objection against the deviation is trivial. 
The court referred to the circumstances under which the condition was created as well as to related 
factors. It concluded that the condition dealt with the first respondent’s use rights pertaining to his 
property and that all the property owners in the area had a right to enforce compliance with that condition. 
This meant that the applicant, as beneficiary of the condition, possessed the locus standi to enforce 
compliance with the restrictive condition. 
90 Van Wyk in Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished 
LLD thesis Unisa (1990) 189-199 explains that the courts have not drawn a distinction between the locus 
standi to enforce conditions created by contract (restrictive covenants) and conditions created by 
legislation (conditions of title). Rather, the courts have relied on the following principles to determine the 
question of locus standi: firstly, a plaintiff must show that he has a personal interest in the enforcement of 
the restriction. Secondly, if legislation is enacted for the benefit of a specific group of persons, those 
persons will have the right to enforce that restriction. Thirdly, if legislation is enacted in the public interest 
any member of the public will have locus standi, provided that he can prove that he has suffered damage. 
If a restriction is imposed to the benefit all property owners in an area, those property owners will have 
locus standi. Finally, property owners within the area of a town-planning scheme have the right to enforce 
compliance with that scheme. Van Wyk concludes that it is no longer necessary to distinguish between 
conditions of title and restrictive covenants for purposes of locus standi. 
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of land owners, have standing to enforce compliance with legislation, zoning schemes 
or restrictive conditions.91 In PS Booksellers (Pty) Ltd and another v Harrison and others 
(PS Booksellers v Harrison)92 for example, the court confirmed the locus standi of a 
voluntary association to restrictive conditions and the provisions of a zoning scheme. 
The respondents questioned the second applicant’s (the Camps Bay Residents and 
Ratepayers Association) standing on the grounds that the voluntary association was not 
a party to the pending appeal.93 In response, the court held that the respondents’ 
argument ‘flies in the face of the recognized standing of residents and property owners, 
in a community or township to enforce the provisions of zoning schemes’.94 The court 
confirmed the significance of voluntary associations, stating that the respondents’ 
argument ignored the ‘developing and modern approach’ of standing of an association 
such as the second applicant, which represented the interests of residents and 
ratepayers in a specific community.95 It held that the second applicant’s standing 
derived from the fact that it had an interest (as an association acting on behalf of 
homeowners and residents) in the enforcement of the restrictive condition and the 
                                                            
91 Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 348 with reference to Erf 167 Orchards CC v Greater 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Council Johannesburg Administration and another 1999 CLR 91 (W); PS 
Booksellers (Pty) Ltd and another v Harrison and others 2008 (3) SA 633 (C) para 19; Chairperson, 
Walmer Estates Residents Community Forum and another v City of Cape Town and others 2009 (2) SA 
175 (C) and Tergniet and Toekoms Action Group and 34 others v Outeniqua Kreosootpale (Pty) Ltd and 
others [2009] ZAWCHC 6 (23 January 2009) para 22. 
92 2008 (3) SA 633 (C) 638G-639E. 
93 2008 (3) SA 633 (C) 639G. 
94 2008 (3) SA 633 (C) 638H. 
95 2008 (3) SA 633 (C) 638I-J. In support of this statement the court referred to Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality and others v Greyvenouw CC and others 2004 (2) SA 81 (SE) 103C-F, where 
Plasket J explained that the standing of associations was recognised even during the era of ‘restrictive 
pre-1994 common-law rules of standing’. He further explained that under the Constitution courts are 
required to promote the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights and section 34 of the Constitution 
makes provision for ‘the entrenchment of the fundamental right of access to court’. The rules of standing, 
in a constitutional setting, must be applied broadly and the common law must be developed to recognise 
standing of associations that act in the public interest. 
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zoning regulation. Its interest did not stem from its status in terms of the appeal.96 
Therefore, one can conclude in light of PS Booksellers v Harrison that a voluntary 
association (such as a neighbours’ or ratepayers’ association) does have locus standi to 
act on behalf of a property owner, or all the owners in a township who seek enforcement 
of restrictive conditions.97 
Finally, section 38 of the Constitution provides that ‘anyone’ listed in the section 
can approach the court alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights had been infringed, 
including ‘anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of 
persons’98 and anyone who acts in the public interest.99 As explained above, the limited 
                                                            
96 2008 (3) SA 633 (C) 639E. 
97 The standing of a voluntary association acting on behalf of property owners in an area was also 
confirmed in Tergniet and Toekoms Action Group and 34 others v Outeniqua Kreosootpale (Pty) Ltd and 
others [2009] ZAWCHC 6 (23 January 2009) para 22. 
98 Section 38(c) of the Constitution. For a detailed discussion of section 38(c) of the Constitution refer to 
Loots C ‘Standing, ripeness and mootness’ in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of 
South Africa Volume 1 2 ed (2003 original service Dec 2003) chapter 7 at 7-10. Loots explain that this 
provision recognises a class action in South African law. See in this regard Bafokeng Tribe v Impala 
Platinum Ltd and others 1999 (3) SA 517 (B), where the court decided that the Bafokeng tribe did have 
the locus standi to assert the rights of its members in court. The words ‘acting as a member of or in the 
interest of’ illustrates that a plaintiff does not necessarily have to pursue an ‘own interest’. In this regard 
Loots refers to Minister of Health and Welfare v Woodcarb (Pty) Ltd and another 1996 (3) SA 155 (N), 
where the court decided that the minister did have the locus standi to prevent atmospheric pollution on 
the grounds of section 29 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (the Interim 
Constitution). 
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real rights created by conditions of title and restrictive covenants are recognised as 
constitutional property for purposes of section 25 of the Constitution.100 This provision 
confirms that land owners, and voluntary associations acting on behalf of land owners, 
will have the standing to assert their constitutional rights in court.101 In conclusion, 
neighbouring land owners and voluntary associations acting on behalf of neighbouring 
land owners has the locus standi to enforce compliance with restrictive conditions by 
requesting of the court to order the demolition of unlawful structures in their 
neighbourhood. 
 
3 2 4 Removal of restrictive conditions 
As explained above, property owners must first remove restrictive conditions from their 
title deeds before they can proceed to build in manner that would otherwise be 
prohibited by those conditions. Van Wyk explains that property owners can remove 
conditions of title by way of a court order or by way of an application to the Administrator 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
99 Section 38(d) of the Constitution. For a more comprehensive discussion of section 38(d) refer to Loots 
C ‘Standing, ripeness and mootness’ in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South 
Africa Volume 1 2 ed (2003 original service: Dec 2003) chapter 7 at 7-11-7-12. Loots refers to O’ Regan 
J’s dissenting judgement in Ferreira v Levin NO and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell NO and 
others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC), where she held that a litigant had the right to claim relief in the public 
interest on the grounds of section 7(4)(v) of the Interim Constitution. Loots explains that section 7(4)(v) of 
the Interim Constitution is ‘virtually identical’ to section 38(d) of the Constitution. Reference is also made 
to Port Elizabeth Municipality v Prut NO and another 1996 (4) SA 318 (E) 325-326, where the municipality 
applied for an order declaring that it did not unfairly discriminate against certain ratepayers by writing off 
debts owed by areas governed by the Black Local Authorities Act 102 of 1982. The court held, on the 
basis of section 7(4)(v) of the Interim Constitution, that the municipality was acting in the public interest. 
Finally, Loots refers to Van Rooyen and others v the State and others 2001 (4) SA 396 (T) 423G-H, 
where the court determined that a magistrate and the Association of Regional Magistrates of South Africa 
were acting in the public interest by challenging the constitutional validity of the Magistrates Commission 
established in terms of the Magistrates Act 90 of 1993. The court held that the litigants could rely on 
section 38(d) for standing.  
 100 Ex Parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) para 19. 
101 Chapter 5 elaborates on the constitutional implications of the non-enforcement of conditions of title and 
restrictive covenants. 
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in terms of the Removal of Restrictions Act 84 of 1967 (the Removal Act).102 The 
application for a court order can either be an ex parte application or an application on 
notice. In the case of the former, a rule nisi would typically be granted calling on any 
person to show cause as to why the condition of title should not be expunged from the 
title deed.103 In the case of the latter a notice must be served on all erf holders who 
benefit from the condition.104 Van Wyk further explains that the purpose of the Removal 
Act is to provide procedures in terms of which restrictive conditions can be removed, 
altered or suspended by the administrator of the province on his own accord; or upon 
application by any person, or at the request of the minister. Other ways in which 
restrictive conditions can be removed include the wording of the condition; in terms of 
the provincial ordinances; by renunciation and by way of prescription.105 
The Western Cape decision, Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association 
and others v Minister of Planning, Culture and Administration, Western Cape, and 
others (Camps Bay),106 dealt with the negligence of the local authority in removing 
conditions of title. In this case the applicants, a voluntary association of homeowners, 
                                                            
102 Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis 
Unisa (1990) 257-282. 
103 Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis 
Unisa (1990) 258-259 explains that in this instance a condition will be removed on the basis of implied 
consent. If there are no objections, the court can infer that all the land owners had consented to the 
removal of the condition. Importantly, any objection from a neighbouring land owner will be sufficient to 
veto the decision to remove the condition.  
104 Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis 
Unisa (1990) 262-264 explains that application by notice is the less popular procedure because of the 
costs involved in notifying each neighbour would be affected by the removal. 
105 Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis 
Unisa (1990) 257-282. At 255-256 Van Wyk explains that restrictive covenants can also be removed by 
way of an inter partes mutual agreement. The land owner is required to obtain the consent of all land 
owners that are party to the agreement (in other words the restrictive covenant is registered against their 
title deeds) before he can have the covenant removed. This method of removal is only applicable to 
restrictive covenants (and not to conditions of title) because they are created in terms of an agreement. A 
land owner can also remove a restrictive covenant in terms of the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937.  
106 2001 (4) SA 294 (C). 
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applied to have the first respondent’s (the minister’s) decision to remove certain 
restrictive conditions set aside on review.107 This was the second round of review 
proceedings launched against a decision to remove title deed conditions.108 In support 
of the application for review, the applicants relied on the fact that the minister, in 
reaching his decision to remove the restrictive conditions, did not comply with the 
                                                            
107 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 302B-J, 303E-J, 304A-H, 305A-C. The other respondents were the City of Cape 
Town (second respondent), the property owner (the third respondent) and a banking institution that 
financed the development (the fourth respondent). This matter was brought to court on the ground that 
the property owner stood to incur financial losses and because of the possibility that the development was 
unlawful, which could result in application for a demolition order. 
108 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 302B-J, 303E-J, 304A-H, 305A-I. The first round of review proceedings was 
launched against the decision of the erstwhile Director of Local Government, to remove the condition of 
title that prohibited the erection of flats on the property. This condition was removed without complying 
with statutory formalities. As a result, the condition of title did not appear on the title deed at the time 
when the third respondent purchased the land with the intention of constructing ultra-luxurious flats on the 
property. The respondent obtained three mortgage bonds to the value of R12 million to finance the 
development and building plans were submitted for approval to the municipality. The municipality did not 
refer the building plans to the applicants for comments (as was usual practice) since the conditions of title 
did not on the face of it prohibit the erection of flats. As a result, no objections were raised against the 
proposed development and the plans were approved. Shortly after approval, the property owner 
commenced to develop the property. In March 1997 interested parties launched proceedings (known as 
the first review application) to have the decision to remove the condition of title reviewed and set aside. 
During May 1997 the third respondent yet again applied, in terms of the procedures of the Act, to have 
the condition of title removed. This application was approved in 1998 and subsequently the developer 
applied for the discharge of the interdict given during the first review proceedings. Consequently, the 
applicants re-launched the application for the review of the decision to remove the conditions of title. 
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procedure for removal set out in the Removal Act.109 The court’s attention was drawn to 
specific irregularities, namely the premature objection process,110 unlawful delegation of 
authority,111 absence of notice to all affected parties112 and failure to consider 
                                                            
109 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 317A-B, with reference to the Removal of Restrictions Act 84 of 1967. The 
province of Gauteng has its own legislation in terms of which restrictions registered against land can be 
removed, namely the Gauteng Removal of Restrictions Act 3 of 1996. Van Wyk AMA Restrictive 
conditions as urban land-use planning instruments unpublished LLD thesis Unisa (1990) 274-278 
explains that the Removal of Restrictions Act 84 of 1967 enables the administrator, either on his own 
accord or on application by a property owner, to remove, alter or suspend restrictions that are registered 
against land. The administrator may only act to remove restrictions, if it is desirable and in the interest of 
the township or in the public interest. Prior to removing a condition on his own accord, the administrator 
must inform the local authority and request that comments and recommendations be made within a 
stipulated time period. A notice must be published in the official Gazette and individual notices may be 
given to all property owners directly affected by the decision. A property owner must lodge an application 
for the removal of the condition with the local authority and the provincial secretary or, alternatively, with 
the provincial secretary. The provincial secretary must cause a notice to be published in the official 
Gazette, which invites the public to inspect the application. Notice may also be served on every owner 
directly affected by the application for removal, and a copy of each objection received must be served on 
the applicant. Upon the expiry of the time period, the objections, as well the applications will be lodged 
with the Townships Board for inspection, which will then make a recommendation to the administrator. 
The administrator will then decide whether the condition should be removed. It is also possible for the 
administrator to make the removal subject to certain conditions. For more information in this regard, refer 
to Van Wyk ‘Removing restrictive conditions and preserving the residential character of a neighbourhood’ 
(1992) 55 THRHR 369-385 as well as to Van Wyk J Planning law: principles and procedures of land-use 
management (1999) 190-236. 
110 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 317C-F. Section 3(2) of Act 84 of 1967 stipulates that the local authority must 
consider the application for removal, whereafter it must forward the original application, together with its 
comments and recommendations, to the director-general. The director-general must initiate the process 
of notification and call for objections once he has received the application, comments and 
recommendations from the local authority. In this case the municipality did not comply with the directions 
of section 3(2) as it called for objections prior to forwarding the applications and its recommendations to 
the director-general. The court held that it could ‘not safely say that the departure from the prescribed 
procedure did not affect the final result’. 
111 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 317G-318A-D. 
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objections.113 The court held that the minister’s decision was flawed due to his failure to 
consider objections and the abovementioned irregularities in the decision-making 
process.114 In considering the justifiability of the minister’s decision, the court referred to 
section 2(1) of the Removal Act, which stipulates that the minister can only grant the 
removal of the conditions if one or more circumstances in sections 2(1)(a) and (b) were 
present. The court reasoned that it only had to consider section 2(1)(a), which stipulates 
that the minister ‘must be satisfied’ that it is ‘desirable’ to remove the conditions as it is 
‘1) in the interest of the establishment or development of any township; or 2) in the 
interest of any area; or 3) in the public interest’.115 Some of the reasons advanced by 
the minister to justify his decision were the fact that the development would conform to 
existing developments;116 that the development would not detract from the character of 
the neighbourhood117 and the fact that the development corresponded with the zoning 
scheme.118 The court determined that the ‘fact that a new development conforms to 
existing developments does not show that the new development is in the interests of the 
township, the area or the public’.119 Similarly, a development is not in the interest of the 
township, area or public simply because it will not detract from the character of the 
neighbourhood.120  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
112 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 318E-I. Notice was only given to nine owners in the vicinity. The court explained 
that the decision was ‘so obviously wrong that no person properly applying his or her mind to the matter 
could have reached the conclusion that only these nine persons were ‘directly affected’ by the removal 
application’. Every person in the township was entitled to be informed of the removal application. 
113 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 318J-320F. 
114 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 320F. 
115 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 320J-321A-B. 
116 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 322A-B. 
117 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 323G-H. 
118 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 324E-F. 
119 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 323C. 
120 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 323H. 
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With reference to Malan v Ardconnel Investments121 the court confirmed that 
restrictive conditions take precedence over the zoning scheme of a township.122 The 
court held that: 
‘[i]f it were in the public interest for all properties to be subject only to zoning 
restrictions, the Legislature would simply have abolished all restrictive title deed 
conditions by statute. Instead, it has laid down a procedure whereby such title deed 
restrictions can be removed only if to do so would specifically be in the interest of 
the township, area or public. Indeed, a theme running through the arguments put up 
by the developer in support of the removal application is that restrictive conditions 
are a relic of the past and should be abolished in favour of the zoning scheme.’123 
The court continued that ‘this is not the philosophy of the Act and it was inappropriate 
and irregular for the Minister to have allowed himself to be swayed by this 
consideration’.124 Consequently, the court set aside the minister’s decision to remove 
the conditions of title, with the implication that the third respondent’s activities became 
unlawful.125 The third respondent was interdicted from continuing with the building works 
in contravention of the conditions of title.126 Moreover, the applicants became entitled to 
apply for demolition of the existing structures built on the third respondent’s property.127 
                                                            
121 1988 (2) SA 12 (A) 40E-F. 
122 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 324F. 
123 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 324H. 
124 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 324G-I. 
125 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 328A-B. 
126 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 329G. 
127 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 329J. 
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Camps Bay firstly shows that the removal of restrictive conditions is a complicated 
and cumbersome process. Secondly, it confirms that the courts will enforce compliance 
with a restrictive condition even if the land owner constructed a building in bona fide 
belief that his actions would not conflict with such as condition. Restrictive conditions 
constitute limited real rights and they fulfil an important function as a town-planning tool. 
It is therefore desirable for the court to enforce compliance with restrictive conditions if 
necessary by way of a demolition order, even if it causes some hardship for the 
offending land owner. Generally, it is also clear that there are instances where it would 
be impossible for the land owner to have the conditions expunged from his title deed. 
Typically, this would be where neighbouring land owners, as the holders of limited real 
rights created by conditions of title, object to such a removal. Camps Bay also 
emphasise that it is extremely important to follow the correct procedures set out in the 
Removal Act. The land owner in Camps Bay faced the potential demolition of its 
apartment blocks because they were constructed in conflict with a condition of title that 
was incorrectly removed from the title deed.   
 
3 2 5 Conclusion 
The fundamental difference between the three Van Rensburg cases128 and the Camps 
Bay129 judgment is that in the former the respondents had blatantly contravened the 
conditions of title, whereas in the latter, the respondent’s contravention of the condition 
of title could be ascribed to the city’s negligence to effectively remove the condition from 
the title deed. The outcome of these decisions is, however, more or less the same. In 
the Van Rensburg cases, the respective courts ordered the demolition of the buildings 
to the extent that they contravened the condition of title. In Camps Bay, the court 
ordered that any one of the applicants ‘may apply to Court at any time for an order 
                                                            
128 Van Rensburg and another NNO v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and others 2008 (2) SA 
8 (SE); Van Rensburg NO and another v Equus Training and Consulting CC and another [2009] 
ZAECPEHC 50 (25 September 2009) and Van Rensburg NO v Naidoo NO [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 
2010). 
129 2001 (4) SA 294 (C). 
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directing the third respondent forthwith to demolish all building work’ built in 
contravention of conditions of title.130 Collectively, these cases make it clear that it is 
unlawful for a person to proceed with building operations prior to having conflicting 
restrictive conditions removed in accordance with the Removal Act. Furthermore, if a 
person should proceed with building works in conflict with a restrictive condition that had 
not been removed lawfully the courts will more often than not order demolition of the 
unlawful building works. A relevant factor is whether a person has proceeded with 
building operations, pending the outcome of removal proceedings. Additionally, it is 
evident that the court will not allow a factor such as the financial loss suffered by the 
guilty property owner to stand in the way of granting a demolition order in instances 
where it is justified to do so. With reference to all three the Van Rensburg decisions, 
that property owners who have built in contravention of restrictive conditions will no 
longer be able to successfully rely on a fait accompli (completed building works) in the 
hope of avoiding a demolition order, if such an opportunity ever existed before these 
decisions. 
An important aspect of the Camps Bay decision is that it confirmed that conditions 
of title (and other restrictive conditions) fulfil an important function as a town-planning 
tool. The court explained that the restrictive conditions are not a ‘relic of the past’ and 
that it still performs an important function as a town-planning tool.131 It also emphasised 
that to have a restrictive condition removed the minister has to be satisfied that it would 
be in the interest of the area, township and in the public interest. A potential 
development will only comply with these requirements if it constitutes an actual 
improvement to the area where it is built. A building that conforms to existing 
developments in the area or that does not detract from the character of an area does 
not amount to an improvement. In light of this consideration, one can argue that a 
contravening owner would have to prove that his development would be in the interest 
of the public and of the area where it is situated to avoid a demolition order. Similarly, a 
court must apply the same criteria when having to decide whether a building, built in 
                                                            
130 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 329J. 
131 Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association and others v Minister of Planning, Culture and 
Administration, Western Cape, and others 2001 (4) SA 294 (C) 324H-I. 
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contravention of a restrictive condition would have to be demolished or partially 
demolished so as to bring such a structure in line with the condition. It can only refuse to 
order the demolition of an unlawful development if the development itself will be in the 
interest of an area, township and the public. Furthermore, even if there have been some 
changes in the area, this does not necessarily mean that further change is warranted.132 
One can argue that a demolition order or a partial demolition order133 is a more 
suitable remedy to protect the rights of property owners in a specific township. The 
reason for this is that it is unclear which neighbouring land owners’ should be 
compensated for the breach of a restrictive condition. A damages award, will arguably, 
only be paid to adjacent neighbouring land owners. This remedy is unsuitable to 
vindicate the limited real rights held by all the land owners in the township. Finally, 
demolition or partial demolition of a building is preferable to a damages order because 
the latter remedy will not restore the character of the neighbourhood once it is tarnished 
by a contravening building.134 It may seem excessive to order the demolition of a 
building especially where, as in Camps Bay, the property owner had acted in bona fide 
belief that he was acting in accordance with the law. Nevertheless, as Van Wyk argues, 
the property owner is not left without a remedy as he can hold the local authority 
delictually liable for negligence.135  
In conclusion, illegal and unlawful land uses are on the increase despite the 
existence of town-planning tools such as restrictive conditions that regulate land use. 
Possibly, this can be ascribed to the failure of local authorities, for whatever reason, to 
efficiently regulate building and development in their area. Restrictive conditions such 
                                                            
132 Van Rensburg NO v Naidoo NO [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010) para 40. 
133 A partial demolition order will compel the local authority to demolish those parts of a building that are 
prohibited by the restrictive condition. For example, the local authority can be compelled by a court to 
demolish an additional storey that the owner built in contravention of restrictive conditions.  
134 Van Wyk J ‘Contravening a condition of title can result in a demolition order’ (2007) 70 THRHR 658-
662 at 661 with reference to Van Rensburg and another v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and 
others 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE). 
135 Van Wyk J ‘Revaluation of conditions of title: Camps Bay Ratepayers Association v Minister of 
Planning Western Cape 2001 (4) SA 294 (C)’ (2002) 65 THRHR 642-649 at 648. 
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as conditions of title remain an indispensable planning tool and can assist local 
authorities to regulate developments in the area of their jurisdiction, provided that these 
restrictions are effectively enforced. The Van Rensburg cases and the Camps Bay case 
illustrate the value of a demolition order as a means of enforcement. A demolition order 
protects the rights of other property owners and restores the character of a 
neighbourhood. A demolition order can also serve as a deterrent to property owners 
that intend to develop properties in contravention of restrictive conditions. 
 
3 3 The demolition of illegal buildings  
3 3 1 Introduction 
As explained above,136 there is a general belief that the courts are unwilling to demolish 
especially valuable buildings. There are, however, some older cases where the courts 
have ordered the demolition of illegal buildings.137 For purposes of this discussion illegal 
buildings are buildings that were built in disregard or contravention of legislation such as 
the town-planning ordinances, the National Building Regulations and Building Standards 
Act 103 of 1977 (the Building Standards Act) or other applicable legislation. The 
defining characteristic of illegal buildings is that building plans for these buildings have 
never been approved by the local authority as required by law or that they have not 
been built according to the approved plans. Often, in addition to the lack of approved 
building plans, these buildings will contravene other statutory enactments such as 
legislation designed to protect the health and safety interests of the public or to preserve 
the environment. Where the unlawful buildings referred to in the previous section 
conflicted with established private-law rights, illegal buildings contravene the objective 
law. In principle, the case in favour of a demolition order should therefore be even 
stronger. 
                                                            
136 See section 3 1. 
137 Ostrowiak v Pinetown Town Board 1948 (3) SA 548 (D); Johannesburg City Council v Bruma Thirty-
Two (Pty) Ltd 1984 (4) SA 87 (T); Transvaalse Raad vir die Ontwikkeling van Buitestedelike Gebiede v 
Venter 1985 (3) SA 979 (T). 
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There are older cases where the courts have ordered the demolition of buildings 
that were not erected in accordance with approved building plans. An example of such a 
case is Ostrowiak v Pinetown Town Board,138 where the court confirmed the power of 
the respondent to demolish two rondavels built by the applicant without submitting 
building plans as required by certain by-laws. The court concluded its judgment by 
stating: 
‘I cannot leave the case without calling attention to one feature: An attempt has 
been made in this case to invoke the Court’s indulgence on the ground of apparent 
hardship, notwithstanding the very clear terms of the legislation. The sympathies of 
the Court and its view of the general public interest can have no bearing upon a 
matter of this sort … The public interest requires that the control and regulation of 
buildings in local authority areas should be placed in the hands of the local authority 
itself. This may, in individual cases, cause some hardship, but if private persons are 
permitted to erect buildings in the teeth of the law, then there is an end to any sound 
local government.’139 
Similarly, in the case of Transvaalse Raad vir die Ontwikkeling van Buitestedelike 
Gebiede v Venter,140 the court confirmed the applicant’s power to demolish four houses 
and the accompanying car ports on the grounds that the respondent had built them in 
contravention of the provisions of the town-planning scheme created in terms of the 
Town-planning and Townships Ordinance 25 of 1965 (T). The respondent had also 
failed to submit building plans for the houses that were built on the property. The court 
held, with reference to Ostrowiak v Pinetown Town Board,141 that the applicant had a 
statutory duty to ensure compliance with the town-planning scheme by exercising 
control over the nature and extent of building operations.142 It was clear that the 
respondent would suffer hardship once the applicant had performed its statutory duties, 
                                                            
138 1948 (3) SA 548 (D). 
139 1948 (3) SA 548 (D) 591. 
140 1985 (3) SA 979 (T). 
141 1948 (3) SA 548 (D). 
142 1985 (3) SA 979 (T) 987H-I. 
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but the respondent had brought the hardship upon himself. The court will not allow an 
individual to jeopardise the effectiveness of the entire town-planning scheme.143  
In more recent case law144 the courts adopted a similar attitude as in Ostrowiak v 
Pinetown Town Board and Transvaalse Raad vir die Ontwikkeling van Buitestedelike 
Gebiede v Venter. Together, these decisions show that the courts are prepared to order 
the demolition of buildings to compel the local authority to observe its statutory duties, 
or alternatively, to assist the local authority to enforce compliance with building and 
development laws in its area of jurisdiction. These cases further illustrate the various 
interests that will be protected by the granting of a demolition order in the instance of 
illegal building works.  
 
3 3 2 Recent case law concerning illegal buildings 
3 3 2 1 The locus standi to enforce compliance with the law 
Within the context of illegal buildings it is generally accepted that local authorities have 
a duty to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Building Standards Act and 
similar legislative instruments. Section 21 of the Building Standards Act provides, for 
example, that the local authority can approach the magistrates’ court for an order to 
prevent any person from erecting a building that does not comply with the provisions of 
the Act. The local authority can also apply for a demolition order for any building that 
does not comply with the provisions of the Act. Recent case law where the courts 
emphasised the duty of the local authority to enforce legislation includes Ruck v 
Makana Municipality and others145 where, with reference to Odendaal v Eastern 
                                                            
143 1985 (3) SA 979 (T) 987I. The exact words of the court were: ‘[e]k kan nie toelaat dat sulke 
willekeurige optrede van individue die hele administrasie van die skema in chaos dompel nie’. 
144 Barnett and others v Minister of Land Affairs and others 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA); City of Tshwane v 
Ghani 2009 (5) SA 563 (T); Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Swartland Municipality and others [2010] 
ZAWCHC 103 (31 May 2010) and Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Swartland Municipality and others 
[2011] ZASCA 106 (1 June 2011). 
145 [2010] ZAECGHC 111 (24 November 2010). 
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Metropolitan Local Council,146 the court explained that legislation such as zoning laws 
imposes onerous duties on local authorities. The purpose of these duties, as well as the 
powers bestowed on local authorities, is to ensure ‘that the objectives of the legislative 
instruments are achieved’ and ‘that there is a balance of interests within a geographical 
community’.147 Moreover, the local authority is the guardian of the community’s interest 
and the individual interests of the property owners in its jurisdiction. Towards the 
conclusion of the judgment the court reminded the municipality that it has a duty to 
order the cessation of the further construction of illegal structures and to order the 
demolition of such a building if necessary. Likewise, in Liebenberg v Frater NO and 
others, Drakenstein Municipality v Frater NO and others148 the court confirmed that the 
municipality has a prima facie right to enforce compliance with the zoning scheme as 
and with the Building Standards Act. This right is born from the fact that the municipality 
administers the zoning scheme in its area of jurisdiction as prescribed by section 39 of 
the Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985. The municipality also has a duty to 
ensure compliance with the Building Standards Act.149 By virtue of their statutory duties, 
local authorities therefore have locus standi to enforce compliance with the law.150 
Cilliers, Loots and Nel further explain that a private person will also have standing 
to enforce compliance with legislation in three instances.151 Firstly, if the legislation was 
enacted in the interest of a specific class of persons, any member of that class can 
enforce compliance with that law, regardless of whether the person was negatively 
                                                            
146 [1999] CLR 77 (W) 84-84. 
147 [2010] ZAECGHC 111 (24 November 2010) paras 21 and 39. 
148 [2010] ZAWCHC 203 (23 September 2010). 
149 [2010] ZAWCHC 203 (23 September 2010) para 18. 
150 Cilliers AC, Loots C and Nel HC Herbstein and Van Winsen The civil practice of the High Courts and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa Volume II 5 ed (2009) 1476. 
151 Cilliers AC, Loots C and Nel HC Herbstein and Van Winsen The civil practice of the High Courts and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa Volume I 5 ed (2009) 192. The first two instances were 
developed in Patz v Green 1907 TS 427 at 433. It is generally referred to as the Patz v Green test. 
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affected by non-compliance.152 Secondly, if legislation was enacted in the public 
interest, any member of the public will be able to enforce compliance with legislation, 
provided that he can show that he was adversely affected by the non-compliance with 
the law.153 Finally, if legislation is designed to protect a constitutional right, a property 
owner will have the standing to enforce compliance by virtue of section 38 of the 
                                                            
152 Cilliers AC, Loots C and Nel HC Herbstein and Van Winsen The civil practice of the High Courts and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa Volume I 5 ed (2009) 192, with reference to the authoritative 
case of Patz v Green 1907 TS 427 at 433. In Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town Council v Eastern Properties 
(Prop) Ltd 1933 AD 87 at 96, the court confirmed that if legislation is designed to benefit a specific class 
of people, a member of that class can enforce compliance without special proof of damage. 
153 Cilliers AC, Loots C and Nel HC Herbstein and Van Winsen The civil practice of the High Courts and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa Volume I 5 ed (2009) 192 with reference to Patz v Green 
1907 TS 427 at 433. Loots C ‘Locus standi to claim relief in the public interest in matters involving the 
enforcement of legislation’ (1987) 104 SALJ 131-148 at 145 and 130 criticises this leg of the Patz v Green 
test because it does not draw a distinction between actions brought to vindicate personal interests and 
actions brought in the public interest. Essentially, she argues that the Patz v Green test is not absolute 
and that it must sometimes yield to the intention of the legislature. Some laws are enacted with the 
intention to protect or regulate a specific matter of public interest. Loots argues that such laws ‘may be 
said to create rights vesting in each member of the public’. In such circumstances a member of the public 
will have locus standi if there was an infringement of a right or a reasonable apprehension that the right 
will be infringed; the legislature intended the remedy concerned to be available and where the legislature 
intended that any member of the public could enforce such a remedy. Loots contends that such a public 
interest action can have potentially far-reaching consequences for, for example, the enforcement of 
environmental legislation. Specifically, she explains that interested organisations can defend the public 
interest by enforcing environmental laws where local authorities are unwilling or unable to implement the 
law. 
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Constitution.154 Legislation is often enforced by way of an interdict. A person will have 
locus standi to obtain an interdict if he meets the requirements of the Patz v Green155 
test, provided that the legislation does not protect a constitutional right.156 If the 
legislation protects a constitutional right, neighbouring land owners will have standing to 
apply for an interdict on the basis of section 38 of the Constitution.157 
The South African courts have recognised the standing of neighbouring property 
owners to enforce compliance with the provisions of a town-planning or zoning 
                                                            
154 Cilliers AC, Loots C and Nel HC Herbstein and Van Winsen The civil practice of the High Courts and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa Volume I 5 ed (2009) 193. The final instance is not 
irrelevant to this discussion. With reference to Barnett and others v Minister of Land Affairs and others 
2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA), it is argued below that illegal development can cause irreparable harm to the 
environment. This can amount to a violation of section 24 of the Constitution. Section 24(b) of the 
Constitution states that anyone has the right to ‘have the environment protected, for the benefit of present 
and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other means that (i) prevent pollution and 
ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation and (iii) secure ecological sustainable development and 
use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development’. On the basis of 
section 38 of the Constitution property owners will have locus standi to protect their right to a healthy 
environment. They would do so by applying for either a prohibitory or mandatory interdict. A prohibitory 
interdict compels a property owner to cease with the construction of an illegal building. Property owners 
would then apply for a mandatory interdict to compel the builder to demolish the illegal structure and to 
rehabilitate the environment. Furthermore, section 33 of the Constitution provides that ‘[e]veryone has the 
right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair’. The Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) was enacted to give effect to this constitutional provision. 
Section 6 of PAJA provides that anyone can approach a court or a tribunal for the judicial review of 
administrative action. Essentially, this provisions extends standing to neighbouring land owners who can 
have the local authority’s decision set aside on review if, for example, it was taken despite a procedural 
irregularity. Section 6 of PAJA lists a range of grounds on which administrative actions can be set aside 
on review. PAJA is therefore another way in which neighbouring land owners can enforce compliance 
with the law. 
155 1907 TS 427. 
156 Cilliers AC, Loots C and Nel HC Herbstein and Van Winsen The civil practice of the High Courts and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa Volume I 5 ed (2009) 195-196. 
157 Cilliers AC, Loots C and Nel HC Herbstein and Van Winsen The civil practice of the High Courts and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa Volume I 5 ed (2009) 195-196. 
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scheme.158 In recent case law, the courts confirmed the standing of neighbouring 
property owners to approach the court for relief in circumstances where a neighbour 
had built, or was in the process of building, an illegal structure.159 The applicants in 
Neves and Others v Merlico 148 CC and another (Neves)160 sought and obtained an 
urgent interdict to prevent the respondent from continuing with the construction of illegal 
building works on the neighbouring property.161 They then applied to the court for final 
interdictory relief.162 The court decided that the applicants had a clear right to require 
the first respondent to comply with the provisions of the Building Standards Act and the 
zoning scheme regulations that regulated development in the area. It was evident that 
the applicants had a reasonable apprehension that the illegal structures would interfere 
with their right to privacy.163 An interdict was the only way in which the applicants’ rights 
                                                            
158 BEF (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality and others 1983 (2) SA 387 (C); Bedfordview Town Council 
and Strydom R and another v Mansyn Seven (Pty) Ltd and others 1989 (4) SA 599 (W); Pick and Pay 
Stores Ltd and others v Teazers Comedy and Revue CC and others 2000 (3) SA 645 (W); PS 
Booksellers (Pty) Ltd and another v Harrison and others 2008 (3) SA 633 (C) paras 16-20 and Tergniet 
and Toekoms Action Group and 34 others v Outeniqua Kreosootpale (Pty) Ltd and others [2009] 
ZAWCHC 6 (23 January 2009) para 22. 
159 In Muller NO and others v City of Cape Town 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 73 the court, although not 
specifically referring to locus standi, stated that adjoining property owners have a right to insist that a 
neighbouring property owner should adhere to statutory provisions when developing his property.  
160 [2010] ZAWCHC 115 (14 April 2010).  
161 [2010] ZAWCHC 115 (14 April 2010) paras 1, 6 and 7. The first respondent had purchased its property 
with the intention of constructing a retail and residential complex on the property. Specifically, the 
respondent planned to build residential flats with balconies on the garage of the building. The respondent 
further had the intention of building swimming pools and braai facilities in the balcony areas. To do so the 
respondent had to obtain a formal departure in terms of Land Use Planning Ordinance 1985 for which he 
required the consent of the applicant. The applicant refused the give her consent for the departure 
application and as a result the respondent submitted building plans without referring to the balconies and 
the braai facilities. These plans were approved and the respondent continued with its development of its 
property, including the construction of the balcony areas. 
162 [2010] ZAWCHC 115 (14 April 2010) para 6. 
163 [2010] ZAWCHC 115 (14 April 2010) para 8. 
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could be adequately protected.164 Likewise, in Liebenberg v Frater NO and others, 
Drakenstein Municipality v Frater NO and others (Liebenberg v Frater)165 the applicant 
sought a permanent interdict to prevent the fourth respondent (the Trust) from building 
any illegal structures on its property.166 The Trust had submitted building plans as 
required by the Building Standards Act, but these plans were not approved. It continued 
building operations on its property in blatant disregard of the law.167 One of the issues in 
dispute was whether the applicant, as a neighbouring property owner, had the requisite 
locus standi to approach the court for relief. The court held that the applicant would 
have locus standi if she met two requirements. Firstly, she had to show that she has a 
direct interest in the matter. Secondly, she had to show that she was able to vindicate a 
right which she possesses in her own right and not merely a right that all citizens 
                                                            
164 [2010] ZAWCHC 115 (14 April 2010) para 8. Recently, in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v 
Swartland Municipality and others [2010] ZAWCHC 103 (31 May 2010) the court had to decide whether a 
bank, which held two mortgage bonds over a property on which an illegal structure was erected, should 
have been joined as a party to the proceedings were the demolition of that structure was ordered. The 
court decided that the bank should not have been joined as a party to the proceedings. One of the 
reasons for this decision was that the bank did not have the locus standi to approach the court for relief. 
This decision was overturned in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Swartland Municipality and others 
[2011] ZASCA 106 (1 June 2011), where it was concluded that the bank should have been joined as a 
party to demolition proceedings. The court confirmed that the bank had a direct and substantial interest in 
the outcome of the demolition proceedings because it was likely to affect the value of the property. 
Furthermore, the demolition of the structures could impact on the possibility of selling the property. On the 
basis of these decisions one can deduce that the bank had a right to be joined in the application for the 
demolition order. However, the court did not specifically confirm that the bank had locus standi to prevent 
the demolition of the illegal structure. 
165 [2010] ZAWCHC 203 (23 September 2010). 
166 [2010] ZAWCHC 203 (23 September 2010) paras 2 and 3-4. The Drakenstein Municipality had in 
separate proceedings applied for an interim interdict to, amongst other things; restrain the fourth 
respondent from constructing any buildings until it had obtained the necessary permission. The court 
exercised its discretion to consolidate the two applications. 
167 [2010] ZAWCHC 203 (23 September 2010) para 7. 
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possess.168 It was decided that the applicant had the locus standi to bring the 
application for the interdict, despite the fact that she had also erected an illegal structure 
on her property.169 Finally, in light of decisions such as PS Booksellers (Pty) Ltd and 
another v Harrison and others170 and Tergniet and Toekoms Action Group and 34 
others v Outeniqua Kreosootpale (Pty) Ltd and others171 one can infer that voluntary 
associations have the standing to act on behalf of land owners in the township who 
seek relief in circumstances where an illegal building has been erected in the 
neighbourhood.  
To conclude, it remains the local authorities’ responsibility to enforce compliance 
with laws such as the Building Standards Act in their area of jurisdiction, if necessary by 
way of a demolition order. However, case law has recognised that land owners in a 
township will also have the standing to approach the court for an interdict to prevent the 
continuance of illegal building and development, in instances where local authorities 
have, for whatever reason, failed to enforce the law. Moreover, the courts have 
recognised the standing of voluntary associations to approach the court for relief on 
behalf of land owners in a township. 
                                                            
168 [2010] ZAWCHC 203 (23 September 2010) para 9. The court cites Roodepoort-Maraisburg Town 
Council v Eastern Properties (Pty) Ltd 1933 AD 87 at 101, as well as Glass v Glass 1980 (3) SA 263 (W) 
at 266H, as authority for the second requirement. 
169 [2010] ZAWCHC 203 (23 September 2010) paras 9 and 12. The Trust raised the ‘clean hands 
doctrine’ as a defence to the application for an interdict. In this regard the court explained that the 
doctrine was an English law concept that was similar to the Roman-Dutch maxim of in pari delicto potior 
est condition possidentis vel defendentis (the par delictum rule). The court cites Afrisure CC and another 
v Watson No and another 2009 (2) SA 127 (SCA) para 39, where the court held, with reference to Jajbay 
v Cassim 1939 AD 537, that the par delictum rule has been relaxed. Under the circumstances the court 
decided that it could not prevent the applicant from protecting her interest. 
170 2008 (3) SA 633 (C) 638G-639E. Refer to section 3 2 3 above where this case is briefly discussed. 
171 [2009] ZAWCHC 6 (23 January 2009) para 22.  
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3 3 2 2 Protecting the public interest  
In Barnett and others v Minister of Land Affairs and others (Barnett)172 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal (the court) upheld a demolition and eviction order granted by the court a 
quo.173 Specifically, the demolition order was granted in respect of holiday cottages174 
that had been erected in contravention of an environmental conservation decree. This 
decree was promulgated by the President of the Transkei in July 1992 and put into 
operation on 1 January 1993.175 The essence of the decree was to declare ‘all State 
land situated on the landward side of the entire Transkeian coast within a strip of one 
                                                            
172 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA). Refer to Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional property law’ (2007) 4 JQR 2.3, Van 
der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 35-36 and Van der 
Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 342 footnote 13 for a discussion of this case. 
173 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA) 315F-G. The court a quo ordered the eviction of the defendants and the 
demolition of holiday cottages (situated on the Transkei Wild Coast) within four months on the grounds 
that the sites formed part of state land. Upon the expiry of the four month period the respondents 
(referred to as the government) were authorised to demolish the cottages at the defendants’ expense. 
174 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA) 316D-317F. These cottages were erected by the 16 defendants (mostly 
farmers and businessmen) within a month after the Transkei was declared part of the Republic of South 
Africa. The defendants obtained the land (upon which they built the cottages) by consulting with the local 
tribal headman, Chief and Tribal Authority in the following manner: they first informed the local headman 
of their desire to possess a specific site, whereafter they were taken to the Chief for his approval. The 
defendants usually brought a gift of brandy to the Chief. After the defendants had obtained the Chief’s 
approval they met with the Tribal Authority. The Tribal Authority approved the request and the defendants 
paid a ‘customary fee’ of R200. They were issued a receipt, signed by the secretary of the Authority, 
which was described as a ‘fishing site licence application’. The heading of the document indicated that it 
had to be taken to the local magistrate. It was evident that the document informed the magistrate that the 
Tribal Authority had approved an application for a fishing licence. This document was taken to an official 
of the Department of Agriculture who had an office at the magistrate’s court. The official arranged the time 
when the defendants, the Chief, and some members of the local tribe would meet at the sites. At the 
meeting the sites were demarcated with reference to certain landmarks. The Chief asked the community 
whether they had objections to the sites. There were no objections and consequently the consent to build 
on the land was given. Shortly after the sites were set out the ‘festivities’ began - the defendants supplied 
food and drink to all who were present at the meeting.  
175 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA) 315I. 
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kilometre above the high-water mark, a coastal conservation area’.176 Development 
within the conservation area by any person (including the state) was strictly prohibited, 
unless a permit had been obtained from the Department of Agriculture and Forestry.177 
The government relied on the decree as a main cause of action and argued that the 
structures should be demolished on the ground that the defendants had constructed 
cottages in a conservation area without first having obtained a permit.178 Evidence of 
the damage caused by the defendants’ activities in the conservation area was provided. 
In particular, reference was made to the damage caused by the use of four-wheel drive 
vehicles on the dunes and on the beach. The defendants had caused damage to the 
dunes by constructing their cottages too close to the high-water mark. In the 
construction process the defendants had also cleared away coastal forest and these 
open areas, together with the cottages, interfered with the formerly untouched natural 
landscape. It was submitted that the only way in which the area could be rehabilitated 
was by demolishing and removing the cottages from the area.  
The court in City of Tshwane v Ghani179 granted an interdict prohibiting the 
respondents from occupying five erven, four of which were owned by the applicant. In 
so doing the court upheld not only the public interest in the regulation of building works, 
but also the health and safety interests of the respondents’ employees and of the public 
in general.180 The court also granted an interdict that prohibited the respondents from 
                                                            
176 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA) 316A, 319A-C. The decree remained in force on the ground of section 229 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (the Interim Constitution). 
177 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA) 316B. 
178 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA) 315J, 316B-C, 319B-I, 322G. The government relied, as an alternative cause 
of action, on a common-law ground, namely that the defendants had unlawfully occupied and possessed 
state-owned land. In this regard, the court explained that it was common cause that land occupied by the 
appellants formed part of state-owned land since the land was ‘never transferred into private ownership’. 
179 2009 (5) SA 563 (T). Refer to Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 341-343, footnotes 11, 13 
and 17 for a discussion of this case. 
180 2009 (5) SA 563 (T) 567C-D. The applicant submitted, in support of its urgent application, that the 
health of the public was jeopardised by the fact that a building had been constructed in contravention of 
building regulations. 
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trading from the premises owned by the city.181 The central issue in this case was that 
the respondents had, in an act of piracy, taken possession of the five erven without first 
purchasing them.182 The respondents built a retail store on the premises, without 
submitting building plans as required by section 4 of the Building Standards Act.183 It is 
also likely that, since the respondents had bypassed all statutory processes, the 
building was built in contravention of other laws such as health and safety by-laws.  
Similarly, in Liebenberg v Frater,184 the municipality obtained an interim interdict to 
prevent the Trust from continuing with the illegal construction of buildings on its 
property.185 The court also awarded an interim interdict to prevent the Trust from 
operating a restaurant on the property. From the scant information provided in the report 
one can deduce that the local authority had refused to approve building plans submitted 
                                                            
181 2009 (5) SA 563 (T) 565A-F. Ghani was the director of the second respondent (Kwik Property 
Holdings (Pty) Ltd) and the third respondent (Kwik Kat Cash and Carry (Pty) Ltd). Both companies were 
under the control of the first respondent. 
182 2009 (5) SA 563 (T) 566A-B. The applicant and the respondents were in the process of negotiating a 
price for the transfer of ownership of the four plots. As to the fifth plot, the respondents had attempted to 
acquire the plot, but the transaction was not completed. 
183 2009 (5) SA 563 (T) 566-I, 569B, with reference Act 103 of 1997. This store was in operation at the 
time of the application and employed about 100 employees. During the process of construction a notice 
was issued, in terms of regulation 25(10) of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 
103 of 1977, that informed the second respondent that it was unlawfully constructing a building and 
‘without the prior approval’ of the relevant authority. The second respondent proceeded with the 
construction of the building despite this notice. Two subsequent notices were issued to the second 
respondent before he lodged building plans for approval with the local authority. After having received yet 
another notice, the second respondent launched an urgent application for an order that prevented the 
applicant from interfering with its occupation and use of the five erven, pending the approval of the 
building plans. This application was struck from the roll as it lacked urgency. Further, the building plans 
were rejected on the grounds that they had not been submitted by the registered owner of the erf. 
184 [2010] ZAWCHC 203 (23 September 2010). 
185 [2010] ZAWCHC 203 (23 September 2010) paras 3 and 16. The Drakenstein municipality’s application 
was consolidated with the Liebenberg application. The applicant in the latter application sought and 
obtained a permanent interdict to prevent the Trust from erecting illegal structures on its property. The 
operation of this interdict was temporarily suspended to afford the employees of the restaurant time to 
show why the interdict should not be made final.  
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by the Trust. This did not deter the Trust from proceeding with the renovation of one 
building and the construction of another building on its property.186 The Trust then 
continued to conduct a restaurant in the renovated building, without first obtaining an 
occupancy certificate or a trading licence and without complying with various statutory 
provisions pertaining to hygiene and safety.187 By granting the interim interdict the court 
protected not only the interests of neighbouring property owners but also the interests of 
the patrons and employees of the restaurant.  
Both City of Tshwane v Ghani and Liebenberg v Frater are relevant to a discussion 
of demolition orders because they indicate that there is a possibility that the respective 
local authorities may apply to the magistrates’ courts for demolition orders as required 
by section 21 of the Building Standards Act.188 The local authorities have a statutory 
duty to enforce compliance with the provisions of the Building Standards Act and this 
may mean that illegal structures will be demolished. Furthermore, the public has an 
interest in the strict enforcement of the law, which might entail the demolition of illegal 
structures. This is in line with the view expounded in Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 
v Swartland Municipality and others (Swartland Municipality).189 In that case the court 
held that the actions of the third respondent (who built the illegal structures) were contra 
bonos mores and contrary to public policy.190 The court held that it could not set aside 
the demolition order because that would militate ‘against the doctrine of legality, which 
forms an important part of our legal system and more especially since the Constitution 
became the Supreme Law of the country’.191 In Barnett and others v Minister of Land 
Affairs and others (Barnett),192 it was clear that the only way in which the public interest 
in the protection and rehabilitation of the environment could be upheld was by granting 
a demolition order. Moreover, the public interest in the regulation of building operations 
                                                            
186 [2010] ZAWCHC 203 (23 September 2010) para 7. 
187 [2010] ZAWCHC 203 (23 September 2010) para 5. 
188 Section 21 of Act 103 of 1977. 
189 [2010] ZAWCHC 103 (31 May 2010). For a discussion of this case, refer to Van der Walt AJ 
‘Constitutional property law’ (2010) 2 JQR 2.4.1 
190 [2010] ZAWCHC 103 (31 May 2010) para 22. 
191 [2010] ZAWCHC 103 (31 May 2010) para 22. 
192 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA). 
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was best served by the granting of a demolition order, since it confirmed that the court 
will not tolerate the construction of buildings in direct contravention of the law.  
 
3 3 2 3 The supervisory role of the court 
In United Technical Equipment Co v Johannesburg City Council,193 the court held that 
the local authority (the Johannesburg City Council) had not only a statutory duty but 
also a moral duty to uphold the law that regulates building in its jurisdiction. The court 
stated that it would be wrong of a local authority to whittle away its obligation to uphold 
the law. A lenient approach by the local authority could be an invitation to the public to 
‘use land illegally with the hope that the use will be legalised in due course...’.194  
The cases discussed above show that the courts will compel the local authorities 
to enforce compliance with legislation by ordering the demolition of illegal buildings. 
Alternatively, the courts will assist the local authorities to enforce building and 
development laws in their area of jurisdiction. In City of Tshwane v Ghani the court held 
that many local authorities struggle to perform their duties due to financial and 
organisational constraints. It would be ‘utterly wrong’ of the court not to assist the local 
authority to perform its duties, ‘particularly when the proper execution thereof is sought 
to be thwarted with as much cynical disregard of the law as is the case here’.195 In 
Barnett the court ordered the demolition of the illegal structures and in so doing 
compelled the local authority to enforce the provisions of the Proclamation.  
 
3 3 2 4 The attitude and intent of the builder as a decisive factor  
The Barnett and City of Tshwane v Ghani cases show that the courts will not 
necessarily consider the value of an illegal structure when it decides whether that 
structure should be demolished. However, the court will consider the attitude and the 
                                                            
193 1987 (4) SA 347 (T) 348H. 
194 1987 (4) SA 347 (T) 348H. 
195 2009 (5) SA 563 (T) 568D-E. 
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intention of the builder.196 In support of their plea that it would be unjust and unfair to 
evict them, the defendants in Barnett drew the court’s attention to the fact that they 
would lose the money, time and labour, which they had invested in the cottages.197 In 
response, counsel for the government argued that the court should also consider the 
fact that the defendants (who were all literate and ‘sophisticated’ people) had, despite 
‘glaring incongruities’ such as the fact that the sites had been obtained for R200 and the 
fact that the land was allocated in a ‘cavalier’ fashion, deliberately chosen to ignore the 
law and proceed with their illegal conduct.198 The court agreed with this argument and 
held that the ‘considerations of justice and equity did not favour the defendants’.199  
In City of Tshwane v Ghani the respondents attempted to persuade the court to 
condone his actions and grant him an order for transfer of the property.200 The court 
held that it was evident that the respondents had knowingly contravened the law in an 
attempt to obtain properties owned by the local authority and indirectly by the public. 
Besides, the respondents intended to approach the applicant with a fait accompli to 
coerce the local authority to transfer the property to them.201 With reference to Malan v 
Ardconnel Investments (Pty) Ltd202 and United Technical Equipment Co (Pty) Ltd v 
                                                            
196 In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Swartland Municipality and others [2010] ZAWCHC 103 (31 
May 2010) paras 6 and 21-22; Neves and others v Merlico 148 CC and another [2010] ZAWCHC 115 (14 
April 2010) para 8 and Liebenberg v Frater NO and others, Drakenstein Municipality v Frater NO and 
others [2010] ZAWCHC 203 (23 September 2010) para 14 the courts placed emphasis on the attitude 
and intent of the owner on whose property illegal structures were built. 
197 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA) 326C.  
198 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA) 326F-G.  
199 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA) 327A-B. 
200 2009 (5) SA 563 (T) 567D. 
201 2009 (5) SA 563 (T) 567E. 
202 1988 (2) SA 12 (A) 40E-F. 
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Johannesburg City Council203 the court stated that it is ‘obliged to set its face sternly 
against actions that are as blatantly and brazenly in conflict with the law as those the 
respondents have committed’.204 The respondents had taken possession of the 
properties despite being aware of the local authority’s ownership and in so doing it had 
‘persistently, knowingly and designedly acted in transgression of the law’.205 
The respondents further attempted to intimidate the court by explaining that the 
Premier of Gauteng had agreed to investigate and to intervene in ‘this most sensitive 
issue’.206 In a letter addressed to the court the respondents requested a four week 
extension of the final order so as to afford the premier sufficient time to conduct his 
investigation.207 The court held that ‘the letter is regrettable in the extreme for its 
apparent assumption that real or perceived political connectivity may somehow excuse 
any disregard of or lack of respect for, the law and the consequences thereof’.208 
Furthermore, the respondents’ request required the court to ‘shrink from its duty of 
enforcing the law and to kowtow to political intervention to save the wilful transgressor 
of the law from the consequences of his or its unlawful conduct’.209 The respondents’ 
suggestion undermined the integrity of South Africa’s constitutional dispensation and 
the independence of the judiciary.210 The court concluded that the respondents’ request 
                                                            
203 1987 (4) SA 343 (T) 348E-349F. Specifically, the court referred to statements made by Harms J in 
United Technical Equipment Co (Pty) Ltd 1987 (4) SA 347 (T) 348E-349F, when he had to consider a 
suggestion that an interdict (granted to the local authority) should be suspended for the benefit of the 
applicants. Harms J stated that it was incorrect for the applicants to rely on a fait accompli created by their 
own unlawful actions. Further, the local authority has a statutory and a moral duty to uphold the law and 
to enforce compliance with the planning scheme. A lenient approach adopted by the local authority with 
regard to the enforcement of the scheme could invite other members of the public ‘to use land illegally 
with the hope that the use will be legalised in due course and that pending finalisation the illegal use will 
be protected indirectly by the suspension of an interdict’.    
204 2009 (5) SA 563 (T) 567F-G. 
205 2009 (5) SA 563 (T) 567F. 
206 2009 (5) SA 563 (T) 569. 
207 2009 (5) SA 563 (T) 570. 
208 2009 (5) SA 563 (T) 570E. 
209 2009 (5) SA 563 (T) 570F. 
210 2009 (5) SA 563 (T) 570F. 
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should be ‘rejected unreservedly’.211 City of Tshwane v Ghani has therefore made it 
clear that the courts will not look kindly on land owners who deliberately build in 
disregard of the law. One can deduce that instances where the owner built a structure in 
blatant disregard of the law, the courts will not hesitate to order the demolition of illegal 
structures, and in so doing, to uphold the principle of legality.  
 
3 3 3 Conclusion 
It is evident from the discussion above that local authorities have a duty to enforce 
compliance with legislation that regulates building and development. Case law has 
shown that neighbouring property owners who can show that they will be adversely 
affected by an illegal structure will have legal standing to approach the court for either a 
prohibitory or a mandatory interdict or both. Neighbouring property owners can therefore 
apply for a demolition order (mandatory interdict) to compel the removal of an illegal 
structure.  
Cases such as Barnett and Swartland Municipality show that the courts are not 
willing to come to the aid of a land owner who erects a structure in disregard of the law. 
This means that the courts will not hesitate to order the demolition or partial demolition 
of illegal structures. Factors such as the financial implications for the owner of the illegal 
building are irrelevant to the extent that they are the cause of their own loss in cases of 
illegal building. The court in Barnett ordered the demolition of entire holiday cottages 
built in disregard of legislation. Similarly, the court in Swartland Municipality ordered the 
demolition of a garage and a storeroom that was built without approved building plans. It 
is also likely that the court will order the partial demolition of a building insofar as it 
contravenes the provisions of the Building Standards Act. The Neves case is an 
example of where the court ordered the demolition of balconies and braai facilities that 
were not approved by the local authority. Likewise, Liebenberg v Frater raises the 
possibility that the local authority will apply for a demolition order to remove those parts 
of the buildings which do not meet legal requirements. 
                                                            
211 2009 (5) SA 563 (T) 570F. 
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A demolition order might seem harsh. However, the granting of the demolition 
order is often the only effective way in which the court can protect the respective 
interests involved. It was explained above that the demolition of an illegal structure 
would uphold the public interest in the orderly and safe development of built-up areas. 
In circumstances where a building is built illegally in an environmentally sensitive area, 
a demolition order upholds the public interest in a protected environment. Moreover, by 
ordering the demolition of an illegal structure the court protects the public interest in the 
rule of law. The demolition of an illegal structure has deterrent value as it can 
discourage any other person who intends to build structures in disregard of the law. On 
a local level, the demolition of an illegal structure can contribute toward preserving the 
unique character of residential areas. This in turn will protect neighbouring property 
owners’ financial investment in their neighbourhood.  
All the cases discussed above illustrate the supervisory role adopted by the courts. 
Decisions such as Barnett show that there are instances where the court will compel the 
local authority to enforce the law, if necessary by ordering the demolition of illegal 
structures. In other instances, the court will grant a remedy, such as an interdict, to 
enable the local authority to meet its statutory responsibilities. Importantly, from Camps 
Bay Ratepayers and Resident’s Association v Harrison212 one can deduce that there are 
exceptional instances where the courts will refuse to order the demolition of illegal 
building works. This decision is discussed in greater detail in section 3 5 2 below. At this 
stage it suffices to say that certain factors can have an influence on the court’s decision.  
                                                            
212 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010). For a discussion of this decision, refer to Van der Walt AJ 
‘Constitutional property law’ (2010) 1 JQR 2.1.1. 
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3 4 The right of neighbouring property owners to have building plans set aside 
on review and to have the unlawful buildings demolished 
3 4 1 Introduction 
In Muller and others v City of Cape Town and another213 the court explained that it is 
‘trite law’ that ownership is the most comprehensive right ‘which a person can have with 
regard to a corporeal thing’.214 Furthermore, an owner has the right to develop his 
property ‘to any permissible optimal level’.215 Ownership entitlements such as the right 
to develop can, however, be restricted by law of general application such as the 
National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (the Building 
Standards Act), town-planning ordinances and zoning-scheme regulations.216 A land 
owner does not have the right to develop his property in a manner that contravenes the 
law or that ‘adversely affects the rights of owners of adjoining or neighbouring 
properties’.217 The court explained that owners of adjoining properties have a right to 
insist that statutorily imposed restrictions on building in a specific area ‘be adhered to 
inclusive of a right not to have plans passed in respect of an adjoining property in 
circumstances where the statute prohibits the passing of such plans’.218  
The Constitutional Court in Walele v The City of Cape Town and others219 stated 
that a balance has to be struck between the right of a property owner to build on his 
property and the rights of neighbouring property owners who are negatively affected by 
                                                            
213 2006 (5) SA 415 (C). Refer to Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 368-367 for a discussion 
of this case. 
214 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 72. 
215 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 73. 
216 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 72. 
217 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 74. 
218 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 73. 
219 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC). Refer to Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional property law’ (2008) 3 JQR 2.1, 
Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 33-34 and Van 
der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 346-349 and 351-355 for a discussion of this important 
decision. 
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the building.220 This balance has to be achieved within the framework of the Building 
Standards Act. The implication of this statement is that the Building Standards Act 
provides a framework in terms of which property owners can lawfully develop their 
properties by obtaining approved building plans as required by section 4 of the Act. The 
protection afforded to neighbouring property owners by the Building Standards Act is 
twofold in the sense that it protects the rights of neighbouring property owners before as 
well as after the approval of the building plans. Neighbours are protected prior to the 
approval of building plans because the Act prescribes a series of requirements to be 
complied with prior to approval of building plans. A measure of protection is also 
afforded to neighbours once plans have been approved, since the Act enables them to 
apply for the review and setting aside of approved building plans under certain 
conditions. Neighbouring property owners can, in certain circumstances, apply for a 
demolition order once building plans have been set aside on review, thereby rendering 
the completed or partial building works illegal. 
The purpose of this discussion is to sketch the procedure that a neighbouring 
property owner has to follow to have his neighbour’s approved building plans set aside 
on review. This section will first outline the relevant provisions of the Building Standards 
Act; whereafter consideration will be given to the remedy of the interim interdict. In the 
third section the grounds of review as set out in the Building Standards Act are 
discussed with reference to case law. There are instances where neighbouring property 
owners’ rights can only be vindicated by the demolition of the building insofar as it 
cannot be brought in line with the provisions of the Building Standards Act. It will be 
shown, with reference to case law, that in such instances the courts have confirmed that 
the local authority has a statutory duty to order the demolition of a building, or parts of a 
                                                            
220 In Odendaal v Eastern Metropolitan Local Council 1999 CLR 77 (W) 84-85 the court concisely 
explained that local authorities have a statutory duty to ensure that areas are developed in ‘as efficient, 
safe and aesthetically pleasing way as possible’. Local authorities must also protect the interests of 
property owners in their jurisdiction. That is why rights and powers of owners in relation to their property 
are limited. Property owners in South Africa have never had unfettered powers over their property. Rapid 
urbanisation and the ‘inevitable need’ for regulation have placed even more extensive limitations on 
ownership entitlements. 
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building, for which there are no approved building plans. The concluding section briefly 
explains the implications of the Oudekraal221 principle. At this stage it suffices to say 
that, due to the operation of the Oudekraal principle, the court has a discretion to refuse 
an application for a demolition even in circumstances where applicants have 
established a clear right to such an order. 
 
3 4 2 General overview of sections 4, 6 and 7 of the Building Standards Act 103 of 
1977 
Property owners must first obtain building plans as required by section 4 of the Building 
Standards Act before they can proceed to build on their land. Section 4(1) of the 
Building Standards Act provides that: 
‘[n]o person shall without the prior approval in writing of the local authority in 
question, erect any building in respect of which plans and specifications are to be 
drawn and submitted in terms of this Act’.  
In terms of section 5(1) of the Building Standards Act, the local authority must appoint a 
building control officer responsible for making recommendations222 to the local authority 
in respect of building plans and other documents. The local authority can approve 
building plans once it has received the recommendation from the building control officer 
and if it is satisfied that the plans comply with section 7(1)(a) and section 7(1)(b). In 
Walele v The City of Cape Town223 the Constitutional Court confirmed that neighbours 
do not have a general right to be heard when their neighbours applies for the approval 
                                                            
221 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and others 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA). 
222 Section 6(1)(a) of Act 103 of 1977 provides that the building control officer shall ‘make 
recommendations to the local authority in question, regarding any plans, specifications, documents and 
information submitted to such local authority in accordance with section 4(3)’. 
223 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC). 
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of building plans.224 The principal reason for this is that section 7 of the Building 
Standards Act contains a ‘self-contained protection which safeguards the rights of 
owners of neighbouring properties’.225 It is therefore unnecessary to hear neighbouring 
land owners before the approval of building plans. Explained differently, neighbouring 
                                                            
224 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) paras 22-45. One of the grounds on which the applicant challenged the 
decision of the first respondent to approve the building plans was that the decision was procedurally 
unfair, arbitrary and capricious. The court explained that the audi alterem partem principle was the most 
important element of procedural fairness. This principle requires that parties that are likely be affected by 
administrative decisions must be given the opportunity of a hearing before the decision is taken. Under 
the common law the audi alteram partem principle was developed to protect existing rights as well as 
legitimate expectations. Section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) is the 
statutory embodiment of the audi alteram partem principle. The applicant in Walele v The City of Cape 
Town had to prove that the decision to approve the building plans ‘materially and adversely affected his 
rights or legitimate expectations’ as required in section 3 of PAJA. The court determined that the 
applicant’s case was based on the argument that the erection of the building would cause his property to 
lose value. Therefore, the applicant did not attack the administrative decision, namely the decision to 
approve the building plans. The court held that ‘administrative action’ as intended in section 3 of PAJA 
could not be interpreted to include the erection of the buildings. The court explained that it was 
unnecessary to afford such a wide reading to section 3 of PAJA because section 7 of the Building 
Standards Act enabled the applicant to challenge the approval of the building plans, an administrative 
action, on review. In light of these considerations the court concluded that the applicant was unable to 
prove that the erection of the building on the respondents’ property would cause his property to lose 
value. The applicant argued that he had a legitimate expectation to be heard because the city had on a 
previous occasion created the opportunity for a hearing. Further, the applicant contended that the building 
works on the respondents’ property would ‘cast a large shadow in the winter’. The court held the applicant 
failed to prove that the city had a regular practice of granting neighbours the right to participate in pre-
approval hearings. Furthermore, the court decided that the fact that a person was the owner of the 
neighbouring property did not ‘give rise to an expectation to be heard’.  
225 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 56. 
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property owners do not have a right to participate in the approval process.226 However, 
neighbouring land owners do have the right to have building plans set aside on review 
on the basis of one of the grounds listed in section 7 of the Building Standards Act or 
section 6 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA).227 In this 
regard the Constitutional Court in Walele explained that building plans can be set aside 
on review if they are approved despite the presence of a disqualifying factor listed in 
section 7(1)(b) of the Building Standards Act.228 In summary, Walele confirmed that 
neighbouring land owners do not have a general right to be heard prior to the approval 
of their neighbours building plans but they do have the right to have approved building 
plans set aside on review on the basis of section 7(1)(b) of the Building Standards Act, 
or alternatively, on the basis of section 6 of PAJA.   
Section 7(1)(a) of the Building Standards Act provides that the local authority must 
be certain that the approved building plans will comply with ‘the requirements of this Act 
and any other applicable law’.229 After having considered the provisions of section 
7(1)(aa) the local authority must assess the building plans in light of the grounds in 
                                                            
226 Although the court explained in Walele v The City of Cape Town and others 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 
(CC) para 71 that it would be helpful for the building control officer, at the stage when he is compiling the 
recommendation, to invite neighbouring property owners to make representations of the potential impact 
that the development might have on their properties. This would drastically reduce the possibility of plans 
being approved that would trigger one of the disqualifying factors listed in section 7 of the Building 
Standards Act. The existence of disqualifying factors could result in the plans being set aside on review, 
even though the owner had already commenced building in accordance with the plans. In The Camps 
Bay Residents and Ratepayers Association and other v Hartley and others ZAWCHC 198 (2 September 
2010) paras 36-37 the court explained that the ‘unwholesome situation of a partly completed building 
standing unattended for months while litigation took its course could also have been avoided if the local 
authority had heeded the advice given’ in Walele. The court stated that this advice would aid the local 
authority in fulfilling the local government’s objective in terms of section 152 of the Constitution. There 
was no reason why the building plan applicant should not bear the financial and logistical burden of 
obtaining the permission of his neighbours. 
227 Section 6 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 lists a range of grounds on which 
administrative action, in this case, the decision to approve building plans, can be set aside on review.  
228 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 56. 
229 Section 7(1)(a) of Act 103 of 1977. 
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section 7(1)(b) of the Act.230 Section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)231 provides that the local authority 
cannot approve the building plans if it is satisfied that the building  
‘is to be erected in such manner or will be of such nature or appearance that – (aaa) 
the area in which it is to be erected will probably or in fact be disfigured thereby; 
(bbb) it will probably or in fact be unsightly or objectionable and (ccc) it will probably 
or in fact derogate from the value of adjoining or neighbouring properties’.  
Furthermore, section 7(1)(b)(ii)(bb) provides that the local authority cannot approve the 
buildings if it is satisfied that the proposed building ‘will probably or in fact be dangerous 
to life or property’. An applicant can have building plans set aside on review if he can 
prove that a building, built in accordance with validly approved building plans, has 
brought about one of the abovementioned grounds for review.  
 
3 4 3 The setting aside of building plans on review 
3 4 3 1 Interim interdict 
It has become common practice for applicants to first apply for a prohibitory interdict 
prior to launching proceedings to have building plans set aside on review. The purpose 
of the temporary interdict is to prohibit the respondent from proceeding with building 
work, pending the application for the review and setting aside of building plans and the 
application for a demolition order.232 The requirements for an interim interdict are a 
prima facie right; a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm; balance of 
convenience and absence of an alternative remedy.233 This section briefly sets out 
                                                            
230 Muller and others v City of Cape Town and another 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 28. 
231 Section 7(1)(b)(i) of Act 103 of 1977 provides that if the local authority may not approve building plans 
unless it is satisfied that the plans would comply with the provisions of the Building Standards Act or any 
other applicable law. 
232 See for example, Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and others [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) 
para 1, where the applicant sought an interdict, pending the first respondent’s response to the applicant’s 
request for reasons (in terms of section 5 of PAJA), for approving the second and third respondents’ 
building plans. Furthermore, the interdict was sought pending any review proceedings that the applicant 
might have launched after having received the municipality’s reasons. 
233 Van der Westhuizen v Butler 2009 (6) SA 174 (C) 181B-D. 
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some of the arguments raised in cases where applicants successfully obtained 
interdicts ordering the cessation of building works pending the outcome of review and 
demolition proceedings. 
Land owners (who faced the possibility that their building plans could be set aside 
on review) have argued, with reference to CoalCor (Cape) (Pty) Ltd and others, the 
Boiler Efficiency Services CC and others,234 that an interdict could only be granted if the 
building plans have already been set aside.235 Therefore, the existence of the approved 
building plan prevented the applicant from establishing that the construction in 
accordance with such plans was unlawful.236 In Van der Westhuizen v Butler,237 the 
court explained that it had to decide whether it would rigidly enforce approved building 
plans that had not yet been set aside on review.238 The rigid enforcement of the 
consequences of the valid decision would exclude the possibility of granting an interim 
interdict. However, in light of Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 
(Oudekraal),239 the court rejected the respondent’s argument that the decision to 
approve the building plans should be rigidly enforced. In Oudekraal the court 
determined that ‘an unlawfully made administrative decision was nothing more than a 
relevant fact to be taken into account’.240 The court held that ‘the permission which had 
been initially granted and which will now be the subject matter of a review application 
cannot be an irresistible obstacle to the interim relief sought in this case’.241 Accordingly, 
the existence of validly approved building plans can no longer automatically and finally 
prevent a neighbouring property owner from obtaining an interdict to temporarily stop 
building works.   
                                                            
234 1990 (4) SA 394 (C). 
235 Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and others [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 5 and Van 
der Westhuizen and others v Butler and others 2009 (6) SA 174 (C) 182G-J. 
236 Van der Westhuizen v Butler 2009 (6) SA 174 (C) 181I-F. 
237 2009 (6) SA 174 (C). 
238 2009 (6) SA 174 (C) 184B-C. 
239 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA). 
240 2009 (6) SA 174 (C) 182E-F. 
241 2009 (6) SA 174 (C) 184D-E. 
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In Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and others (Searle),242 the court held that to 
show the existence of a prima facie right, the applicant had to prove the prospects of 
success in the pending review proceedings.243 An interdict would only be granted if the 
applicant could prove that there were ‘very weighty and convincing indications of the 
unlawfulness of the impugned decision’ or that he was likely to suffer irreparable harm if 
the interim interdict was not granted.244 One of the arguments raised by the applicant in 
Searle in support of his application for an interdict was that it would be more difficult to 
obtain a demolition order once a building had been completed.245 As will be shown 
below, this argument was rejected by the court on the ground that the local authority 
has a statutory duty to enforce the provisions of the Building Standards Act. The court 
explained that the completed state of the unlawful structure might be an incentive for 
‘functionaries to go out of their way to determine regularization applications favourably 
and thereby permit a result that would not have been permitted if the factor of fait 
accompli had not been present’.246 This potential could cause the applicant to get 
                                                            
242 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009). 
243 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) paras 6-10. This was the approach adopted in Ladychin 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v South African National Roads Agency Ltd and others 2001 (3) SA 344 (N) and 
Transnet Bpk h/a Coach Express en n ander v Voorsitter en andere 1995 (3) SA 844 (T). In this regard 
the court stated that it would not be prompted to grant the interim relief sought by the applicant simply 
because the applicant had requested reasons in terms of section 5 of PAJA. Another factor that would not 
influence the court to grant an interdict is the fact that the applicant’s sea view had been obstructed. The 
court held with regard to the sea view that the harm had already been done and that this matter could 
only be adequately addressed by ‘at least a partial demolition order’. 
244 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) paras 18-19, 20-25. The applicant in Searle succeeded in 
proving that he had a reasonable prospect of success to have the respondent’s building plans set aside in 
review proceedings on account of safety concerns. Evidence was provided of the steep slope of the dune 
on which the respondent intended to build. There was a possibility that the physical integrity of the 
applicant’s house would be compromised in the event that the dune was destabilised by the respondent’s 
building operations. Apart from the safety concerns, evidence was also provided of alleged 
inconsistencies in the building plans and the conditions of approval. These inconsistencies further 
persuaded the court to find that the applicant stood a reasonable chance in having the plans set aside on 
review. 
245 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 10. 
246 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 11. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
152 
involved in additional review proceedings to compel the local authority to demolish the 
building.247 
It appears that, once an applicant has succeeded in proving the existence of a 
prima facie right and the possibility of irreparable harm if the interdict is not granted, the 
courts would more easily find that the balance of convenience favours the applicant. In 
Searle the court held that ‘the prejudice to the respondents that will be occasioned by a 
cessation of the building work must be subordinate to the applicant’s entitlement to the 
enforcement of the principle of legality’.248 The financial loss that a respondent would 
sustain due to the delay in the construction process is a factor that the court will take 
into account. The court will nonetheless have less sympathy if it appears that the 
respondent had proceeded with building even though he was aware of the pending 
review proceedings. This is illustrated in Van der Westhuizen v Butler,249 where the 
respondents argued that they had already incurred R13,4 million in construction 
expenses and that they would ‘suffer prejudice’ if there was a delay in completing the 
building.250 The court held that the respondents had continued to construct their building 
despite being aware of the pending review application and ‘that in itself should weigh 
heavily with the courts in deciding whether to exercise its discretion and grant interim 
relief as sought’.251 Accordingly, the balance of convenience did not favour the 
respondents and the court granted the interdict to restrain the respondents from 
continuing the building work pending the final determination of review proceedings and 
the demolition application.252  
 
                                                            
247 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 11. In this regard the court referred to High Dune House v 
Ndlambe Municipality and others [2007] ZAECHC 154 (29 June 2007) as a practical example of where 
the applicant had to engage in subsequent review proceedings to obtain the relief sought.  
248 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 26. 
249 2009 (6) SA 174 (C). 
250 2009 (6) SA 174 (C) 188G-I. 
251 2009 (6) SA 174 (C) 189A-B. 
252 2009 (6) SA 174 (C) 189D-F. 
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3 4 3 2 Grounds for review  
3 4 3 2 1 Section 7(1)(a) of the Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 
In terms of section 7(1)(a) of the Building Standards Act, a property owner can have 
building plans set aside if he shows that they do not comply with the provisions of the 
Act or any other applicable law. Applicants usually rely on the requirements set out in 
sections 5 and 6 of the Building Standards Act to prove that the respondent’s building 
plans do not comply with the provisions of the Act as required in section 7(1)(a).253  
One of the grounds relied upon in Paola v Jeeva NO and others,254 in support of 
the application to have building plans set aside, was that the local authority had not 
appointed a building control officer as required in section 5 of the Act. Additionally, a 
building control officer had not made a recommendation to the local authority as 
required by section 6 of the Act. The court decided in favour of the applicant and held 
that it could not agree with the respondent’s counsel that the failure to comply with the 
provisions of section 5 and section 7 of the Act amounted to a ‘mere irregularity of no 
consequence’.255 These sections were jurisdictional requirements and constituted 
‘necessary preconditions to the exercise by the local authority of its powers to approve 
or reject building plans’.256 Similarly, in Walele v The City of Cape Town and others,257 
the applicant argued, in support of his application for review of the building plans, that 
the decision-maker had not received a recommendation from the building control officer 
as required by sections 6(1) and 7(1) of the Act. The court held that interpreting section 
7(1) to mean that the decision-maker had only ‘to infer from the recommendation that 
                                                            
253 Section 5 of Act 103 of 1977 provides for the appointment of a building control officer. The functions of 
the building control officer are set out in section 6 of the Act. For example, section 6(1)(a) requires the 
building control officer to make recommendations to the local authority prior to the approval of building 
plans. Litigants have relied on the failure of the local authority to appoint a building control officer as a 
ground for setting building plans aside on the basis of section 7(1)(a) of the Act.  
254 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA). Refer to Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 364-366 for a 
discussion of this case. 
255 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) para 13. 
256 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) para 11. 
257 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC). 
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the disqualifying factors will not be triggered’ would weaken the protection that the Act 
provided to neighbouring property owners.258 Rather, it was the intention of the 
legislator that the decision-maker be ‘himself’ satisfied that ‘the protection requirements 
were met’.259 A court will have to conduct a factual enquiry to ascertain whether the 
decision-maker was ‘satisfied’ that the disqualifying factors would not be triggered.   
The court held that the documents provided to the decision-maker could not have 
satisfied him that ‘none of the disqualifying factors would be triggered’ by the approval 
of the building plans.260 Besides, even if the building control officer had considered the 
section 7(1)(b) factors, this was not communicated to the decision-maker.261 The facts 
indicated that the building control officer was in possession of information that related to 
‘the very issues that the decision-maker had to consider’.262 This information was not 
provided to the decision-maker and accordingly the court concluded that he could not 
have made an informed decision. The court therefore held that the mandatory 
requirements for the approval of building plans had not been complied with and as a 
result the building plans were set aside on review. 
The exact scope of ‘any other applicable law’ remains unclear. In Muller and 
others v City of Cape Town and another (Muller v the City of Cape Town),263 the court 
confirmed that ‘any other applicable law’ includes compliance with zoning scheme 
regulations.264 This section draws on case law to determine what might constitute ‘any 
other applicable law’ for purposes of section 7(1)(a) of the Building Standards Act. 
Specifically, reference is made to Muller v the City of Cape Town as well as Self en 
                                                            
258 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 56. 
259 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 56. 
260 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 60. 
261 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 66. 
262 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 70. 
263 2006 (5) SA 415 (C). 
264 The National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 (the Heritage Resources Act) constitutes ‘any other 
applicable law’ for purposes of section 7(1)(a) of the Building Standards Act. This law is not discussed in 
this section since chapter 4 provides a detailed account of the limitations that the Heritage Resources Act 
imposes on ownership. Refer to chapter 4 for an explanation of the purpose of the Heritage Resources 
Act and the impact that it has on property owners’ demolition rights. 
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andere v Munisipaliteit van Mosselbaai en 'n ander (Self v Munisipaliteit van 
Mosselbaai).265 The applicants in the latter case successfully relied on the provisions of 
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) to challenge the 
approval of building plans. Consideration will also be given to Transnet Ltd v Proud 
Heritage Properties266 since this case serves as an example of where the applicants 
could have relied on the provisions of section 7(1)(a) in support of their review 
applications. 
In Muller v City of Cape Town,267 the applicants sought the review and setting 
aside of the first respondent’s decision to approve the second respondent’s building 
plans. In addition to the setting aside of the building plans, the applicants sought an 
order in terms of which the respondent’s deviation plans would be set aside. 
Additionally, the applicants sought an order that would compel the second respondent 
to abide by zoning-scheme regulations in relation to height requirements.268 The ground 
relied on by the applicants was that the first respondent had not applied his mind 
properly before approving the plans. Specifically, the applicants alleged that the 
structure exceeded the height limit in the zoning scheme regulations that were enacted 
in terms of the Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (LUPO). Furthermore, the 
alterations that had been carried out in line with the building plans interfered with the 
applicant’s view from his property, which caused his property to derogate in value.269  
The court held that zoning-scheme requirements constitute ‘any other applicable 
law’ as referred to in section 7(1)(a) of the Building Standards Act.270 Therefore, before 
a local authority can approve building plans there has to be compliance with the 
provisions of the Building Standards Act as well as the zoning-scheme requirements.271 
Once the local authority is satisfied that the plans comply with both the Building 
                                                            
265 [2006] 2 All SA 518 (C). 
266 [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008). 
267 2006 (5) SA 415 (C). 
268 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 4. 
269 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 5. 
270 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) paras 28-29. 
271 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 28. 
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Standards Act and the zoning-scheme requirements, it can proceed to consider section 
7(1)(b)(ii) of the Act. The court held that it had to determine whether or not the second 
respondent’s building plans complied with ‘any other applicable law’ as intended in 
section 7(1)(a) of the Act.272  
It was also discovered that the incorrect method of calculation had been used to 
determine the height of the building. This was in contravention of the provisions of the 
zoning scheme and it was an indication that the official had not properly applied his 
mind when he approved the plans.273 The court decided that the second respondent’s 
house had resulted in the derogation in the value of the applicant’s property, insofar as 
it did not comply with the height requirements imposed by the zoning scheme. This 
meant that the official responsible for approving the plan had not considered section 
7(1)(b)(ii) of the Building Standards Act.274 Accordingly, the court ordered that the 
building plans and the deviation plan be set aside. Furthermore, the court ordered the 
respondent to comply with the provisions of the zoning scheme regulations as set out in 
LUPO. 
The applicants in Self v Munisipaliteit van Mosselbaai275 sought the review and 
setting aside of the first respondent’s decision to approve the second respondent’s 
building plans. Furthermore, the applicants sought an order to compel the second 
respondent to demolish his building and to rehabilitate the area.276 The applicants relied 
on ecological, aesthetic and safety grounds in support of their application for review of 
the building plans.277 Most relevant to this discussion is the applicants’ reliance on 
ecological grounds to have the building plans set aside. 
                                                            
272 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 29. 
273 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) paras 58 and 63. 
274 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 75.  
275 [2006] 2 All SA 518 (C). 
276 [2006] 2 All SA 518 (C) para 2. 
277 [2006] 2 All SA 518 (C) para 5. 
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It was argued that in contravention of the provisions of NEMA,278 the first 
respondent failed to obtain an Environmental Impact Assessment prior to the approval 
of the building plans. An expert confirmed that the area was rich in conservation-worthy 
plant life and that irreversible damage would be caused by development on the 
respondent’s site.279 The second respondent argued that she was erecting a house that 
would cause the minimum interference with the natural environment and surrounds. In 
comparison with other houses built in the area, her house would only have a slight 
impact on the environment. Moreover, the entire area had been developed and the 
addition of another house would not have a significant impact on the environment.280 
The court rejected the arguments raised by the respondent and held that ecological 
considerations usually become more important in instances where a natural resource 
has been depleted by development.281 The court held that the building plans had to be 
set aside due to the first respondent’s failure to consider the provisions of NEMA.282 
In Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties283 the applicant applied for a 
permanent interdict prohibiting the respondent from continuing with the building of 
apartment blocks that would render the Richmond Beacon useless. The beacon is a 
navigational aid consisting of two leading lights that guide vessels through a ‘dangerous 
or shallow channel’ during night-time.284 Even though this was not an application for 
review but for an interdict, the ground relied on by the applicant can arguably be applied 
within the context of section 7(1)(a) of the Building Standards Act. The applicant argued 
that it had a statutory duty to operate the beacon by virtue of the provisions of the 
National Ports Act 12 of 2005 (the Ports Act) and that the construction of the apartment 
                                                            
278 The applicants alleged that the first respondent approved the building plans in contravention of 
sections 24(1), (3)(a) and (7) of Act 107 of 1998. 
279 [2006] 2 All SA 518 (C) para 11. 
280 [2006] 2 All SA 518 (C) para 20. 
281 [2006] 2 All SA 518 (C) para 21. 
282 [2006] 2 All SA 518 (C) para 24, with reference to Act 107 of 1998. 
283 [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008). See the discussion of this case in Van der Walt AJ 
‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 38. 
284 [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008) para 3. 
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blocks prevented it from performing this duty as required by law.285 The applicant further 
argued that the building plans should never have been approved, because the local 
authority did not consider the provisions of the Ports Act or the impact that the 
development would have on the beacon. 286 
The court decided in favour of the applicant. It held that the applicant did prove the 
existence of a clear right on the basis of its statutory duty. The applicant had also 
succeeded in showing that irreparable harm would follow if the respondents continued 
with the building operations. It was clear that the development would cause the beacon 
to become worthless and that the lights emanating from the apartment block would 
interfere with the efficiency of the entire system.287 The respondents argued that the 
applicant had two other remedies available to it, namely that it could move the beacon 
or rely on the appeal procedure contained in section 9 of the Building Standards Act. 
The first remedy was rejected by the court on the ground that ‘given the structure of the 
respondents’ case and the submissions advanced to emphasise that the solution 
proposed by the respondents is not one countenanced in our law’.288 As to the second 
remedy, the court held that the applicant did not contest the interpretation of any 
building regulation or related by-law. Therefore, the applicant could not have resorted to 
the section 9 appeal procedure.  
                                                            
285 [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008) paras 1-2. Section 2(a) of Act 12 of 2005 explains that the 
object of the Act is to ‘to promote the development of an effective and productive South African ports 
industry capable of contributing to the economic growth and development of the country’. Section 12(c) 
and 12(h) provides that the National Ports Authority (Pty) Ltd (the Authority) aims to achieve this objective 
by, amongst other things, enabling ‘port users to access the port in the most effective way possible’ and 
by promoting and undertaking ‘the necessary measures to enhance safety and security of life and 
property in ports’. Section 74 of the Act stipulates that the Authority must ‘for the purpose of ensuring 
safety of navigation and shipping in ports provide, operate and maintain adequate and efficient 
lighthouses and other navigational aids within the port limits and at such other places as the Authority 
may determine’.  
286 [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008) para 18. 
287 [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008) para 14. 
288 [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008) paras 15-18. 
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Throughout this judgment, no reference was made to section 7(1)(a) of the 
Building Standards Act. However, one can argue that the applicant would have been 
successful in a review application had he relied on section 7(1)(a) to show that the local 
authority had failed to consider the impact of the provisions of the Ports Act in approving 
the respondent’s building plans. Stated differently, the Ports Act can be interpreted as 
‘any other applicable law’ for purposes of section 7(1)(a) of the Building Standards Act. 
This argument is supported by the fact that the beacon had stood at its current location 
for nearly thirty years and it was clear that building operations of the nature undertook 
by the respondents would have impacted negatively on the operation of the beacon.289 
One would expect a local authority to have detailed knowledge of the specific statutory 
enactments that could impact on building operations within its jurisdiction. Arguably, in 
this context, the local authority would not have been able to prove that it was ‘satisfied’ 
that the building operations would comply with the provisions of ‘any other applicable 
law’. 
The majority of the court in True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and another290 held 
that the correct interpretation of section 7(1)(a) was that the local authority must refuse 
the approval of the building plans if it is satisfied that it would not comply with the 
provisions of the Act or any other law. Furthermore, the local authority must refuse the 
approval of the plans if it is uncertain as to whether the plans will contravene the 
provisions of the Act or any other law.291 The court held that ‘the test imposed by 
section 7(1)(a) requires the local authority to be positively satisfied that the parameters 
of the test laid down are met’.292 In light of this interpretation one can argue that the 
local authority in the Transnet Ltd v Proud Heritage Properties293 would have been 
unable to conclude, without a doubt, that the building plans would not have violated any 
other applicable law. 
                                                            
289 [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008) para 11. 
290 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA). See the discussion of this case in Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional property 
law’ (2009) 1 JQR 2.2.3 and Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 366-368. 
291 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 19. 
292 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 19. 
293 [2008] ZAECHC 155 (5 September 2008). 
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3 4 3 2 2 Section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa) of the Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 
As explained above, once the local authority is satisfied that building plans will comply 
with the provisions of section 7(1)(a) it can continue to consider the provisions of section 
7(1)(b)(ii)(aa) of the Act. It is possible that building plans can, on the face of it, comply 
with section 7(1)(a) but ‘nevertheless not be susceptible to approval’.294  
Generally, applicants prefer to rely on section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) because it is 
presumed, based on the findings in Paola v Jeeva NO and others,295 that it is relatively 
simple to prove that a proposed building would derogate from the value of neighbouring 
properties and that it may therefore not be approved. As will be shown below, this 
presumption is incorrect in light of the recent decision in True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v 
Madhi and another,296 where the court pronounced on the meaning of the word ‘value’ 
in the context of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the Building Standards Act. One can 
argue, with reference to the True Motives297 decision, that it is possible for an applicant 
to have building plans set aside on review on the basis that the proposed building would 
derogate from the value of neighbouring properties, but the applicants will have to prove 
that a proposed building will devalue neighbouring properties more than is reasonable in 
the circumstances.  
This section briefly discusses case law where the applicants were successful in 
relying on the provisions of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa) in support of their application to have 
building plans set aside. The section further examines the impact of True Motives 84 
(Pty) Ltd v Madhi and another.298 Mention should be made of the fact that in the cases 
where the applicants successfully relied on section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa) to have building plans 
set aside, they had done so in conjunction with other grounds. It appears therefore that 
it is a rare occurrence for applicants to have building plans set aside on review solely on 
                                                            
294 True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and another 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) 162F-G. 
295 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA). 
296 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA). 
297 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA). 
298 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA). 
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the grounds of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa). Nevertheless, one should not exclude the 
possibility that the courts will delineate the scope of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa), which would 
enable applicants to extract the full potential of this provision to have building plans set 
aside on review. 
In Paola v Jeeva NO and others,299 the appellant appealed against the judgment of 
the court a quo, where his application for the review and setting aside of the third 
respondent’s decision to approve building plans was dismissed. The first and second 
respondents were trustees of the trust that sought the approval of a building plan that 
would enable them to lawfully alter a structure on the trust property.300 The applicant 
built his house about twenty years after the house on the trust property had been 
constructed. This house was designed, after considering the existing development on 
the trust property, to maximise the outlook and surroundings.301 It was evident that the 
alterations in terms of the respondent’s building plans would have significantly interfered 
with the views from the applicant’s property.302 
A local estate agent provided undisputed evidence that the market value of the 
applicant’s house would diminish as a result of the developments on the trust 
property.303 The applicant relied on three grounds in support of his application for the 
review of the building plans, the most important of which is that due to ‘its size, proximity 
and position relative to his own house and its effect on his amenities the proposed 
development would probably or in fact derogate from the value of his property’.304 
Consequently, the applicant argued, the third respondent was precluded from approving 
                                                            
299 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA). 
300 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) para 1. 
301 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) para 3. 
302 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) para 3. 
303 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) para 4. 
304 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) para 5. 
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the plans on the grounds of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the Building Standards Act.305 
In this regard counsel for the applicant argued, with reference to section 
7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc), that since undisputed evidence was provided of the potential 
derogation of value of the applicant’s property as a result of the developments on the 
respondent’s property, the building plans could not be approved. The applicant argued 
that the meaning of ‘value’ as intended in section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) was a reference to 
market value.306 In response, the respondents contended that the right to a view was 
not an aspect that the local authority had to take into account when deciding whether 
proposed development would derogate from the value of the neighbouring properties. 
Moreover, the applicant did not have a registered servitude that protected his right to a 
view.307 The applicant argued that he did not assume that he had a right to a view. 
Rather, he sought the review and setting aside of the building plans on the grounds that 
statute prohibited the approval of plans in instances where it would derogate from the 
value of neighbouring properties.308  
The court agreed that ‘value’ as intended in section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) was a 
reference to market value.309 Furthermore, the court held that a local authority cannot 
approve building plans once it is established that a proposed development would 
derogate from the value of a neighbouring property. Accordingly, the court concluded 
that there was sufficient indication that the value of the applicant’s property would 
                                                            
305 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) paras 5-8 and 14. Other grounds relied on by the applicant were that the 
official ‘did not apply his mind properly’ in considering the plans and that the plans were in violation of 
town planning regulations ‘because the rear space between the rear of the building and the rear boundary 
of the trust property was less than five metres’. The applicant also discovered, after the decision of the 
court a quo had been handed down, that a building control officer did not make a recommendation (as 
required in section 7(1)(a) of the Act) to the third respondent prior to the approval of the building plans. It 
was on the basis of this last ground that the court decided that the building plans should be set aside. It 
held that the recommendation from a building control officer was a jurisdictional fact and a prerequisite for 
the approval of the plans. The court proceeded to consider the other grounds, obiter, on the request of 
the parties. 
306 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) para 19. 
307 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) para 20. 
308 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) para 19. 
309 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) para 23. 
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diminish as a result of the development on the respondent’s property.310 The court held 
that the plans should not have been approved as the proposed building would derogate 
from the value of the applicant’s property.311 The plans were set aside on review, but on 
a different ground.312 
The Constitutional Court in Walele v The City of Cape Town and others (Walele)313 
had to decide whether building plans submitted by the respondents, for the erection of a 
block of flats, had been approved in accordance with the provisions of the Building 
Standards Act. One of the grounds relied on by the applicant was that the flats would 
derogate from the value of his property.314 The applicant’s appeal was upheld by the 
majority of the court and consequently the respondent’s building plans were set 
                                                            
310 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) para 23. 
311 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) paras 16, 24-26. 
312 Paola v Jeeva NO and others 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA) has been cited as authority in support of the 
argument that a property owner has a right to a view. More specifically, it has been argued on the basis of 
the court’s interpretation of section 7(1) that in circumstances where development interferes with a 
property owner’s view, that such a development will derogate from the value of the neighbouring property. 
Accordingly, the building plans should be set aside on the basis of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) of the 
National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977. Van der Walt AJ The law of 
neighbours (2010) 356-376 explains, with reference to the common law principles, that the right to a view 
was not recognised in Roman-Dutch or in English law. There is possibly one exception, namely that the 
right to natural light may have been recognised in Roman law. Van der Walt argues in light of the 
common law principles that it would be strange to allow the recognition of a right to a view via legislation 
that regulates building and development. Recently, in Erasmus NO and another v Blom and others [2011] 
ZAECPEHC 11 (31 March 2011) paras 36-37 the court explained that there is general agreement that the 
entitlements that accompany the ownership of land do not include the right to a view. A property owner 
can only obtain a right to a view by way of a negative servitude; restrictive condition; building legislation or 
the provisions of a town-planning scheme. A property owner would have to rely on section 7(1)(a) of the 
Building Standards Act to challenge the approval of building plans, in the circumstance where those plans 
are approved despite the existence of one of these mechanisms designed to protect his view. 
313 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC). 
314 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 2. 
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aside.315 Most relevant to this discussion is the majority of the court’s interpretation of 
section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Act. 
Jafta AJ explained that the Building Standards Act bars property owners from 
erecting buildings for which they had not obtained approved building plans. The Building 
Standards Act therefore limits the property owner’s rights with regard to the use of his 
property.316 The approval of the building plans itself does not affect the rights of other 
neighbouring property owners. However, the subsequent execution of the plans can 
result in the construction of a building that does affect neighbouring property owners. It 
is for that reason that the provisions of the Building Standards Act must be read in line 
with section 39(2) of the Constitution.317 Additionally, sections 6 and 7 of the Building 
Standards Act have to be interpreted within the context of the Act as a whole and these 
two sections have to be read together.318 Accordingly, the court held that the decision-
maker had to be satisfied of two things prior to approving the building plans, namely that 
                                                            
315 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 72. The applicant also argued that the decision-maker did not have a 
recommendation before him when he had to approve the building plans. This constituted a violation of 
sections 6 and 7 of the Building Standards Act. The court decided in favour of the applicant as the city 
had not complied with the mandatory requirements of the Building Standards Act. 
316 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 52. 
317 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 52. Section 3 4 2 above explains that neighbouring land owners do 
not have the right to be heard prior to the approval of a neighbour’s building plans. The reason for this is 
that section 7 of the Building Standards Act contains a list of ground in terms of which building plans can 
be set aside on review. This is understandable if one considers the fact that it is not the approval of plans 
that affect neighbouring landowners’ rights, but the subsequent construction of an potentially illegal 
building. 
318 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 54. The court explained that section 7 comprises of four issues that 
relate to ‘the process of exercising the power to approve building plans’. Firstly, in terms of section 6 the 
building control officer has to make a recommendation to the local authority with regard to the building 
plans. Secondly, the local authority must approve the building plans if it is satisfied that the plans comply 
with the provisions of the Building Standards Act and with the provisions of any other law, unless it is also 
satisfied that the building, built in accordance with the proposed plans, ‘will trigger one of the disqualifying 
factors in section 7(1)(b)(ii)’. Thirdly, the local authority must refuse to approve the plans if it is satisfied 
that one of the disqualifying factors will be brought about by the proposed building. Finally, the decision-
maker should refuse the application for the approval of the building plans if he is of the opinion that the 
plans do not comply with the necessary requirements. 
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the plans complied with ‘necessary legal requirements’ and that the section 7(1)(b)(ii) 
requirements were not triggered by a building built in accordance with the approved 
plans.319 With reference to the decision in Paola v Jeeva NO and others,320 the court 
stated that building plans had to be set aside on review if for example it authorised the 
construction of a building that devalued neighbouring properties. Furthermore, the 
applicant could challenge the approval of the plans ‘irrespective of whether or not the 
decision-maker was satisfied that none of the disqualifying factors could be triggered’.321 
To have the building plans set aside, an applicant will simply have to prove that the 
‘erection of the building will reduce the value of his or her property’.322  
The court held that ‘the legislature could not have intended to authorize an invalid 
exercise of power’.323 This consequence could be avoided if the decision-maker 
approved a building plan only once he was satisfied that the disqualifying factors would 
not be triggered by the construction of a building pursuant to such a plan. The court held 
that this interpretation of the Act was consistent with the ‘obligation to promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bills of Rights’.324 This interpretation further shows that it is 
not only the interests of the individual land owner that deserve protection, but also the 
interests of neighbouring property owners that may be adversely affected by a building 
erected in terms of approved building plans, in circumstances where the approval 
process did not afford them a hearing.325 The court held that this interpretation strikes a 
balance between the rights of the land owner to ‘exercise his or her right of ownership 
over property’ and the rights of neighbouring land owners.326 
                                                            
319 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 55. 
320 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA). 
321 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 55. 
322 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 55. 
323 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 55. 
324 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 55. 
325 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 55. 
326 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 55. 
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True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and another327 challenged the Constitutional 
court’s interpretation of section 7(1)(b)(ii) as set out in Walele v The City of Cape Town 
and others.328 In this decision, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the correct 
interpretation of section 7(1)(b)(ii) is that the local authority must refuse the approval of 
the building plans if it is satisfied that ‘the building will probably or in fact cause one of 
the undesirable outcomes’.329 The court explained that section 7(1)(b)(ii) did not enable 
the local authority to refuse the approval of the plans simply because there was a 
possibility that one of the section 7(1)(b)(ii) grounds would be triggered.330 Rather, the 
local authority could only refuse the approval if such an outcome was probable.331  
The court held that Paola v Jeeva NO and others (Paola)332 is not authority for the 
view that a building plan was invalid if the building caused derogation of the value of a 
property. Further, Paola did not support the view that ‘the court’s own determination of 
the issue as to whether a building will derogate from the value justifies the setting aside 
of a local authority’s approval of a plan’.333 Finally, Paola was not authority for the 
proposition that the local authority must ‘be satisfied that none of the undesirable 
outcomes set out in section 7(1)(b)(ii) will be a consequence of the erection of the 
building concerned’.334 
The Constitutional Court summarised the differences between these two 
interpretations of section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Building Standards Act, without deciding upon 
the correctness of either one, in Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association and 
                                                            
327 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA). 
328 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC). 
329 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 21. 
330 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 21. 
331 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 21. 
332 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA). 
333 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 29. 
334 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 29. 
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another v Harrison and another.335 In this case the court explained that the 
interpretation adopted in Walele means that the local authority cannot approve building 
plans unless it is ‘positively satisfied’ that one of the disqualifying factors in section 
7(1)(b)(ii) will not be triggered.336 This implies that the applicant (who applies for the 
approval of plans) must show that the disqualifying factors will not be triggered. 
Additionally, Walele imposes a positive duty on the local authority to ensure that the 
disqualifying factors are not triggered. By contrast, the interpretation adopted by True 
Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and another means that the local authority must approve 
the building plans unless it is satisfied that the ‘proposed building will probably, or in 
fact, trigger one of the disqualifying factors’ in section 7(1)(b)(ii).337 This interpretation 
requires of the objector to show the existence of one of the disqualifying factors. The 
court did not indicate which was the correct interpretation of section 7(1)(b)(ii).  
Another factor that the court in True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and another338 
had to consider was the meaning that had to be attributed to the phrase ‘derogation of 
value’.339 The court held that ‘value’ had to be interpreted as ‘market value’.340 Market 
value is ‘the price that an informed willing buyer would pay to an informed willing seller 
for the property, having regard to all its potential at the time of sale, both realised and 
unrealised’.341 The implication is that the informed buyer and seller will always take into 
account all advantages as well as disadvantages that will flow from the ‘lawful exercise 
of rights’ and these considerations will be reflected in the price attributed to the 
                                                            
335 2011 (2) BCLR 121 (CC). This case was an application for leave to appeal against the Supreme Court 
of Appeal’s findings in Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association v Harrison [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 
February 2010). One of the grounds on which the court refused leave to appeal was that the applicants 
case did not raise issues pertaining to the interpretation of section 7(1)(b)(ii). Moreover, because the 
issue was not raised the court refused to indicate whether Walele v City of Cape Town or True Motives 84 
(Pty) Ltd v Madhi and another formulated the correct interpretation for section 7(1)(b)(ii). 
336 2011 (2) BCLR 121 (CC) para 33. 
337 2011 (2) BCLR 121 (CC) para 33. 
338 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA). 
339 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 30. 
340 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 30. 
341 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 30. 
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property.342 Essentially, a hypothetical willing buyer and seller would take into account 
the possibility and effect of later legal building developments on adjacent plots of land 
when determining the market value of the plot which is for sale. Furthermore, to 
determine the market value of the property the local authority must take into account all 
‘adverse aspects’ flowing from the lawful use of the property that will be contemplated 
by a willing buyer and seller.343 Derogation of value only takes place if the ‘influence of 
such aspects exceeds the contemplation of the hypothetical informed parties’.344 The 
local authority must assess the facts of each individual case. Further, the building 
control officer possesses the relevant expertise to make a finding after it has considered 
all ‘facts and probabilities’.345 The building control officer would be able to determine 
whether an unforeseen disadvantage would be brought about by the construction of the 
proposed building.346  
The Supreme Court of Appeal criticised the Walele347 judgment insofar as it 
incorrectly interpreted and applied the findings in Paola v Jeeva NO and others.348 
Furthermore, the majority was of the opinion that the statements made in Walele were 
based on ‘wrong statements of the law’ and ‘obiter’.349 The court held that Walele 
                                                            
342 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 30. 
343 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 30. 
344 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 30. This interpretation of ‘value’ was confirmed by the Constitutional 
Court in Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association and another v Harrison and another 2011 (2) 
BCLR 121 (CC) paras 38-40. The court elaborated that a ‘hypothetical buyer’ of property would give 
consideration to the limitations that will be placed on his land-use rights by legislation such as zoning 
scheme regulations. A building that interferes with the ‘previously existing attributes of the subject 
property’ will not necessarily derogate the value of the neighbouring property. However, there will be 
derogation in the value of surrounding properties if a building does not comply with the law. Accordingly, 
derogation in market value will arise if a building does not comply with statutory provisions or, if it does 
comply with legislation, it is ‘so unattractive or intrusive that it exceeds the legitimate expectations of the 
parties to the hypothetical sale’.  
345 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 31. 
346 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 31. 
347 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC). 
348 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA). 
349 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 35. 
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created the incorrect impression that a neighbouring property owner could appeal 
against the decision to approve the building plan if he can show that the proposed 
building will derogate the value of his property. The court explained that ‘the existence 
of such a right is in conflict with the appeal procedure laid down in section 9 of the Act 
and ignores the nature of the local authorities decision under section 7(1)(b)(ii) and the 
test which that body is required to apply’.350 
As explained above, the decision of Paola v Jeeva NO and others351 has been 
relied on to support the notion that a property owner simply has to prove that a 
proposed building will cause his property to devaluate to have the building plans set 
aside. The court in of True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and another352 attempted to 
resolve to some extent the uncertainties created by decisions such as Walele with 
regard to the correct interpretation of section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Act. Currently, in light of 
True Motives 84 (Pty) Ltd v Madhi and another, it appears that property owners will only 
be able to successfully rely on the provisions of section 7(1)(b)(ii)(aa)(ccc) if they could 
prove that their properties would derogate beyond what could reasonable be anticipated 
by a willing buyer and a willing seller. This would be difficult to prove, especially if one 
considers the emphasis placed on the expertise and duties of the building control officer 
in the approval process as a whole. An applicant would have a greater chance at 
success if he, in addition to relying on one of the section 7(1)(b)(ii) grounds, relies on 
other grounds in support of his application for review and setting aside on the building 
plans. For example, the applicant can rely on administrative law grounds to impugn the 
recommendation made by the building control officer to the local authority. Alternatively, 
the applicant can rely on section 7(1) of the Building Standards Act in support of his 
argument that the local authority, prior to approving building plans, had not given proper 
consideration to the recommendation placed before it. 
 
                                                            
350 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA) para 36. 
351 2004 (1) SA 396 (SCA). 
352 2009 (4) SA 153 (SCA). 
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3 4 4 Application for a demolition order once building plans have been set aside 
3 4 4 1 High Dune House (Pty) Ltd v Ndlambe Municipality and others353 
Recently, the courts confirmed the role of the demolition order as an instrument to 
protect the rights of neighbouring property owners. In so doing, the court emphasised 
the responsibilities of local authorities with regard to buildings built in contravention of 
the provisions of the Building Standards Act.354 
The court in High Dune House (Pty) Ltd v Ndlambe Municipality and others (High 
Dune House v Ndlambe Municipality) reviewed and set aside the approval of the 
respondent’s building plans. The implication was that the respondent had constructed a 
building for which there were no approved building plans. In such instances the Building 
Standards Act prescribes that a local authority has a duty to ‘take appropriate steps to 
ensure that the position is regularised’.355 The respondent relied on section 8 of PAJA to 
launch a counter-application for a declaratory order that his house should not be 
demolished and that he should pay R600 000 to compensate the applicant.356 The 
respondent argued that the payment of compensation could adequately address the 
                                                            
353 [2007] ZAECHC 154 (29 June 2007). 
354 Act 103 of 1977. 
355 [2007] ZAECHC 154 (29 June 2007) para 2. 
356 [2007] ZAECHC 154 (29 June 2007) para 2. Section 8(1)(d) stipulates that a court that has heard an 
application under section 6 can make an ‘order declaring the rights in respect of any matter to which the 
administrative action relates’. Section 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb) enables the court, in exceptional circumstances, to 
order a party to review proceedings to pay of compensation. 
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harm suffered by the applicant and submitted that the payment of compensation was 
preferable to demolition or partial demolition.357  
The court held that it would not prematurely grant a declaratory order that would 
‘directly impinge upon or confine the discretion of the local authority in carrying out any 
of the duties imposed on it by law’.358 It explained that the local authority was faced with 
a house that was built in contravention of section 4 of the Building Standards Act. One 
of the measures that an authority can take is a demolition order as prescribed in section 
21 of the Act. The court held that ‘the local authority should have at its disposal all 
possible options for solving what is likely to continue to be a difficult problem’.359 
There was a possibility that the respondent would not be able to provide the local 
authority with building plans (for the existing structure) ‘which are capable of 
approval’.360 In such instances the only option available to the local authority was the 
demolition of the non-complaint structure.361 Accordingly, the court held that: 
‘[a]n application to court to determine the question of demolition or partial demolition 
is inappropriate and premature until the local authority has dealt with the matter, all 
                                                            
357 [2007] ZAECHC 154 (29 June 2007) para 3. The reasons provided by the respondent in support of his 
application was that the cost of demolition, wasted expenses brought about by demolition and the cost of 
building a new house outweighed the amount of fair compensation. Furthermore, the abovementioned 
costs were ‘out of proportion both to the reduction in the value of the applicant's property, and to the 
extent of any amenity loss caused by obstructing the applicant's view’. The respondent also argued that 
there was a risk that the process of demolition could destabilise the dune on which the second 
respondent’s house was situated. This could have potentially negative consequences for the houses on 
adjoining properties. Finally, the second respondent had laboured under a bona fide belief that he was 
building his house in accordance with a validly approved building plan. The respondent explained that he 
was the victim ‘of mistakes by the professional persons who advised him and built his house, and 
mistakes by the local authority in the process of approving the plans’. 
358 [2007] ZAECHC 154 (29 June 2007) para 5. 
359 [2007] ZAECHC 154 (29 June 2007) para 5. 
360 [2007] ZAECHC 154 (29 June 2007) para 5. 
361 [2007] ZAECHC 154 (29 June 2007) para 5. 
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the alternatives have been presented and considered, and demolition or partial 
demolition is indeed an issue’.362 
 
3 4 4 2 Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and others363 
The court in Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and others364 explained that local 
authorities have a statutory duty to enforce compliance with zoning schemes.365 
Furthermore, the Building Regulations Act enables local authorities to demolish ‘non-
compliant’ buildings, namely buildings for which there are no approved building plans as 
required by section 4 of the Building Standards Act.  
The court held that the local authority would be compelled to consider the 
possibility of demolition or partial demolition in instances where building plans are set 
aside on review, and where the ‘resultant position cannot be lawfully remedied’.366 If a 
local authority unreasonably fails to demolish a building under such circumstances, that 
decision will ‘itself be reviewable at the applicant’s instance in terms of section 6(3) read 
with section 8 of PAJA’.367 The court stated that the question of demolition cannot be 
decided ‘whimsically or capriciously, whether by the relevant functionaries or, indeed, a 
court’.368 Furthermore, ‘the primacy in our constitutional order of the principle of legality 
makes it unlikely that the building owner’s convenience will prevail if the structure is in 
fact irremediably unlawful’.369 The court held that ‘pre-constitutional judgments such as 
De Villiers v Kalson370 must, insofar as their references to the court’s discretion where 
                                                            
362 [2007] ZAECHC 154 (29 June 2007) para 5. 
363 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009). 
364 See the discussion of this decision in Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional property law’ (2009) 1 JQR 2.2.2. 
365 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 10. 
366 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 10. In this regard the court referred to High Dune House 
(Pty) Ltd v Ndlambe Municipality and others [2007] ZAECHC 154 (29 June 2007) and Van Rensburg 
NNO v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE). 
367 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 10. 
368 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 10. 
369 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 10. 
370 1928 EDL 217 at 231. 
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the demolition of buildings is in issue, be construed and applied in the light of modern 
constitutional principle’.371 
 
3 4 4 3 Conclusion 
Essentially, these two decisions confirm that buildings become unlawful and susceptible 
to demolition once building plans are set aside on review. A local authority has a duty to 
regularise the building in an attempt to prevent the demolition of the entire building. 
Stated differently, the local authority must determine what can be done to render the 
building compliant with the provisions of the Act. This might entail the partial demolition 
of certain sections of the building to bring it in line with the requirements set in 
legislation. The local authority has a statutory duty to demolish the building if it is 
satisfied that nothing can be done to regularise the building. However, the demolition of 
an entire building should only occur in exceptional circumstances. A neighbouring 
property owner can, on the authority of the Searle case, approach the court for an order 
that compels the local authority to demolish or partially demolish a building if it has 
failed to do so in accordance with the provisions of the Building Standards Act. Due to 
the onerous nature of a demolition order it seems fair that the local authority should first 
attempt to find alternatives to the demolition of buildings. Such an alternative would be 
the partial demolition of those sections that cannot be regularised. A building should be 
demolished in its entirety in circumstances where all alternatives have been exhausted 
and where the building cannot be brought in line with the provisions of the Building 
Standards Act. 
 
3 5 The Oudekraal principle 
3 5 1 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and others372 
It has been confirmed above that neighbouring property owners can apply to the local 
authority for demolition orders once building plans have been set aside on review. 
                                                            
371 [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 10. 
372 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA). 
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Nevertheless, it is possible for a court to refuse to set aside building plans, by virtue of 
the Oudekraal principle, even though the applicant had established a clear right to such 
relief. The implication is that in such circumstances the applicant could be denied the 
right to apply for the demolition of unlawful building works.  
In Oudekraal the court confirmed that in proceedings for judicial review, a court 
has the discretion to set aside unlawful administrative action. In this regard the court 
stated: 
 ‘[i]t is that discretion that accords to judicial review its essential and pivotal role in 
administrative law, for it constitutes the indispensable moderating tool for avoiding or 
minimising injustice when legality and certainty collide’.373 
Specifically, the court referred to delay in launching review proceedings as a factor that 
would potentially influence the court’s discretion.374 When exercising its discretion, a 
court will take into account the length of time that has lapsed since the administrative 
action has first taken place. In addition to the lapse of time the court will also consider 
all relevant circumstances, including ‘the need for finality’, ‘the consequences for the 
public at large, and, indeed for future generations, of allowing the invalid decision to 
stand’.375 Furthermore, the court will also consider the extent to which parties might 
have acted in reliance upon the delay.376 
 
3 5 2 Practical application of the Oudekraal principle 
This principle was applied in Camps Bay Ratepayers and Resident’s Association v 
Harrison.377 The parties in this case were involved in litigation since 2005 and a few 
                                                            
373 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) 246D. 
374 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) 242E. In this regard the court referred to Harnaker v Minister of the Interior 
1965 (1) SA 372 (C) 318C, where the court explained that in instances where a court refused to set aside 
an unlawful decision on account of delay it could be said that ‘in a sense delay would validate a nullity’.   
375 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) 249H-I. 
376 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) 249I. 
377 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010). For a discussion of this decision, refer to Van der Walt AJ 
‘Constitutional property law’ (2010) 1 JQR 2.1.1. 
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orders were handed down throughout the battle. The appellants appealed against the 
refusal of the court a quo to review and set aside the decision of the second respondent 
to approve the first respondents building plans.378 One of the grounds relied on by the 
applicants in the court a quo were the breach of zoning scheme requirements and the 
contravention of conditions of title. The appellants further questioned the procedural 
fairness of the decision to approve the first respondent’s building plans.379 
Subsequently, the appellants added additional grounds, namely that the building plan 
contravened a provision in the zoning scheme and that ‘the approval of the plans as a 
rider to a previously approved plan was incompetent’.380 The court a quo refused to 
consider these grounds ‘on the basis that it had been raised late (in reply) and was as a 
result not adequately canvassed’.381 In the Supreme Court of Appeal the appellants 
relied on the same grounds as those relied on in the court a quo. They also raised 
additional grounds which are not relevant to this discussion. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal rejected all but one of the grounds raised by the 
appellant. It held that the court a quo had wrongly refused to entertain the ground raised 
by the appellant in relation to the zoning scheme and it determined that the provision 
had been contravened in so far as the respondents building encroached over the 
building line.382 Accordingly, the court had to determine whether the appellants were 
entitled to have the building plans set aside on that ground. The court explained that the 
litigation process had been going on for three years before the appellants raised this 
specific ground, which created the impression that the ‘infraction was not their primary 
concern’.383  
The Oudekraal384 delay principle was a further reason why the court refused to 
entertain this ground. Furthermore, the court explained that even since before PAJA the 
                                                            
378 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010) para 1. 
379 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010) para 13. 
380 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010) para 13. 
381 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010) para 14. 
382 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010) para 45. 
383 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010) para 55. 
384 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v The City if Cape Town and others 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA). 
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courts have recognised the principle that it might refuse to grant relief on account of 
delay to bring the action.385 With reference to Oudekraal,386 the court held that it could 
not condone the delay and that the application for the review and setting aside of the 
building plans had to be denied. The reasons provided were that the three year delay 
was significant, ‘particularly if regard is had to the promptitude with which people might 
ordinarily be expected to act and build in accordance with approved building plans’.387 It 
could not be said that the respondent acted with intent when she built over the building 
line. She acted in accordance with the approved building plans and it would be costly to 
adapt the building. In addition to the costs of adapting the building she had incurred 
‘considerable cost in defending litigation that was quite unrelated to the encroachment 
over the building line’.388 The encroachment was moreover so insignificant that it had 
gone unnoticed for three years. Finally, the local authority was of the view that there 
was no ‘prospect that the infraction will impact in any meaningful way on the aesthetics 
or future development of Camps Bay’.389 
The Oudekraal principle, as illustrated in Camps Bay Ratepayers and Resident’s 
Association v Harrison,390 has clear implications for neighbouring property owners 
seeking to have building plans set aside on review and the subsequent demolition of 
building works. It is evident that the court has the discretion to refuse the granting of a 
demolition order, even in instances where the applicant has shown that he has a right to 
such relief. This is to be welcomed in light of the fact that exceptional circumstances can 
arise where, despite the fact that the building cannot be regulated, the granting of a 
demolition order would be disproportionate to the harm suffered by neighbours. In 
                                                            
385 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010) para 57. In support of this statement the court referred to the 
decisions, amongst others, of Harnaker v Minister of the Interior 1965 (1) SA 372 (C) and Wolgroeiers 
Afslaers v Munisipaliteit van Kaapstad 1978 (1) SA 13 (A) 42A-D. 
386 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA). 
387 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010) para 62. 
388 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010) para 62. 
389 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010) para 62. In Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association 
and another v Harrison and another 2011 (2) BCLR 121 (CC) the court refused the applicants leave to 
appeal against the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal.  
390 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010). 
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exercising its discretion the court will take a range of factors into account, including the 
delay of the applicant in bringing the proceedings; the potential hardship suffered by the 
respondent and the seriousness of the respondent’s contravention of the Building 
Standards Act. The court can also consider factors such as the impact of the invalid 
administrative action on the public and third parties.  
In conclusion, the principle of legality requires of the courts and local authorities to 
act strictly in accordance of the law, raising the real possibility that buildings might have 
to be demolished because the buildings plans were set aside on review. However, the 
Oudekraal discretion affords the court sufficient flexibility to cater for those exceptional 
cases where the granting of a demolition order seems excessive.   
 
3 6 Conclusion 
This chapter consisted of four main parts, on restrictive conditions, illegal buildings and 
building works, buildings that were built in accordance with building plans set aside on 
review and, finally, instances where the courts might not order the demolition of an 
illegal structure. Throughout the chapter the emphasis fell on firstly, the local authorities’ 
statutory duties in relation to illegal and unlawful buildings and, secondly, the right of 
land owners to approach the court for relief in instances where a neighbour developed 
his land in a manner proscribed by law. Local authorities are ultimately responsible to 
regulate building and development in their area of jurisdiction, and to ensure the 
congruent and healthy development of urban areas. This means that where necessary 
local authorities must apply to have illegal and unlawful structures partially or wholly 
demolished. Restrictive conditions such as conditions of title are invaluable town-
planning tools specifically designed to protect the unique character of built-up areas. 
However, these tools can only be effective if they are properly enforced by local 
authorities. A demolition order is a particularly effective enforcement mechanism as it 
removes the unlawful use of land and restores the character of the neighbourhood. 
Likewise, case law has confirmed that local authorities should demolish illegal 
structures in instances where they cannot be brought in line with the law. This means 
that when building plans are set aside on review the local authority must first determine 
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whether the building can be altered or adapted so that it meets the relevant statutory 
requirements. Local authorities must apply for a demolition order when it is discovered 
that the illegal structure cannot be remedied. The courts have in this regard explained 
that the ‘primacy in our constitutional order of the principle of legality makes it unlikely 
that the building owner’s convenience will prevail if the structure is in fact irremediably 
unlawful’.391 Furthermore, decisions such as Barnett show that there are instances 
where the court will order the summary demolition of illegal structures. Typically, this will 
occur when persons build structures in blatant disregard of the law. In such instances 
the courts have explained that it will not protect the interests of those persons who 
cynically disregarded the law. As in the case of restrictive conditions demolition is the 
most efficient way in which the local authority can remove the illegal use of land and 
uphold the interests that are protected by building and development laws.  
As stated above, the chapter emphasised that neighbouring land owners have the 
right to apply to the courts for demolition orders in instances where their neighbours 
constructed illegal or unlawful buildings. Restrictive conditions constitute limited real 
rights and it has been confirmed that they amount to constitutional property.392 The 
chapter showed the willingness of the courts to order the demolition of buildings built in 
conflict with such restrictive conditions. In so doing, the courts protected the limited real 
rights held by neighbouring land owners. Case law has also confirmed that 
neighbouring land owners (and voluntary associations acting on behalf of land owners) 
can approach the courts for relief (often in the form of an interdict and later a demolition 
order) in instances where neighbours construct illegal building works, or where buildings 
are rendered illegal because building plans have been set aside on review. One can 
conclude that it is desirable for neighbouring land owners to become more actively 
involved in regulating building and development in their area. Neighbouring land owners 
know their environment better and will, as such, be more attuned to the construction of 
illegal and unlawful buildings in their area. 
                                                            
391 Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and others [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 10. 
392 Ex Parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C). 
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Finally, Camps Bay Ratepayers and Resident’s Association v Harrison (Camps 
Bay)393 made it explicit that there are exceptional instances where the courts would be 
unwilling to order the demolition of a building, even though it is in principle illegal. It is 
impossible to delineate all the factors that can cause a court to shy away from a 
demolition order. The Camps Bay decision indicated that the court will consider the 
number of years that the illegal structure (or illegal aspects of the structure) had gone 
unnoticed; whether the illegality of the structure poses a threat to the public whether it 
will negatively impact on the area where the building is situated; whether the structure 
infringes on the rights of others; the degree of illegality and the cost of altering or 
demolishing the structure. Essentially, whether or not the court would order the 
demolition of the structure will depend on the unique circumstances of the case.
                                                            
393 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010). For a discussion of this decision, refer to Van der Walt AJ 
‘Constitutional property law’ (2010) 1 JQR 2.1.1. 
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Chapter 4:  
The impact of historic preservation laws on property owners’ 
demolition rights  
 
4 1 Introduction 
The desire to preserve historic and culturally significant buildings is a worldwide 
phenomenon. Generally, this goal is achieved through the enactment of legislation 
designed to protect historically or culturally valuable buildings held in private ownership. 
Although legislation of this nature addresses the broader social need for heritage 
preservation, it can deprive an individual owner of some of his ownership entitlements, 
including demolition rights. This usually becomes an issue when the owner intends to 
demolish a historic property for purposes of development; where the building’s 
maintenance becomes too expensive or when the building is so dilapidated that it 
presents a danger to life or property. In such instances, historic preservation legislation 
may compel an owner to apply for a permit to demolish the building, either as a whole or 
partially. These applications are often unsuccessful.  
 In addition to the deprivation of their demolition rights, preservation laws can 
compel property owners to maintain the protected building at their own expense. The 
maintenance of historic buildings can place an immense financial burden on the owner. 
Furthermore, once a building is formally protected, the owner might often only be able to 
do very little on his property without first obtaining the consent of the heritage 
authorities. It is therefore evident that historic preservation laws can drastically interfere 
with ownership entitlements.  
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the nature of the limitations that historic 
preservation laws place on owners’ rights to demolish culturally valuable buildings. This 
chapter will specifically refer to heritage preservation jurisprudence from three 
jurisdictions, namely South Africa, the United States of America (the US) and Germany. 
The two foreign legal systems were selected as they both operate within constitutional 
frameworks that are comparable to the South African situation. In both jurisdictions the 
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courts have handed down landmark judgments concerning the limitations that can be 
placed on ownership by historic preservation laws. In Penn Central Transportation 
Company v City of New York,1 the US Supreme Court confirmed the constitutional 
validity of historic preservation laws. A similar conclusion was reached by the German 
Federal Constitutional Court in Rheinland-Pfälzischen Denkmalschutz-und-
Pflegegesetz.2 However, in the German case it was also decided that historic 
preservation laws can, in some instances, place too severe limitations on ownership 
entitlements. In certain exceptional circumstances, a property owner cannot be 
expected to bear the burden of maintaining a historic building in the public interest. 
Accordingly, there are circumstances where the owner should be allowed to demolish a 
protected building. Alternatively, the land owner should be compensated for the loss 
suffered as a result of his inability to demolish, develop or use the property.  
To date, the South African Constitutional Court has not been confronted with a 
dispute concerning the constitutionality of the limitations imposed by the National 
Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 (the Heritage Resources Act) on ownership. As a 
result, it is still unclear as to when these limitations will be excessive and 
unconstitutional. The discussion of the two foreign legal systems assists in delineating 
the circumstances where it might be unconstitutional to deny the owner a demolition 
permit for a protected building. This discussion further highlights the distinguishing 
factors that might render otherwise excessive limitations on ownership constitutional.  
The first section of this chapter provides a brief overview of historic preservation in 
the South African context. This overview includes a reference to the statutory 
predecessors of the Heritage Resources Act and an explanation of the operation of the 
Act. The focus of the second section falls on a discussion of South African case law, 
where the courts have interpreted the scope of the heritage authorities’ statutory powers 
in relation to historic buildings. This is followed by a discussion of US case law and the 
prominent German decision in Rheinland-Pfälzischen Denkmalschutz-und-
                                                            
1 438 US 104 (1978). 
2 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999]. 
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Pflegegesetz.3 The final section considers the broader implications of US and German 
law as applied to South African law.  
 
4 2 An overview of historic preservation in South Africa 
Pienaar explains that the statutory protection of monuments and buildings in South 
Africa developed in four phases.4 Initially, during the first phase, there was no legislation 
that protected historic buildings and monuments.5 It was only later, during the second 
phase, with the promulgation of the Natural and Historical Monuments, Relics and 
Antiquities Act 4 of 1934 (the 1934 Monuments Act), that historic buildings and 
monuments were successfully protected by statute.6 The National Monuments Act 28 of 
1969 (the 1969 Monuments Act), the predecessor of the National Heritage Resources 
Act 25 of 1999 (Heritage Resources Act), marked the third phase of the statutory 
protection of buildings and other monuments. The fourth phase includes important 
amendments to the 1969 Monuments Act, introduced by the War Graves and National 
                                                            
3 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999]. 
4 Pienaar JM ‘Bewaring en die Wet op Nasionale Gedenkwaardighede 28 van 1969’ (1996) 29 De Jure 
89-111 at 90. These phases were the pre-1936 phase; the 1936 to 1969 phase; the 1969 to 1986 phase 
and the post-1986 phase.  
5 Pienaar JM ‘Bewaring en die Wet op Nasionale Gedenkwaardighede 28 van 1969’ (1996) 29 De Jure 
89-111 at 90. The first statutory provisions, vaguely related to the protection of monuments, were found in 
the Bushman-Relics Protection Act 22 of 1911 (the Bushman-Relics Act). This Act was created for two 
purposes, namely to prevent the removal of Bushman relics to Europe, and further to cultivate a sense of 
appreciation for South African heritage. 
6 Pienaar JM ‘Bewaring en die Wet op Nasionale Gedenkwaardighede 28 van 1969’ (1996) 29 De Jure 
89-111 at 90. A previous act, the Natural and Historical Monuments Act 6 of 1923 (the 1923 Monuments 
Act), was enacted to preserve monuments and historic buildings. Unfortunately, the provisions of this Act 
were not productively employed to protect culturally valuable buildings. This could be ascribed to the lack 
of funds and the inability of the council to designate buildings for protection. The Bushman-Relics Act, 
and the 1923 Monuments Act, was later consolidated into the 1934 Monuments Act. Pienaar explains that 
the 1934 Monuments Act, in contrast to the 1923 Monuments Act, provided the commission with more 
power to control the demolition and damaging of valuable buildings. 
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Monuments Amendment Act 11 of 1986 (the 1986 War Graves and Monuments Act).7 A 
fifth phase was initiated by the promulgation of the Heritage Resources Act, which 
operates within the framework of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(the Constitution).8  
The Heritage Resources Act prohibits the demolition of buildings that are either 
protected by the formal, or the general protections of the Act. The greater part of the 
discussion below is centred on section 34, a general protection provision, which 
prohibits the demolition of any building older than 60 years without a permit. Section 34 
should be understood within the broader scheme of the Act. Accordingly, in the 
following paragraphs reference is made to the manner in which heritage resources are 
identified, managed and protected. These paragraphs also mention the system of 
heritage resource management prescribed by the Heritage Resources Act and the 
heritage assessment criteria that are taken into account when determining whether a 
building should form part of the national estate. Finally, the section provides a brief 
account of some of the formal protection measures that are put in place to protect 
historically and culturally valuable buildings.   
The Heritage Resources Act consists of three chapters, namely Chapter I: the 
system for the management of national heritage resources;9 Chapter II: the protection 
                                                            
7 Pienaar JM ‘Bewaring en die Wet op Nasionale Gedenkwaardighede 28 van 1969’ (1996) 29 De Jure 
89-111 at 91. One of the important amendments was that under the 1986 Act, numerous buildings of 
scientific, historic and aesthetic value could be protected as one preservation area (bewaringsgebied). 
Previously, under the 1969 Monuments Act, it was only possible to designate and protect single 
monuments and not an entire area. 
8 The 1969 Monuments Act was repealed by section 60 of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 
1999 (the Heritage Resources Act). 
9 Chapter I. This chapter is divided into two parts, namely Part 1, which contains general principles 
concerning, amongst other things, the national estate, the application of the Act and general principles for 
resource management. Part 2 contains provisions relating to the constitution, functions, powers and 
duties of heritage resources authorities. 
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and management of heritage resources;10 and Chapter III: general provisions.11 Section 
4 stipulates that Chapter 1 of the Act ‘establishes the national system for the 
management of heritage resources’.12 This chapter serves as a guideline for the 
management of heritage resources in South Africa.13 It also provides the framework in 
terms of which a heritage resource authority should perform its functions and exercise 
its powers.14 Chapter I establishes the South African National Heritage Resource 
Agency (SAHRA)15 as the statutory body responsible for managing the national estate. 
Section 4(1)(d) provides for the establishment of provincial heritage resources agencies 
(PHRAs). The PHRAs are responsible for the management of heritage resources on a 
provincial and local level.16 Section 4(1)(d) should be read with section 8, which 
provides for the creation of a three-tiered heritage resources management system. This 
system consists of heritage resources authorities on the national, provincial17 and local 
levels. Each of these spheres of heritage resource authorities is responsible for 
identifying and managing different levels of heritage resources. The national heritage 
resource authority is responsible for identifying and managing Grade I heritage 
resources and the provincial and local heritage resource authorities are responsible for 
                                                            
10 Chapter II. The formal protections created by the Act are set out in Part 1. Part 2 consists of provisions 
regarding the general protection of heritage resources. The provisions concerning the management of 
heritage resources are set out in Part 3. Section 34, a general protection provision, places an express 
limitation on property owners’ demolition rights. This section is discussed in more detail below. 
11 Chapter III. This chapter has two parts. In Part 1, the provisions relating to enforcement, appeals, 
offences and penalties are set out. Part 2 contains miscellaneous provisions.  
12 Section 4(1) of Act 25 of 1999. 
13 Section 4(1)(b) of Act 25 of 1999. 
14 Section 4(1)(c) of Act 25 of 1999. 
15 The SAHRA is established in terms of section 11, and its powers are set out in section 13 of the Act. 
The SAHRA is a body corporate that can sue, and be sued, in its corporate name. 
16 Section 4(1)(d) of Act 25 of 1999. 
17 Section 23 of Act 25 of 1999 stipulates that an MEC may establish a provincial heritage authority that 
shall be responsible for managing heritage resources in a specific province. The provincial heritage 
authority is a body corporate that can sue, and be sued, in its corporate name. The functions, powers and 
duties of provincial heritage resources authorities are set out in section 24 of the Act. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
185 
identifying and managing Grade II and Grade III heritage resources. The SAHRA 
collectively organises the three levels of heritage resource agencies.18 
Section 7 stipulates that the SAHRA should, in consultation with the minister and 
MEC for each province, develop a grading system for cultural places and objects that 
will form part of the national estate.19 The SAHRA must also prescribe heritage 
assessment criteria that are consistent with the criteria set out in section 3(3) of the Act. 
These criteria are used by heritage resources authorities to ‘assess the intrinsic, 
comparative and contextual significance of a heritage resource and the relative benefits 
and costs of its protection’.20 The section 3(3) criteria for determining whether a building 
or an object should form part of the national estate can roughly be separated into three 
groups, namely buildings and objects that are relevant to a specific community or 
cultural group;21 buildings and objects that possess unique aesthetic, architectural, 
                                                            
18 Heritage authorities must recognise and promote the general principles of heritage management that 
are set out in section 5 of Act 25 of 1999. For example, section 5(1)(a) provides that ‘[h]eritage resources 
have lasting value in their own right and provide evidence of the origins of South African society, and as 
they are valuable, finite, non-renewable and irreplaceable they must be carefully managed to ensure their 
survival’. Section 5(1)(b) stipulates that ‘every generation has a moral responsibility to act as trustee of 
the national heritage for succeeding generations and the State has an obligation to manage heritage 
resources in the interests of all South Africans’. 
19 Section 3(1) of Act 25 of 1999 provides that ‘[f]or the purposes of this Act, those heritage resources of 
South Africa which are of cultural significance or other special value for the present community and for 
future generations must be considered part of the national estate and fall within the sphere of operations 
of heritage resources authorities’. Section 3(2) provides a list of what can form part of the national estate. 
20 Section 7(1)(c) of Act 25 of 1999.  
21 Section 3(3)(a) stipulates that a building or an object will form part of the national estate because of ‘its 
importance in the community, or pattern of South Africa’s history’. In a similar vein, section 3(3)(e) 
provides that a building or object will form part of the national estate because of ‘its importance in 
exhibiting particular aesthetic characteristics valued by a community or cultural group’. Finally, section 
3(3)(g) provides that a building or object will form part of the national estate because of ‘its strong or 
special association with a particular community or cultural group for social, cultural or spiritual reasons’. 
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technical or other qualities;22 and finally buildings and objects that are historically 
relevant.23 These three categories reveal that buildings can be protected for purposes 
other than pure aesthetic or historic value. In the South African context, heritage 
preservation has become a method of giving recognition to those cultures and histories 
that were previously neglected. One can argue that it is in the public interest to 
safeguard buildings from destruction because of the fundamental value that a specific 
community may attach to them.  
Heritage resources are protected under the formal protections or the general 
protections listed in the Act. As explained above, these protections place a limitation on 
property owners’ right to demolish protected buildings on their property. For example, 
section 27, a formal protection measure, authorises the declaration of national and 
provincial heritage sites.24 It is the duty of the SAHRA and the PHRAs to protect 
national and provincial heritage sites ‘in accordance with the provisions of this 
section’.25 A property owner is prohibited from demolishing, damaging, defacing, 
                                                            
22 In terms of section 3(3)(b) and (d), buildings or objects will form part of the national estate because they 
either possess ‘uncommon, rare or endangered aspects of South Africa’s natural or cultural heritage’, or 
because they demonstrate ‘the principal characteristics of a particular class of South Africa’s natural or 
cultural places or objects’. Finally, in terms of section 3(3)(f), buildings or objects will form part of the 
national estate if they demonstrate ‘a high degree of creative or technical achievement at a particular 
period’. 
23 In terms of sections 3(3)(c),(h) and (i), buildings or objects will form part of the national estate if they 
‘aid understanding of an aspect of South Africa’s natural or cultural heritage’; if they have a ‘strong or 
special association with the life or work of a person, group or organisation of importance in the history of 
South Africa’ and if they are ‘sites of significance relating to the history of slavery in South Africa’.  
24 In terms of section 27(1) of Act 25 of 1999, the SAHRA can declare a national heritage site if it 
considers a place to be ‘so exceptional’ that it meets the heritage assessment criteria that are ‘set out in 
section 3(2) and prescribed under section 6(1) and (2)’ of the Act. Similarly, section 27(2) of the Act 
enables the provincial heritage authority to declare a provincial heritage site if a place is significant within 
the ‘context of the province or a region in terms of the heritage assessment criteria set out in section 3(2) 
and prescribed under section 6(1) and (2)’ of the Act. 
25 Section 27(15) and (16) of Act 25 of 1999. 
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excavating, altering,26 removing from its original position, subdividing or changing the 
planning status of any national or a provincial heritage site without a permit.27 Similarly, 
section 29 authorises the provisional protection of a property for a maximum period of 
two years.28 Limitations identical to those listed in section 27(18) can be imposed on an 
owner once the building has been placed under provisional protection.29 A compulsory 
restoration order can be imposed on a property owner in instances where he destroyed, 
altered or developed, without a permit, any building that is listed on the heritage register 
or that is situated within a heritage area.30  
                                                            
26 ‘Alter’ is defined in section 2(i) of Act 25 of 1999 as ‘any action affecting the structure, appearance or 
physical properties of a place or object, whether by way of structural or other works, by painting, 
plastering or other decoration or any other means’. 
27 Section 27(18) of Act 25 of 1999. Section 27(19)(a) and (b) stipulates that a heritage authority may 
issue regulations concerning the protection of sites under its control or any other site, provided that it has 
obtained the consent of the owner of the sites. These regulations can protect heritage sites from 
‘destruction, damage, disfigurement, excavation or alteration’. It can also regulate ‘the conditions of use of 
any heritage site or the conditions for any development thereof’. 
28 Section 29(1) of Act 25 of 1999 authorises the heritage authority to provisionally protect ‘any protected 
area’; ‘a heritage resource, the conservation of which it considers to be threatened and which threat it 
believes can be alleviated by negotiation and consultation’ and, ‘a heritage resource, the protection of 
which SAHRA or the provincial heritage resources authority wishes to investigate in terms of this Act’. 
29 These limitations are listed in section 29(10) of Act 25 of 1999. Similar limitations are placed on 
ownership by sections 28, 30 and 31 of the Act. Section 28 enables the heritage resource authority to 
declare land surrounding a national heritage site or a shipwreck, as well as land upon which a mine dump 
is situated, a protected area provided it has obtained the owner’s consent. Section 28(3) stipulates that a 
person may not ‘damage, disfigure, alter, subdivide or in any other way develop any part of a protected 
area unless, at least 60 days prior to the initiation of such changes, he or she has consulted the heritage 
resources authority which designated such area in accordance with a procedure prescribed by that 
authority’. Section 30 requires the provincial authority to compile and maintain a heritage register where it 
lists all the heritage resources that it considers conservation worthy in the province. In terms of section 31 
a heritage authority can declare any site of cultural or historic interest a heritage area. Section 30(11)(a) 
and section 31(7)(a) stipulate that the special consent of the local authority is required for ‘any alteration 
to or development’ that will affect a place listed on the heritage register or any site that has been declared 
a heritage area. 
30 Sections 30(11)(e) and 31(7)(c) of Act 25 of 1999. 
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In a recent decision, SA Heritage Resources Agency v Arniston Hotel Property 
(Pty) Ltd and another,31 the court had to determine whether a section 29 protection 
order precluded the property owner from continuing with building works despite the fact 
that he was in possession of approved building plans and that the first phase of 
construction was completed.32 The court held that vested rights are not created upon 
the approval of building plans as required by sections 4 and 7 of the National Building 
Standards and Building Regulations Act 103 of 1977. Therefore, it is possible for the 
heritage authority to place a building under provisional protection even in instances 
where the owner had obtained valid building plans for development on the property. The 
court explained that, within the context of the Constitution, property owners are 
expected to tolerate inroads into their ownership entitlements. Such an inroad is created 
by the provisions of the Heritage Resources Act.33  
The Heritage Resources Act does include some measures that are designed to 
alleviate the burden that are placed on property owners. One such a measure is section 
40 support programmes, in terms of which the  SAHRA can provide financial assistance 
in the form of the grant or a loan ‘to an approved body or an individual for any project 
                                                            
31 2007 (2) SA 461 (C).  
32 2007 (2) SA 461 (C) paras 4-8. The second respondent operated the Arniston Hotel on property owned 
by the first respondent and it was their intention to expand and develop the property in two phases. 
Building plans for both phases had been approved in accordance with the provisions of the National 
Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977. The respondents proceeded with the 
second phase of the development despite the fact that the property was provisionally protected under 
section 29 of the Heritage Resources Act. They adopted the stance that the decision to extend the area of 
provisional protection was unlawful, and that the proclamation did not operate retroactively to prevent 
building works for which building plans had already been approved. 
33 2007 (2) SA 461 (C) para 16. The respondents relied on three additional grounds in support of their 
argument that the provisional protection notice was invalid. Firstly, they challenged the procedural 
fairness of the decision to place the hotel under provisional protection. Secondly, they contested the 
scope of the protection order. Finally, the respondents challenged the duration of the protection order. 
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which contributes to the purpose’ of the Act.34 Section 42 of the Heritage Resources Act 
makes provision for the conclusion of heritage agreements. In terms of section 42(1) the 
SAHRA or a PHRA can, with the consent of the owner, conclude a heritage resources 
agreement with a provincial authority, local authority, conservation body, person or 
community that will provide for the improvement, or the presentation of a clearly defined 
heritage resource.35 In terms of this agreement the owner of a national heritage site, a 
provincial heritage site or a place listed in a heritage register, may appoint the heritage 
resources authority or the local authority as the guardian of the place.36 The heritage 
agreement may further provide for the ‘maintenance and the management of the 
place’,37 or ‘the payment of any expenses incurred by the owner or the guardian in 
connection with the maintenance of the place’.38 Section 46, the expropriation provision, 
states that the minister may, ‘on the advice of SAHRA and after consultation with the 
Minister of Finance’ expropriate any property for preservation, provided that it is for a 
public purpose and in the public interest.39 Finally, the section 49 appeal provides that 
any person who wishes to launch an appeal against the decision of the SAHRA or a 
PHRA must, within 30 days of the decision being handed down, give written notice to 
the minister or the MEC, who will appoint an ‘independent tribunal, consisting of three 
experts, having expertise regarding the matter’.40 The tribunal must have due regard to 
‘(a) the cultural significance of the heritage resources in question’; ‘(b) heritage 
conservation principles’, and ‘(c) any other relevant factor which is brought to its 
attention by the appellant or the heritage resources authority’.41 
                                                            
34 Section 40(1) of Act 25 of 1999. In terms of section 40(2) SAHRA must ‘prescribe the procedures for 
the applications for the approval and granting of financial assistance and the criteria for the assessment 
of projects’. Section 40(4) stipulates that financial assistance granted in terms of section 40 must be paid 
from the National Heritage Resources Fund. 
35 Section 42(1)(a) of Act 25 of 1999. 
36 Section 42(8) of Act 25 of 1999. 
37 Section 42(9)(a) of Act 25 of 1999. 
38 Section 42(9)(h) of Act 25 of 1999. 
39 Section 46(1) of Act 25 of 1999. 
40 Section 49(2) of Act 25 of 1999. 
41 Section 49(3)(a)-(c) of Act 25 of 1999. 
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In conclusion, it is clear that the formal preservation protections in the Heritage 
Resources Act place extensive limitations on ownership. One such limitation is the 
prohibition against demolition of buildings that are protected by one of the formal 
protections measures listed in the Act. Another is the positive burdens that may be 
imposed on owners of protected properties, for example in the form of restoration 
orders. The Heritage Resources Act does contain some measures that are designed to 
alleviate the burden placed on the owners of heritage resources. However, it is unclear 
when an owner will qualify for financial or another form of assistance from the heritage 
authorities. The section below considers the implications that section 34, a general 
protection provision, has for a property owner’s demolition rights. 
 
4 3 The limitation imposed on property owner’s demolition rights by section 34 
of the Heritage Resources Act 
4 3 1 Section 34 of the Heritage Resources Act 
Section 34 of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 (the Heritage Resources 
Act) places an express limitation on the demolition rights of property owners. This 
section has far-reaching consequences as it applies to any building that is older than 
sixty years. Section 34(1) provides: 
‘[n]o person may alter or demolish any structure or part of a structure which is older 
than 60 years without a permit issued by the relevant provincial heritage resources 
authority’.  
In terms of section 34(2) the provincial heritage authority should, within three months of 
refusing the demolition permit, proceed to consider protecting the structure under one of 
the formal protections of the Act.42  
                                                            
42 Section 34(3) provides that the provincial resources authority has the discretion to, by way of a notice 
placed in the Provincial Gazette, create an ‘exemption from the requirements of subsection (1) within a 
defined geographical area, or for certain defined categories of site within a defined geographical area, 
provided that it is satisfied that heritage resources falling into the defined area or category have been 
identified and are adequately provided for in terms of the provisions of Part 1 of this Chapter’. 
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The correct interpretation of section 34(1) and (2), as well as the scope of its 
application, have been scrutinised by the courts. Case law has also addressed the 
question of whether neighbouring property owners have the standing to prevent the 
demolition of a structure in accordance with a section 34(1) permit. The discussion 
below addresses two issues, namely locus standi and cases where the heritage 
authorities’ section 34 powers have been challenged. In the first section the rules 
pertaining to locus standi are described to determine who has standing to enforce 
compliance with the Heritage Resources Act. This section also considers whether 
neighbouring property owners have the right to prevent the demolition of a historic 
building in their area. Section two discusses case law where the correct interpretation 
and application of section 34 have been considered. The purpose of this discussion is to 
delineate the legal position of property owners who wish to demolish buildings that are 
protected by sections 34(1) and (2) of the Act. This discussion is followed by a summary 
of the collective effect of these provisions as interpreted by the courts. 
 
4 3 2 Locus standi  
In Raubenheimer NO v Trustees, Hendrik Johannes Bredenkamp Trust and others,43 
the court had to determine whether the applicant, a resident of a seafront 
neighbourhood and the chairperson of the local residents’ association, had locus standi 
to interdict the demolition of a building for which a section 34(1) permit had been issued. 
This case illustrates the uncertainty concerning neighbouring land owners’ standing to 
prevent the demolition of a house in accordance with a section 34(1) demolition permit. 
This section determines whether neighbouring land owners have standing to enforce 
the provisions of the Heritage Resources Act. More specifically, this section determines 
whether neighbouring land owners have standing to prevent the demolition of a 
structure for which a section 34(1) permit has been issued. This section briefly outlines 
the legal rules in relation to standing to determine whether neighbouring land owners 
have the right to enforce the provisions of the Heritage Resources Act. The section also 
considers the impact of the Raubenheimer decision on the locus standi issue.  
                                                            
43 2006 (1) SA 124 (C). 
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 A neighbouring land owner would typically enforce compliance with legislation, 
such as the Heritage Resources Act, by either obtaining a prohibitive or mandatory 
interdict. In some instances, it would also be necessary to have a decision taken in 
terms of the Heritage Resources Act set aside on review. Cilliers, Loots and Nel explain 
that a person will have the standing to obtain an interdict for breach of legislation 
provided that he meets the requirements set out in Patz v Green.44 This decision 
confirmed that any person has standing to enforce compliance with legislation, provided 
he can show that he is adversely affected by the non-compliance with the Act.45 
Alternatively, if legislation was enacted to benefit a specific group or class of persons, 
any person of such a group will have locus standi to enforce compliance with the 
legislation even if he has not suffered harm.46 However, the courts have in a series of 
cases confirmed that land owners in a township, including voluntary associations acting 
on behalf of land owners, have standing to enforce compliance with building and 
development laws such as the National Building Standards and Building Regulations 
Act 103 of 1977 (the Building Standards Act) or the provincial ordinances.47 Arguably, 
as in the case of the Building Standards Act, neighbouring land owners will have the 
locus standi to enforce compliance with the provisions of the Heritage Resources Act. 
This right not only extends to neighbouring land owners, but also to other land owners in 
the township, and to heritage preservation associations acting on behalf of the owners 
                                                            
44 Cilliers AC, Loots C and Nel HC Herbstein and Van Winsen The civil practice of the High Courts and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa Volume I 5 ed (2009) 192 with reference to Patz v Green 
1907 TS 427 at 433 
45 Patz v Green 1907 TS 427 at 433. 
46 1907 TS 427 at 433. It is doubtful whether the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 (the 
Heritage Resources Act) was enacted for the benefit of a specific group or class of persons. Accordingly, 
potential litigants will have standing if they can show that they have been adversely affected by non-
compliance with the legislation. 
47 Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 348 with reference to Erf 167 Orchards CC v Greater 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Council Johannesburg Administration and another 1999 CLR 91 (W); PS 
Booksellers (Pty) Ltd and another v Harrison and others 2008 (3) SA 633 (C) para 19; Chairperson, 
Walmer Estates Residents Community Forum and another v City of Cape Town and others 2009 (2) SA 
175 (C) and Tergniet and Toekoms Action Group and 34 others v Outeniqua Kreosootpale (Pty) Ltd and 
others [2009] ZAWCHC 6 (23 January 2009) para 22. 
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in the area. Moreover, section 6(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000 (PAJA) provides that ‘any person may institute proceedings in a court or tribunal 
for the judicial review of administrative action’.48 Finally, section 38(c) of the Constitution 
states that ‘anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of 
persons’ may approach a court in circumstances where a right in the Bill of Rights have 
been infringed. The implication is that neighbouring land owners, including voluntary 
associations acting on behalf of land owners, will have the locus standi to have a 
decision taken in terms of the Heritage Resources Act, set aside on review, provided 
that they have first exhausted internal remedies.49 Neighbouring land owners will 
therefore first have to launch an appeal in terms of section 49 of the Heritage 
Resources Act before they can have a heritage authority’s decision set aside on review. 
One can conclude in light of these considerations that neighbouring land owners will 
have the standing to request a prohibitory interdict to prevent the destruction of the 
building, if a heritage authority has issued a demolition permit for an historic structure, 
despite an irregularity in the approval process. The heritage preservation authority’s 
decision can then be set aside on appeal or, alternatively, during the review 
proceedings.  
As explained above, the Raubenheimer case created uncertainty as to whether 
neighbouring property owners have standing to prevent the demolition of a treasured 
building situated in their area. After this decision it is also unclear whether neighbouring 
property owners would have the right to launch a section 49 appeal against the heritage 
authority’s decision to issue a section 34(1) demolition permit. The applicant in 
Raubenheimer sought an interim interdict to prevent the demolition of an historic house, 
pending the outcome of section 49 appeal proceedings, which he intended to launch.50 
More specifically, the applicant intended to challenge the heritage authority’s decision to 
allow the demolition of the house. The applicant argued that he did have locus standi to 
                                                            
48 Section 6(1) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
49 Section 7(2)(a) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 provides that ‘no court or 
tribunal shall review an administrative action in terms of this Act unless any internal remedy provided for 
in any other law has first been exhausted. 
50 2006 (1) SA 124 (C) para 1. 
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seek an interdict because the house formed part of his ‘social and cultural life’ and he 
received ‘emotional and psychological satisfaction’ from it.51 The court explained that it 
first had to determine whether the applicant would have the right to launch a section 49 
appeal. It would then consider the standing of the applicant to obtain an interdict. 
Section 49(2) read with regulation 12(1) of the Heritage Resources Act provides that 
any ‘[p]ersons and bodies with a bona fide interest in, or who are affected by a decision 
of a committee or other delegated representative of the South African Heritage 
Resources Agency may appeal to the SAHRA Council against such decision’.52 The 
court found that the applicant did not have a bona fide interest in the granting of the 
demolition permit. Furthermore, the applicant was not affected by the decision to 
demolish the house. His attachment to the structure was purely sentimental and 
emotional, and his attempt to represent the house as a historical beacon was based on 
‘vague, romantic and incorrect or exaggerated statements’.53 Accordingly, the applicant 
did not have the standing to launch a section 49 appeal. Likewise, the applicant did not 
have the standing to interdict the demolition of the structure pending the outcome of the 
section 49 appeal. Even if the applicant did have the requisite locus standi he would not 
have met the requirements for an interim interdict.54 
Two comments can be made in relation to this decision. Firstly, it seems that the 
court collapsed the merits of the case into the question whether the applicant had a right 
to launch a section 49 appeal. The fact that the house was in a state of disrepair, and 
that it no longer resembled the original cottage to which the community was attached, 
should not have been a relevant consideration in determining whether the applicant had 
a right to launch appeal proceedings. Arguably, the merits of the case should be 
considered during the appeal proceedings. Furthermore, regulation 12(1) provides that 
                                                            
51 2006 (1) SA 124 (C) para 28. 
52 2006 (1) SA 124 (C) para 45 with reference to section 12(1) of the regulations to the National Heritage 
Resources Act 25 of 1999 published in Provincial Notice, Western Cape 336 of 2002 (Government 
Gazette 5937 25 October 2002). This appeal must be launched within fourteen days from the date on 
which the applicant was notified, in writing, that the permit has been issued.  
53 2006 (1) SA 124 (C) para 46. 
54 2006 (1) SA 124 (C) para 52. 
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any person has standing if he has a bona fide interest in, or is affected by, the decision 
of the heritage authority. This means that a person does not necessarily have to be 
directly affected by the demolition of an historic structure to launch an appeal. One can 
argue that property owners in a neighbourhood have a bona fide interest in the 
demolition of historic structures that are situated in their residential area. Neighbouring 
property owners should, by implication, have the right to launch a section 49 appeal 
against the decision of the heritage authority to allow the demolition of a building.  
Secondly, the considerations outlined above indicate that neighbouring land 
owners, including voluntary associations acting on behalf of land owners, have standing 
to approach the court for an interdict to prevent the demolition of a building pending the 
outcome of appeal or review proceedings. The requirements for a temporary and final 
interdict are well-known. To obtain an interim interdict an applicant will have to show 
that he has a clear or prima facie right; that there is a well grounded apprehension of 
irreparable harm if the relief is not granted and that the balance of convenience favours 
the granting of relief.55 In the case of a permanent interdict an applicant will have to 
show that on a balance of probabilities he has a clear right to relief; that there is an 
injury actually committed or reasonable apprehended and, finally, that there is no 
alternative remedy available.56 One can argue that on the one hand, a neighbouring 
land owner will satisfy the requirements for either an interim or final interdict if there was 
an indication that the heritage authority, or even a land owner, had acted in conflict with 
the provisions of the Heritage Resources Act. On the other hand, neighbouring land 
owners might not meet the requirements for an interdict if all the provisions of the 
Heritage Resources Act had been complied with, but where they nevertheless assert 
that the heritage authority’s decision to issue a demolition permit is wrong. The reason 
for this is twofold. Firstly, the principle of deference requires of the courts to respect ‘the 
findings of fact and policy decisions made by those with special expertise and 
                                                            
55 Cilliers AC, Loots C and Nel HC Herbstein and Van Winsen The civil practice of the High Courts and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa Volume II 5 ed (2009) 1456-1457. 
56 Cilliers AC, Loots C and Nel HC Herbstein and Van Winsen The civil practice of the High Courts and 
the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa Volume II 5 ed (2009) 1456. 
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experience in the field.’57 Secondly, the right of a land owner to apply for  review and 
setting aside of the heritage authority’s decision to grant a demolition permit is 
comparable to the right of a land owner who applies to have his neighbour’s building 
plans set aside on review. The Constitutional Court confirmed that neighbouring land 
owners do not have the right to participate in the decision-making process when 
building plans are submitted for approval.58 The reason for this is that the National 
Building Standards and Building Regulations Act 103 of 1977 (the Building Standards 
Act) contains provisions that are designed to protect neighbouring land owners’ rights. 
Moreover, section 7 of the National Building Standards and Building Regulations Act 
103 of 1977 contains a list of grounds in terms of which the decision to approve building 
plans can be challenged.59 Like the Building Standards Act, the Heritage Resources Act 
incorporates provisions designed to protect the public interest in historically and 
culturally valuable buildings. A neighbouring land owner’s rights are adequately 
protected provided that all the relevant statutory provisions have been followed. 
 
4 3 3 Cases where the heritage authorities’ section 34 powers had been challenged 
4 3 3 1 The Qualidental Laboratories cases 2007/2008 
In Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another,60 the Cape 
Provincial Division of the High Court, and eventually the Supreme Court of Appeal, had 
to determine whether it was permissible for the heritage authority to impose conditions 
that would safeguard another building on the property, which was not formally protected 
under the Act, when granting a section 34(1) demolition permit. The owner of a historic 
property applied to the first respondent, the PHRA, for a demolition permit that would 
                                                            
57 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para 
22. 
58 Walele v The City of Cape Town 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 45. 
59 Walele v The City of Cape Town 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 45. 
60 2007 (4) SA 26 (C); 2008 (3) SA 160 (SCA). Refer to Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional property law’ 
(2007) 3 JQR 2.2 and Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional property law’ (2008) 2 JQR 2.1.3 for a discussion of 
these decisions. See also Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De 
Jure 32-47 at 36-37. 
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enable him to demolish two buildings (both older than 60 years as specified by section 
34(1) of the Act), referred to as the villa and the annex.61 This application was deemed 
incomplete due to a lack of information and the applicant was directed to obtain a 
heritage statement from a heritage practitioner.62 The heritage practitioner stressed the 
aesthetic and cultural importance of the villa.63 Consequently, the first respondent 
granted a demolition permit for the annex, subject to certain conditions imposed in 
terms of section 48(2) of the Heritage Resources Act.64 These conditions stipulated that 
a permit was granted for the demolition of the annex, but not for the villa; any new 
development on the property had to be approved by the committee; and any new 
development had to be secondary to the villa in relation to massing, siting, scale and 
location.65 Reasons provided in support of the conditional permit were, firstly, that the 
villa was worthy of protection and, secondly, that any development that detracted from 
the villa’s landmark status was inconsistent with the first respondent’s statutory duty to 
protect culturally and historically valuable buildings.66  
The applicant did submit building plans to the first respondent in accordance with 
the conditions imposed on it. It was evident that the applicant intended to build two 
apartment blocks on the property. These plans were rejected by the first respondent on 
the grounds that one of the apartment blocks would obstruct the main view of the villa 
from a specific street and that the new development would be intrusive, and would not 
suit the context created by the villa as well as other buildings in the vicinity.67 The first 
                                                            
61 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 27.  
62 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 27-28. 
63 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 28. At this stage the court explained that the villa was not protected under any of 
the formal protections created by the Act. The court pointed out that the villa did fall within an area that 
had been designated by the municipality’s consultants as ‘being worthy of consideration of an erven 
conservation area in terms of the local zoning scheme’. 
64 Section 48(2) enables heritage authorities, upon the application by a property owner for a permit, to 
exercise their discretion to issue a conditional permit. Section 48(2)(a)-(d) provides a non-exhaustive list 
of conditions than can be imposed by the heritage authorities.  
65 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 28-29. 
66 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 29. 
67 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 29. 
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respondent was of the view that the new development would make a ‘mockery of the 
villa’s landmark status’.68  
The applicant proceeded with the development despite the fact that the building 
plans were not approved by the first respondent or by a local authority as required by 
the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (the Building 
Standards Act).69 A stop works order was issued by the first respondent, but was 
ignored by the applicant, who considered it invalid.70 Consequently, the applicant 
launched an application for the review of the first respondent’s decision to issue a 
conditional demolition permit.71 In response, the first respondent launched a counter-
application for an interdict prohibiting the applicant from acting contrary to the 
conditional demolition permit and the stop works order.72 Counsel for the applicant 
argued that the first respondent had acted beyond the powers conferred on it by the Act 
when it imposed the conditions. Alternatively, counsel argued that the conditions were 
invalid as they had been imposed for a purpose which was not authorised by the Act.73 
Finally, the stop works order was invalid as it was issued on the basis of invalid 
conditions.74 Counsel explained that the first respondent could only exercise its powers 
to regulate future developments on a property, if that property was protected by one of 
the formal protections of the Act. Consequently, the only powers on which the first 
respondent could rely in support of its actions were the powers created in terms of 
section 34 read with section 48(2) of the Act.75 
                                                            
68 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 29. 
69 Act 103 of 1977. 
70 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 29. 
71 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 27. Specifically, the applicant requested the court to delete the condition stipulating 
that he had to submit plans of any new development to the first respondent for approval. Furthermore, the 
applicant requested the court to review and set aside the stop works order issued by the first respondent. 
Alternatively, the applicant sought a finding that the stop works order was invalid and of no force and 
effect. 
72 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 30. 
73 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 30. 
74 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 33. 
75 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 33. 
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In response, counsel for the first respondent argued that one had to consider the 
wording of section 48(2) to determine whether the conditions were ultra vires.76 Counsel 
contended that section 48 had a wide, general application and was not only applicable 
in instances where a demolition permit had been granted under section 34 of the Act. 
Section 48(2) affords heritage resources authorities the discretion to either issue a 
permit or to refuse to issue a permit. The section further gives the heritage resources 
authorities the discretion, upon the issue of the permit, to impose conditions, terms and 
directions.77 Section 48(2) stipulates that such conditions can ‘include’ those listed in 
paragraphs (a) to (d) of the section. The implication was that the heritage resource 
authorities could, in addition to the conditions imposed in paragraphs (a)-(d), impose 
any other conditions that they deemed suitable. As a result, the first respondent had 
acted within the power conferred on it by section 48 when it imposed the relevant 
condition.78 Counsel for the respondent argued that the applicant had adopted an 
‘unduly narrow’ and ‘restricted interpretation’ to section 48(2) of the Act.  
Davis J explained that it was necessary to determine whether conditions could be 
imposed in instances where the applicant sought a permit for the demolition or alteration 
of a building older than 60 years. Explained differently, the question was whether 
section 34(1) envisaged ‘either a stark positive or a negative response to an application’ 
for demolition.79 Counsel for the applicant argued that the correct interpretation for 
section 34(1) was the latter and that no additional powers were conferred on heritage 
authorities beyond those embodied in section 34(1) and (2) of the Act. 
The court decided that there were three reasons in support of the finding that the 
first respondent did have the power to impose conditions when it issued a section 34 
permit. Firstly, there is no indication in the Act that the respondent did not have the right 
to impose conditions to the permit allowing demolition of a house. Secondly, the 
                                                            
76 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 34. 
77 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 34. 
78 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 34. Counsel for the first respondent argued that the first respondent had the power 
to impose any suitable condition ‘by virtue of the wording of section 48(2)(c) or the residual power 
contained in section 48(2) to impose a condition’.  
79 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 34-35. 
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wording of section 48(2)(a) indicated that it was permissible for the respondent to attach 
conditions to the demolition permit issued in terms of section 34(1) of the Act.80 Finally, 
due regard had to be given to the purpose of the Act. The powers of the first respondent 
would be unduly restricted by the assertion that section 48 is only applicable in 
instances where the buildings are protected under the formal protections of the Act. This 
implied that the first respondent would be excluded from preventing potential abuses in 
instances where the building was not protected under the formal protections of the Act. 
With reference to the long title and the preamble, the court held that a purposive 
interpretation of the Act indicated that the first respondent had wide – rather than narrow 
– powers to protect heritage resources in its province. Each application has to be 
considered ‘on its own merits with reference to the statutory duties and responsibilities 
of first respondent to protect and manage the relevant heritage authorities’.81 The first 
respondent’s statutory duty was not limited to buildings for which an application for 
demolition was submitted. It was possible that the demolition of the annex could have a 
negative impact on another heritage resource, namely the villa. Section 48(2)(c) of the 
Act indicates that it is the legislature’s intention to protect heritage resources situated in 
the vicinity of a building for which a demolition permit had been obtained.82  
Counsel for the applicant argued that the court’s interpretation of the Act would 
‘erode the very ownership rights of the applicants’.83 In response, the court explained 
that ownership was no longer an absolute right, and under the Constitution emphasis 
                                                            
80 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 36. Section 48(2)(a) stipulates that upon issuing a permit, heritage authorities may 
impose conditions, including a condition ‘that the applicant give security in such form and such amount 
determined by the heritage resources authority concerned, having regard to the nature and the extent of 
the work referred to in the permit, to ensure the satisfactory completion of such work or the curation of 
objects and material recovered during the course of the work’. The court relied on this section to argue 
that section 48(2)(a) envisages the imposition of conditions when a permit in terms of section 34(1) is 
issued. For example, authorities can request of the land owners to give security when a house is 
demolished.  
81 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 36. 
82 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 36.  In terms of section 48(2)(c) heritage authorities can, when granting a permit, 
impose a condition stipulating that ‘design proposals be revised’.   
83 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37. 
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has been placed on the exercise of ownership entitlements ‘in accordance with the 
social function of the law and in the interest of the community’.84 A balance must be 
struck between the protection of ownership and the exercise of ownership entitlements 
in relation to third parties, and the obligations that an owner has to the community. The 
court ruled that the Heritage Resources Act provides the framework in which ownership 
should now function. A purposive interpretation of its provisions enables the promotion 
of the objects of the Heritage Resources Act, without unfairly restricting ownership.85 As 
a result, the application for the review and setting aside of the conditions was 
dismissed. 
This decision was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Qualidental 
Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another.86 The court held that the 
conditions imposed by the first respondent were in accordance with ‘its conservation 
mandate in terms of the Act and ... directly in line with the principles of heritage 
resources management set out in ss 5 and 6’.87 It is clear that the imposition of the 
conditions was within the parameters of the Act and that it was in agreement with the 
general scheme of the Act.88 These conditions were not imposed to control 
development, but rather to pursue the objectives of the Act, namely the preservation of 
historic buildings such as the villa.  
 
4 3 3 2 The Gordon case 2005 
An interesting issue was raised in Provincial Heritage Resources Authority, Eastern 
Cape v Gordon.89 Specifically, the court had to establish whether the general protection 
of section 34(1) lapsed after the expiry of the section 34(2) three month period, in 
circumstances where the heritage authority had not taken steps to formally protect a 
                                                            
84 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37. 
85 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37. 
86 2008 (3) SA 160 (SCA). 
87 2008 (3) SA 160 (SCA) para 19. 
88 2008 (3) SA 160 (SCA) para 19. 
89 2005 (2) SA 283 (E). 
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structure. The respondent purchased a house, named Cock’s Castle, which was in such 
a state of disrepair that he presumed it would be relatively simple to obtain a section 
34(1) permit for the demolition of the structure.90 An application for a section 34(1) 
demolition permit was submitted to the PHRA for the Eastern Cape, who later informed 
the respondent that it would not approve the application as ‘presently formulated’ and 
suggested an on-site meeting to discuss the alterations to Cock’s Castle.91 The 
respondent interpreted this suggestion as a refusal to issue the demolition permit, and 
after the lapse of three months he continued to demolish the house. He adopted the 
stance that he could commence with the demolition of Cock’s Castle since the 
demolition permit had not been granted, and since the building had not been considered 
for formal protection under the Act within the three month time period.92 As a result, the 
                                                            
90 2005 (2) SA 283 (E) 286. The house was built by a well-known and affluent British Settler, William 
Cock, in the 1840s. Initially, William Cock named the house Richmond House, but the squared 
crennellations, castellated walls and parapets gave the house a ‘fortified appearance’ and later it became 
known to the local community as ‘Cock’s Castle’. Upon purchasing the property, the respondent 
approached an architect to design a house to be built on the property once Cock’s Castle was 
demolished. This house was similar in style to a Cape Dutch mansion and completely different from 
Cock’s Castle.  
91 2005 (2) SA 283 (E) 286-289. This was the final of a series of demolition applications submitted by the 
respondent. The first application was lodged with the National Monuments Council of the Eastern Cape, a 
statutory body created in terms of the 1969 Monuments Act. This Act was later repealed and replaced by 
the Heritage Resources Act. As a result, a second application had to be submitted to the PHRA for the 
Eastern Cape as required by section 34(1) of the Act. Unfortunately, the relevant MEC had failed to 
appoint a PHRA and the respondent’s application was heard by another body, namely the Interim 
Provincial Committee, Eastern Cape (Permit Committee). The respondent later initiated proceedings in 
the High Court, and it was determined that the SAHRA had not validly delegated the power to decide on 
applications such as the respondent’s to the Permit Committee of the Eastern Cape. A PHRA was 
established sixteen months after the High Court judgment and only after a series of attempts by the 
respondent and his counsel to secure the creation of a PHRA for the Eastern Cape. The respondent 
submitted an application for a demolition order to the newly established PHRA for the Eastern Cape and it 
is this application that formed the subject matter of the dispute. 
92 2005 (2) SA 283 (E) 290. 
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applicant obtained a rule nisi to interdict the respondent from continuing with the 
demolition and alteration of Cock’s Castle.93  
The core of this decision lies in the second leg94 of the court’s enquiry, namely the 
correct interpretation of section 34(1) and (2) of the Act. Essentially, the court had to 
determine whether section 34 operates as a two-tier process.95 Section 34(1) embodies 
the first tier of the process, where a property owner applies for permission to alter or 
demolish a building that is older than 60 years. The second tier of the process is 
activated when the abovementioned permission is denied and the building has to be 
considered for formal protection under the Act.96 In this regard, the respondent argued 
that property owners have the right to demolish buildings without a permit in instances 
where a demolition permit has been denied and the building has not been considered 
for formal protection within the stipulated three-month period. 
The court disagreed with the respondent’s interpretation of section 34(1) and 34(2) 
‘since it read into the statute something which the Legislature has not specifically 
prescribed viz, that protection under section 34(1) shall lapse if an application for a 
permit is refused but formal protection is not thereafter extended within the period 
prescribed by section 34(2)’.97 There are three reasons for protecting a building even 
though it had not previously been placed under formal protection. Firstly, a building can 
because of ‘some significant historical event’ become more worthy of preservation even 
though the building was not previously placed under formal protection after a demolition 
permit had been denied.98 Secondly, a series of administrative steps has to be taken 
prior to the declaration of a property as a heritage site; for example, the mortgage bond 
holder, owner, occupiers and conservation bodies should be informed so that they can 
                                                            
93 2005 (2) SA 283 (E) 286. 
94 2005 (2) SA 283 (E) 291-293. In the first leg of the enquiry the court had to determine whether, on the 
facts of the case, it could be said that the demolition permit had actually been denied. The court found 
that it could not be said that the demolition permit had been refused. 
95 2005 (2) SA 283 (E) 292. 
96 2005 (2) SA 283 (E) 292. 
97 2005 (2) SA 283 (E) 293. 
98 2005 (2) SA 283 (E) 293. 
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make submissions to the PHRA. Thirdly, a heritage resource authority might, due to a 
lack of funds, not have been able to extend formal protection to a heritage resource. 
However, this did not mean that the heritage resource was not worthy of conservation or 
that it would not be placed under formal protection in the future.99  
The respondent’s argument was founded on the supposition that it was the 
legislature’s intention to protect buildings under the formal protections of the Act and 
that section 34 only had two functions. These functions are, firstly, to provide a 
mechanism in terms of which potential buildings can be identified and, secondly, to 
provide a period of interim protection during which time a decision will be taken as to 
whether or not a building should be placed under formal protection.100 The court 
explained that there was no indication in the Act that section 34(1) and (2) should be 
interpreted narrowly. Section 34 of the Act indicated that no building older than 60 years 
can be demolished without a permit. One could only depart from the clear, ordinary and 
grammatical meaning of section 34 if it resulted in absurd or anomalous results.101 In 
this regard the court held that:  
‘[i]t may well be that section 34 is a means by which buildings suitable for formal 
protection under Part 1 of Chapter II may be indentified for formal protection, but in 
my view continued protection under section 34(1) following a failure to afford such 
formal protection within a period of three months following the refusal of a permit 
does not lead to any absurd or anomalous results that justify the conclusion that the 
Legislature must in fact have intended protection under the section to fall away’.102  
A final issue addressed by the court was the fact that the house had been in a state of 
partial demolition for about three years. The court reasoned that even though the 
respondent had demolished and altered extensive parts of the house, the demolition 
was not yet complete.103 It was clear that experts deemed Cock’s Castle historically 
significant, and there was a possibility that the heritage authorities would proceed to 
                                                            
99 2005 (2) SA 283 (E) 293. 
100 2005 (2) SA 283 (E) 293-294. 
101 2005 (2) SA 283 (E) 294. 
102 2005 (2) SA 283 (E) 294. 
103 2005 (2) SA 283 (E) 294. 
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declare the property a heritage site as required in section 27 of the Act. Furthermore, it 
was likely that a section 45 compulsory restoration order would be served on the 
respondent once the building was formally declared a heritage site.104 Accordingly, the 
rule nisi was confirmed as the interdict was a necessary precaution to prevent the 
respondent from causing any further damage to the property.105 
 
4 3 3 3 The Corrans case 2009 
Corrans v MEC for the Department of Sport, Recreation, Arts and Culture, Eastern 
Cape, and others106 shows that the courts are wary to interfere with a heritage 
authority’s decision to refuse a demolition permit. In this case the applicant sought the 
review and setting aside of a decision taken by the PHRA to allow a conditional partial 
demolition of a structure described as an ‘a simple wood and iron home’ dating back to 
the late 1800s or early 1900s.107 The court explained that the structure hardly paid 
homage to ‘our own forebears’ architectural achievement’.108  
It was evident that the applicant purchased the property to expand her 
guesthouse, which she operated from the neighbouring property. She applied to the 
PHRA for a demolition permit and her application was accompanied by architectural 
drawings of the structure to be built on the property, as well as letters from a local 
historical society and the regional tourism agency. Both letters expressed their support 
                                                            
104 Section 45(1)(a) of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 stipulates that if the heritage 
authority is of the view that a heritage site has been allowed to fall into a state of disrepair for the purpose 
of ‘(i) effecting or enabling its destruction or demolition; (ii) enabling the development of the designated 
land; or (iii) enabling the development of any land adjoining the designated land; or (b) is neglected to 
such an extent that it will lose its potential for conservation’, the heritage authority may serve on the 
owner an order to repair or maintain such a site, within a specific time period, and to the satisfaction of 
the authority.  
105 2005 (2) SA 283 (E) 295. 
106 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG). 
107 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) para 2. 
108 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) para 2. 
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for the demolition of the structures.109 The application was considered by the PHRA, 
who decided that the applicant could partially demolish the buildings, provided that she 
complied with the conditions prescribed by the authority. In response, the applicant 
launched an appeal on the ground that the PHRA did not provide reasons for its 
decision. She contended that she had consulted with experts who deemed it 
unnecessary to preserve the structure, as it was impractical and totally uneconomical to 
do so.110 Moreover, she argued that the building was vacant, uninhabitable, and 
particularly vulnerable to a criminal element and a fire risk.111 This appeal was 
dismissed on the grounds that the building was situated in an historic part of the town, 
and it formed part of a precinct of similar buildings. The building’s facade was deemed 
to be a valuable component of the town’s landscape and it was in a reasonable 
condition. It was possible for the owner to keep the front facade and related buildings in 
its original state while developing the remainder of the site.112 The appeal board 
suggested that the front facade and related buildings should be restored and that the 
original plaster should not be removed from the walls.113    
The applicant relied on the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) in support of her application for review. Specifically, with reference 
to section 6(2)(a)(i) of PAJA, the applicant alleged that the PHRA did not have the 
requisite jurisdiction to consider her application. Alternatively, she argued that, should 
the court find that the PHRA did have the jurisdiction to hear the application, it had 
taken irrelevant considerations into account and that it had ignored important 
considerations.114 Furthermore, the applicant’s decision was not rationally connected to 
                                                            
109 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) para 4. 
110 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) para 5. 
111 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) para 5. 
112 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) para 6. 
113 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) para 6. 
114 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) para 8. The applicant relied on section 6(2)(e)(iii) of Act 3 of 2000 to argue that 
the heritage authority had taken irrelevant considerations into account when making a decision. 
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the purpose for which it was taken, the purpose of the empowering legislation, the 
information before it and the reasons given by the PHRA.115  
The first ground for review was dismissed by the court.116 More relevant to this 
discussion is the court’s findings with regard to the second ground for review. In this 
regard the court explained that the main thrust of the applicant’s argument was that the 
building was comparable to a shack and of ‘no redeeming cultural significance’.117 With 
reference to the overall scheme of the Act, the court held that the individuals who are 
responsible for identifying and protecting heritage resources are appointed for their 
knowledge and experience in the field of heritage preservation. Part 2 of Chapter I of 
the Act stipulates that members of the SAHRA and PHRAs must have ‘special 
experience or interests in fields relevant to heritage resources’.118 Instead of challenging 
the expertise of the PHRA’s permit and appeal committees, the applicant argued that 
the decision to refuse the complete demolition of the structure was wrong. It is the duty 
of the court to respect the policy decisions and factual findings of a decision-making 
body in instances where the decision corresponds with the general scheme of the 
legislation.119 The court found that there was no need for judicial intervention in this 
case. The PHRA had acted within its statutory powers and the partial demolition order 
was granted in pursuance of one of the goals of the Act, namely the preservation of 
buildings that are culturally and historically significant.120 
 
                                                            
115 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) para 8. The applicant relied on section 6(2)(f)(ii) of Act 3 of 2000 in support of 
this argument. 
116 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) paras 9-17. 
117 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) paras 19. 
118 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) para 21. 
119 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) para 21. In this regard, the court referred to Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para 48, where the Constitutional 
Court emphasised the importance of the principle of due deference.   
120 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) para 23. 
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4 3 4 Analysis of the cases 
Section 34(1) and (2) of the Heritage Resources Act appears to be a relatively 
uncomplicated provision. However, the three cases discussed above show that section 
34 places greater limitations on land owners’ rights than appears from a first reading of 
the section. One of the principal conclusions to be drawn from the cases is that there 
are instances where ownership, and particularly the owner’s right to develop her 
property, has to yield to the greater needs of the public. Within the context of heritage 
preservation, it is expected of the owner to refrain from demolishing buildings that are 
considered valuable by the general public or even a specific community. It is also 
expected of the owner, at his own expense, to maintain the building on behalf of the 
public once it is formally protected under the Act.  
Both the Corrans and Gordon decisions made it clear that property owners can no 
longer presume that it would be relatively simple to obtain a demolition permit for a 
building situated on their property. The Gordon case emphasised that the owner will not 
be allowed to demolish a building that is older than 60 years, even though the heritage 
authority had previously failed to place that building under formal protection as 
prescribed by section 34(2). Rather, it is expected of the owner to apply, and if 
necessary re-apply, to the heritage authority for a section 34(1) demolition permit. 
Corrans illustrates that the fact that the owner, or anyone else for that matter, considers 
the building unappealing or unimportant is irrelevant and will not be taken into account 
by the heritage authorities. Owners must accept that it could be expected of them to 
preserve buildings that represent cultures or histories to which they attach no relevance.  
What is more, Qualidental confirms that the heritage authority has generous 
powers to fulfil the obligations set out in the Act. These powers include the right to 
impose conditions in relation to the demolition of the building. For example, the heritage 
authority in Corrans granted a partial demolition permit, provided that the owner 
preserved the facade of the building as well as the plaster that covered the walls. It is 
also in heritage authorities’ power to impose conditions relating to a building other than 
the one for which a demolition permit is sought. In Qualidental the owner was permitted 
to demolish the annex but not the villa. The conditions in Corrans, as well as in 
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Qualidental, had the potential to inhibit further development on the respective 
properties. Those conditions stipulated that any new development had to be secondary, 
in terms of size and scale, to the historic buildings on the property. It was expected of 
the owner in Qualidental to submit any building plans for new developments to the 
heritage authority for approval. The implication was that even if the plans complied with 
all other statutory provisions, such as conditions of title or zoning scheme regulations, 
there was still a possibility that those plans could fall foul of section 7(1)(a) of the 
Building Standards Act. Explained differently, the Heritage Resources Act constitutes 
‘any other applicable law’ for purposes of section 7(1)(a) of the Building Standards 
Act.121 In essence, the Heritage Resources Act imposes another layer of limitations on 
ownership, over and above those limitations already imposed by, for example, the 
Building Standards Act, zoning schemes and conditions of title.  
In addition to significantly limiting the owner’s right to use, enjoy and develop his 
property, the Heritage Resources Act authorises the heritage authority to impose 
positive obligations on the owner. On the one hand, these obligations and limitations 
collectively have the potential to erode ownership entitlements. On the other hand, 
property owners should by now have realised that the ownership of land, on which 
historic buildings are situated, is accompanied by a set of responsibilities. The very 
nature of the property dictates the type of limitations and responsibilities that are 
imposed on ownership. Stated differently, certain kinds of property are accompanied by 
certain types of responsibilities and limitations. The owner owes it to the community to 
protect the culturally or historically significant buildings situated on his property.122  
Not one of the owners in the cases succeeded in having the heritage authorities’ 
decisions to deny the demolition permits set aside. In Corrans the court was unwilling to 
entertain allegations that the heritage authority’s decision to deny a demolition permit 
was wrong. The generous interpretation of the Act in Qualidental enabled the court to 
find that it was not beyond the scope of the heritage authority’s powers to grant a partial 
                                                            
121 See the discussion of section 7(1)(a) of the National Building Standards and Building Regulations Act 
103 of 1977 in chapter 3, section 3 4 3 2 1 above.  
122 Chapter 6 elaborates on the social responsibilities of the land owner. The obligations of the land owner 
in the context of historic preservation is discussed in chapter 6, section 6.4. 
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demolition order subject to certain conditions. Likewise, it was held in Gordon that it was 
in the heritage authority’s power to deny the owner a demolition permit on more than 
one occasion even though the building was not formally protected by the Act. These 
decisions should not be perceived as a rubber stamp for all decisions taken by heritage 
authorities in the future. On the contrary, property owners should explore alternative 
remedies in the form of administrative law or a section 25(1) constitutional enquiry. The 
constitutional implications of section 34 of the Heritage Resources Act (and any 
decision taken in terms of the Act) are discussed in chapter 5. At this stage it suffices to 
say that section 34(1) authorises the heritage authority to impose a section 25(1) 
deprivation of property in certain instances. Whether or not this will amount to an 
arbitrary deprivation of property will depend on the unique circumstances of the specific 
dispute.  
Finally, the court confirmed in Gordon that an owner does not automatically obtain 
the right to proceed with the demolition of a building where the application for a 
demolition permit had been denied and the building has not been considered for formal 
protection within three months as required by section 34(2). This aspect of the judgment 
can be criticised in three respects. Firstly, the fact that an owner can be prohibited from 
demolishing a building because of the possibility that it can later become more worthy of 
preservation is bizarre. Arguably, the heritage authority should be compelled to assess 
the historic or cultural value of the building at the time when the application for a 
demolition permit is submitted. Secondly, section 34(2) prescribes a three-month period 
during which time the building should be considered for formal protection. Surely it 
would be more beneficial for all parties concerned to place a property under section 29 
provisional protection in instances where the heritage authority cannot operate within 
the three-month time limitation prescribed by section 34(2). This will provide, to some 
extent, legal certainty with regard to the status of the building and the responsibilities of 
the owner. Thirdly, the section 34 general protection measure does prohibit the 
demolition of buildings older than 60 years, but it does not expressly compel an owner 
to maintain a building. Moreover, there is no incentive for the owner to maintain a 
building which could possibly be demolished. Some property owners are likely to 
neglect buildings with the sole intent to obtain a demolition order. 
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4 4 Demolition rights within the context of US heritage preservation law 
4 4 1 Introduction 
Van der Walt explains that the law of the United States of America (US law) recognises 
two types of state interferences with private property rights, namely the expropriation of 
property for public use and regulation of the use of property in the public interest.123 
These interferences are referred to as the power of eminent domain (expropriation) and 
the exercise of the state’s police power (deprivation) respectively.124 Both interferences 
must be for a public purpose, or in the interests of public welfare, and must comply with 
the due process requirement.125 Traditionally, the police power principle provides that 
the state can, by way of legislation, regulate the exercise of ownership entitlements for 
purposes of the health, safety and welfare of the public. Legislation that is directly 
related to one of these objectives can place even relatively severe limitations on 
property rights. These regulatory limitations of ownership are uncompensated because 
they are imposed for a valid public purpose.126 However, Van der Walt explains that 
                                                            
123 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 398-400 and 403. Van 
der Walt explains that the US property clause is contained in the Fifth Amendment (1791), read with the 
Fourteenth Amendment (1868) to the Constitution of the United States of America 1787. The Fifth 
Amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of property without the due process of the law, nor 
shall private property be taken for public use without compensation. Van der Walt explains that in 1833, 
the US Supreme Court declared that the Fifth Amendment was only applicable to the federal government 
and not to the individual states. The Fourteenth Amendment, which is applicable to the states, contains a 
due process clause but, unlike the Fifth Amendment, it does not contain a takings clause. However, in 
1897, the Supreme Court held that a taking of property without compensation violated the due process 
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment. In so doing, the Supreme Court effectively read the Fifth 
Amendment takings clause into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The takings 
clause is therefore also enforceable in the individual states.  Many of the constitutional property disputes 
in America concern the question of whether there has been a taking of private property. In many of these 
disputes the courts essentially have to determine whether a specific exercise of the police power has 
gone too far, or has amounted to a taking of property for public use without compensation.   
124 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 403. 
125 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 403. 
126 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 412. 
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once a regulation moves out of the limited sphere of protection for purposes of public 
health and safety, the state interference into property rights must not go too far, even if 
the regulation ‘was ostensibly imposed to protect public health and safety’.127 In 
Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon,128 the United States Supreme Court (the Supreme 
Court) confirmed that an exercise of police power that goes too far will amount to a 
taking of property for which a land owner should be compensated.  
Apart from the regulatory taking qualification, the US courts have accepted a wider 
application of the state’s police power by upholding regulatory measures that fall outside 
of the limited sphere of public health and safety. An example of the wider application of 
the police power principle is Village of Euclid v Amber Realty Co,129 where the Supreme 
Court explained that land-use regulations such as those imposed by zoning laws ‘must 
find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public 
welfare’.130 The Supreme Court concluded that the relevant zoning law was enacted in 
the public welfare and that it imposed constitutional limitations on ownership.131 
Similarly, in Berman v Parker,132 the Supreme Court confirmed the constitutional validity 
of legislation that provided for the aesthetic improvement and redevelopment of a poor 
and decaying neighbourhood. In so doing, the Supreme Court adopted the view that a 
wider range of interests could justify the statutory restriction of private property rights. 
The Supreme Court explained that the exercise of the police power was not limited to 
matters of public health and safety; morality; peace and quiet and law and order, 
although those purposes make up the core of the police power. Public welfare is a 
broad and inclusive concept, and the values that ‘it represents are spiritual as well as 
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary’.133 The legislator has the power to ‘determine 
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, 
                                                            
127 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 414. 
128 260 US 393 (1922). 
129 272 US 365 (1926). 
130 272 US 365 (1926) 387. 
131 272 US 365 (1926) 395. 
132 348 US 26 (1954). 
133 348 US 26 (1954) 33. 
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well balanced as well as carefully patrolled’.134 Importantly, regulatory actions that fall 
outside the category of protection of public health and safety will be subject to stricter 
scrutiny. Together, these decisions afford a generous interpretation to the public welfare 
concept, which justifies the enactment of historic preservation laws designed to protect 
privately owned historic buildings.135  
New York City was the first city in the United States of America to enact a 
landmark preservation law and a historic district plan.136 The American legislature soon 
followed by enacting the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966137 and by the time 
the infamous Penn Central Transportation Company v City of New York  (Penn 
Central)138 was decided, 50 American states and over 500 municipalities had enacted 
historic preservation laws and historic district ordinances.139 These laws protect 
historically valuable buildings by prohibiting their demolition or alteration without a 
                                                            
134 348 US 26 (1954) 33. 
135 Refer to Caravello DT ‘From Penn Central to United Artists’ I & II: the rise to immunity of historic 
preservation designation from successful takings challenges’ (1995) 22 B C Envtl Aff L Rev 593-622, for 
an overview of the origins of the US historic preservation movement. Carravello explains that it was 
especially Berman v Parker 348 US 26 (1954) that prompted the nationwide enactment of historic 
preservation ordinances.  
136 Caravello DT ‘From Penn Central to United Artists’ I & II: the rise to immunity of historic preservation 
designation from successful takings challenges’ (1995) 22 B C Envtl Aff L Rev 593-622 at 601. 
137 Fowler JM ‘Federal historic preservation law: National Historic Preservation Act, Executive Order 
11593, and other recent developments in federal law’ (1976) 12 Wake Forest L Rev 31-74 at 31, and to 
the same effect, Caravello DT ‘From Penn Central to United Artists’ I & II: the rise to immunity of historic 
preservation designation from successful takings challenges’ (1995) 22 B C Envtl Aff L Rev 593-622 at 
602. Fowler explains that the National Historic Preservation Act 1966 was the first federal law that 
protected privately owned historic buildings. Previously, the historic preservation laws provided for the 
protection of national monuments, but the wealth of historic properties held in private ownership were 
ignored. For a detailed account of the origins and operation of federal historic preservation laws, refer to 
Fowler JM ‘Federal historic preservation law: National Historic Preservation Act, Executive Order 11593, 
and other recent developments in federal law’ (1976) 12 Wake Forest L Rev 31-74 and Kenneth Kyre K 
‘Historic preservation cases: a collection’ (1976) 12 Wake Forest L Rev 227-274 at 258-265. 
138 438 US 104 (1978). 
139 Penn Central Transportation Company v City of New York 438 US 104 (1978) 107. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
214 
permit or the consent of a commission.140 In some instances, property owners 
approached the courts asserting that the limitation on their demolition rights has gone 
too far and that it caused a regulatory taking of their property, for which they should be 
compensated.141 However, apart from the regulatory taking qualification, the Penn 
Central decision dispelled any uncertainty about the general constitutional validity of 
preservation laws. Unless preservation laws go too far (in which case they might bring 
about a regulatory taking that requires compensation), they are generally regarded as 
legitimate and valid regulatory limitations on the use of private property. The Penn 
Central decision provided a three-pronged enquiry for determining whether a statutory 
regulation has gone too far and caused a regulatory taking of property. This test has 
been applied by the courts to determine the circumstances where it would be 
unconstitutional to deny an owner the right to demolish a historic building.  
                                                            
140 Caravello DT ‘From Penn Central to United Artists’ I & II: the rise to immunity of historic preservation 
designation from successful takings challenges’ (1995) 22 B C Envtl Aff L Rev 593-622 at 601. Caravello 
refers to the New York City’s Landmark Preservation Law, which prohibits an owner to demolish, alter or 
even restore a structure without the consent of the Landmark Preservation Commission.  
141 As explained above, in Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922), the Supreme Court 
confirmed that exercises of the police power that go too far will be considered takings for which the land 
owner has to be compensated. Many of the historic preservation disputes concern the issue of whether 
limitations, imposed by land owners by historic preservation laws, amount to takings without 
compensation. See for example City of Annapolis v Anne Arundel County 217 Md 265 (1974); Maher v 
the City of New Orleans 516 F 2d 1051 (1975); First Presbyterian Church of York v City Council of the 
City of New York 25 Pa Cmwlth 154 (1976) and Penn Central Transportation Company v City of New 
York 438 US 104 (1978). Van der Walt AJ explains in Constitutional property clauses: a comparative 
analysis (1999) 411 that typically, a constitutional challenge to the validity of a statutory regulation can 
take one of two forms. Firstly, plaintiffs can assert that the exercise of the police power had brought about 
a regulatory taking of property. A regulatory taking of property occurs when statutory regulation of the use 
of property goes too far and has the effect of expropriating an owner of his property without 
compensation. The purpose of this line of attack is to obtain compensation. Secondly, on the basis of the 
principle of due process, the plaintiffs can question the legitimacy of the specific exercise of the police 
power. Both lines of attack can result in the regulation being declared invalid.   
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The discussion below is centred on the Penn Central decision as it is the most 
important US landmark preservation case to date.142 This discussion comprises of four 
sections. The first section provides an overview of historic preservation cases decided 
before Penn Central. This is followed by a more detailed description of the Penn Central 
decision. The section also refers to Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council,143 where 
the Supreme Court formulated an exception to the principles enunciated in Penn 
Central. Finally, the section considers the implication of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation 
Council, Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,144 where the Supreme Court explained 
the interaction between the Penn Central and Lucas decisions. The third section shows 
how the courts have applied the Penn Central principles to subsequent demolition 
cases. Concluding remarks follow in the final section. 
 
4 4 2 Pre-Penn Central cases 
Analysis of the pre-Penn Central case law reveals that the US courts were generally 
unsympathetic to the argument that heritage preservation laws are an invalid exercise of 
the police power principle. For example, in Maher v the City of New Orleans,145 the 
                                                            
142 Refer to Dukeminier J, Krier JE, Alexander GS and Schill MH Property 6ed (2006) 990-1006, for a 
comprehensive discussion of this landmark decision. See also, Rubenfeld J ‘Usings’ (1993) 102 Yale L J 
1077-1163 at 1089-1090, 1094-1095, 1101 and 1106. 
143 505 US 1003 (1992) 1015. Refer to Dukeminier J, Krier JE, Alexander GS and Schill MH Property 6ed 
(2006) 1006-1025 for a discussion of this decision. 
144 535 US 302 (2002). Refer to Dukeminier J, Krier JE, Alexander GS and Schill MH Property 6ed (2006) 
1031-1042 for a discussion of this case. 
145 516 F 2d 1051 (1975). Maher is a well-known historic preservation case as it concerns one of the more 
famous historic districts, namely the French Quarter in New Orleans, also known as Vieux Carre. In 
accordance with the provisions of the Vieux Carre Ordinance, the plaintiff sought a demolition permit for a 
Victorian cottage situated in the French Quarter. The plaintiff intended to construct an apartment block on 
the property once the cottage had been demolished. Unsurprisingly, the application for a demolition 
permit was unsuccessful and the plaintiff approached the court for relief. At issue in this case was 
whether the denial of the demolition permit amounted to a taking of private property, for which the plaintiff 
had to be compensated. 
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court emphasised that the boundaries of police power are ‘both ample and protean’.146 
The court explained that it is expected of the legislator to rely on its rich and flexible 
police power to cater for economic and cultural developments and to provide novel 
solutions to new problems.147 This may require, and will continue to require, stricter 
regulations on the use of land in especially urban areas.148 Accordingly, the exercise of 
the state’s police power should not be restricted. Each dispute should be determined 
with reference to its own facts, and in light of the existing circumstances and needs of 
the community.149 Furthermore, the police power not only functions to prevent unhealthy 
conditions but also to foster the ‘ends’ that the community deems valuable.150 In light of 
the nationwide sentiment that the country’s heritage should be protected, and 
considering the unique characteristics of the French Quarter, the court concluded that 
the objectives of the Vieux Carre Ordinance fell within the scope of the police power.151  
It appears as if the courts have developed different tests, depending on whether 
the building had been designated as a landmark or is situated in a historic district, to 
determine whether the denial of a demolition permit amounts to a taking of property in a 
particular case. Despite these different standards, case law reveals that it was only in 
very specific circumstances that the denial of a demolition permit constituted a taking of 
property. The courts have also drawn a distinction between historic landmarks held for 
charitable and for commercial purposes respectively. In one of the earlier historic 
                                                            
146 516 F 2d 1051 (1975) paras 10-11. 
147 516 F 2d 1051 (1975) paras 10-11. 
148 516 F 2d 1051 (1975) paras 10-11. 
149 516 F 2d 1051 (1975) paras 10-11. 
150 516 F 2d 1051 (1975) para 13. 
151 516 F 2d 1051 (1975) para 15. Similarly, in Figarsky v Historic District Commission of the City of 
Norwich 171 Conn 198 (1976) 207-209, the court relied on Village of Euclid v Amber Realty Co 272 US 
365 (1926); Berman v Parker 348 US 26 (1954) and Maher v the City of New Orleans 516 F 2d 1051 
(1975) to find that that the preservation of buildings within a historic district was in the public interest. The 
court in Figarsky concluded that the relevant historic-district ordinance was a valid exercise of police 
power. 
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landmark cases, Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor in City of New York v Platt,152 the 
court held that in the case of commercial property it was necessary to determine 
whether the denial of a demolition permit prevented the owner from obtaining an 
adequate return on its investment.153 A comparable test for property held for charitable 
purposes was whether the protection of a building physically or financially prevented, or 
seriously interfered with, the carrying out of the charitable purpose.154 The court 
explained that this had to be established when it determined whether the preservation of 
the building interfered with the use of the property. It was also necessary to determine 
whether the buildings could be converted into a useful purpose without excessive costs. 
Finally, the court had to determine whether maintenance costs would be excessive.155 
                                                            
152 29 AD 2d 376 (1968). For a more detailed discussion of this case, refer to Kenneth Kyre K ‘Historic 
preservation cases: a collection’ (1976) 12 Wake Forest L Rev 227-274 at 252-254. 
153 29 AD 2d 376 (1968) 378. 
154 29 AD 2d 376 (1968) 378. This decision was followed in Lutheran Church in America v the City of New 
York 35 NY 2d 121 (1974), where the court had to determine the constitutional validity of the designation 
of a property owned by a religious institution as a landmark in accordance with the New York Landmark 
Preservation Law 1965. The owner of the designated building intended to demolish the building and to 
replace it with a structure that would be more suited to his needs. The majority of the court found that the 
designation of the property amounted to a ‘naked taking’ since the current building was not suited to the 
needs of the owner, and the designation prevented it from replacing it with a more suitable building. For a 
discussion of this case refer to Kenneth Kyre K ‘Historic preservation cases: a collection’ (1976) 12 Wake 
Forest L Rev 227-274 at 25-255. For a more complete overview of the challenges that non-profit 
organizations face in relation to historic preservation refer to Faller C ‘Economic hardship and historic 
preservation of non-profits: balancing individual burden with community benefit’ (2008) paper 28 
Georgetown Law Historic Preservation Paper Series 1-27 
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/hpps_papers/28. Essentially, Faller argues that the courts have 
interpreted the Snug Harbour test so restrictively that it seems that non-profit organisations have exactly 
the same burden of proof than owners of commercial property. To show that the denial of a demolition 
permit amounts to a taking of property, non-profit owners must prove that they will not obtain a 
reasonable return on their investment. In support of her argument she refers to the courts’ restrictive 
interpretations of the test in The Society for Ethical Culture in the City of New York v Spatt 415 NE 2d 922 
(1980) and St Bartholomew’s Church v City of New York 914 F2d 348 (2nd Cir 1990). 
155 29 AD 2d 376 (1968) 378.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
218 
Texas Antiquities Committee v Dallas County Community College District156 is an 
excellent example of where the inability of the owner to demolish a landmark amounted 
to a taking of the property. The College District (the College) was the owner of three 
buildings that were so dilapidated that the City of Dallas permitted the temporary use of 
the buildings, on condition that they would be demolished within five years.157 The 
Texas Antiquities Committee (the Committee) opposed the demolition of the buildings 
on the grounds that the buildings were included in the National Register for Historic 
Places. In support of its argument the Committee relied on the general provisions of a 
regional antiquities statute, despite the fact that the buildings were not formally 
protected by that statute.158 The court held that denial of the demolition permit was 
unconstitutional because the College District did not have the funds to maintain or to 
restore the buildings.159 Evidence showed that the restoration of the buildings would 
exhaust the College’s funds, which were reserved for education purposes.160 The 
restoration of the buildings would also have created five times more space than the 
College required. Moreover, the buildings were in such a bad state that their 
foundations would have had to be rebuilt. Every sample taken from the sandstone from 
which the buildings were built, had crumbled. Even if the buildings were restored at 
great expense, they could only be leased as commercial space. This was impractical 
since the building was situated in the middle of an ‘inappropriate academic 
community’.161 Twenty percent162 of the buildings in that area were already vacant, and 
there was no guarantee that the College would be able to find a commercial lessee 
once the buildings were restored. The buildings took up space that could otherwise be 
used for educational purposes. The decisive factors in this case were, accordingly, that 
                                                            
156 554 SW 2d 924 (1977). 
157 554 SW 2d 924 (1977) 926. 
158 554 SW 2d 924 (1977) 926-929. The court found that the Committee did not have the authority to hear 
permit applications for buildings that it had not designated. Accordingly, the owner did not even have to 
apply to the Committee for a demolition permit. 
159 554 SW 2d 924 (1977) 926 and 928. 
160 554 SW 2d 924 (1977) 928. 
161 554 SW 2d 924 (1977) 929-930. 
162 20%. 
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the buildings were so dilapidated that restoration was prohibitively expensive; that the 
College did not have any use for the restored buildings; and it was unlikely that it would 
be able to offset the cost of restoration against rental income. Finally, the restoration 
costs would have absorbed funds that were set aside for education purposes. The court 
granted the demolition permit as it was clear that preservation of the building imposed a 
disproportionate burden on the owner.163  
In Maher v the City of New Orleans,164 the court had to determine whether the 
denial of a demolition permit for a building situated in a historic district amounted to a 
taking of property. The plaintiff alleged that the Vieux Carre Ordinance overstepped the 
boundaries of the state’s police power by requiring him to maintain the building at his 
own expense.165 The court explained that a plaintiff would not make out a case for a 
taking simply by showing that the law required of him to apply for a demolition permit 
and that his application may be unsuccessful.166 Rather, he would have to show that all 
‘potential use of the property was foreclosed’.167 This meant that the plaintiff had to 
prove that denial of a demolition permit so diminished his property’s value that he was in 
effect left with nothing.168 More specifically, the plaintiff had to show that it was 
impractical to sell or to commercially lease the property, or that he had no other uses for 
his property.169 The court held that the fact that a property owner had been deprived of 
the most profitable use of property did not necessarily mean that a taking had 
                                                            
163 554 SW 2d 924 (1977) 930. 
164 516 F 2d 1051 (1975). For a more detailed discussion of Maher v the City of New Orleans 516 F 2d 
1051 (1975), refer to Kenneth Kyre K ‘Historic preservation cases: a collection’ (1976) 12 Wake Forest L 
Rev 227-274 at 243-245 and 247. 
165 516 F 2d 1051 (1975) paras 22-23. 
166 516 F 2d 1051 (1975) para 21. 
167 516 F 2d 1051 (1975) para 21. 
168 516 F 2d 1051 (1975) paras 22-23. 
169 516 F 2d 1051 (1975) paras 22-23. In an earlier decision, Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Annapolis 
v Anne Arundel County 271 Md 265 (1974) 294, the court held that it had to determine whether the denial 
of a demolition permit in accordance with a historic district ordinance denied the owner all reasonable use 
of the building. The court decided that the ordinance only limited the destruction of the exterior of the 
building. This limitation was deemed to be a mild and therefore a constitutionally valid limitation of the 
property owner’s rights. 
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occurred.170 Furthermore, the fact that the owner would be required to bear the financial 
burden of maintaining the building did not necessarily mean that a taking had occurred 
either. The court decided that the maintenance provisions were constitutional as they 
were consistent with the preservation objectives of the Vieux Carre Ordinance. 
However, this decision did not mean that the application of the maintenance provisions 
would be ‘beyond constitutional assault’.171 The court explained that each case had to 
be decided on its own merits, and that it could not exclude the possibility that the 
maintenance costs would in some instances be so excessive as to constitute a 
taking.172  
Maher v the City of New Orleans173 was followed in The First Presbyterian Church 
of York v City Council of the City of York,174 where it was decided that, since the 
appellant was unable to prove that it was impractical to sell or to commercially lease the 
house, it could not be said that his property had been taken for a public purpose. The 
appellant could not prove that it had no other use for the house either.175 By contrast, in 
Wolk v Reisem, Chairman, et al, constituting the Rochester Preservation Board176 the 
court held that it was arbitrary to deny a demolition permit if the building constituted a 
danger to life and property. The building in question was situated within a preservation 
district. It had stood vacant since 1973 and had been vandalised on more than one 
occasion. It had been declared unsafe and dangerous to public safety, life and property 
by the Rochester Buildings Commissioner and a Fire Marshall had recommended 
demolition of the building as it posed a danger to the lives of fire fighters.177 It was the 
opinion of the heritage authority that instead of being demolished, the building should be 
                                                            
170 516 F 2d 1051 (1975) para 20. 
171  516 F 2d 1051 (1975) para 24. 
172 516 F 2d 1051 (1975) para 24. 
173 516 F 2d 1051 (1975). 
174 25 Pa Cmwlth 154 (1976). 
175 25 Pa Cmwlth 154 (1976) 161-162. 
176 413 NYS 2d 60 (1979). This case was decided shortly after Penn Central, yet no mention was made of 
this important judgment. It is for that reason that it this case is discussed under this section and not under 
the section below that discusses post-Penn Central case law. 
177 413 NYS 2d 60 (1979). 
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converted into an income-producing structure.178 The heritage authority was further of 
the view that demolition of the building ‘would damage the integrity of the streetscape 
and further reduce the inventory of original structures which gives East Avenue its 
unique character in the City of Rochester’.179 In response, the court held that the 
decision to deny the demolition of the building was arbitrary and unsupported by the 
facts of the case.180 The court concluded its judgment by stating that: 
‘[i]n the face of a clear threat to the public health and safety, the governmental duty 
to its citizens and civil servants to protect such vital interests must take precedence 
over the aesthetic and historical concerns expressed by the majority of the 
Preservation Board in denying petitioner's application..’181 
Even though the courts formulated different tests for single landmarks and buildings 
situated in a historic district respectively, there is an underlying theme in these cases, 
namely that the enactment of legislation that protects historically valuable buildings held 
in private ownership, is a permissible exercise of the state’s police power. Limitations 
imposed on an owner’s demolition rights by historic preservation legislation are 
generally constitutional. Likewise, the fact that a historic preservation law imposes a 
positive duty on the owner to maintain the building does not automatically mean that a 
taking had occurred. Each case has to be assessed with reference to its unique set of 
facts. To show that the denial of a demolition permit constitutes a taking of his property, 
a property owner would have to prove that he was deprived of all uses of its property. 
On the basis of the historic district cases, one can conclude that the owner not only has 
to show that he was unable to find a reasonable use for his building, but also that he 
was unable to sell or lease the building. Similarly, the owner of a landmark held for 
charitable purposes has to prove that it was financially or physically impossible to 
continue its operation in the protected building. However, there are circumstances 
where the balance of convenience requires the granting of the demolition order. This is 
the case where the buildings are so decrepit that the cost of restoration outweighs any 
                                                            
178 413 NYS 2d 60 (1979) para 2. 
179 413 NYS 2d 60 (1979) para 3. 
180 413 NYS 2d 60 (1979) para 2. 
181 413 NYS 2d 60 (1979) para 3. 
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benefits that could be derived from the preservation of the structure. In such 
circumstances, the denial of a demolition permit might constitute a taking of the 
property.  
 
4 4 3 The Penn Central case 1978 
4 4 3 1 Background 
In this case, the Supreme Court had to determine whether limitations imposed by the 
New York Landmarks Preservation Law 1965 (the Preservation Law) on ownership 
caused a taking of property for which the owner had to be compensated.182 By the time 
Penn Central was decided, numerous states and municipalities had enacted 
preservation laws to protect architecturally or historically significant buildings. This could 
be ascribed to the fact that many historic buildings and landmarks were previously 
demolished without considering economically viable ways to preserve these 
properties.183 There was (and probably still is) a widespread belief that ‘structures with 
special historic, cultural or architectural significance enhance the quality of life for all’.184 
The Preservation Law was adopted in 1965 for a number of reasons, including to foster 
‘civic pride in the beauty and noble accomplishments of the past’, and to promote the 
use of historic landmarks and buildings for ‘the education, pleasure and welfare of the 
people of the city’.185  
Like other heritage preservation laws, the Preservation Law prohibits the alteration 
or demolition of historic buildings without a permit. The principal theme of the 
Preservation Law is ‘to ensure the owners of any such properties both a “reasonable 
return” on their investments and maximum latitude to use their parcels for purposes not 
inconsistent with the preservation goals’.186  
                                                            
182 438 US 104 (1978) 107. 
183 438 US 104 (1978) 108. 
184 438 US 104 (1978) 108. 
185 438 US 104 (1978) 109. 
186 438 US 104 (1978) 110. 
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The Grand Central Terminal (the Terminal), a historic landmark and one of New 
York City’s most famous buildings, was one of a number of properties owned by the first 
appellant in the area of Manhattan. This eight-story terminal was designed in the French 
Beaux-Arts style and was operated as a railroad station.187 The first appellant intended 
to construct a multi-storey office building above the Terminal.188 It sought the permission 
of the Landmarks Preservation Commission of the City of New York (the Commission) 
to construct the office building and submitted two building plans for approval.  
The first building plan was rejected by the Commission, which explained that there 
was not a fixed rule prohibiting additions to landmark buildings and that ‘it all depends 
on how they are done [but] to balance a 55-story office tower above a flamboyant Beaux 
Arts facade seems nothing more than an aesthetic joke’.189 The second plan proposed 
partial demolition of a section of the Terminal and removing features from the building’s 
facade. This plan was also rejected and in this regard the Commission stated that ‘[t]o 
protect a Landmark, one does not tear it down. To perpetuate its architectural features, 
one does not strip them off’.190 Consequently, the appellants approached the New York 
Supreme Court, alleging that the Preservation Law enabled a taking of their property 
                                                            
187 438 US 104 (1978) 115. 
188 438 US 104 (1978) 116. The first appellant concluded a fifty-year lease agreement with the second 
appellant (UPG Properties). It stipulated that UPG would construct a multi-storey office block on top of the 
Terminal. Penn Central would earn rental income of US Dollars 1 million annually during the time of 
construction and US Dollars 3 million annually for the subsequent years. 
189 438 US 104 (1978) 117-118. 
190 438 US 104 (1978) 117-118. The Commission further explained that landmarks cannot be separated 
from their settings, especially in instances where ‘the setting is a dramatic and integral part of the original 
concept’. The Terminal within its setting is a ‘great example of urban design’ and such examples are not 
abundant in New York City. Landmarks must be treasured and preserved in ‘a meaningful way – with 
alterations and additions of such character, scale, materials and mass as will protect, enhance and 
perpetuate the original design rather than overwhelm it’. 
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without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment.191 After a 
series of consecutive appeals, the appellants turned to the Supreme Court for relief. 
The appellants did not dispute that the protection of buildings with historic, cultural and 
aesthetic significance was a valid governmental goal. They did not dispute that the 
imposition of restrictions on certain properties was a suitable way in which New York’s 
preservations goals could be met either. The appellants further accepted the fact that 
their property could earn a reasonable return without additional development, and that 
the transferable development rights were valuable assets. Despite these factors, the 
appellants maintained that the Preservation Law authorised a taking of their property.192 
Specifically, they argued that the Preservation Law completely deprived them of their 
airspace rights since it prohibited the construction of a multi-storey office block on top of 
the Terminal.193 
 
                                                            
191 438 US 104 (1978) 118-121. The appellants also argued that they had been arbitrarily deprived of their 
property ‘without the due process of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’, and they 
requested injunctive relief to prevent the city from interfering with any construction that could otherwise be 
lawfully erected on the property. The appellants also sought the payment of damages for the temporary 
taking of the property, which occurred from the date of designation up and until the removal of the 
restrictions imposed by the Preservation Law. Injunctive relief was granted, but the court severed the 
question of damages for a ‘temporary taking’. The appellants appealed to the Appellate Division, which 
found that no taking had occurred, since the appellants were unable to prove that they were deprived of 
all beneficial use of the property. This decision was confirmed in the New York Court of Appeals, which 
held that the appellants had not been deprived of their property in violation of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  
192 438 US 104 (1978) 129-130. 
193  New York City zoning laws created transferable development rights that are conferred on property 
owners who have not exploited their property to the full extent (height or coverage) permitted by the 
zoning laws. These rights can be transferred to contiguous properties that are situated on the same block. 
A property owner, who has acquired development rights from other owners, will be able to develop his 
property to an extent that he would otherwise not have been able to do. The owners of designated 
landmarks are afforded additional opportunities to transfer these rights to other properties. At least eight 
of the first appellant’s own properties were suitable to receive the development rights allocated to the 
Terminal by virtue of its landmark status. See in this regard Penn Central Transportation Company v City 
of New York 438 US 104 (1978) 113-115.  
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4 4 3 2 The Supreme Court’s findings 
Justice Brennan, delivering the majority opinion, explained that the Supreme Court has 
always had difficulty in determining what exactly constitutes a taking of property. In 
Armstrong v United States194 the Court held that: 
‘[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for public 
use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear the public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole’.195 [emphasis added]. 
The Supreme Court explained that it had been unable to develop a specific method for 
determining when ‘“justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused by public 
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately 
concentrated on a few persons’.196 The Supreme Court added that previously, when 
deciding regulatory takings cases, it had confirmed that it was vital to consider the 
specific circumstances of the case. This amounts to an ad hoc factual enquiry in which 
several factors are relevant when deciding whether governmental action has caused a 
regulatory taking of property.197 These factors are the economic impact of the 
                                                            
194 364 US 40 (1960). 
195 364 US 40 (1960) 49. 
196 438 US 104 (1978) 124, with reference to Goldblatt v Hempstead 369 US 590 (1962) 594. 
197 438 US 104 (1978) 124. 
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regulation;198 the extent to which ‘the regulation has interfered with the distinct 
investment-backed expectations’ of the owner199 and the character of the governmental 
regulation.200  
                                                            
198 Refer to Singer JW Introduction to property 2 ed (2005) 727-729 for a discussion of this factor. Singer 
explains that most regulatory actions destroy at least some value of property rights. It is difficult to 
ascertain when the diminution of value of a property rights is sufficiently severe to amount to a taking of 
property. Singer further explains that a too excessive depreciation in value of property can be compared 
to the government seizure of property, which will amount to a taking unless it can be justified by the public 
interest. The greater the reduction in value of property interests, the greater the public interest should be 
to justify such depreciation. Furthermore, the extent to which the property has depreciated in value 
depends on how the courts view property interests. For example, the court can consider the depreciation 
in value in light of the property as a whole or in light of specific property entitlements. If the former method 
is adopted, very few regulatory actions will amount to takings. By contrast, if the court follows the latter 
method (the sticks in the bundle approach), every form of regulatory action might constitute a taking. 
Singer explains that the courts are more likely to find that a taking has occurred if the regulatory action 
destroys most of the market value of property and if it cannot be justified by equally important public 
interest considerations. Furthermore, Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council 505 US 1003 (1992) has 
made it clear that regulatory action will amount to a taking if the owner is deprived of all economic use of 
the property. By contrast, it is improbable for a court to find that a taking has occurred if there is only a 
slight reduction in value of the property or if the regulation is designed to prohibit a use that never formed 
part of the owner’s entitlements in the first place. Additionally, regulatory action will not amount to a taking 
if the regulation protects the public from harm. See also, Alexander GS ‘Ten years of takings’ (1996) 46 J 
Legal Ed 586-595 at 589-590. 
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The Supreme Court further explained that takings jurisprudence has indicated that 
the courts should focus on the ‘character of the action and on the nature and extent of 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
199 See in this regard Singer JW Introduction to property 2 ed (2005), who explains that a court will be 
more willing to find that a taking has occurred if government action affects a substantial investment made  
on the basis of an existing regulatory regime. This factor does not protect future investment opportunities. 
See to the same effect Alexander GS ‘Ten years of takings’ (1996) 46 J Legal Ed 586-595 at 589-590 and 
Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence 
(2006) 71. Singer further explains that a regulation is likely to cause a taking if it interferes with vested 
rights, such as in the instance where a building permit is revoked after the owner has already commenced 
with construction. The example provided by Singer contradicts the position in South African law. See in 
this regard the discussion of SA Heritage Resources Agency v Arniston Hotel Property (Pty) Ltd and 
another 2007 (2) SA 461 (C) in section 4 2 above. Singer further explains that a court is likely to find that 
a taking has occurred if a regulatory action interferes with the present use of property. However, 
regulatory action will not cause a taking if the owner should have foreseen that the law would change or 
where the owner is prevented from benefitting from future uses of the property that he has not yet 
invested in.  
200 438 US 104 (1978) 124. With reference to United States v Causby 328 US 256 (1946), the Supreme 
Court explained that it would be more ready to find that a taking had occurred where the regulation 
constituted a ‘physical invasion by government’ than where the interference was brought about by a 
public programme that adjusts ‘the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good’. 
In a later decision, Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp 458 US 419 (1982), the Supreme Court 
confirmed that a permanent physical invasion of property will amount to a taking for which the property 
owner should be compensated. Singer JW Introduction to property 2 ed (2005) 722-727 explains that the 
‘character of the government action’ is the most important factor in determining whether regulatory action 
amounts to a taking of property. In essence, this factor requires of the court to determine whether the 
statutory regulation is imposed to protect individuals or members of the public, or whether it amounts to 
an unlawful seizure of property that cannot be taken without compensation. Singer provides a list of 
instances where it is more likely, or less likely, for a court to find that a taking had occurred. For example, 
a court is more likely to find that a taking has occurred if the regulatory action amounts to a forced, 
permanent physical invasion of property or where the property owner is deprived of a core property right. 
A court is less likely to find that a taking has occurred if, for example, legislation regulates the use of 
property without causing a physical invasion of property, or if the regulatory action is designed to prevent 
the public from suffering harm. See in this regard Singer JW Introduction to property 2 ed (2005) 723-724.  
See further Alexander GS ‘Ten years of takings’ (1996) 46 J Legal Ed 586-595 at 589-590 and Alexander 
GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 71-
75 for a discussion of the three Penn Central factors. 
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the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole’ when deciding whether a taking has 
taken place.201 Takings jurisprudence does not separate property rights into segments 
to determine whether or not the owner had been deprived of a particular segment.202 
The appellants could therefore not argue that a taking had occurred simply because 
they had been deprived of development rights which they believed were available for 
exploitation.203  
With reference to the character of the Preservation Law, the appellants argued that 
the operation of the statute had caused the value of the Terminal to diminish. 
Furthermore, the appellants argued that landmark owners are singled out to bear a 
                                                            
201 438 US 104 (1978) 130-131. 
202 This statement is an outright rejection of the notion of conceptual severance. The term ‘conceptual 
severance’ was coined by Radin MJ ‘The liberal conception of property: cross currents in the 
jurisprudence of takings’ (1988) 88 Colum L Rev 1667-1696 at 1676.  Alexander GS The global debate 
over constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 78-80 and 92-94 draws a 
distinction between temporal, spatial and functional conceptual severance. Temporal conceptual 
severance refers to the notion that a taking has occurred if the owner is deprived of the use of his 
property for a certain period of time. See for example Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc v Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency 535 US 302 (2002), where the property owners argued that a 32-month 
development moratorium constituted a taking of their property. The Supreme Court rejected this argument 
since it ignored the principle (developed in Penn Central) that one has to consider the impact of the 
regulation on the property as a whole. Spatial conceptual severance refers to the physical division of land 
(or other assets) for purposes of a takings enquiry. Functional conceptual severance refers to the idea 
that each individual ownership entitlement is a property interest that should be protected from excessive 
government interference. This means that regulatory action can amount to a taking of a specific 
ownership entitlement for which the owner should be compensated. The implication of conceptual 
severance is that it broadens the scope of the takings clause. Alexander explains that case law decided 
after Penn Central has reignited the conceptual severance debate. See in this regard Hodel v Irving 481 
US 704 (1987) and First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v County of Los Angeles 482 US 304 
(1987). By contrast, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v DeBenedictis 480 US 470 (1978) the 
Supreme Court rejected the idea of conceptual severance. Alexander explains that the future of functional 
conceptual severance remains uncertain. The Supreme Court appears to be unwilling to fully engage with 
functional conceptual severance. However, it is possible that the importance of a specific ownership 
entitlement will be a factor that the Supreme Court will take into account in a takings enquiry. 
203 438 US 104 (1978) 130. 
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burden in the public interest because their buildings did not form part of a historic 
district. Zoning laws and historic-district legislation imposed similar limitations and 
benefits on all the property owners in the area. By contrast, the Preservation Law 
imposed severe restrictions on individual land owners to benefit the public. Landmark 
owners did not benefit from similar limitations that are imposed on other owners in the 
area.204 As a result, the Preservation Law enabled a taking of property.  
The Supreme Court rejected this argument on the ground that the Preservation 
Law formed part of a comprehensive plan to protect valuable buildings in the city. About 
400 landmarks and 31 historic districts have been identified under this plan. Moreover, 
the appellants’ arguments would invalidate not only the Preservation Law but all other 
preservation statutes in the country.205 The Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
Preservation Law did impact more severely on some land owners than on others, but 
that was not reason enough to find that the Preservation Law caused a taking.206 It was 
further inaccurate to argue that the first appellant received no benefit from the 
designation of its property as a landmark. The Terminal was, at the time, one of 400 
landmarks in the area and the preservation of these buildings benefitted ‘all New York 
citizens and all structures, both economically and by improving the quality of life in the 
city as a whole’.207  
The final argument raised by the appellants was that the government had acquired 
the airspace above the Terminal for a governmental purpose. This contention was 
rejected by the Supreme Court and it explained that the Preservation Law prevented 
any other person from occupying the airspace above the Terminal while allowing the 
appellants to lucratively use the rest of the property.208 It was also possible for the first 
appellant to sell its development rights to other property owners in the area. This 
alleviated the burden that the Preservation Law imposed on the landmark owner. As a 
                                                            
204 438 US 104 (1978) 131-132. 
205 438 US 104 (1978) 131. 
206 438 US 104 (1978) 133. The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the decision to declare a 
property as a landmark was arbitrary, subjective and ‘a matter of taste’. 
207 438 US 104 (1978) 134. 
208 438 US 104 (1978) 135. 
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result, the Supreme Court confirmed that the Preservation Law was not invalid in so far 
as it did not provide for compensation whenever ownership entitlements were 
restricted.209 
The final question was whether the Preservation Law caused a deprivation that 
was so severe to justify the payment of compensation.210 This inquiry involved an 
investigation into the impact of the Preservation Law on the first appellant’s parcel and 
an evaluation of the impact of the Preservation Law on the Terminal site.211 The 
Supreme Court held that the Preservation Law did not interfere with the current uses of 
the Terminal. It was possible for the first appellant to continue with the use of the 
structure as it had done for the preceding 65 years. Accordingly, the Preservation Law 
did not interfere with the first appellant’s primary expectation with regard to the use of 
their land.212 Moreover, the Preservation Law permitted the first appellant to make a 
profit from the Terminal and it enabled it to obtain a reasonable return on its 
investment.213 The appellants were not completely deprived of the right to develop the 
airspace above the Terminal. Development would be permitted if it harmonises ‘in scale, 
material and character with the Terminal’.214 Finally, by virtue of the landmark status of 
the Terminal, the first appellant was the owner of valuable transferable development 
rights that could be transferred to at least eight of its other properties. This would 
mitigate the financial burden brought about by the Terminal’s designation to some 
                                                            
209 438 US 104 (1978) 135. 
210 438 US 104 (1978) 136, referring to a quotation from Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 
(1922) 413. 
211 438 US 104 (1978) 136. 
212 438 US 104 (1978) 136. 
213 438 US 104 (1978) 136. 
214 438 US 104 (1978) 137. 
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extent. The Supreme Court accordingly held that it could not be said that the 
Preservation Law caused a taking of the appellants’ property.215  
In a later decision, Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council (Lucas),216 the 
Supreme Court held that there are two instances where a court can find that a taking 
has occurred without conducting the ad hoc factual enquiry prescribed by Penn Central. 
                                                            
215 For a thorough discussion of the Penn Central decision, refer to Singer JW Introduction to property 2 
ed (2005) 687-692. See further Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for 
American takings jurisprudence (2006) 205-206. Alexander criticises the Penn Central judgment in three 
respects, namely on the grounds of its limited degree of contextuality; lack of transparency and 
predictability. Alexander explains that initially it seemed as if the Supreme Court would delve into a 
contextual analysis because it provided a detailed account of the background to the case. However, the 
Supreme Court’s analysis was formulistic and it simply marched through the three-legged enquiry. The 
Supreme Court, for example, did not explain what type of harm the public would suffer if the development 
of Penn Central was allowed to continue. Furthermore, the Supreme Court did not clearly explain which 
values were protected by the landmark designation. The Supreme Court’s decision was not transparent 
as it was unclear which factors influenced its decision. Furthermore, the Supreme Court failed to explain 
why certain factors were more important than others. For example, was the fact that Penn Central was a 
commercial property and not a residential property a weighty factor? Finally, Alexander explains that the 
Supreme Court’s ad hoc enquiry has been criticised on the grounds that it makes it difficult to predict the 
outcome of a takings case. He argues that the balancing approach adopted by the Supreme Court makes 
takings cases predictable because this approach nearly always favours the government.  
216 505 US 1003 (1992) 1015; 1019 and 1028-1030. Refer to Singer JW Introduction to property 2 ed 
(2005) 707-711 and to Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for 
American takings jurisprudence (2006) 82-83 for a discussion of Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council 
505 US 1003 (1992). See also Epstein RA ‘Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council: a tangled web of 
expectations’ (1993) 45 Stan L Rev 1369-1392; Epstein RA ‘The seven deadly sins of takings law: the 
dissents in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council (1993) 26 Loy La L Rev 955-978; Fisher WW ‘The 
trouble with Lucas’ (1993) 45 Stan L Rev 1393-1410; Humbach JA ‘Evolving thresholds and the takings 
clause’ (1993) 18 Colum J Envtl L1-29; Lazarus RJ ‘Putting the correct “spin” on Lucas’ (1993) 45 Stan L 
Rev 1411-1432; Michelman FI ‘Property, federalism, and jurisprudence: a comment on Lucas and judicial 
conservatism (1993) 35 Wm & Mary L Rev 301-328; Sax JL ‘Property rights and the economy of nature: 
understanding Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council’ (1993) 45 Stan L Rev 1433-1455; Sax JL ‘Rights 
that “inhere in the title itself”: the impact of the Lucas case on western water law’ (1993) 26 Loy La L Rev 
943-954 and Underkuffler-Freund LS ‘Takings and the nature of property’ (1996) 9 Can J Law & Jur 161-
205 at 194-202. 
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The first instance would be where there was a physical invasion of private property, as 
in Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.217 The second instance would be 
where the statutory regulation of private property rights deprives the owner of all 
economically beneficial use of his land.218 Both these instances amount to a categorical 
taking of property for which compensation should be paid.219 The Supreme Court 
explained that the deprivation of all economic use of property is similar to the physical 
appropriation of property.220 When an owner is deprived of all economic use of his 
property, it is ‘less realistic’ to say the ‘legislature is simply “adjusting the benefits and 
burdens of economic life”’221 in a way that ensures the ‘“average reciprocity of 
advantage”222 to everyone concerned’.223 Furthermore, it is possible that the property is 
being forced into a form of public service under the pretext that the regulatory action 
mitigates an important public harm.224 The Supreme Court explained that in 
circumstances where the owner had been deprived of all economically viable use of 
                                                            
217 458 US 419 (1982). Refer to Dukeminier J, Krier JE, Alexander GS and Schill MH Property 6ed (2006) 
961-971 for a discussion of this decision.  
218 505 US 1003 (1992) 1015.  
219 Singer JW explains in Introduction to property 2 ed (2005) 692 that the Supreme Court has developed 
five exceptions to the rule that a court must conduct an ad hoc factual enquiry to determine whether 
regulatory action causes a taking of property. Explained differently, there are five instances where a court 
can find that a taking has occurred without considering the importance of the public interest that is served 
by the regulatory laws. These exceptions (categorical rules) are: if regulatory action amounts to a 
permanent physical invasion of property; if there is a deprivation of a core property right; deprivation of all 
economically viable use; interference with vested rights; and exactions to prohibit a certain type of 
development unless the owner complies with certain conditions. Singer JW Introduction to property 2 ed 
(2005) 692-721 discusses each of these categorical rules with reference to the relevant case law. 
220 505 US 1003 (1992) 1017. 
221 Penn Central Transportation Company v City of New York 438 US 104 (1978) 124. 
222 Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922) 415. 
223 505 US 1003 (1992) 1018. 
224 505 US 1003 (1992) 1018. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
233 
property, the state can only resist the payment of compensation if the proscribed use 
has never formed part of the owner’s title.225   
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 
(Tahoe-Sierra),226 the Supreme Court confirmed that the principles of fairness and 
justice require the courts to apply the principles set forth in Penn Central when deciding 
regulatory takings cases.227 This case concerned the constitutional validity of a 32-
month development moratorium that had been placed on properties situated in the Lake 
Tahoe Basin.228 The land owners (the petitioners) attempted to show that the regulatory 
action constituted a categorical taking for which they should be compensated. With 
reference to the Lucas case, they argued that they were deprived of all economically 
viable use of their land for the duration of the moratorium, which amounted to a per se 
                                                            
225 505 US 1003 (1992) 1027. The Supreme Court explained that one had to consider the relevant state’s 
nuisance and property laws to determine whether there was a limitation on property rights even before 
the promulgation of regulatory legislation. In this regard, the Supreme Court explained that a ‘limitation so 
severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in 
the restrictions that background principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already placed on 
ownership’.  
226 535 US 302 (2002). Refer to Eagle SJ ‘Planning moratoria and regulatory takings: the Supreme 
Court’s fairness mandate benefits landowners’ (2004) 31 Fla St U L Rev 429-507 at 432-441, Oshiro A 
‘Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency: a significant ripple in takings 
jurisprudence’ (2004) 41 Hous L Rev 167-200; Singer JW Introduction to property 2 ed (2005) 718 and 
Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence 
(2006) 88-92 for discussions of this case.  
227 535 US 302 (2002) 342. Specifically, the court stated that ‘[w]e conclude, therefore, that the interest in 
“fairness and justice” will be best served by relying on the familiar Penn Central approach when deciding 
cases like this, rather than attempting to craft a new categorical rule’. 
228 535 US 302 (2002) 306. The purpose of the moratorium was to preserve the status quo while the 
impact of development on the Lake Tahoe and surrounding environment was investigated. Studies had 
shown that development caused the exceptionally clear water of the lake to discolour. This could be 
attributed to the rain water that falls on ‘impervious coverage’ consisting of concrete, asphalt and 
buildings and which cannot be absorbed into the soil. As a result, the phosphorous and nitrogen rich 
water flows into the lake, which in turn enables algae to grow. The algae cause the discolouration of the 
water. Lake Tahoe is specifically famous for its clear blue water. 
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taking of their property for that period.229 The Supreme Court found that the Lucas 
approach was limited to the exceptional circumstances where ‘no productive or 
economically beneficial use of the land is permitted’.230  In all other instances, where the 
regulation does not cause ‘complete elimination of value’ of the property or ‘total loss’ of 
the use of the property, the Penn Central analysis would apply.231 Accordingly, when 
faced with a regulatory takings dispute a court must first consider the effect of the 
regulation on the property as a whole.232 The court will proceed with an investigation of 
all the particular circumstances of the case, as prescribed in Penn Central, when it is 
found that the regulation has not caused a total taking of private property.233  
  
4 4 4 Post-Penn Central case law on historic preservation 
In subsequent historic preservation case law, the courts relied on Penn Central in 
support of findings that landmark preservation did not cause a taking in instances where 
some use of the property remained. Two cases, 900 G Street Associates v Department 
of Housing and Community Development (900 G Street Associates)234 and St 
Bartholomew’s Church v City of New York (St Bartholomew’s Church),235 illustrate how 
the courts have applied the Penn Central judgment. In 900 G Street Associates an 
owner sought a demolition order for a French Renaissance-style building dating back to 
1867 that was listed on the National Register of Historic Places and on the District of 
Columbia Inventory of Historic Sites.236 It was the property owner’s intention to demolish 
the building to build a large office block in its place. The demolition permit was denied 
                                                            
229 535 US 302 (2002) 539. 
230 535 US 302 (2002) 330, quoting from Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council 505 US 1003 (1992) 
1017-1019. 
231 535 US 302 (2002) 330, quoting from Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council 505 US 1003 (1992) 
1019-1020. 
232 535 US 302 (2002) 331. 
233 535 US 302 (2002) 331. 
234 430 A 2d 1387 (1981). 
235 914 F 2d 348 (1990). 
236 430 A 2d 1387 (1981) 1387. 
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and the owner alleged that the application of the historic preservation law resulted in a 
taking of his property. With reference to Penn Central, the court held that the protection 
of historic buildings and sites was a legitimate exercise of governmental power.237 The 
court explained that it had to determine to what extent the diminishing in value of 
property caused by governmental action would constitute unreasonable economic 
hardship or a taking.238 In this regard the court held that: 
 ‘[w]e thus need only to consider in the instant case whether there is any 
other reasonable economic use for the building. If there is, there has been 
neither a constitutional taking nor any unreasonable economic hardship 
imposed by the decision of the Mayor’s in this case.’239 
The court held that a taking had not occurred, since the owner still had a reasonable 
alternative use of the property available for exploitation. The court reached this decision 
despite the fact that the monetary value of the property had been significantly 
diminished and the fact that the owner had been deprived of the most beneficial use of 
the property.240 This decision is interesting because, although the court cited the Penn 
Central decision extensively, it actually applied the principle that a taking would occur if 
                                                            
237 430 A 2d 1387 (1981) 1389. The relevant heritage preservation law stipulated that a demolition permit 
for a historic building had to be granted where if it was in the public interest to do so or if the protection of 
the building caused the owner to suffer unreasonable economic hardship. The court found that this 
standard was akin to a taking of property without just compensation. 
238 430 A 2d 1387 (1981) 1390.  
239 430 A 2d 1387 (1981) 1391. 
240 430 A 2d 1387 (1981) 1390-1391. The court referred to the decision of Maher v City of New Orleans 
516 F 2d 1051 (5th Cir 1975), where it was decided that the fact that a owner had to apply for a 
demolition permit prior to demolishing a building did not mean that a taking had taken place. Likewise, the 
fact that a regulation causes a substantial depreciation in value of the property does not mean that a 
taking has occurred. As explained above, in Maher the denial of the demolition permit was upheld 
because the owner had not succeeded in proving that the sale or lease of the property was impractical or 
that he had no use other for the property. The court also referred to William C Haas & Co v City and 
County of San Francisco 445 US 928 (1980), where the Supreme Court held that a taking had not 
occurred despite the fact that the owner had been deprived of 95% of the value of his property. 
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the owner was deprived of all economic use of his property. This principle was also later 
applied in the Lucas decision. 
In St Bartholomew’s Church241 the church owned two buildings that were 
designated as landmarks in accordance with the New York Landmarks Preservation 
Law 1965 (the Preservation Law).242 The church applied for a demolition order for one 
of the buildings as it intended to construct a 59-storey office tower on the site.243 Not 
surprisingly, the application for the demolition permit was unsuccessful and the church 
approached the court, asserting that the Preservation Law has placed such severe 
restrictions on its ability to use its property that it constituted a taking.244 The court held 
that it had to apply the Penn Central principles to a property used for charitable 
purposes.245 Central to the Penn Central decision was the fact that the owner still had 
the original use of the property available to it and that use of the property was still 
economically viable.246 What had to be determined in this case was whether the 
Preservation Law had deprived the appellant of the original use of the property. The 
court found that the appellant could still use its facilities (despite the regulation) for 
charitable and religious activities. Admittedly, the Preservation Law caused the property 
to be frozen in its existing use and the appellant was prevented from expanding or 
altering its activities.247 However, Penn Central sanctioned such consequences and the 
court could not find that a taking had occurred when the property owner still had the 
                                                            
241 Refer to Pak T ‘Free exercise, free expression, and landmarks preservation’ (1991) 91 Colum L Rev 
1813-1846 for a discussion of this decision. 
242 914 F 2d 348 (1990) 351. 
243 914 F 2d 348 (1990) 351. 
244 914 F 2d 348 (1990) 356. 
245 914 F 2d 348 (1990) 356. 
246 914 F 2d 348 (1990) 359-360. The church was unable to show that it could not afford to repair and 
maintain the building.  
247 914 F 2d 348 (1990) 356. 
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original use of the property available.248 This finding was further corroborated by the fact 
that the church could not prove that the building was no longer suitable for its original 
use or that the costs of the rehabilitation and repair of the building were beyond the 
financial means of the church.249 
 
4 4 5 Concluding remarks 
One of the significant aspects of the Penn Central decision is the Supreme Court’s 
finding that landmark preservation law does not only provide economic benefits but that 
it also improves the quality of life in urban areas.250 Penn Central shows that historic 
preservation law is not only a legitimate but a necessary exercise of the police power. 
The Tahoe-Sierra decision confirmed that when US courts decide whether statutory 
regulation of property rights causes a taking of property, they must first determine 
whether or not the owner has been deprived of the current or original use (Penn 
Central) or of all beneficial use (Lucas) of the property.251 Accordingly, a court will have 
to determine whether the prohibition against the demolition of a landmark building 
deprives the owner of the beneficial use of that property. If the denial of a demolition 
order does not deprive the owner of the current or original use of the property, it is 
unlikely that it would be regarded as a regulatory taking, even if the owner loses the 
opportunity to change the use of the property and, accordingly, loses a significant 
portion of the property’s value in the process. However, if the prohibition against 
                                                            
248 914 F 2d 348 (1990) 356. The appellant attempted to show that this case differed from Penn Central in 
several respects. Firstly, the appellant argued that unlike the owners in Penn Central it would not have a 
reasonable return on its investment in the buildings. The court held that reasonable return was irrelevant 
where the buildings had to be used for charitable purposes. Appellant further argued that, unlike Penn 
Central, it had submitted a second plan proposing the construction of a smaller building. This argument 
was rejected by the court and it held that the appellant could still submit for approval more suitable 
additions to the Community House. Finally, the court rejected the appellant’s argument that the property 
owners in Penn Central owned valuable transferable development rights and that its development rights 
were worthless. 
249 914 F 2d 348 (1990) 357. 
250 438 US 104 (1978) 134. 
251 Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council 505 US 1003 (1992). 
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demolition deprives an owner of all economic use of his property, it will amount to 
categorical taking for which the owner should be compensated. The Lucas test places 
an exceptionally heavy onus on the property owner. Arguably, it would only be in rare 
instances that an owner will be able to prove that the denial of the demolition order has 
the effect of completely destroying all use which he has for the property. The court will 
apply the Penn Central logic (an ad hoc, factual balancing test), once it has established 
that the protection of the landmarked building has not deprived the owner of all possible 
uses of his land.  
The Penn Central approach does not provide a clear-cut test for determining when 
the denial of a demolition order would be unconstitutional. What it does provide is a set 
of principles that the courts should apply when it determines whether the denial of the 
demolition permit constitutes a taking of property. The first principle is that US courts 
should conduct a context-sensitive factual enquiry when faced with a takings dispute. 
This means that the courts will delve into the specific circumstances of a case when 
they determine whether the denial of a demolition permit amounts to a taking for which 
the owner should be compensated. In so doing, the courts must specifically consider the 
economic impact that the refusal of the demolition order will have on ownership rights. 
The courts must also consider the extent to which the denial of the demolition permit will 
interfere with the investment-backed expectations of the property owner and the 
character of the governmental action. Finally, the courts must consider the effect of the 
refusal of the demolition permit in light of the property as a whole.  
Penn Central shows that it would not be unconstitutional to deny a demolition 
order where the landmark status of a building has not deprived the owner of the original 
or current use of the building or the use of the building for which the property was 
purchased. Likewise, denial of the demolition permit will not amount to a taking if the 
property owner has an alternative, economic use for the property available to him. In 
Penn Central, the court found that the historic preservation law did not deprive the land 
owner of existing uses of the property. This in turn indicated that the landmark 
protection of Grand Central Station did not interfere with the owner’s investment-backed 
expectations. In 900 G Street Associates, the court held that the denial of the demolition 
order did not amount to a taking because the owner had an alternative use of the 
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property available to him. In similar vein, the court decided in St Bartholomew’s Church 
that the landmark status of the buildings did not deprive the church of the original use of 
the property.  
The case law discussed above indicates that the refusal of a demolition permit will 
not constitute a taking of property where it is still economically viable to use the property 
in its protected form. Economic viability can refer to current as well as future income 
earned from the use of the building. In Penn Central the US Supreme Court held that 
the owner of Grand Central Station could continue to use the property as it did before; it 
would still be able to earn a reasonable return on its investment; and it was in 
possession of valuable transferable rights that could be sold for a profit. These factors 
indicated that it was economically viable for the owners to use the property despite the 
decision to uphold its landmark status and to deny the development application. 
Economic viability within the context of St Bartholomew’s Church meant that the church 
could afford to maintain and restore the landmark building. 
  
4 5 Demolition rights within the context of German heritage preservation law 
4 5 1 Introduction 
The Rheinland-Pfälzischen Denkmalschutz-und-Pflegegesetz case252 is the most 
important German historic preservation case to date. In this case, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court (the Constitutional Court) set out the circumstances where it would 
be unconstitutional to deny an owner the right to demolish a protected building. This 
decision should be understood in light of the interaction between Article 14.1.1 and 
Article 14.2 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany 1949 (the German 
                                                            
252 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999]. Refer to Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: 
lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 119-121 and Hofman H ‘Eigentumsgarantie, Erbrecht 
und Enteignung’ in Schmidt-Bleibtreu B and Klein F et al (eds) Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hofman, Hopfauf 
Grundgesetz: Kommentar 11 ed (2008) Rdn 41 for a discussion of the case. See also Du Plessis E ‘To 
what extent may the state regulate private property for environmental purposes? A comparative study’ 
2011 TSAR 512-526 at 520. 
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Basic Law),253 and the principle of proportionality as applied in German constitutional 
law.  
Article 14 of the German Basic Law,254 the property clause, is subdivided into three 
separate clauses.255 Van der Walt explains that Article 14.1.1 contains the guarantee 
clause and Article 14.2 (read with Article 14.1.2) contains the regulation clause.  Article 
14.3 is the expropriation clause of the German Basic Law.256 Article 14.1.1 carries a 
positive formulation as it provides that ‘[p]roperty and the right of inheritance shall be 
guaranteed’.257 Van der Walt explains that is unusual for a constitutional property clause 
to be formulated in a positive manner and extensive theory has been developed in 
German law to delineate the exact meaning of this provision.258 It is generally accepted 
that the purpose of Article 14.1.1 is not primarily to guarantee property but to protect the 
                                                            
253 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 122. Van der Walt 
explains that the correct translation for Grundgesetz (GG) is Basic Law and not ‘Constitution’. The term 
German Basic Law is used throughout this discussion. 
254 An official translation of the German Basic Law can be found at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html (accessed on 10-10-2011).  
255 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 122. For the purpose 
of discussion Van der Walt numbers the individual sentences of the three clauses for example 14.1.1 or 
14.1.2. This method is employed whenever it is necessary to refer to a specific sentence of one of the 
three clauses. Van der Walt explains that Article 14 should be interpreted with reference to the 
‘fundamental purpose’ of the property guarantee as explained by the German Federal Constitutional 
Court. This fundamental purpose is set out at the beginning of all the important decisions on Article 14, 
and it states that ‘the property guarantee (a) is a fundamental (human) right, (b) which is meant to secure, 
for the holder of property, (c) an area of personal liberty (d) in the patrimonial sphere, (e) to enable her to 
take responsibility for the free development and organization of her own life (f) within the larger social 
context’. Van der Walt further explains that the fundamental purpose should be understood in light of the 
fact that human dignity has a special place in the German Bill of Rights. The right to human dignity 
influences all interpretations of Article 14. See Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a 
comparative analysis (1999) 124. 
256 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 123. 
257 Refer to http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html (accessed on 10-10-2011) for an 
official translation of the German Basic Law. 
258 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 124. 
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liberty and autonomy of the individual.259 This guarantee is designed to enable the 
individual to participate in social, political and economic structures.260 Van der Walt 
reasons that Article 14.1.1 is also the starting point for explaining ‘socially-orientated 
limitations on private property’.261 Viewed from this perspective, it is clear that the Article 
14 property guarantee allows for, but also confines, the regulation of property, insofar as 
it lays down requirements for statutory and regulatory actions that define the content of 
property rights and that limit existing property rights.262  
 The property guarantee consists of two separate guarantees, namely the 
individual guarantee (Bestandsgarantie or the Individualgarantie)263 and the institutional 
guarantee (Institutionsgarantie).264 The individual guarantee is associated with the 
negative aspects of the property guarantee in Article 14.3. Essentially, it recognises that 
the state can regulate property rights, provided that it complies with certain 
requirements. More specifically, the state may interfere with property rights by way of 
regulation or expropriation, if it meets the necessary requirements, and provided it is 
done for a public purpose that trumps the individual guarantee.265 The institutional 
guarantee is linked to the positive part of the property clause in Article 14.1.1, and it 
                                                            
259  Papier J ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T and Dürig G et al (eds) Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz: Kommentar Band II 
53 ed (2008) Rdn 1 and Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 
126. 
260 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 127. 
261 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 127. 
262 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 128. Jarass HD 
‘Eigentumsgarantie und Erbrecht’ in Jarass HD and Pieroth B (eds) Jarass/Pieroth Grundegesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Kommentar 8 ed (2006) Rdn 1 explains that the purpose of the property 
guarantee is to protect property interests so that the individual can participate in economic and social 
structures and, as a result, take responsibility for her own life.  
263 Papier J ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T and Dürig G et al (eds) Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz: Kommentar Band II 
53 ed (2008) Rdn 8. 
264 Refer to Jarass HD ‘Eigentumsgarantie und Erbrecht’ in Jarass HD and Pieroth B (eds) Jarass/Pieroth 
Grundegesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Kommentar 8 ed (2006) Rdn 4 and to Papier J ‘Art. 
14’ in Maunz T and Dürig G et al (eds) Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz: Kommentar Band II 53 ed (2008) Rdn 
11 for an explanation of the practical relevance of the institutional guarantee.  
265 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 128. 
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relates to the entire institution of private property. Van der Walt explains that this 
guarantee ‘secures a core of legal norms, which describes the essence of property (its 
existence, availability and usefulness for private property holders) and it ensures that 
this core is not abolished or eroded by legislation’.266 For example, the institutional 
guarantee prevents the state from removing entire categories of property from the 
sphere of private ownership without sufficient justification.267 The institutional guarantee 
prevents the state from diminishing the ‘sphere of personal liberty’ guaranteed by article 
14.268 
Article 14.1.1 is qualified by Article 14.1.2, which stipulates that the content (Inhalt) 
and limits (Schranken) of private property rights shall be determined by law.269 Article 
14.1.2 recognises that property rights can be subjected to the restrictions created by the 
statutory regulation of the use of property. Van der Walt explains that Article 14.1.1, 
read with Article 14.1.2, places an obligation on the legislature to create a property 
regime that strikes an equitable balance between the individual’s interest in private 
property and the public interest in the regulation of private property rights.270 Article 14 
not only places a duty on the legislature to maintain an equitable property system 
through the regulation of private property rights, but it also prohibits the excessive 
                                                            
266 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 129. 
267 Papier J ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T and Dürig G et al (eds) Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz: Kommentar Band II 
53ed (2008) Rdn 11 and Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 
129. 
268 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 130. 
269 See in this regard Jarass HD ‘Eigentumsgarantie und Erbrecht’ in Jarass HD and Pieroth B (eds) 
Jarass/Pieroth Grundegesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Kommentar 8 ed (2006) Rdn 35; 
Papier J ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T and Dürig G et al (eds) Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz: Kommentar Band II 53 
ed (2008) Rdn 27 and 305 and Hofman H ‘Eigentumsgarantie, Erbrecht und Enteignung’ in Schmidt-
Bleibtreu B and Klein F et al (eds) Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hofman, Hopfauf Grundgesetz: Kommentar 11 ed 
(2008) Rdn 36. 
270 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 132. See to the same 
effect Bryde B ‘Art. 14 Eigentum und Erbrecht’ in Von Münch I and Kunig P (eds) Von Münch/Kunig 
Grundgesetz Kommentar Band I 5 ed (2000) Rdn 59. 
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statutory regulation of private property rights (Übermaβverbot).271 Accordingly, the 
regulation of property entails the determination of the content and the limits of property 
rights within the framework of Article 14.272 The legislature must uphold the institutional 
guarantee when determining the content of property rights.273 As explained above, this 
means that the legislature must establish new property institutions if required and refrain 
from removing existing property institutions from the social and economic sphere, 
unless it is absolutely necessary.274 The legislature must adhere to the individual 
property guarantee when determining the limits of property rights.275 This means that 
the limits of property must be delineated, but that the legislature must also give effect to 
its constitutional duty to preserve existing individual property rights.276 The 
proportionality principle also limits the legislature’s power to regulate private property 
rights. This principle requires of the legislature to strike a balance between private 
property rights and the public interest in the regulation or limitation of private property 
rights.277 A regulation will be invalid if it imposes disproportionate burdens on the owner 
                                                            
271 Papier J ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T and Dürig G et al (eds) Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz: Kommentar Band II 
53 ed (2008) Rdn 315 and Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis 
(1999) 132. See to the same effect Van der Walt AJ ‘Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: a 
comparative overview of constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings (1999) 14 SAPL 273-331 at 
286 and Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings 
jurisprudence (2006) 135. 
272 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 132. See to the same 
effect Van der Walt AJ ‘Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: a comparative overview of 
constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings (1999) 14 SAPL 273-331 at 286. 
273 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 133. 
274 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 133. 
275 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 133. 
276 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 133. 
277 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 133. See to the same 
effect Van der Walt AJ ‘Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: a comparative overview of 
constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings (1999) 14 SAPL 273-331 at 287. 
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and in so doing disturbs the equitable balance between the public interest and the 
interests of the individual property owner.278 
Article 14.1.2 should be read together with Article 14.2 of the German Basic Law, 
which stipulates that: ‘[p]roperty entails obligations. Its use should also serve the public 
interest’.279 This clause confirms that property has an underlying social function and that 
property rights can be limited in the public interest.280 Van der Walt explains that this 
social limitation originates from the constitutional property guarantee, which requires a 
balance to be struck between private property rights and the social or public interest in 
                                                            
278 Van der Walt AJ ‘Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: a comparative overview of 
constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings (1999) 14 SAPL 273-331 at 287-288. See to the same 
effect Du Plessis E ‘To what extent may the state regulate private property for environmental purposes? A 
comparative study’ 2011 TSAR 512-526 at 520. 
279 Refer to http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html (accessed on 10-10-2011) for an 
official translation of the German Basic Law. See to the same effect Papier J ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T and 
Dürig G et al (eds) Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz: Kommentar Band II 53 ed (2008) Rdn 422, who explains 
that historic preservation and environmental conservation laws fulfil a particularly important function in 
German society, and that the uncompensated limitations imposed on ownership in terms of these laws 
are justified in light of Article 14.1.2 of the German Basic Law. These laws are constitutional, provided 
that they are reconcilable with the proportionality principle. The ownership of, for example, a historic 
building, is accompanied by certain social responsibilities (Sozialpflichtikeit). Uncompensated limitations 
on the owner’s rights in relation to his historic building will be permissible, provided that there are still 
economically viable uses of the property available to the owner. However, the historic preservation law 
will be unconstitutional if it imposes disproportionate burdens on the owner. 
280 Jarass HD ‘Eigentumsgarantie und Erbrecht’ in Jarass HD and Pieroth B (eds) Jarass/Pieroth 
Grundegesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Kommentar 8 ed (2006) Rdn 35 explains that Art 14.2 
instructs the legislature to regulate property in the public interest. This duty becomes even more important 
in instances where the public has a particularly strong interest in the regulation of a specific form of 
property. Papier J ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T and Dürig G et al (eds) Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz: Kommentar 
Band II 53 ed (2008) Rdnn 306 and 308 explains that Article 14.1.2 and Article 14.2 confirms that 
property must be regulated in the public interest. Importantly, the limitations imposed on ownership in the 
public interest are not without boundaries. Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: 
lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 133-135 argues that this provision expressly 
incorporates a social-obligation norm into the German legal system. Chapter 6 applies Alexander’s social 
obligation norm theory to explain why certain limitations are imposed on ownership in the context of illegal 
buildings, historic preservation and unlawfully occupied buildings.  
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the use of the property.281 Furthermore, this balance must be maintained in light of the 
proportionality principle, which serves as a safeguard against the excessive regulation 
of property rights.282 Van der Walt is of the view that the principle of proportionality 
ensures that a regulation ‘starts with but also ends with the public interest and that it 
respects and protects both the public interest and the individual interests equally’.283 
The operation of the proportionality principle and the prohibition against regulatory 
excess is best illustrated by the grading approach (the principle of Abstufung der 
Sozialpflichtigkeit) adopted in German law. This approach requires of the courts to draw 
a distinction between property that provides ‘security for the personal liberty of its 
holder’ and property that is held for other, less personal purposes such as commercial 
property.284 German law protects property rights more fiercely when it is owned to 
ensure personal autonomy and liberty.285 This means that if property provides security 
and liberty to its holder, the statutory limitations imposed on that property will be less 
                                                            
281 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 133. See to the same 
effect Bryde B ‘Art. 14 Eigentum und Erbrecht’ in Von Münch I and Kunig P (eds) Von Münch/Kunig 
Grundgesetz Kommentar Band I 5 ed (2000) Rdnn 61-62. 
282 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 133. 
283 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 135. See to the same 
effect Hofman H ‘Eigentumsgarantie, Erbrecht und Enteignung’ in Schmidt-Bleibtreu B and Klein F et al 
(eds) Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hofman, Hopfauf Grundgesetz: Kommentar 11 ed (2008) Rdn 38. Jarass HD 
‘Eigentumsgarantie und Erbrecht’ in Jarass HD and Pieroth B (eds) Jarass/Pieroth Grundegesetz für die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Kommentar 8 ed (2006) Rdnn 38a-39 explains that a regulatory measure 
will be proportional if it meets three requirements. These requirements are, firstly, that the regulation must 
be strictly necessary; secondly, the regulation must be suited to the purpose for which it was enacted 
and, finally, the regulation must not impose burdens that are disproportionate to the benefits created by 
the regulation. Furthermore, a regulation must be generally constitutional, which means that it cannot be 
in conflict with other constitutional provisions such as the equality clause. See to the same effect Van der 
Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 135 and Alexander GS The global 
debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 134. 
284 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 135. 
285 Jarass HD ‘Eigentumsgarantie und Erbrecht’ in Jarass HD and Pieroth B (eds) Jarass/Pieroth 
Grundegesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Kommentar 8 ed (2006) Rdn 43. See also Alexander 
GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 
135-136. 
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severe.286 For example, a person’s home is protected more strictly and less interference 
into these property rights is tolerated. By contrast, property held for reasons other than 
personal security and liberty will be subjected to more vigorous regulations with more 
far-reaching consequences.287 Van der Walt explains that this approach results in the 
situation where certain properties are subjected to particularly strict and far-reaching 
regulations because the public interest in regulating that property outweighs the 
individual interest in not having the property regulated.288 For instance, land is a scarce 
and valuable resource, and for that reason it is subjected to stricter statutory 
regulations.289  
 
4 5 2 The Rheinland-Pfälzisches Denkmalschutz- und -Pflegegesetz case 1999 
4 5 2 1 Background 
The Rheinland-Pfälzisches Denkmalschutz- und Pflegegesetz (the Act) provides for the 
protection, restoration and maintenance of historic buildings and objects. Like its South 
African and American counterparts, the Act limits the owner’s right to demolish or alter a 
protected building. The Act stipulates that a protected building can only be demolished 
or altered with the consent of the relevant official or board, and changes to such a 
building can only be done in accordance with prescribed standards. Permission to 
demolish a historic building is only granted if the demolition is in the public interest. The 
Act does not compel the decision-maker to take the individual property owner’s interests 
into account when deciding whether a demolition permit should be issued.290  
                                                            
286 Bryde B ‘Art. 14 Eigentum und Erbrecht’ in Von Münch I and Kunig P (eds) Von Münch/Kunig 
Grundgesetz Kommentar Band I 5 ed (2000) Rdn 59. 
287 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 135-136. See to the 
same effect Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings 
jurisprudence (2006) 135-136. 
288 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 135-136. See to the 
same effect Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings 
jurisprudence (2006) 135-136. 
289 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 136. 
290 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] 2. 
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Three protection measures are put in place to protect owners who are unable to 
efficiently use their properties while adhering to the limitations imposed by the Act. 
Firstly, property can be expropriated in instances where it cannot be protected in any 
other reasonable manner. Secondly, a property owner must be compensated in 
instances where he uses his property in accordance with preservation requirements and 
where, as a result, his economic uses of his property are drastically diminished. Finally, 
compensation must be paid where the application of the Act has the effect of an 
expropriation.291  
The property central to this dispute was a 950 square meter palatial villa (the Villa) 
built in the nineteenth century in the vicinity of an industrial business area.292 Initially, 
the building was used as a house for the director of a business (Direktorenwohnhaus) 
and later as a family residence.293 The Villa stood vacant since 1981 as it was no longer 
suitable to be used as a home. In 1981 the Villa’s owner (the plaintiff) applied to the 
preservation authority for permission to demolish the building in accordance with 
paragraph 13 of the Act. It was evident that the plaintiff did not have any economic use 
for the building.294 For years she unsuccessfully tried to find an alternative use for the 
building or a lessee who would have a use for the Villa. The plaintiff also offered the free 
use of the Villa to the local district, who could utilise it as a museum, on condition that 
the district should bear the cost of maintaining the building.295 This offer was turned 
down as it was estimated that restoration costs would exceed 1 million German Marks. 
It was also estimated that the annual maintenance costs of the Villa would amount to 
                                                            
291 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] 3. 
292 For a discussion of this case refer to Papier J ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T and Dürig G et al (eds) Maunz-Dürig 
Grundgesetz: Kommentar Band II 53 ed (2008) Rdn 352-353 and Alexander GS The global debate over 
constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 119-121. See further Du 
Plessis E ‘To what extent may the state regulate private property for environmental purposes? A 
comparative study’ 2011 TSAR 512-526 at 523.  
293 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] paras 43-44. 
294 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 46. 
295 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 46. 
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300 000 German Marks. It was clear that the plaintiff spent a disproportionate amount of 
energy and money on the maintenance of the Villa.296  
The application for a demolition permit was turned down by the preservation 
authority despite the plaintiff’s contention that it was unreasonable to expect her to 
maintain a vacant and useless building.297 In 1983 the Villa was placed under formal 
protection and subsequent appeals (against the denial of a demolition permit) to the 
Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) and Higher Administrative Court 
(Oberverwaltungsgericht) proved unsuccessful.298 Both courts confirmed the historic 
and cultural value of the Villa. The Higher Administrative Court held that it was only 
necessary to consider the historic value and characteristics of the building when 
deciding whether a building should be placed under formal protection. Other factors, 
such as the property owner’s financial position or more economic uses of the property, 
had not been taken into account.299 As to the demolition permit, the court held that it 
was not in the public’s interest to demolish the Villa. The court reached its decision even 
though it had not taken into account the owner had no economic use for the property, or 
the fact that the maintenance and restoration costs were excessive.300  
The Administrative Court held that the private interests of the property owner were 
irrelevant to the question of whether a demolition permit should be granted. It directed 
the appellant to draft a use-and-renovation plan (Nutzungs-und Sanierungskonzept) for 
the Villa, which would be funded by the preservation authorities once it had been 
approved.301 The Administrative Court was of the view that the burden of paying the 
renovation and maintenance costs would not be as strenuous as alleged by the 
appellant, since it would be paid over a long period of time.302 It is against this 
                                                            
296 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 46. 
297 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 47. 
298 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 48. 
299 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 49. 
300 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 50. 
301 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 51. 
302 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 51. 
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background that the plaintiff proceeded to challenge the constitutional validity of 
paragraph 13 of the Act in the Federal Constitutional Court.  
 
4 5 2 2 The finding of the Federal Constitutional Court 
The plaintiff argued that paragraph 13 of the Act was unconstitutional as it did not oblige 
the preservation authority to consider the interests of property owners when deciding 
whether a demolition permit should be granted.303 The Federal Constitutional Court first 
considered the questions of jurisdiction and ripeness and held that this case raised a 
constitutional issue.304 It then addressed the issue of whether paragraph 13 had to be 
tested against Article 14.1 (the deprivation clause) or Article 14.3 (the expropriation 
clause) of the German Basic Law. The court held that paragraph 13 (and the Act in 
general) set out to determine the restrictions that could be imposed on ownership.305 
The fact that the owner’s application for a demolition permit had been turned down did 
not mean that an expropriation had taken place. Accordingly, this case raised issues 
concerning the validity of the statutory regulation of private property, which had to be 
tested against Article 14.1 of the German Basic Law.306  
                                                            
303 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 54.  Refer to Papier J ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T and Dürig G et al (eds) 
Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz: Kommentar Band II 53 ed (2008) Rdnn 352-353 for an analysis of the Court’s 
decision.  
304 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 77. 
305 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 79. See in this regard Alexander GS The global debate over 
constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 119. 
306 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] par 81; see Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative 
analysis (1999) 147. The Federal Constitutional Court drew a distinction between what in South African 
law would be a deprivation and the expropriation of property. In instances of expropriation the state takes 
physical possession of a part or the whole of the property to be used for a specific public purpose. Van 
der Walt explains that Art 14.3 of the Basic Law, the expropriation clause, allows two types of 
expropriation, namely an expropriation authorised in terms of legislation and an administrative 
expropriation. The court decided that the appellant had not been expropriated of her property. The extent 
to which property rights are interfered with is irrelevant when deciding whether a person had been 
deprived of his property. Furthermore, regulatory action remains a deprivation of property even in 
instances where the effect of the regulation is similar to an expropriation of property.  
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The court explained that it expected of the legislator to maintain a balance 
between the protection-worthy interests of the property owner and the public interest in 
the regulation of property when it determined the content and limitations of 
ownership.307 It must also uphold other constitutional principles such as the principles of 
equality and proportionality. Private property was regulated in the public interest, but the 
extent to which burdens can be imposed on ownership must be limited. The limitations 
imposed on ownership may not go beyond the purpose for which the regulation was 
enacted.308 Property fundamental to a person’s dignity and, which promoted his 
personal autonomy would be protected more fiercely than property that was merely held 
for commercial purposes.309 A regulation would be invalid and unconstitutional when the 
legislator overstepped the boundaries created by this framework when determining the 
content and limitations of ownership. Payment of compensation in such an instance 
would not render the regulation constitutional and valid.310  
Turning to the validity of paragraph 13, the court held that, unlike similar pieces of 
legislation, the Act did not compel the preservation authority to consider the interests of 
the owner when making decisions concerning historic buildings in private ownership. 
This imposed disproportionate burdens on the owner.311 The court confirmed that the 
protection of historic and culturally valuable buildings was a legitimate goal that would 
generally fall within the scope of Article 14.2 of the German Basic Law.312 Moreover, the 
consent-based procedure adopted by the Act was deemed a suitable and necessary 
                                                            
307 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 83. 
308 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 83. 
309 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 84. 
310 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 85. Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: 
lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 120 explains that the limitation could not be treated as 
a ‘compensable expropriation’ because the legislature did not have the intention to remove the asset from 
private ownership. Rather, this limitation on ownership amounted to an excessive regulation, which was 
invalid. 
311 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 87. 
312 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 88. See to the same effect Jarass HD ‘Eigentumsgarantie und Erbrecht’ 
in Jarass HD and Pieroth B (eds) Jarass/Pieroth Grundegesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 
Kommentar 8 ed (2006) Rdn 62a. 
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method to protect valuable buildings.313 In this regard, the court explained that it could 
not think of another method that would deliver similar results, but with lesser burdens on 
ownership. In most cases the application of the Act would not impose disproportionate 
and unreasonable burdens on property owners.314 
 The court decided that generally the prohibition against the demolition of a 
valuable building would not deprive an owner of the existing use of the property.315 In 
light of Article 14.2.2 of the German Basic Law and the purpose of the legislation, 
property owners should accept that they would not always have the most beneficial use 
of their property available for exploitation.316 However, the situation could arise where 
the operation of regulatory legislation caused an individual owner to be deprived of all 
beneficial use of his property.317 A regulation could also cause existing uses of the 
property to become impractical. The court explained that a property owner would bear a 
disproportionate burden in the public interest if historic preservation laws had the effect 
of depriving him of all reasonable uses of his property, including the possibility of selling 
the property.318 In such instances, the legal position of the owner would be transformed 
into something that could no longer be called ownership and, under these 
                                                            
313 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 89. 
314 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 90. See to the same effect Papier J ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T and Dürig G et 
al (eds) Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz: Kommentar Band II 53 ed (2008) Rdn 352. 
315 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 91. 
316 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 91. 
317 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 92. 
318 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 92. See to the same effect Papier J ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T and Dürig G et 
al (eds) Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz: Kommentar Band II 53 ed (2008) Rdn 352. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
252 
circumstances; it would be reasonable and justifiable to grant a demolition permit.319 If 
the public interest still required the protection of the valuable building, the state would 
have to expropriate the property.320 Accordingly, the court held that paragraph 13 of the 
Act was unconstitutional insofar as it did not avoid the imposition of disproportionate 
burdens on the property owners, and in that it did not prescribe methods to remedy 
instances where owners were disproportionately burdened.321 
The court explained that the compensation provision (paragraph 31) of the Act did 
not remedy the disproportionate burden brought about by the prohibition to demolish the 
                                                            
319 In 1 BvR 2140/08 [2010] paras 4; 20; 21 and 25, the court confirmed the decision reached in BVerfGE 
100, 226 [1999]. The court specifically held that a disproportionate burden would be imposed on property 
owners where the operation of historic preservation legislation caused the owner to be deprived of the 
right to use or sell his property, and where the owner had the concomitant financial burden of maintaining 
and restoring an historic building. In this case the court found that a disproportionate burden had not been 
imposed on the owner despite the fact that he was denied the right to demolish a chapel situated on his 
property. The reason for this was that the plaintiff had received a part of the property, which had been 
declared a protected area in terms of the provisions of the same Act discussed above. Subdivision only 
occurred after the property had been placed under formal protection. The court held that to determine 
whether the Act imposed disproportionate burdens on the owner, it had to consider the entire protected 
area, and not only the piece of land on which the chapel stood. Stated differently, the court had to 
determine whether it would have been reasonable to expect of the owner to preserve the chapel before 
the subdivision of the land.  The court decided that before subdivision it would have been proportionate, 
and reasonable, to allow the protection of the chapel. Therefore, the owner could not argue that it was 
unreasonable to deny a demolition permit because of the effects of the subdivision. The court held that 
Art 14.1 did not protect the private use of property that had been severed from a larger and economically 
viable parcel of land. Refer to Du Plessis E ‘To what extent may the state regulate private property for 
environmental purposes? A comparative study’ 2011 TSAR 512-526 for a discussion of this decision. 
320 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 92. 
321 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 93. See to the same effect Jarass HD ‘Eigentumsgarantie und Erbrecht’ 
in Jarass HD and Pieroth B (eds) Jarass/Pieroth Grundegesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 
Kommentar 8 ed (2006) Rdn 62a and, Papier J ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T and Dürig G et al (eds) Maunz-Dürig 
Grundgesetz: Kommentar Band II 53 ed (2008) Rdn 426. 
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Villa.322  It was within the legislature’s power to incorporate an equalisation provision 
(Ausgleich)323 in a historic preservation statute324 to prevent that law from imposing 
disproportionate burdens on land owners. However, paragraph 31 could not fulfil this 
function as it was formulated too vaguely. The court explained that a legislative 
provision that unreasonably limited ownership and that was linked to an equalisation 
measure could only be reconciled with Article 14.1 of the German Basic Law in 
exceptional circumstances.325 The court further explained that the legislature did have 
the power to enforce provisions which would have extremely unreasonable effects, 
provided it had created equalisation measures clearly designed to prevent the 
                                                            
322 Bryde B ‘Art. 14 Eigentum und Erbrecht’ in Von Münch I and Kunig P (eds) Von Münch/Kunig  
Grundgesetz Kommentar Band I 5 ed (2000) Rdn 100a explains that the general compensation provision 
could not qualify as an equalisation measure. Moreover, Article 14.1.1 of the German Basic Law requires 
of the legislature to, firstly, avoid the imposition of disproportionate burdens on property owners. 
Secondly, a court may only order the payment of an equalisation sum if it is provided for in the act and if it 
will alleviate the otherwise excessive burden that is imposed on the owner. See to the same effect Papier 
J ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T and Dürig G et al (eds) Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz: Kommentar Band II 53 ed 
(2008) Rdn 352 
323 Refer to Bryde B ‘Art. 14 Eigentum und Erbrecht’ in Von Münch I and Kunig P (eds) Von Münch/Kunig 
Grundgesetz Kommentar Band I 5 ed (2000) Rdn 100a for a general explanation of the nature and 
function of equalisation measures. 
324 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis (1999) 143 and 150 and to 
the same effect Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 366-367. Van der Walt translates 
Ausgleich into ‘equalisation payments’. He explains that this is not compensation for the expropriation of 
property or delictual damages, but a (civil law) payment of money to lessen the burden imposed on 
ownership rights by the legitimate regulation of property. In essence, the equalisation payment alleviates 
the burden imposed by the statutory regulation of property and in so doing it prevents such regulation 
from being rendered unconstitutional and invalid. See further Van der Walt AJ ‘Compensation for 
excessive or unfair regulation: a comparative overview of constitutional practice relating to regulatory 
takings (1999) 14 SAPL 273-331 at 288-290; Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the 
Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 42-47; Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional 
property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 120-121 and Hofman H ‘Eigentumsgarantie, 
Erbrecht und Enteignung’ in Schmidt-Bleibtreu B and Klein F et al (eds) Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hofman, 
Hopfauf Grundgesetz: Kommentar 11 ed (2008) Rdn 40. 
325 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 95. 
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imposition of disproportionate and unequal burdens on property owners in the specific 
instance.326  
The court stressed that an equalisation provision was not a general method of 
bringing disproportionate limitations on ownership in line with Article 14.1 of the German 
Basic Law. Regulatory provisions should protect the essence of ownership and uphold 
the principle of equality, even in instances where the legislation did not include 
equalisation provisions.327 Equalisation provisions should be specifically designed to 
prevent disproportionate and unreasonable effects through administrative, technical or 
financial means.328 Furthermore, equalisation measures should meet certain 
requirements to be in line with Article 14.1 of the German Basic Law. Specifically, 
equalisation measures should be expressly provided for in the Act, and the 
circumstances in which it would find application must be specified.329 Compensation 
could not be paid as an equalisation measure where a legislative provision imposed 
disproportionate and unreasonable burdens on a property owner.330 In such instances, 
ownership should be protected in another manner, such as the granting of a demolition 
order. Article 14.1.1 requires of the legislature to avoid imposing disproportionate 
                                                            
326 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 96. See to the same effect Bryde B ‘Art. 14 Eigentum und Erbrecht’ in 
Von Münch I and Kunig P (eds) Von Münch/Kunig Grundgesetz Kommentar Band I 5 ed (2000) Rdnn 65-
66; Jarass HD ‘Eigentumsgarantie und Erbrecht’ in Jarass HD and Pieroth B (eds) Jarass/Pieroth 
Grundegesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Kommentar 8 ed (2006) Rdnn 40 and 46 and Papier J 
‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T and Dürig G et al (eds) Maunz-Dürig Grundgesetz: Kommentar Band II 53 ed (2008) 
Rdnn 344-345. 
327 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 97. 
328 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 98. Papier J ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T and Dürig G et al (eds) Maunz-Dürig 
Grundgesetz: Kommentar Band II 53 ed (2008) Rdn 346 explains that a general compensation provision 
will not be considered an equalisation measure. This means that a general compensation provision in the 
authorising legislation will not prevent a court from declaring the act unconstitutional insofar as it imposes 
a disproportionate burden on the property owner.  
329 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 100. See in this regard Alexander GS The global debate over 
constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 120. 
330 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 101. See to the same effect Hofman H ‘Eigentumsgarantie, Erbrecht 
und Enteignung’ in Schmidt-Bleibtreu B and Klein F et al (eds) Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hofman, Hopfauf 
Grundgesetz: Kommentar 11 ed (2008) Rdn 41. 
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burdens on property owners and ownership entitlements have to be preserved as far as 
possible.331 The court further explained that the legislator had to make provision for the 
granting of a demolition order where, as in this case, the operation of the Act resulted in 
extreme hardship and where an equalisation measure had not specifically been 
designed to avoid disproportionate consequences.332 Moreover, the payment of 
compensation could not serve as an alternative to a demolition order.333 The court 
concluded that the Act imposed a disproportionate burden on the property owner insofar 
as it deprived him of the right to demolish a building that was too expensive to maintain 
and for which he had no economically viable use. There was no equalisation measure 
that alleviated the burden imposed on the owner. Accordingly, he was entitled to a 
demolition permit. The court directed the owner to challenge the administrator’s decision 
to refuse a demolition permit in the Administrative Court.334  
 
4 5 3 Concluding remarks 
In this case the Federal Constitutional Court confirmed that in Germany the protection of 
historic buildings and objects is a permissible legislative goal. The consent-based 
procedure usually adopted in historic preservation legislation is a practical method to 
ensure the protection of historic buildings. Generally, the operation of historic 
preservation legislation such as the Act will not cause unconstitutional and 
disproportionate results. The prohibition against the demolition of a protected building 
does not deprive the owner of the use of the property and a property owner must accept 
                                                            
331 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 101; Papier J ‘Art. 14’ in Maunz T and Dürig G et al (eds) Maunz-Dürig 
Grundgesetz: Kommentar Band II 53 ed (2008) Rdnn 348 and 352 and Hofman H ‘Eigentumsgarantie, 
Erbrecht und Enteignung’ in Schmidt-Bleibtreu B and Klein F et al (eds) Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hofman, 
Hopfauf Grundgesetz: Kommentar 11 ed (2008) Rdn 41. See also Alexander GS The global debate over 
constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 120. 
332 See in this regard the discussion in Hofman H ‘Eigentumsgarantie, Erbrecht und Enteignung’ in 
Schmidt-Bleibtreu B and Klein F et al (eds) Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Hofman, Hopfauf Grundgesetz: 
Kommentar 11 ed (2008) Rdn 41. 
333 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 98. 
334 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 103. 
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that he will not always be able to use the property in the most economically beneficial 
way. However, there will be circumstances where it would be unconstitutional to deny a 
property owner a demolition permit for a protected building. This would be where the 
statutory protection of a building causes an owner to be deprived of all beneficial uses 
of the building or where other uses of the building become impractical. The protection of 
property will also deprive the owner of the opportunity to sell or to lease the building. 
The historic preservation legislation must allow the demolition of historic buildings where 
the protection of the building imposes disproportionate and unreasonable burdens on 
the owner. In such instances, the expropriation of the historic building is the only 
alternative to demolition. In the absence of expropriation, payment of compensation 
cannot take the place of a demolition permit where the protection of the building has 
caused the owner to be deprived of all uses of the building. Equalisation payment 
(Ausgleich) is a useful tool to prevent the imposition of disproportionate burdens on 
property owners, but equalisation measures must be specifically crafted to prevent the 
situation where the protection of a building causes unreasonable and disproportionate 
interferences with ownership entitlements.  
An important aspect of the case is the distinction drawn between property held for 
personal autonomy and liberty and property held for other reasons such as commercial 
property. It is evident that where a historic building is, for example, a home that the 
limitations imposed on ownership by historic preservation laws will be scrutinised more 
closely. This means that a court is more likely to find that the prohibition against 
demolition is disproportional when a historic preservation law compels an owner to 
maintain a structure that he can no longer use as a home and which cannot be sold. By 
contrast, when property is held for commercial reasons, more compelling reasons will 
have to support a finding that historic preservation laws imposes a disproportionate 
burden on the owner.   
  
4 6 Conclusions 
It is clear that in all three jurisdictions historic preservation laws are deemed to be a 
valid and necessary exercise of the state’s police power since ‘structures with special 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
257 
historic, cultural or architectural significance enhance the quality of life for all’.335 Even 
before Penn Central Transportation Company v City of New York (Penn Central)336 the 
American courts acknowledged that historic preservation laws fell within the scope of 
the states police power.337 The Penn Central decision expelled any uncertainty that 
might still have existed in relation to the general constitutional validity of heritage 
preservation laws. Similarly, in German law, a regulatory measure will be valid as long 
as it complies with the proportionality principle. This means that when drafting 
legislation the legislature must maintain a balance between the property owner’s rights 
and the public interest. The regulatory measure should not impose burdens beyond 
what the public interest requires. In Germany, a heritage preservation law will be valid 
as long as it is strictly necessary, suited to the purpose it serves and it does not impose 
burdens that outweigh the benefits obtained through that legislation. The Rheinland-
Pfälzisches Denkmalschutz- und Pflegegesetz (the Act) was declared invalid insofar as 
it did not maintain the fragile balance between the public’s interest in historic 
preservation, ownership entitlements and the burdens that are imposed on the owner. 
The South African courts have also established that heritage or historic preservation is a 
legitimate exercise of the state’s police power as they confirmed that the National 
Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 (the Heritage Resources Act) provides the 
framework within which ownership should now function.338   
Historic preservation laws limit an owner’s right to demolish historic buildings by 
requiring him to apply for a demolition permit, even in circumstances where he may 
have no viable use for the property and where the upkeep of a historical landmark may 
be extremely costly. These laws can also impose a positive duty on the owner to 
maintain a protected building in the public interest. In Penn Central339 the US Supreme 
Court explained that the fact that the demolition permit has been denied does not 
necessarily mean that the owner’s rights had been taken for a public use for which he 
                                                            
335 Penn Central Transportation Company v City of New York 438 US 104 (1978) 108. 
336 438 US 104 (1978). 
337 Maher v the City of New Orleans 516 F 2d 1051 (1975). 
338 Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37. 
339 438 US 104 (1978). 
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should be compensated. Likewise, the German Federal Constitutional Court confirmed 
that the permit-based system was the most efficient way in which the state can protect 
historic buildings and an owner will not automatically be expropriated of his property if 
his application for a demolition permit is unsuccessful. From the case law discussed 
above one can infer that the South African courts have adopted a similar attitude as 
their German and American counterparts. In all three the South African cases the 
respective courts refused to set aside the heritage authorities’ decisions to deny the 
demolition permits.340  
It is clear that the denial of the demolition permit, and the subsequent declaration 
of the building as a historic landmark, can have far-reaching consequences for the 
owner. In many of the cases discussed above the denial of the demolition permit 
thwarted the owners’ plans to develop their properties.341 The preservation of the 
historic building can have extensive financial implications for the owner since he can be 
compelled to maintain the building.342 Historic landmark designation can also freeze the 
property in its existing use.343 Finally, once a building is formally protected the owner 
would be able to do very little on his property without first obtaining the consent of the 
heritage authorities. Both the German Federal Constitutional Court and the US 
Supreme Court confirmed that the prohibition against demolition is generally a justifiable 
                                                            
340 Provincial Heritage Resources Authority, Eastern Cape v Gordon 2005 (2) SA 283 (E); Qualidental 
Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2007 (4) SA 26 (C); Qualidental 
Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2008 (3) SA 160 (SCA) and Corrans v MEC 
for the Department of Sport, Recreation, Arts and Culture, Eastern Cape, and others 2009 (5) SA 512 
(ECG). 
341 See for example Penn Central Transportation Company v City of New York 438 US 104 (1978); 
Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) and Corrans 
v MEC for the Department of Sport, Recreation, Arts and Culture, Eastern Cape, and others 2009 (5) SA 
512 (ECG). 
342 See in this regard the Rheinland-Pfälzischen Denkmalschutz-und-Pflegegesetz case BVerfGE 100, 
226 [1999], where the owner could no longer afford to maintain the historic building, and Corrans v MEC 
for the Department of Sport, Recreation, Arts and Culture, Eastern Cape, and others 2009 (5) SA 512 
(ECG), where the owner was compelled to maintain the facade of the structure as well as the thin layer of 
plaster on the walls.  
343 St. Bartholomew’s Church v City of New York 914 F 2d 348 (1990). 
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limitation of ownership entitlements since it will not deprive the owner of all reasonable 
uses of the property. Furthermore, property owners must accept that they will not 
always have the most beneficial use of their property available for exploitation. These 
potentially far-reaching consequences are deemed to be part of the obligations that 
accompany the ownership of historic buildings. The South African court in Qualidental 
Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another344 acknowledged that the 
Heritage Resources Act has the potential to erode the ownership entitlements.  
However, the court stressed that ownership entitlements should be exercised in 
accordance with the social function of the law and the interests of the community. The 
court emphasised that an owner does not only have entitlements in relation to his 
property but also certain inherent responsibilities.345 A balance must be struck between 
the protection of ownership, the exercise of ownership entitlements and the owner’s 
obligations toward the community. The approach described by the court reflects the 
German view (expressed in Article 14.2 of the German Basic Law) that property 
ownership is accompanied by certain obligations.     
The burden that is created by the denial of the demolition permit, and the 
subsequent formal protection of a building, must be evaluated in light of the property as 
a whole. This view was adopted by both the American346 and German347 courts and it 
appears as if the South African courts have adopted a similar line of reasoning. One of 
the factors that the court considered relevant in Corrans v MEC for the Department of 
Sport, Recreation, Arts and Culture, Eastern Cape, and others348 was that the owner 
would still be able to expand her guesthouse on the remaining part of her property.  
There are instances where the burdens imposed on ownership by historic 
preservation laws will be considered excessive. On the basis of the categorical rule 
                                                            
344 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37. 
345 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37. 
346 See in this regard Penn Central Transportation Company v City of New York 438 US 104 (1978) and 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 535 US 302 (2002). 
347 1 BvR 2140/08 [2010]. 
348 2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG). 
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formulated in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council349 one can conclude that in 
American law a heritage preservation law will cause an unconstitutional taking of 
property if it results in the owner being deprived of all reasonable economic use of this 
property. Alternatively, a court will have to conduct an ad hoc factual enquiry to 
ascertain whether a specific heritage preservation law places an excessive burden on 
the owner. This requires of the court to consider the three factors identified in Penn 
Central, namely character and the impact of the governmental action and the extent to 
which the action interferes with the distinct investment-backed expectations of the 
owner.350 Subsequent case law shows that the limitations on ownership (imposed by 
heritage preservation law) will not be considered excessive if the original use or an 
alternative use of the property is still available or if the owner can still make a 
reasonable return on his investment. The German Federal Constitutional Court has 
found that a heritage preservation law will impose a disproportionate burden on the 
owner if he is unable to use his property in a reasonable manner; if he is unable to sell 
or to lease the property; if the maintenance of the structure has become prohibitively 
expensive and if the legislation does not provide for a mechanism to lessen the burden. 
Essentially, the owner will have to show that he has been deprived of all economic use 
of the property. Therefore, it seems that in all three jurisdictions it would only be in 
exceptional circumstances that a court will find that a historic preservation law imposes 
an excessive burden on the owner.  
A characteristic that the German and American legal systems share is the 
incorporation of statutory measures that are designed to alleviate the burden of owning 
a protected building. In German law it is possible for the legislature to include 
equalisation provisions in heritage preservation laws that are specifically designed to 
prevent the imposition of disproportionate burdens on the owner. The legislative 
scheme in Penn Central incorporated transferable development rights which were held 
by owners of designated properties. The property owner in Penn Central could use his 
rights to develop its property in accordance with the heritage objectives set by the 
heritage authorities. Alternatively, the owner could sell these rights to neighbouring 
                                                            
349 505 US 1003 (1992). 
350 Penn Central Transportation Company v City of New York 438 US 104 (1978) 124. 
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property owners. Clearly these rights alleviated the burden that was imposed on the 
owner by the preservation laws.  
In the South African context it is still unclear under which circumstances the 
Heritage Resources Act will cause an arbitrary deprivation of property as proscribed by 
section 25(1) of the Constitution. It has already been mentioned that to date, a litigant 
has not yet asserted that the denial of the demolition permit and the subsequent 
designation of his property has imposed an arbitrary deprivation of his property. Any 
deprivation that is directly imposed by the Heritage Resources Act must be scrutinised 
in light of the substantive arbitrariness test developed by the Constitutional Court in First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance (FNB).351 The FNB 
substantive arbitrariness will show when the limitation on the owner’s demolition rights, 
coupled with a positive obligation to maintain the historic structure, will amount to an 
arbitrary deprivation of property. More specifically, this nuanced test requires of a court 
to balance opposing interests and to consider the complexity of the relationships 
involved in the dispute. In so doing, the court can establish when a statutory limitation 
(such as the limitation on demolition rights imposed by the Heritage Resources Act) 
goes too far in its interference with property rights. Moreover, the non-arbitrariness test 
will indicate when it might be necessary to mitigate an otherwise disproportionate 
burden imposed on the land owner (by the Heritage Resources Act) by way of an 
equalisation-style measure. Explained differently, it may show when it would be 
necessary to protect the exercise of ownership entitlements by way of a liability rule352 
(constitutional damages) instead of a property rule (demolition). 
Any deprivation that is imposed by administrative action (authorised by the 
Heritage Resources Act) must also meet the standards set for administrative justice in 
section 33(1) of the Constitution, as given effect to by the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000. In some instances it might be necessary to determine whether a 
                                                            
351 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
352 See in this regard, Calabresi G and Melamed AD ‘Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: one 
view of the cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089-1128 and the explanation in chapter 6, section 6 4 
below. 
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deprivation imposed by administrative action is substantively arbitrary because of its 
impact on the owner. These possibilities will be explored in greater detail in chapter 5. 
At this stage it suffices to say that whether the Heritage Resources Act imposes an 
arbitrary deprivation of property will depend on the specific facts of the case. A factor 
that a court might deem relevant is that the Heritage Resources Act does incorporate 
some measures to alleviate the property owner’s burden.353 On the one hand, it is 
possible that a court will find that these measures are sufficient to prevent the imposition 
of a disproportionate burden on the owner. On the other hand it is also possible that a 
court will find that the measures are too vague and inadequate to alleviate the burden 
preserving a historic building in the public interest. 
Finally, there will be instances where the only option is to expropriate the owner of 
his property. The German Federal Constitutional Court confirmed that it is necessary to 
expropriate in circumstances where a historic preservation law imposes a 
disproportionate burden on a property and where the preservation of the building is still 
desired.354 In American law the state would have to expropriate if the building is 
considered preservation-worthy, but where the effect of the heritage preservation law on 
ownership is deemed excessive. Likewise, one can assume that in South Africa there 
will also be instances where it would be necessary to expropriate the owner of his 
property.355 
 
                                                            
353 See in this regard, the discussion in 4 2 above. 
354 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999]. 
355 Section 46 of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 authorises the expropriation of property.  
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Chapter 5: 
A constitutional analysis of the interests affected by the 
granting of or denying of a demolition order  
 
5 1 Introduction 
5 1 1 Section 25(1) of the Constitution: a general overview 
Section 25(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) 
states:  
‘[n]o one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, 
and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property’. 
A deprivation of property is often the result of the statutory regulation of an owner’s use, 
enjoyment and exploitation of his property, for a specific public purpose. Typically, 
property is regulated for the core public purpose of protecting public health and safety. 
However, it is widely accepted that the state can regulate property for purposes of land-
use planning and development control, environmental conservation, the regulation of 
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building works and even historic preservation.1 Within the South African context, yet 
another regulatory control purpose can be identified, namely, anti-eviction legislation 
that regulates the manner in which property owners evict unlawful occupiers from their 
land. 
A deprivation can result in the diminishing of the value of property and other 
significant inroads on property rights. Van der Walt explains that loss caused by 
regulatory controls varies, and that in some instances the deprivation can be so severe 
that the property is completely destroyed.2 Deprivations are not compensated because 
they serve a public purpose and it is presumed that the regulatory measure affects all 
owners more or less equally. In other words, all property owners are subjected to 
roughly similar statutory limitations and all owners derive roughly similar benefits from 
the regulation of their property interests.3  
Section 25(1) of the Constitution has a dual purpose in the sense that it recognises 
that the state can regulate and limit the use, enjoyment and exploitation of property but 
also provides two constitutional requirements against which regulatory interferences 
                                                            
1 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 196. See for example Nyangane v Stadsraad 
van Potchefstroom 1998 (2) BCLR 148 (T) 160E-G, where the court confirmed that it is the duty of local 
authorities to develop urban areas in a harmonious and co-ordinated way. It is permissible for local 
authorities to impose restrictive conditions to achieve this goal. In Walele v The City of Cape Town and 
others 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 2 the court explained that the National Building Regulations and 
Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (the Building Standards Act) provides the framework in which the 
rights of property owners to develop their property should be balanced with the rights of neighbours. 
Likewise, in Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 
37 the court emphasised that ownership entitlements can only function in accordance with the social 
function of the law and the interests of communities. The National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 
(the Heritage Resources Act) provides the framework in which ownership should now function. Finally, in 
PJ Ruck v Makana Municipality (2628/2010) [2010] ZAECGHC 111 (24 November 2010) para 22 the 
court explained that laws (such as the Building Standards Act) are put in place to manage the tension 
between the right of property owners to develop their properties and the interest of the community in the 
safe and harmonious development of urban areas. These laws inform the content of ownership. 
2 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 196. 
3 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 201 
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should be tested.4 These requirements are, first, that the deprivation must be authorised 
in terms of a law of general application and, second, that the deprivation may not be 
arbitrary.5 Van der Walt explains that the law of general application requirement ensures 
that all deprivations are authorised by ‘a properly promulgated and valid law’.6 It also 
ensures that the law applies generally and that it does not single out an owner or a 
group of owners.7 Van der Walt is of the view that regulatory legislation is as a rule of a 
                                                            
4 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 17. 
5 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 225-228. Van der Walt argues that a third 
requirement, that of public purpose, can be read into either the law of general application requirement or 
into the non-arbitrariness requirement. He further argues that the public purpose requirement is implicit in 
section 25(1) because the section recognises the fact that property rights can be interfered with to protect 
public health and safety interests. The test for the public purpose requirement must relate directly to the 
‘core function of the police power’ and typically a higher level of scrutiny is required when the purpose of 
the deprivation is not to protect public health and safety interests but is vaguely related to the public 
interest, such as aesthetic building regulations. 
6 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 232. 
7 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 232. 
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general nature and that it is unlikely that a regulatory deprivation will not meet the law of 
general application requirement.8   
Initially, there was uncertainty as to the correct interpretation of the second 
requirement, namely that the deprivation may not be arbitrary. Originally, there were two 
divergent views concerning the correct interpretation of the non-arbitrariness 
requirement. One view was that the non-arbitrariness requirement referred to a rational 
connection between the deprivation and a purpose for which the deprivation was 
imposed.9 Another view was that the non-arbitrariness requirement referred to a ‘thicker’ 
proportionality-style enquiry, with the implication that the deprivation could not impose 
an excessive burden on an individual owner or group of owners for the benefit of the 
general public.10 In terms of the ‘thicker’ approach a deprivation had to be proportionate 
to the purpose it sets out to achieve.11 This uncertainty had to some extent been laid to 
rest by the authoritative decision of First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
                                                            
8 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 233-234. Van der Walt further explains that 
section 25(1) refers to ‘law of general application’ instead of ‘a law of general application’. This indicates 
that a deprivation can also be authorised by customary or the common law. Deprivations authorised by 
the common or customary law should also meet the non-arbitrariness requirement. Van der Walt reasons 
that property rights are regulated by way of legislation and that it is difficult to conceive of a situation 
where a deprivation will raise section 25(1) issues if it is authorised by either the common or customary 
law. He argues that if such deprivations are possible, this may raise questions concerning the horizontal 
application of section 25. By contrast, Roux argues, with reference to Phoebus Apollo Aviation CC v 
Minister of Safety and Security 2003 (2) SA 34 (CC), that section 25(1) does not protect persons from 
deprivations caused by private actors acting in terms of the common law. Roux explains that it would be 
unnecessary to rely on section 25(1), even if the common law caused a deprivation of property, because 
section 173 of the Constitution enables the courts to develop the common law. Moreover, section 39(2) of 
the Constitution requires of the courts to develop the common law to promote the ‘spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bills of Rights’. By way of section 25(1), the Bill of Rights protects people from being 
arbitrarily deprived of their property. Accordingly, it would generally be unnecessary to determine whether 
section 25 is directly relevant in the dispute. See in this regard Roux T ‘Property’ in Woolman S, Roux T & 
Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa Volume 3 2 ed (2003 original service: Dec 2003) 
chapter 46 at 6-7. 
9 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 237. 
10 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 238. 
11 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 238. 
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Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a 
Wesbank v Minister of Finance (FNB).12 The FNB decision is discussed below; at this 
stage it suffices to say that the court adopted a ‘thick’ interpretation of the non-
arbitrariness requirement.13  
The FNB decision is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it is significant because of 
the methodology proposed by the court, in terms of which future constitutional property 
challenges should be assessed. This methodology should be understood in light of the 
court’s distinction between deprivation and expropriation. Secondly, FNB is also 
significant because of the test formulated by the court to determine whether or not a 
particular interference amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of property. The discussion in 
the section below is centred on these two important aspects of the FNB judgment. This 
discussion delineates the FNB methodology that is applied as a point of departure to 
assess the constitutionality of the limitations imposed on ownership and other property 
interests described in chapters 2, 3 and 4.  
 
                                                            
12 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
13 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 53-54. Van der Walt further explains that 
Constitutional Court in FNB confirmed its purposive approach since it ascribed a ‘“thick”, context-
sensitive, balancing interpretation to the non-arbitrariness provision in section 25(1)’. The fact that the 
arbitrariness of the deprivation has to be assessed with reference to the nature of the property, scope of 
the deprivation and the various relationships involved indicates that the court intended to create a 
balancing test. This balancing test enables a court to balance the individual’s interests in his property with 
the public interest in the regulation of property when assessing the constitutionality of a deprivation. Roux 
T ‘Property’ in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa Volume 3  2 ed 
(2003 original service: Dec 2003) chapter 46 at 24 argues that the FNB arbitrariness test contains a built-
in mechanism to adjust the level of scrutiny required in a specific context. The thickness of the test 
depends on the court’s analysis of the various relationships listed in paragraph 100 of the judgment (see 
5 1 2 below), the nature of the deprivation and the type of property interest in question. Roux explains that 
the level of scrutiny will ‘vacillate between two fixed poles: rationality review and the lower end of the 
scale, and something just short of a review for proportionality at the other’. Roux further argues that the 
arbitrariness test leaves much room for the exercise of judicial discretion because the factors that a court 
will take into account, as well as the level of scrutiny to be applied, depends on the circumstances of the 
case.  
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5 1 2 The FNB methodology and the substantive arbitrariness test 
In FNB, the Constitutional Court had to decide whether a lien, established in terms of 
section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 (the Act), over three vehicles 
owned by the appellant amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of property as proscribed 
by section 25(1).14 The generous interpretation afforded to ‘property’ for purposes of 
section 25(1) of the Constitution is a feature worth mentioning before describing the 
court’s methodology for assessing the constitutionality of deprivations. In this regard, 
the court stated that it would be unwise and impossible to ascribe a comprehensive 
meaning to ‘property’ for purposes of section 25(1). It is, nonetheless, safe to say that, 
‘ownership of a corporeal movable must – as must ownership of land – lie at the heart of 
our constitutional concept of property’.15 The court held that the fact that the owner of 
the property made no or little use of the property was not a factor that it would take into 
account when deciding whether the object (of the dispute) amounted to constitutional 
property.16 Factors such as the owner’s subjective interest in the object and the 
economic value of the object will not be relevant when deciding whether or not the 
object in dispute constitutes constitutional property either.17  
The FNB methodology should be understood within the context of the court’s 
distinction between deprivations and expropriations. In this regard, the court held that ‘in 
a certain sense any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private 
property involves some deprivation in respect of the person having title or right to or in 
                                                            
14 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 7-9. The vehicles were made available to clients of the appellant on the 
basis of two lease agreements and an instalment sale agreement. These vehicles were seized by the 
commissioner to satisfy customs and excise debt owed to it by the appellant’s clients. 
15 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 51. 
16 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 54. 
17 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 56. 
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the property concerned’.18 Deprivation embraces the wider category of interferences 
with property rights and expropriation amounts to a narrower category of interference. In 
                                                            
18 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 57. In Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and another; 
Bisset and others v Buffalo City Municipality and others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and others v 
MEC, Local Government and Housing, Gauteng, and others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi 
Municipality as Amici Curiae) 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 32 the Constitutional Court adopted a different 
interpretation of ‘deprivation’ for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. The court held that ‘at the 
very least, substantial interference or limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions on property use 
or enjoyment found in an open and democratic society would amount to deprivation’. Van der Walt AJ 
‘Retreating from the FNB arbitrariness test already? Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality and another; Bisset and others v Buffalo City Municipality and others; Transfer Rights Action 
Campaign v MEC, Local Government and Housing, Gauteng (CC)’ (2005) 122 SALJ 75-89 at 79-80 and 
Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 204-209 criticises this aspect of the Mkontwana 
judgment. Van der Walt argues that the court’s interpretation of deprivation as only substantial 
interferences with property rights is problematic. He explains that it is peculiar to classify deprivation as 
interferences that go beyond the restrictions that can be imposed in an open and democratic society, 
because all legitimate regulatory restrictions on the use of property are normal in such a society. 
Furthermore, the purpose of section 25(1) is to legitimise all regulatory controls and the concomitant 
deprivations without placing any additional burdens on the state, because these deprivations are 
uncompensated and subject to constitutional review. However, if slight interferences were excluded from 
the definition of deprivation they would not be subjected to constitutional scrutiny. This would create 
uncertainty as to when an interference would be sufficiently severe to be classified as a deprivation. Van 
der Walt explains that it is preferable to assume that all interferences with property rights are deprivations, 
which have to meet the requirements set out in section 25(1) of the Constitution. The Mkontwana 
interpretation was cited with approval in Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and another v Coega Development 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd and others 2011 (1) SA 293 (CC) paras 38-39, but a closer reading of the case 
reveals that the court did not really apply this interpretation. Likewise, in  Reflect-All 1025 CC v Member of 
the Executive Council for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 2009 (6) 
SA 391 (CC) (Reflect-All) both the majority and minority of the court confirmed that ‘deprivation’ for 
purposes of section 25(1), should not be interpreted too narrowly. Van der Walt argues that it seems as if 
the court in Reflect-All followed the wider interpretation of ‘deprivation’ as formulated in FNB rather than 
the narrow interpretation adopted in Mkontwana.  
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other words, expropriations are a subspecies of deprivation.19 The implication of this 
approach is that: 
‘[t]he starting point for constitutional analysis, when considering any challenge under 
s 25 for the infringement of property rights, must be s 25(1)’.20 
The court explained that if a deprivation fails to meet the section 25(1) requirements 
and if it cannot be justified under section 36 of the Constitution, ‘then that would be 
the end of the matter’.21 If the deprivation meets the requirements of section 25(1) or 
if the deprivation can be justified under section 36, a court can proceed to consider 
whether an expropriation has taken place. Consequently, a court must answer the 
following questions when adjudicating a constitutional property challenge: 
(a) Does that which has been taken away from the owner amount to property 
for purposes of section 25 of the Constitution? 
(b) Has there been a deprivation of property? 
(c) If there has been a deprivation of property, is it consistent with the 
provisions of section 25(1) of the Constitution? 
                                                            
19 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 222. See further Van der Walt AJ ‘Striving for 
the better interpretation – a critical reflection on the Constitutional Court’s Harkson and FNB decisions on 
the property clause’ (2004) 121 SALJ 854-878 at 867. This distinction differs considerably from the 
approach followed in Harkson v Lane NO and others 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) paras 31-40. In that case the 
court adopted the view that deprivations and expropriations are two separate categories of state 
interferences. Van der Walt explains that the court in Harkson assumed that a litigant had to argue either 
that he had been deprived of his property or that he was expropriated of his property. The implication was 
that a court would not have to consider the alternative once the applicant had argued that he had either 
been expropriated or deprived of his property. 
20 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 60. 
21 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 59. 
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(d) If the deprivation is not consistent with the provisions of section 25(1), can 
it be justified under section 36 of the Constitution?22 
(e) If the deprivation can be justified under section 36 of the Constitution, does 
it amount to an expropriation of property for purposes of section 25(2) of 
the Constitution?23 
                                                            
22 Roux T ‘Property’ in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa Volume 3 
2 ed (2003 original service: Dec 2003) chapter 46 at 26. Roux explains that it is unlikely that a deprivation 
would be justifiable in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution if that deprivation does not meet the 
requirements set out in section 25(1). Both sections 36(1) and 25(1) of the Constitution contain the law of 
general application requirement. If a deprivation is not authorised in terms of a law of general application, 
it would not pass the section 36(1) limitation test. Similarly, if a deprivation is arbitrary and in 
contravention of section 25(1), logic dictates that it is highly unlikely that it would amount to a ‘reasonable 
and justifiable’ limitation on property rights. Accordingly, one can conclude that an arbitrary deprivation of 
property will never amount to a justifiable limitation of the owner’s property rights in terms of section 36 of 
the Constitution. See to the same effect Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 78.  
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(f) If it is an expropriation of property, does it comply with the provisions of 
section 25(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution? 
(g) If the expropriation does not comply with section 25(2)(a) and (b) of the 
Constitution, can it be justified under section 36 of the Constitution?24 
The court centred its judgment on step (c) of the methodology and formulated a ‘thick’ 
test. In terms of this test, courts in the future can determine if a deprivation is arbitrary 
and in contravention of section 25(1) of the Constitution.25 The court held that a 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
23 Roux T ‘Property’ in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa Volume 3 
2 ed (2003 original service: Dec 2003) chapter 46 at 2-5 and 18-19. Roux argues that, if the FNB 
methodology is followed to assess the constitutionality of a state interference, it is unlikely that the 
analysis will proceed beyond the third step. This could be ascribed to the ‘telescoping effect’ or ‘vortex 
effect’ of the non-arbitrariness requirement in section 25(1). This effect will become evident in instances 
where a litigant seeks to challenge an expropriation of property on one of the grounds listed in section 
25(2) or (3). In terms of FNB all expropriations are a subspecies of deprivations, which means that an 
expropriation would have to comply with the requirements set out in section 25(1), (2) and (3) of the 
Constitution. However, an expropriation that does not comply with either 25(2) or (3) is unlikely to pass 
the arbitrariness test set out in section 25(1). In essence, the expropriation will never be tested against 
section 25(2) and (3), because it would have already fallen foul of the non-arbitrariness requirement. See 
to the same effect Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 75-78. Recent case law has 
shown that the courts have elected to bypass the first four requirements of the FNB methodology in 
instances where it is clear that the dispute relates to an expropriation of property. See for example, Du 
Toit v Minister of Transport 2006 (1) SA 297 (CC) and Erf 16 Bryntirion (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public 
Works [2010] ZAGPPHC 154 (12 October 2010). Furthermore, in Haffejee NO and others v Ethekwini 
Municipality and others 2011 (6) SA 134 (CC) paras 28-31 the Constitutional Court noted, in line with 
FNB, that the point of departure for a constitutional analysis is section 25(1). However, the court did not 
delve into the section 25(1) component of the analysis and proceeded to evaluate the expropriation in 
light of the requirements of section 25(2). Van der Walt notes that this approach shows that the courts 
avoid the vortex effect of the non-arbitrariness requirement described by Roux. In particular, the court 
does not accept that an expropriation ‘that might fail the s 25(2) requirements would already fail the 
arbitrariness test’. See in this regard Van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 285.   
24 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 46. 
25 Paraphrased from Van der Walt AJ ‘Striving for the better interpretation – a critical reflection on the 
Constitutional Court’s Harkson and FNB decisions on the property clause’ (2004) 121 SALJ 854-878 at 
869. 
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deprivation would be arbitrary if the ‘law of general application’ does not provide 
‘sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in question or is procedurally unfair.’26 
Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on the meaning and content that should be 
attributed to the ‘procedurally unfair’ requirement. The role of procedural fairness for 
purposes of the property clause is considered in section 5 1 3 below. 
The court explained that ‘sufficient reason’ must be established with reference to 
at least eight contextual considerations. These considerations mainly require an 
analysis of the ‘complexity of the relationships’ involved. In particular, the court must 
consider the relationship between the means employed (the deprivation) and the ends 
sought, namely the purpose of the law in question; the relationship between the purpose 
of the deprivation and the effect that it will have on the property owner; as well as the 
relationship between the purpose of the deprivation, the nature of the property and the 
extent of the deprivation with regard to the property.27 When the property in question  
‘is ownership of land or a corporeal moveable a more compelling purpose will have 
to be established for the depriving law to constitute sufficient reason for the 
deprivation than in the case when the property is something different and the 
property right something less extensive’.28  
Another consideration is that when there is a deprivation of ‘all the incidents of 
ownership’, the purpose for the deprivation must be more ‘compelling’ than in instances 
where there was only a deprivation of some of the incidents of ownership.29 The court 
further explained that, ‘depending on such interplay between variable means and ends, 
the nature of the property in question and the extent of its deprivation’, there will be 
circumstances where sufficient reason can be determined by a ‘mere rational 
relationship between means and ends’.30 There will, however, be circumstances where 
sufficient reason can only be determined by ‘a proportionality evaluation closer to that 
                                                            
26 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
27 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100; Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 245. The 
requirements are listed here as they are listed in Van der Walt’s book. 
28 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
29 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
30 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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required by s 36(1) of the Constitution’.31 The final consideration is ‘sufficient reason’ for 
the deprivation, which must be decided with reference to all the relevant facts in a 
specific case. One should always bear in mind that ‘the enquiry is concerned with 
“arbitrary” in relation to the deprivation of property under s 25.’32   
Against this background, the court explained that section 114 of the Act had a 
legitimate and important legislative purpose, namely to claim payment of an outstanding 
customs and excise debt. Nevertheless, section 114 of the Act cast the net too wide in 
the sense that it completely deprived owners of their property in circumstances where 
the property owner had no connection with the transaction that gave rise to the debt, 
and where the property had no connection with the customs debt. What is more, the 
property owner had not done anything that caused the commissioner to act to his 
detriment.33 The court concluded that due to the lack of any relevant nexus there was 
insufficient reason for the deprivation and that FNB was arbitrarily deprived of its 
property.34 
The Constitutional Court applied the substantive arbitrariness test in the recently 
decided Reflect-All 1025 CC v Member of the Executive Council for Public Transport, 
Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government (Reflect-All).35 In this case, the 
court had to determine whether section 10(1) and 10(3) of the Gauteng Transport 
Infrastructure Act 8 of 2001 (the Infrastructure Act) imposed a procedurally arbitrary 
deprivation of property.36 This aspect of the judgment is discussed in greater detail in 
section 5 1 3 below. The court also had to determine whether section 10(3) imposed a 
                                                            
31 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
32 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
33 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 108. 
34 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 109. 
35 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). 
36 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 48. 
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substantively arbitrary deprivation of property.37 This decision is significant because of 
O’ Regan J’s dissenting judgment, where she held that section 10(3) imposed a 
substantively arbitrary deprivation of property because the legislative scheme did not 
incorporate a procedural mechanism that would alleviate the burden imposed on 
property owners. 
Prior to the enactment of the Infrastructure Act, roads were constructed and 
planned in accordance with the provisions of the old ordinance.38 Route determinations 
and designs for future roads were published in the provincial Gazette. Affected land 
owners were often consulted prior to the publishing of the notice, but this procedure was 
not obligatory. No legal restrictions were placed on the use of land that fell within the 
determined routes and designs.39 Some roads have been constructed in accordance 
with these determined routes and designs. However, many of the routes and designs 
are more than three decades old and it is unclear whether they will ever be built.40 It is 
evident that a considerable amount of public funds has gone into the development of 
the designs and preliminary routes.41 The Infrastructure Act repealed and replaced the 
planning regime created under the old ordinance and it changed the procedure for 
                                                            
37 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) paras 1, 5 and 8. The applicants were the owners of about twenty properties in 
the Gauteng area. They launched proceedings in the court a quo, where it was decided that section 10(3) 
of the Infrastructure Act was unconstitutional insofar as it arbitrarily deprived the applicants of their 
property. The court decided that section 10(1) was consistent with section 25(1) of the Constitution, 
because under the previous ordinance the owners were adequately consulted. The court a quo held that 
it would be impossible and impractical to disregard the consultation procedures prescribed under the 
previous ordinance. This would ‘stultify’ the construction of roads in accordance with preliminary work that 
had been done under the old ordinance. Accordingly, it could not be said that section 10(1) was 
procedurally arbitrary and in violation of section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
38 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 17. 
39 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 17. 
40 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 18. 
41 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 18. 
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declaring route determinations and designs.42 It further imposed, by way of section 
10(1) and (3), legal restrictions on land that overlap these routes and designs.43  
The majority of the court confirmed that the deprivations caused by section 10(3) 
were sufficiently severe to warrant a proportionality analysis.44 It decided that the 
Infrastructure Act did allow property owners to apply for amendments to the route 
design.45 Furthermore, the court held that the owners were not deprived of their entire 
properties and that the Infrastructure Act maintained a balance between the public 
interest in the preservation of the hypothetical road network and private property 
interests.46 As a result, it could not be said that section 10(3) was disproportionate to the 
                                                            
42 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 19. 
43 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) paras 19, 21 and 23. Section 10(1) provides that route determinations are 
subject to the restrictions contained in section 7, which provides that applications for the establishment of 
a township must, together with a civil engineering report, be submitted to the MEC for comments. These 
comments will be considered by the municipality when making a decision. Furthermore, section 7 
prohibits any service provider from laying services over and below the route without the consent of the 
MEC. Section 10(3) determines that preliminary designs are subject to the restrictions contained in 
section 9 of the Infrastructure Act. A closer inspection of this section reveals that it only places restrictions 
on areas that fall within the road and rail reserve boundary of the preliminary design. Section 9 prohibits, 
amongst other things, the granting of applications for the subdivision of land and the change in land use 
in terms of a law or town planning scheme. In essence, these restrictions have the effect of freezing land 
(situated within the stipulated area) in its existing use. Section 9 further prohibits service providers from 
laying, adding and constructing services below, and above, the land without the written permission of the 
MEC. Once a route or a design has been published the consultation procedure that would normally be 
compulsory is deemed to have taken place. 
44 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 49.  The court applied the FNB substantive arbitrariness test and explained 
that in determining whether section 10(3) was proportional, it had to consider the nature of the property 
involved; the extent of the deprivation; and whether there are less restrictive means available to achieve 
the purpose. 
45 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 55. The court explained that the owners could in terms of section 8(9) of the 
Infrastructure Act request of the MEC in writing to ‘revisit the preliminary designs that affect portions of 
their property within the road reserve’. 
46 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 49. The court explained that the property owners were not entirely deprived 
of their property since the restrictions in section 9 only affected land that was situated within the road 
reserve. 
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end it sought.47 The court held that section 10(3) did not impose a substantively 
arbitrary deprivation of property. 
In her minority judgment, O’ Regan J held that section 10(3) imposed an arbitrary 
deprivation of property insofar as it did not make provision for a periodic review process 
where the proposed road network could be scrutinised.48 She emphasised that the 
Infrastructure Act has a legitimate purpose, namely to protect the ‘integrity of the 
planning system’.49 She further explained that it made sense to prevent property owners 
from using the land in a manner that would render the implementation of the road 
scheme, economically or otherwise, impossible.50 Nonetheless, there are instances 
where it is clear that some of the roads will never be built and yet the property will be 
frozen in its existing use for what may appear to be an indeterminate period.51 In such 
instances, section 10(3) imposes an arbitrary deprivation of property because the 
limitation imposed on property rights is disproportionate to the purpose of the Act.52 The 
disproportionality of the deprivation would be mitigated by a review process where the 
planned road network could be scrutinised for roads that will not be built as a result of 
changed circumstances.53 This review process would also afford property owners the 
opportunity to be heard, especially in cases where the scheme was introduced at a time 
when there initially was no provision for them to be heard.  
In essence, O’ Regan J concluded that the deprivation was arbitrary because the 
legislature did not provide a procedural mechanism where the imposition of a 
disproportionate burden on property owners could be avoided or assuaged. Within the 
                                                            
47 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 58. 
48 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) paras 110-112. O’ Regan J explained that section 10(3) read with section 9 of 
Act 8 of 2001 has the effect of depriving property owners whose property falls within the road reserve 
area of the right to proclaim a township, to subdivide the property or the right to change the land use of 
the property. This deprivation was particularly burdensome in light of the rapid rate of urbanisation and 
economic development in Gauteng. 
49 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 108. 
50 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 108. 
51 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 107. 
52 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 109. 
53 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 110. 
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context of the case, the mechanism had to be an administrative review process where 
property owners could make themselves heard and in terms of which the road scheme 
could be evaluated. O’ Regan J’s finding in Reflect-All is comparable to the conclusion 
reached in the Rheinland-Pfälzisches Denkmalschutz-und-Pflegegesetz case.54 In that 
case, the German Federal Constitutional Court determined that the preservation law 
imposed a disproportionate burden on a property owner insofar as she was deprived of 
the right to demolish a building for which she had no economic use. The German 
Federal Constitutional Court explained that the preservation law would have been saved 
from a finding of invalidity if the legislature had incorporated an equalisation measure 
(Ausgleich) specifically designed to prevent the imposition of a disproportionate burden 
on the owner. An equalisation provision in this case could include – but was not 
restricted to – a monetary payment to assist the owner with the burden of owning and 
maintaining an historic building.55 O’ Regan J’s dissenting judgment suggests that it 
might be necessary to include equalisation-style measures in legislation that fulfils an 
important public function, but that could potentially impose disproportionate burdens on 
property owners. Such a development is necessary to prevent otherwise legitimate laws 
                                                            
54 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999]. This case is discussed in chapter 4, section 4 5 2. See further Alexander GS 
The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 119-
121 and Du Plessis E ‘To what extent may the state regulate private property for environmental 
purposes? A comparative study’ 2011 TSAR 512-526 at 523. 
55 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 367 explains that the textbook example of a 
equalisation measure is the construction of a new road, which causes excessive hardship in the form of 
road noise that neighbouring property owners have to bear. In such instances, the state is obliged to 
prevent the scheme from being disproportionate and invalid, for instance by installing noise reduction 
measures for the property owners. Alternatively, the state could pay the property owners an amount 
(called an equalisation sum) to install noise reduction measures themselves. The crucial point is that 
these equalisation sums are not compensation for expropriation (because nothing was expropriated) or 
for delict (because the state action was lawful). An equalisation sum alleviates the unwanted and 
disproportionately unfair results of an otherwise valid regulatory action and, in so doing, prevents the 
scheme from being invalid. 
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from being declared unconstitutional for imposing excessive burdens on property 
owners.56  
In summary, a deprivation must meet two requirements to pass constitutional 
scrutiny, namely it must be imposed by law of general application and it may not be 
arbitrary. The Constitutional Court has confirmed in FNB that a deprivation will be 
arbitrary if the law does not provide sufficient reason for such a deprivation or is 
procedurally unfair.57 Sufficient reason must be determined with reference to eight 
contextual factors which direct a court in its analysis of the complexity of the 
relationships involved in the dispute. These contextual factors requires of the court to 
scrutinise the relationship between the deprivation and the ends sought to achieve it; 
the relationship between the affected person and the deprivation and the relationship 
between the purpose of the deprivation, the nature of the property and the extent of the 
interference with property rights. Moreover, there must be more compelling reasons for 
the deprivation if it affects the ownership of land and corporeal movables than in the 
instance where the affected property right is something different. Likewise, when the 
deprivation embraces all the incidents of ownership the reasons for the deprivation will 
have to be more persuasive than in the instance where the deprivation affects only 
some incidents of ownership. Depending on the interaction between these factors, there 
are instances where sufficient reason will be established if there is a rational 
relationship between means and ends. In other instances, it would be necessary for the 
court to adopt a proportionality enquiry similar to the evaluation required in section 36(1) 
of the Constitution. Finally, each case will have to be assessed with reference to its 
                                                            
56 Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 43-47 
argues that it is essential to investigate the possibility of incorporating equalisation measures into South 
African law. These measures will prevent the imposition of disproportionate burdens on land owners as it 
reduces loss or damage caused by lawful state action.  
57 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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context-specific facts and a court should bear in mind that ‘the enquiry is concerned with 
“arbitrary” in relation to the deprivation of property under section 25’.58 
 
5 1 3 Procedural arbitrariness 
As explained above, in FNB59 the Constitutional Court held that a deprivation would be 
arbitrary if the law provided insufficient reason for the deprivation, or if it is procedurally 
unfair.60 This decision is significant for two reasons. Firstly, the court developed the 
methodology in terms of which future constitutional property challenges should be 
assessed. Secondly, the court formulated a test for determining whether a deprivation is 
substantively arbitrary. Unfortunately, the court failed to explain what it meant when it 
stated that a deprivation will be arbitrary if the law is procedurally unfair. From the FNB 
judgment one can infer that, in addition to substantive arbitrariness, procedural fairness 
is a separate ground for finding that a deprivation is arbitrary and unconstitutional.61  
Since FNB only two other Constitutional Court cases have mentioned the concept 
of procedural fairness in relation to a section 25(1) dispute, namely Reflect-All62 and 
Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and another; Bisset and others 
v Buffalo City Municipality and others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and others v 
MEC, Local Government and Housing, Gauteng, and others (KwaZulu-Natal Law 
                                                            
58 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
59 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
60 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
61 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 264-265.  
62 Reflect-All 1025 CC v Member of the Executive Council for Public Transport, Roads and Works, 
Gauteng Provincial Government 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). 
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Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) (Mkontwana).63 In Mkontwana the 
court explained that in contexts other than section 25(1) it has held that ‘procedural 
fairness is a flexible concept and the requirements that must be satisfied to render an 
action or a law procedurally fair depend on all the circumstances’.64 This approach also 
applies to procedural fairness for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. The 
court held that the law was not procedurally unfair because it could be interpreted to 
mean that there was an obligation on the municipality to furnish the owner with 
information concerning outstanding water and electricity debts incurred by occupiers of 
the property upon the receipt of a written request.65  
In Reflect-All the applicants argued that section 10(1) of the Act was procedurally 
arbitrary insofar as it enabled the MEC to declare route determinations without affording 
the property owners a procedure in terms of which their interests could be considered. 
They further argued that the consultations that had taken place under the earlier 
ordinance was inadequate, in the sense that it was not obligatory and in that it would not 
comply with the provisions of the Promotion of the Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
(PAJA). Moreover, the consultations had taken place more than 30 years previously and 
                                                            
63 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) paras 1-2 and 65-67.  This case concerned the constitutional validity of laws that 
made property owners liable for the unpaid water and electricity debts incurred by occupiers of their 
properties. The appellants challenged section 118 (1) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 
32 of 2000, which prohibited the transfer of property if all outstanding consumption charges in relation to 
the property were not paid. The appellants argued that the limitation on their right to transfer amounted to 
an arbitrary deprivation of their property. They also alleged that section 118(1) was procedurally unfair 
insofar as it failed to compel the municipality to provide owners, on a continuous basis, with information 
concerning outstanding consumptions debts incurred by occupiers of their properties.  
64 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 65, with reference to Premier, Mpumalanga, and another v Executive 
Committee, Association of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 (2) SA 91 (CC) para 39; 
President of the Republic of South Africa and others v South African Rugby Football Union and others 
2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) para 216; Janse Van Rensburg NO and another v Minister of Trade and Industry and 
another NNO 2001 (1) SA 29 (CC) para 24; Permanent Secretary, Department of Education and Welfare, 
Eastern Cape, and another v Ed-U-College (PE) (Section 21) Inc 2001 (2) SA 1 (CC) para 19; Minister of 
Public Works and others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and another (Mukhwevho 
Intervening) 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC) para 101.  
65 2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) para 67. 
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did not involve the current land owners. These consultations did not take current 
circumstances pertaining to the use of land into account.66 In relation to section 10(3), 
the applicants argued that the provision had to be interpreted in such a way that it gave 
the MEC the discretion to consider each preliminary design individually, prior to the 
publishing of a notice in the provincial Gazette. They contended that such an 
interpretation would be in line with the standard set for procedural fairness in PAJA.67 
Such an interpretation would also give effect to the procedural guarantee of section 
25(1) of the Constitution.68 The applicants argued that if this interpretation was rejected, 
the provision would be procedurally arbitrary.69  
The court decided that the sections were not procedurally arbitrary and it explained 
that the attack on section 10(1) had to fail because it would be unrealistic to ignore the 
consultative processes that had taken place under the old ordinance.70 With reference 
to section 10(3), the court held that it would be practically impossible and too expensive 
for the MEC to consult with every property owner whose land was affected by the 
creation of the preliminary designs under the previous ordinance.71 
Van der Walt argues that the FNB and Mkontwana decisions create the impression 
that a limitation on the use of property, which raises procedural fairness issues, should 
be assessed according to the principles for administrative justice in section 33 of the 
Constitution, as given effect to in PAJA, if it was imposed by administrative action.72 
Explained differently, a procedurally unfair deprivation of property brought about by 
administrative action should be assessed in terms of section 33 of the Constitution and 
                                                            
66 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 11. 
67 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 12. 
68 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 44. 
69 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 12. 
70 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) paras 40-43. 
71 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) paras 44-47. 
72 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 265. Section 1(i)(b) of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 defines administrative action as any ‘decision taken, or any failure to 
take a decision, by a natural or a juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public 
power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision which adversely affects the 
rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect...’ 
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PAJA and not in terms of section 25(1).73 This raises the question of whether the sole 
purpose of a section 25(1) enquiry is to prevent a substantively arbitrary deprivation of 
property.74 Van der Walt argues that it seems peculiar that the Constitutional Court (in 
all three cases) would suggest that a procedurally unfair deprivation of property should 
be assessed in terms of the non-arbitrariness requirement in section 25(1).75 Van der 
Walt reasons that the solution to this predicament lies in the principal difference 
between the cases, namely the source of the deprivations. The deprivations of property 
rights in both FNB and Mkontwana were imposed by legislation.76 By contrast, in 
Reflect-All, the source of the deprivation was not legislation but the decision of the MEC 
to proclaim route determinations (administrative action).77 Viewed from this perspective, 
it is evident that, unlike the Reflect-All deprivation, it would not have been possible in 
FNB or in Mkontwana to review the deprivation in light of the standard set for procedural 
fairness in PAJA.78 However, in FNB and in Mkontwana, it was in theory necessary to 
determine whether the legislation imposed a procedurally unfair deprivation of property. 
In this regard Van der Walt explains that  
‘[i]f a deprivation is imposed by legislation in a procedurally unfair manner, judged 
according to the same principles that apply in administrative law under PAJA, the 
deprivation would be arbitrary and therefore the legislation in question could be 
challenged in terms of section 25(1) for permitting arbitrary deprivation’.79 
A deprivation caused by legislation differs from the Reflect-All deprivation, which was 
caused by administrative action and which should be measured against the standards 
set for procedural fairness in PAJA.80 If a deprivation is brought about by administrative 
                                                            
73 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 267. 
74 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 266. 
75 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 266. 
76 In FNB the source of the deprivation was section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964 and in 
Mkontwana section 118(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
77 Reflect-All 1025 CC v Member of the Executive Council for Public Transport, Roads and Works, 
Gauteng Provincial Government 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 11. 
78 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 267. 
79 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 267. 
80 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 269. 
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action, it cannot be scrutinised in terms of section 25(1) and it will be invalid insofar as it 
does not comply with PAJA or with the administrative justice provisions incorporated in 
the authorising legislation.81 This deprivation can subsequently be set aside on review in 
terms of PAJA. Deprivations caused by procedurally unfair legislation will be 
procedurally arbitrary and unconstitutional for being in conflict with section 25(1).  
Van der Walt argues that the Reflect-All decision blurs the distinction between 
deprivations caused by legislation and deprivations caused by administrative action.82 In 
Reflect-All, the court scrutinised the procedural fairness of the deprivations (that were 
caused by administrative action) in light of PAJA, but it concluded that the deprivations 
were not procedurally arbitrary. Van der Walt explains that Reflect-All incorrectly creates 
the impression that a procedurally unfair deprivation will amount to an arbitrary 
deprivation of property, as proscribed by section 25(1), even if it is caused by 
administrative action.83 Van der Walt is of the view that the deprivation in Reflect-All 
should have been scrutinised in light of PAJA and section 33(1) and that it never raised 
a section 25(1) issue because the deprivation was caused by administrative action.84 
Furthermore, the court’s approach in Reflect-All contradicts the principle of 
subsidiarity.85 PAJA was enacted to give effect to section 33(1) of the Constitution, 
                                                            
81 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 269. 
82 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 268. 
83 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 268. 
84 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 269. 
85 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 268. The subsidiary principle was first 
formulated in South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 (5) SA 400 (CC) paras 
51-52, and it provides that if legislation has been enacted to give effect to a constitutional right, a litigant 
cannot rely directly on the constitutional right when launching an action to protect that right against 
interference. Rather, it is necessary for the litigant to rely on the legislation to protect his right from 
infringement. The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) is an example of legislation 
enacted to give effect to a constitutional right, namely the right to just administrative action embodied in 
section 33 of the Constitution. This approach should only be followed if the litigant wants to protect a 
constitutional right that is given effect to by legislation. A litigant may rely on the constitutional right 
directly if he wants to challenge the constitutional validity of the legislation. For a detailed explanation of 
the subsidiarity principle, refer to Van der Walt AJ ‘Normative pluralism and anarchy: reflections on the 
2007 term’ (2008) 1 CCR 77-128 at 100-103. 
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which requires that administrative action should be lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair. A dispute concerning the procedural fairness of a deprivation of property caused by 
administrative action should therefore be adjudicated in terms of PAJA and section 33 
and not in terms of section 25(1).86  
Van der Walt also argues that a deprivation caused by administrative action can 
be substantively arbitrary because there is insufficient reason for such a deprivation.87 
This implicates that a litigant will be able to make a case either on the basis of 
substantive arbitrariness and section 25(1), or on the basis of procedural fairness and 
PAJA. A property owner should rely on section 25(1) if a deprivation is substantively 
arbitrary because of the impact of the administrative action on ownership. A property 
owner should rather rely on PAJA and section 33(1) if a deprivation is procedurally 
arbitrary because of the manner in which the administrative discretion or procedure is 
exercised.88   
As explained above, deprivations caused by legislation will be procedurally 
arbitrary if they do not comply with the standard set for administrative justice and 
specifically for procedural fairness in PAJA. Van der Walt explains that the procedural 
fairness principle in administrative law refers to the right to be heard and the rule 
against bias. He argues that bias will probably not be an issue in the case of 
deprivations caused by legislation.89 The reason for this is that the rule against bias is 
addressed by the law of general application requirement in section 25(1). There are, 
nonetheless, instances where the right to be heard can raise issues of procedural 
fairness when deprivations are imposed by legislation.90 For example, such an instance 
                                                            
86 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 269. 
87 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 267. 
88 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 267 
89 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 269-270. 
90 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 270. Van der Walt argues that one such an 
instance is where the deprivation will only be procedurally fair if the property owners are permitted to 
assert their rights in court. Van der Walt cites the following cases in support of his argument: Jaftha v 
Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) and Zondi v Member of 
the Executive Council for Traditional and Local Government Affairs and Others 2005 (3) SA 589 (CC).  
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would be where the deprivation is procedurally arbitrary because the legislative scheme 
does not include a review procedure that would assuage the burden placed on the 
owner.91  
Finally, before a court can proceed to determine whether a deprivation is 
substantively or procedurally arbitrary or procedurally unfair, it must first determine 
whether the deprivation was actually authorised by the law of general application. Van 
der Walt explains that when determining the constitutional validity of a deprivation, the 
courts fail to enquire whether a specific interference with property rights is in fact 
authorised by legislation.92 He argues that the first question should always be: does the 
law of general application authorise the specific interference with property rights? If the 
answer to this question is negative, the deprivation will be unlawful and 
unconstitutional.93 A court may only proceed to determine whether deprivations are 
either substantively or procedurally arbitrary or procedurally unfair if it decides that the 
law of general application does in fact authorise such deprivations.94 Van der Walt 
further explains that this approach accords with the principle of subsidiarity, which 
                                                            
91 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 270. Van der Walt argues that O’ Regan J’s 
dissenting judgment in Reflect-All 1025 CC v Member of the Executive Council for Public Transport, 
Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC), could also be interpreted 
along these lines even though she concluded that the deprivation was substantively arbitrary.  
92 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 235-237. 
93 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 236. 
94 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 236. Van der Walt illustrates his argument with 
reference to Growthpoint Properties Ltd v SA Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and others 
[2010] ZAKZDHC 38 (3 September 2010). In that case the court had to determine whether strike action 
caused an arbitrary deprivation of the applicant’s property. The court decided that it was necessary to 
balance the applicant’s section 25(1) rights with the picketers’ right to assembly and demonstration 
embodied in section 17 of the Constitution. Van der Walt argues that instead of balancing two 
constitutional rights the court should rather have determined whether the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
(LRA) enabled the strikers to act in a manner that would result in the arbitrary deprivation of property. The 
LRA did not allow the strikers to act in a way that would unreasonably interfere with property rights. This 
meant that the strikers’ actions were unlawful and that it was not necessary for the court to determine 
whether there was an arbitrary deprivation of property.  
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requires a litigant to rely on legislation that gives effect to a constitutional right, instead 
of directly relying on that constitutional right.95  
To summarise, deprivations are the statutory interference with the owner’s use, 
enjoyment and exploitation of his property rights for a public purpose. FNB has made it 
explicit that to pass constitutional muster, deprivations must be imposed by law of 
general application and they may not be arbitrary. An enquiry into the constitutional 
validity of a deprivation comprises of four stages. Firstly, one must determine whether 
there is law of general application that authorises the particular deprivation. If the 
answer to this question is negative, the deprivation is unlawful and unconstitutional. 
However, one can proceed to the second stage of the enquiry if the specific interference 
with property rights is in fact authorised by law of general application. Secondly, it is 
necessary to determine whether the deprivation is substantively arbitrary. More 
specifically, one must apply the eight contextual factors which constitute the FNB non-
arbitrariness test to determine whether the law of general application provides sufficient 
reason for the deprivation. Thirdly, one must determine whether the deprivation is either 
procedurally arbitrary for purposes of section 25(1) or procedurally unfair on the basis of 
PAJA. At this stage, it is therefore essential to determine whether the deprivation is 
caused by legislation or, alternatively, by administrative action. On the one hand, a 
deprivation caused by legislation will be procedurally arbitrary in terms of section 25(1) if 
– ‘judged according to the same principles that apply in administrative law under 
PAJA’96  – it is imposed by legislation in a procedurally unfair manner. Van der Walt 
holds the view that such deprivations are uncommon but they can, for example, arise 
where – as in Reflect-All – the legislative scheme does not include a review procedure 
that would ameliorate the burden placed on the owner. On the other hand, a 
procedurally unfair deprivation caused by administrative action should be assessed in 
light of section 33 of the Constitution, PAJA and, where applicable, the authorising 
legislation. Finally, there may be instances where a litigant will have a choice of 
remedies because the deprivation caused by administrative action is substantively 
                                                            
95 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 236. Van der Walt explains that a litigant can 
rely on the constitutional right directly if the wants to attack the constitutional validity of the legislation. 
96 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 267. 
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arbitrary as well as procedurally unfair. A litigant will, in such an instance, be able to 
argue his case on the basis of section 25(1) or on the basis of PAJA and section 33 of 
the Constitution. Van der Walt suggests that section 25(1) might be the preferred line of 
attack if a deprivation is substantively arbitrary because of the impact of the 
administrative action on the property owner. Alternatively, a litigant ought to rely on 
PAJA or the authorising law if the deprivation is arbitrary because of some procedural 
irregularity (or shortcoming) or because of the manner in which the administrative 
discretion is exercised. 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine what type of deprivations, if any, are 
imposed on land owners when they are compelled to demolish their unlawful and illegal 
buildings. This chapter also considers the nature of the deprivations imposed on 
neighbouring land owners when illegal and unlawful buildings are not demolished. 
Furthermore, with reference to historic preservation and unlawfully occupied buildings, 
this chapter determines the types of deprivations imposed on land owners and other 
property right holders by the regulatory denial of an owner’s wish to demolish buildings 
on his land.  
The sections below firstly indicate the instances where the deprivations (in each of 
these categories) do not raise constitutional issues because the specific interferences 
with property rights are not authorised by the relevant laws of general application. 
Secondly, the chapter delineates the instances where these deprivations are 
substantively arbitrary as proscribed by section 25(1) of the Constitution. Thirdly, this 
chapter draws a distinction between deprivations caused by administrative action or by 
legislation to determine whether these interferences with property rights are either 
procedurally arbitrary or procedurally unfair. Finally, this chapter determines when a 
litigant will have a cause of action either on the basis of section 25(1) or on the basis of 
PAJA. In such instances it is necessary to ascertain on which basis the litigant will have 
the strongest case. There are circumstances where it would clearly benefit the litigant to 
assert his rights on the basis of section 25(1), instead of PAJA and section 33(1). This 
would be where section 25(1) provides a more compelling case; where there is a 
shortcoming in PAJA; or where PAJA is vague and unclear. Naturally, there are also 
instances where section 33(1) and PAJA provide a more persuasive line of attack. 
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Finally, as this chapter advances, it will become clearer when – because of the 
operation of the principle of subsidiarity – a litigant will first have to rely on the remedies 
provided for in authorising legislation prior to asserting his rights on the basis of section 
25(1) or PAJA. 
To aid the discussion, each section in the chapter identifies a series of 
constitutional issues relevant in the context of illegal and unlawful buildings, heritage 
preservation and unlawfully occupied buildings. Although some of these issues have 
been touched upon in the courts, they have not necessarily been resolved. Other 
issues, especially those raised in relation to conditions of title and unlawful and illegal 
buildings, have not been addressed by the courts yet.  
 
5 2 The demolition of unlawful and illegal buildings 
5 2 1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 distinguished between the demolition of buildings affected by restrictive 
conditions, illegal buildings and buildings that were either wholly or partially completed 
when the building plans were set aside on review. Each of the sections showed that the 
courts are prepared to order the demolition of structures that conflict with existing rights 
or that do not comply with legislation. A demolition order in these instances has a 
multitude of functions. For example, when the court orders the demolition of a building, 
it compels the local authority to enforce legislation such as the National Building 
Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (the Building Standards Act). A 
demolition order is also the most effective way in which the rights of neighbours can be 
protected. The court further upholds the public interest in the strict enforcement of the 
law, the orderly and harmonious development of urban areas and the conservation of 
the environment.  
The constitutional analysis in this section is centred on the rights of two groups of 
litigants, namely property owners and neighbouring property owners in the broad 
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sense.97 Specifically, group one comprises of owners who face the demolition of their 
structures because their buildings are illegal or unlawful. A building is unlawful when it is 
constructed in disregard of the property rights of others, for example the limited real 
rights created by restrictive conditions. Illegal buildings refer to structures that were built 
without approved building plans, as was the case in City of Tshwane v Ghani98 and in 
Barnett and others v Minister of Land Affairs and others.99 The courts have further 
confirmed that a structure will be illegal in instances where building plans are set aside 
on review.100 Structures can also, for example, be illegal because they were built in 
conflict with other laws such as environmental regulations, zoning schemes and the 
ordinances. Group two consists of neighbouring land owners, whose rights are 
protected by the demolition of unlawful or illegal structures.101  
This section firstly determines whether the owners in group one possess 
constitutional property interests in illegal structures and, secondly, whether they will be 
unconstitutionally deprived of their rights if their illegal buildings are demolished against 
their will. The section further argues that the right of neighbouring land owners to insist 
that the local authorities enforce compliance with legislation amounts to a constitutional 
property interest. Neighbouring property owners are deprived of this right when the local 
authority approves building plans in conflict with legislation, conditions of title or 
restrictive covenants or when the authorities refuse to enforce legislation or building 
plans. They are further deprived of their constitutional property rights when the local 
authority fails to demolish an illegal building. The section below determines whether 
these deprivations are unlawful and therefore unconstitutional. This section also 
considers the issues of substantive arbitrariness and of procedural fairness. Where 
necessary, the section indicates when neighbouring land owners will have to assert 
                                                            
97 Neighbouring property owners in the broad sense refers to immediate neighbours and to other property 
owners in a township. See the explanation of ‘neighbouring property owners’ in chapter 3, section 3 1 
above. 
98 2009 (5) SA 563 (T). 
99 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA). 
100 Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and others [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) para 10. 
101 See the distinction drawn between unlawful and illegal buildings in chapter 3, section 3 1 above. 
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their rights on the basis of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA), 
or the Building Standards Act, instead of relying on their right to just administrative 
action as embodied in section 33 of the Constitution directly or on their section 25(1) 
rights. 
 
5 2 2 Land owners 
This section aims to show that most land owners will not be unconstitutionally deprived 
of property in circumstances where their illegal buildings are demolished. Case law has 
on more than one occasion confirmed that building and development regulation is a 
valid exercise of the state’s police power. With reference to these cases, it is argued 
below that land owners will generally find it difficult to prove that they have constitutional 
property interests in structures that they did not have the right to build in the first place. 
This means that these owners will be unable to argue that the subsequent demolition of 
their structures amounts to an arbitrary or procedurally unfair deprivation of their 
property. The argument is supported by the decision in Standard Bank of South Africa 
Limited v The Swartland Municipality (Swartland Municipality),102 where the court held 
that a mortgagee does not have a proprietary interest in an illegal structure. The section 
further relies on Camps Bay Ratepayers and Resident’s Association v Harrison103 to 
show that, in a very specific set of circumstances, there may be instances where the 
demolition of an illegal building or building works will result in a substantively arbitrary 
deprivation of other legal property interests. This exceptional case should be 
distinguished from cases such as City of Tshwane v Ghani104 and Barnett and others v 
Minister of Land Affairs and others,105 where the owners do not have property interests 
worthy of section 25 protection.  
Case law has confirmed that the police power principle has been accepted into 
South African law. Van der Walt explains that ‘police power’ refers to the power of the 
                                                            
102 [2010] ZAWCHC 103 (31 May 2010). 
103 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010). 
104 2009 (5) SA 563 (T). 
105 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA). 
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state to regulate land-use planning, development, building and the conservation of the 
environment in the public interest.106 Limitations imposed on ownership by regulatory 
controls will generally be constitutional, provided they are properly authorised, in line 
with the rules of procedural fairness and not arbitrary.107 For example, in Nyangane v 
Stadsraad van Potchefstroom,108 the court held that it is accepted in a ‘modern system 
of law’ that the local authority has the power to impose conditions of title to ensure the 
‘co-ordinated and harmonious development and town-planning within their areas of 
administration’ and therefore the exercise of such powers is not per se 
unconstitutional.109 Likewise, in Muller NO and others v City of Cape Town,110 the court 
confirmed that ownership is not an absolute right and that it is subject to the restrictions 
imposed on it by statute and common law.111 More recently, in PJ Ruck v Makana 
Municipality,112 the court explained that property rights often clash with what is in the 
broader public interest.113 The purpose of regulatory laws is to manage this tension 
between property rights and the public interest and further ‘to lay the foundation for 
uniform, orderly and harmonious development and growth’.114 This in turn will promote 
certainty, which is ‘crucial’ to informing ‘the content of the right of ownership’.115 
Collectively, these cases indicate that ownership is not an absolute right and that it must 
                                                            
106 Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional property law’ 2008 ASSAL 231-264 at 240.  
107 Van der Walt AJ ‘Constitutional property law’ 2008 ASSAL 231-264 at 240.  
108 1998 (2) BCLR 148 (T). 
109 1998 (2) BCLR 148 (T) 160-161. 
110 2006 (5) SA 415 (C). 
111 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) paras 72-73.  
112 [2010] ZAECGHC 111 (24 November 2010). 
113 [2010] ZAECGHC 111 (24 November 2010) para 20. 
114 [2010] ZAECGHC 111 (24 November 2010) para 20. 
115 [2010] ZAECGHC 111 (24 November 2010) para 20. 
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yield to the statutory limitations that are imposed in the public interest.116 Viewed from 
this perspective, one can argue that an owner will not have a constitutional property 
interest in an illegal structure, which he did not have the right to build. This argument is 
supported by the Swartland Municipality117 decision, where the court decided that a 
mortgagee (or any other person or institution that holds a real right in the property), 
does not have a proprietary interest in illegal structures built on the property of the 
mortgagor. The court explained that ‘the doctrine of jus in re aliena does not protect the 
applicant from the demolition of the unauthorised and illegal structures, which 
                                                            
116 Visser DP ‘The absoluteness of ownership: the South African common law perspective’ 1985 Acta 
Juridica 39-52 at 43-48 explains that Roman-Dutch law did not incorporate the notion that ownership is an 
absolute right. Ownership in the Roman-Dutch context has always been a fundamentally restricted right. 
Visser describes some of the restrictions originally placed on ownership, including limitation of the 
owner’s right to alienate property. Furthermore, the various remedies granted to adjacent land owners in 
the context of neighbour law indicate that ownership was a non-absolute construct. The concept of 
absoluteness was introduced into South African law by the courts that relied on the work of the nineteenth 
century Pandectists. Visser argues that this notion of absoluteness is rooted in nineteenth century 
Germany rather than seventeenth and eighteenth century Holland and that it should never have been 
transplanted into South African law. By contrast, Lewis C ‘The modern concept of the ownership of land’ 
1985 Acta Juridica 241-266 at 242 argues that ownership has been eroded by the limitations imposed by 
legislation. She argues that in a modern society, ownership is a ‘paltry right so whittled away by 
legislation in the past century that it cannot be equated with the ownership of classical Roman law or 
even the right as it was envisaged by the Roman-Dutch writers’. The central premise of Lewis’s article is 
that ownership entitlements, and particularly the right to use property, has been transformed by political, 
social and economic forces. Limitations imposed on ownership for social reasons include town-planning 
and health and safety regulation. These limitations are imposed in the public interest and they have 
transformed ownership into a restricted right. Van der Walt AJ ‘The effect of environmental measures on 
the concept of landownership’ (1987) 104 SALJ 469-479 at 469 and 479 describes a range of statutory 
limitations imposed on ownership for purposes of protecting the natural and built-up environment in South 
Africa. Van der Walt argues that these limitations can indicate that ‘ownership, and especially 
landownership, is in principle and ab initio of a limited nature’. Viewed from this perspective he argues 
that limitations such as those imposed by environmental conservation measures ‘should not be seen as 
inroads into or limitations of the owner’s theoretically unlimited right but as natural duties and limits 
inherent in ownership of land as such’. 
117 [2010] ZAWCHC 103 (31 May 2010). 
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fortuitously became part of its security’.118 The implication is that the demolition of the 
illegal structures would not have impacted on the mortgagee’s legal property interests. 
Accordingly, the decision did not raise a section 25(1) issue. Explained differently, the 
mortgagee did not have a proprietary interest in the illegal structure built on the 
property. However, the mortgagee did have legal interests in the land, but these 
interests would not have been affected by the demolition of the illegal structure. As a 
result, it could not be said that the subsequent demolition of the illegal structure would 
have deprived the mortgagee of legal interests that it held in relation to the land.119 
Essentially, this decision makes it explicit that a land owner and holders of limited real 
rights will not have a property interest – and by implication a constitutional property 
interest – in an illegal building. Land owners will therefore be unable to argue that the 
subsequent demolition of illegal buildings amounts to a deprivation of constitutional 
property interests, which they possess in relation to those illegal structures.   
Furthermore, a land owner can evidently not have a constitutional property interest 
in a structure that interferes with the property rights of others. This means that land 
owners do not have the right to build on their land in a way that conflicts with the 
property rights of other land owners. A land owner has the responsibility to exercise his 
                                                            
118 [2010] ZAWCHC 103 (31 May 2010) para 16. 
119 This point can also be explained with reference to the well known Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of 
Cape Town and others 2010 (1) SA 333 (SCA) (Oudekraal). In Oudekraal the court had to decide 
whether it would set aside the administrator’s decision to allow certain developments on the property. The 
decision to allow township development had been taken thirty years previously at a time when the 
administrator was unaware of sacred Muslim graves situated on the land. Moreover, it was later 
determined that the land was environmentally sensitive and home to unique fauna and flora. The court 
decided that despite the unprecedented delay it could set aside the decision to allow development 
because of the range of interests that would be negatively affected by development. Arguably, the land 
owner would have been in the same position as the mortgagee in Swartland Municipality had it 
proceeded to develop the land even though the administrator’s approval had been set aside. Any 
structures erected by the Oudekraal owner, which conflicted with the Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision, 
would have been illegal. The subsequent demolition of the illegal structures would not have impacted on 
the Oudekraal land owner’s legal property interests, namely his ownership of the land. As a result, the 
demolition of the illegal structures would not have activated a section 25(1) enquiry because demolition 
would not have affected the land owner’s legal property interests in any way.      
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ownership entitlements in accordance with the law and in a manner that does not 
infringe on the property rights of others. This implies that if a structure conflicts with 
conditions of title or restrictive covenants in favour of others, a land owner cannot argue 
that the subsequent demolition of the structure on his land amounts to a deprivation of 
his property.120 In addition to being creatures of statute, restrictive conditions constitute 
limited real rights sui generis,121 which create mutual and reciprocal obligations for all 
the land owners in the township.122 Restrictive covenants differ from conditions of title in 
the sense that they are created in terms of a contract between the township developer 
and the original owners of the properties in a township.123 Registration against the title 
deeds of the servient properties nevertheless converts these contractual rights into 
limited real rights sui generis, which bind all subsequent owners of those properties.124  
However, there are instances where the demolition of illegal structures will 
negatively impact on the land owner’s other legal interests, for example, the legal parts 
of a specific structure. Explained differently, there are circumstances where the 
demolition of illegal structures will result in a deprivation of legal property interests such 
as legal buildings or building works. In these cases it is necessary to conduct a section 
25(1) enquiry to establish whether – in the words of FNB – there is sufficient reason for 
                                                            
120 Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 40-41 
argues that the limitations imposed on ownership by building regulations are constitutionally valid 
provided they are authorised by the law of general application and as long as there is a sufficiently strong 
link between the deprivation and the purpose of the law. This means that the demolition of the illegal 
building will not, as a rule, be unconstitutional. The reason for this is that the builder had contravened 
legitimate laws, such as the Building Standards Act, which fulfils an important function in society. Van der 
Walt argues that it is desirable that the law be strictly enforced even if it results in great losses for the land 
owner. 
121 Van Wyk J ‘The nature and classification of restrictive covenants and conditions of title’ (1992) 25 De 
Jure 270-288 at 288. 
122 Pienaar JM Die regsaard van beperkende en dorpstigtingsvoorwaardes LLM Thesis PU for CHE 
(1990) 37. 
123 Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments LLD Thesis Unisa (1990) 
111. See the discussion in chapter 3 section 3 2 1 above. 
124 Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments LLD Thesis Unisa (1990) 
111. 
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such a deprivation.125 If there is insufficient reason for such a deprivation, it will be 
substantively arbitrary and will therefore be in conflict with section 25(1). A prime 
example of such an instance is Camps Bay Ratepayers and Resident’s Association v 
Harrison (Camps Bay),126 where the Supreme Court of Appeal refused to set aside the 
respondent’s building plans despite the fact that they had been approved in breach of 
zoning scheme regulations.127 This meant that the appellants could not obtain a 
demolition order, even though the respondent’s building was at least partially illegal. 
One can argue that by refusing to set aside the building plans, the court protected the 
proprietary interests – and by implication the constitutional property rights – of the 
respondent in the legal parts of her building. Furthermore, one can argue that in this 
case there would have been insufficient reason to justify the demolition of the legal parts 
                                                            
125 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
126 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010). 
127 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010) paras 52 and 62. More specifically, the court had to decide 
whether it would condone the three year delay in bringing the alleged zoning scheme contraventions to 
the attention of the court. The court held it would not condone the delay and that it would not set aside the 
respondent’s building plans. 
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of the respondent’s building.128 This is illustrated with reference to the factors that 
influenced the court to conclude that it would have been unjust to require the 
respondent to demolish her building insofar as it contravened the zoning scheme. 
Particularly, the court considered the fact that the litigation between the parties had 
been continuing for three years before the appellants raised the issue of the zoning 
scheme infraction. The court also established that the respondent had unintentionally 
built over the building line, as was proscribed by the zoning scheme. Moreover, the local 
authority confirmed that her infraction was relatively minor, and that it would not pose a 
threat to the health and safety of the public, or impact on the character of the area and it 
would also not interfere with the rights of other land owners in the township.129 What is 
more, the respondent’s infraction was so minor that it had gone unnoticed for three 
years. Finally, the respondent would have had to incur considerable costs to bring her 
sizeable building in line with the zoning scheme if her building plans were to be set 
aside on review. These expenses, together with the litigation costs over the years, 
would have placed an immense financial burden on the respondent.130 
                                                            
128 At this stage it is necessary to retrace the steps of the FNB methodology (described in section 5 1 2 
above) insofar as it applies to Camps Bay Ratepayers and Resident’s Association v Harrison [2010] 
ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010) (Camps Bay). The first step in the FNB methodology is to determine 
whether there is actually a property interest that will be affected. Clearly, the property interest affected in 
Camps Bay is the legal aspects of the building, which might be partially or completely destroyed when the 
illegal aspects of the structure are demolished. Secondly, it is imperative to ascertain whether the land 
owner would actually be deprived of her property interests. It is evident that the complete or partial 
destruction of legal buildings or building works in Camps Bay will constitute a ‘deprivation’ for purposes of 
a section 25(1) enquiry. Thirdly, one must determine whether the deprivation meets the requirements of 
section 25(1), namely law of general application and non-arbitrariness. The law of general application in 
this instance would have been the section 21 of the National Building Standards and Building Regulations 
Act 103 of 1977 (the Building Standards Act), which authorises the local authority to apply to the court for 
a demolition order for an illegal structure. As a result, the law of general application requirement would 
have been met because the local authority would have acted in accordance with the Building Standards 
Act. Importantly, the deprivation is brought about by administrative action (the local authority’s decision to 
apply for a demolition order) and not by the legislation itself.   
129 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010) para 62. 
130 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010) para 62. 
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These factors suggest that the setting aside of the building plans and the 
subsequent partial demolition of the building would have amounted to a substantively 
arbitrary deprivation of the respondent’s property. The relationship between the 
deprivation (the complete or partial demolition of her legal buildings and building works) 
and the ends sought to achieve (protection of the rights of other land owners, public 
health and safety and preservation of the character of the area) was practically non-
existent. Clearly, the demolition of the legal parts of the building – in an attempt to bring 
the illegal component of the building in line with the zoning scheme – would have 
served no real purpose. The court had established that the illegal aspect of the building 
was so slight that it did not impact in any profound way on the property rights of other 
land owners or on the health and safety interests of the public in general. Furthermore, 
the illegal building works did not disfigure the Camps Bay area. As a result, the 
traditional interests that would usually have been advanced by the demolition of an 
illegal structure had fallen away.  
The respondent had constructed a partially illegal building which, under the 
circumstances, did not have any real negative consequences for neighbouring land 
owners and the public in general. Therefore, it could not be a said that there was a 
particularly strong relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and the 
respondent because demolition, in this instance, would have served no function. 
Contrastingly, the strict enforcement of the law by way of a demolition order would have 
had dire consequences for the respondent. The respondent would, at great expense, 
have been compelled to demolish the illegal as well as some legal aspects of her 
building. In addition to the delay brought about by the litigation proceedings over the 
years, demolition would have caused the land owner to further postpone the 
development of her land. As stated above, these interferences with property rights did 
not really further the goal of safe, healthy and aesthetically pleasing urban areas. 
Moreover, the demolition would not have provided further protection to the rights of 
other land owners, because these rights were not really affected in any material way. 
Accordingly, the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation, the nature of the 
property and the extent of the deprivation is rather weak. One the one hand, demolition 
of the illegal (and by implication legal) aspects of the building would not have better 
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protected the range of interests mentioned above. It would on the other hand, have 
severely burdened the owner who, in addition to the legal costs already incurred, had to 
bear the financial burden of the destruction of legal parts of her building. Furthermore, 
the strict enforcement of the zoning scheme in this case was not a compelling enough 
reason to justify the demolition of legal buildings and building works, especially if one 
considers that the illegality of the structure had gone unnoticed for three years. 
Admittedly, the demolition would not have embraced all the incidents of the 
respondent’s ownership since she would have been able to sell the plot of land. That 
being said, it was unclear whether the value of the land would have offset the financial 
burden of the litigation costs and the demolition of the legal aspects of her building.  
Collectively, these considerations, coupled with the delay aspect of the dispute, 
show that there is a disproportionate relationship between the deprivation (demolition of 
legal building works) and the purpose it seeks to achieve, namely the protection of the 
rights of others, the preservation of the character of the area and public health and 
safety. These interests were not threatened by the respondent’s infraction of the zoning 
scheme. It was, therefore, unnecessary to protect these interests by requiring the 
demolition of illegal and legal aspects of the respondent’s structure. Evidently, there 
would have been insufficient reason to justify the partial demolition of the respondent’s 
building, considering the circumstances, the limited extent and impact of the illegality 
and the potentially excessive effects of enforcement. This means that a demolition order 
would have resulted in a substantively arbitrary deprivation of the respondent’s property. 
Decisions such as Camps Bay and Swartland Municipality differs from other illegal 
building cases such as City of Tshwane v Ghani (City of Tshwane v Ghani)131 and 
Barnett and others v Minister of Land Affairs and others (Barnett)132 because in the case 
of the former, the land owner and mortgagee respectively had legal interests worthy of 
section 25(1) protection. In the case of the latter, the illegal builders had no legal 
interests that would be affected by demolition. More precisely, the mortgagee in 
Swartland Municipality had a legal interest in the land. As explained above, this case did 
                                                            
131 2009 (5) SA 563 (T). 
132 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA). 
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not raise a section 25(1) issue because the demolition of the illegal structure did not 
impact on the mortgagee’s legal interests. Likewise, the land owner in Camps Bay had 
a legal interest in her land as well as in those parts of her building which complied with 
the law. The Camps Bay decision raised a section 25(1) issue because the demolition 
of the illegal building works would have far-reaching consequences for her legal 
property interests, in particular the legal parts of her building.  
In City of Tshwane v Ghani and Barnett the structures were built without approved 
building plans – as required by section 4 of the Building Standards Act – and in blatant 
disregard of health, safety and environmental legislation. In both cases, the illegal 
builders also attempted to appropriate land by building the structures on plots which 
they did not own. The illegal builders in City of Tswane v Ghani and Barnett would 
undoubtedly have had no legal interests (and by implication constitutional property 
interests) that would potentially have been affected by the demolition of the illegal 
structures. These decisions did not raise a section 25(1) issue because the illegal 
builders did not possess legal property interests worthy of constitutional protection. As a 
result, the illegal builders would not have been able to argue that the demolition of their 
illegal structures amounted to a potentially arbitrary deprivation of their property 
interests. In fact, demolition may have been the only effective way to protect the 
constitutional property interests of others, such as the owners of the land. Furthermore, 
demolition may have been the only effective way in which the court could have upheld 
the interests of the neighbouring land owners and the public in general.133  
Camps Bay shows that regulatory laws cannot be applied rigidly and that it is 
necessary for a court to consider the unique circumstances of each case. The 
circumstances, assessed within the framework of the FNB substantive arbitrariness test, 
indicate when the rigid enforcement of the law leads to unjust and unconstitutional 
results. Camps Bay remains, however, an exceptional case and there is no clear 
indication of when the court will refrain from ordering the demolition of illegal structures, 
as a measure to protect land owners’ constitutional property interests in their land and 
                                                            
133  As explained in chapter 3, section 3 3 2 above, these illegal buildings had a negative impact on the 
environment and posed a health and safety risk to neighbouring land owners and the public in general. 
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legal buildings situated on the property. Whether or not the court will be willing to protect 
the land owner’s constitutional property interest depends on the case-specific factors 
and circumstances relevant to the dispute.  
Camps Bay suggests that a range of factors will be relevant in a section 25(1) 
balancing enquiry (substantive arbitrariness test). These factors include: the 
seriousness of the infraction; whether the land owner had acted in bad faith; the impact 
of the infraction on the rights of others and the character of the neighbourhood; whether 
the illegal building poses a health and safety risk to the public and whether the illegal 
building operations are detrimental to the environment. This is not a closed list and any 
other relevant circumstance may have an impact on the court’s finding. The court in 
Camps Bay might, for example, have been more willing to set aside the respondent’s 
building plans if the building conflicted with conditions of title or restrictive covenants in 
favour of neighbouring land owners. As explained above, conditions of title and 
restrictive covenants amount to limited real rights and there would have to be more 
compelling circumstances to justify interference with these rights. Nevertheless, one 
cannot exclude the possibility that there will be exceptional instances where an illegal 
building would be permitted to stand even though it is incompatible with conditions of 
title. Such an instance could be where the land owner had built in conflict with a 
condition of title which the court finds is obsolete. 
The other pivotal factor in the Camps Bay was the fact that the appellants had 
delayed in raising the issue of the respondent’s breach of the zoning scheme. This 
factor, in combination with the other circumstances, influenced the court to find in the 
favour of the respondent. The issue of delay also played a central role in the series of 
Oudekraal cases.134 In Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and others,135 
the Supreme Court of Appeal had to decide whether a 30 year delay precluded it from 
setting aside the administrator’s decision to allow the establishment of a township on 
                                                            
134 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and others 2002 (6) SA 573 (C); Oudekraal Estates 
(Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and others 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) and Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City 
of Cape Town and others 2010 (1) SA 333 (SCA). 
135 2010 (1) SA 333 (SCA). 
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the appellant’s property.136 The court held that the administrator’s decision was invalid 
because it was taken at a time when he was unaware of sacred Muslim graves that 
would have been destroyed in the course of development.137 The court explained that 
the degree of delay in this case was unprecedented, but there were also other 
exceptional circumstances which justified the setting aside of the administrator’s 
decision.138 More specifically, the entire area on which the development would have 
taken place was regarded as holy by the Muslim community.139 There was also 
uncertainty as to how many undiscovered graves would have been destroyed by 
development. Moreover, the property formed part of an ecologically sensitive area and it 
was home to rare species of fauna and flora that formed a unique biodiversity 
complex.140 These policy considerations persuaded the court to set aside the 
administrator’s decision. In this regard the court explained: 
‘[i]t appears to me that, in the totality of the circumstances referred to above, to 
incline in favour of the respondents would be to exercise a discretion so as to 
promote the spirit, purport and the object of the Bill of Rights. In the circumstances 
of this case, by ensuring that an invalid decision does not stand, the principle of 
legality and the interests of justice will be advanced’.141 
Evidently, the development of the Oudekraal property would have had a significant 
impact not only on the interests of the Muslim community, but also on the public interest 
in the preservation of the environment. These interests outweighed the owner’s right to 
proceed with the development. Furthermore, the unique circumstances of the case 
placed an additional obligation on the owner, namely the duty to develop his property in 
a manner that would uphold the Muslim community’s interest in the preservation of 
sacred religious sites as well as the public interest in the preservation of the inimitable 
environment. Like Camps Bay, the Oudekraal decision confirms that the case-specific 
                                                            
136 2010 (1) SA 333 (SCA) para 58. 
137 2010 (1) SA 333 (SCA) para 25. 
138 2010 (1) SA 333 (SCA) para 79. 
139 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and others 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) paras 14-17 and 
Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and others 2010 (1) SA 333 (SCA) para 70. 
140 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and others 2010 (1) SA 333 (SCA) paras 3-8. 
141 2010 (1) SA 333 (SCA) para 82. 
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circumstances will impact on the way in which the courts apply the law. The policy 
considerations in Oudekraal influenced the court to uphold the principle of legality and 
to set aside the invalid administrative action. 
In conclusion, legislation such as building and development or environmental 
conservation laws can drastically limit the owner’s right to use his land. One such a 
limitation is that the owner can only build on his property in accordance with the 
requirements set in legislation. Buildings will be illegal if they conflict with these laws or 
if they are built in accordance with building plans that are set aside on review. 
Generally, an owner does not have a property interest, and by implication a 
constitutional property interest, in an illegal structure. This implies that the subsequent 
demolition of the structure will not amount to a deprivation of property. The reason for 
this is that the right to build a structure in conflict with the law does not form part of the 
owner’s entitlements in relation to his property. This argument is supported by the 
Swartland Municipality case, where the court confirmed that a mortgagee does not have 
a proprietary interest in an illegal structure which fortuitously became part of its security. 
However, Camps Bay illustrated that there are instances where the law cannot be 
applied inflexibly, and where the courts will protect the owner’s legitimate proprietary 
interests in deciding whether demolition of the illegal structure would be justified, 
considering all the circumstances. Essentially, the FNB substantive arbitrariness test 
enables one to determine when the demolition of an illegal building or building works will 
amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property to the extent that demolition imposes an 
unjustifiably excessive burden on the affected owner’s legitimate property interests in 
the land and in legal parts of the building. More specifically, the FNB non-arbitrariness 
test requires consideration of the complexity of the relationships relevant in the dispute. 
This test also directs one to balance the opposing interests of the affected land owner, 
neighbours and the public in general. The Camps Bay example showed that there 
would have been insufficient reason for the deprivation (demolition) because there was 
a disproportionate relationship between the purpose of the deprivation (public health 
and safety and the protecting of neighbouring land owners’ interests) and the demolition 
of the illegal building works. The reason for this was that the illegal structures had little 
bearing on the interests of the public or neighbouring land owners while demolition 
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would have deprived the land owner of most if not all of the legal aspects of her 
building. Furthermore, the delay element of the dispute contributed in part to the 
conclusion that demolition would have amounted to an excessive interference with 
property rights. 
A range of factors can influence the court’s decision to protect the owner’s 
legitimate property interests by not allowing demolition of the illegal structure. Oudekraal 
shows that a decisive factor (such as delay) in one instance can be less important in 
another context. Oudekraal, like Camps Bay, demonstrates that policy considerations 
and other factors will impact on the court’s application of the law. The relevant factors in 
Oudekraal influenced the court to set aside the invalid administrative action despite the 
fact that the decision had been permitted to stand for an unprecedented 30 year period. 
In doing so, the court upheld the principle of legality and it protected the various 
interests that would have been affected by the development.  
 
5 2 3 Neighbouring land owners 
5 2 3 1 Introduction: constitutional property interests 
The purpose of this section is to determine whether neighbouring land owners are 
unconstitutionally deprived of property in circumstances where local authorities fail to 
demolish illegal or unlawful buildings. One must, therefore, first determine whether the 
limited real rights created by conditions of title and restrictive covenants amount to 
constitutional property.  
Chapter 3 showed that the courts initially classified conditions of title as praedial 
servitudes, which create reciprocal rights and obligations for property owners in a 
specific township upon registration. Academic authors hold divergent views as to the 
exact nature of conditions of title and restrictive covenants. Van der Merwe142 reasons 
that restrictive conditions (including restrictive covenants as well as conditions of title) 
are unique servitudes; Van Wyk convincingly argues that conditions of title and 
                                                            
142 Van der Merwe CG Sakereg 2 ed (1989) 501. 
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restrictive covenants are not servitudes but limited real rights sui generis.143 It is 
nonetheless clear that restrictive conditions create limited real rights, regardless of 
whether they are classified as servitudes or not.144 Restrictive conditions, created by 
legislation, become limited real rights sui generis once registered against the title deeds 
of properties.145 Similarly, restrictive covenants will constitute limited real rights sui 
generis once they have been registered against the title deeds of the specific 
properties.146 Recently, in Ex Parte Optimal Property Solutions CC,147 the court 
confirmed that registered praedial servitutal rights, including registered conditions of title 
and restrictive covenants, are constitutional property for purposes of section 25(1) of the 
Constitution. 
When conditions of title or restrictive covenants are not relevant to the dispute, one 
would have to establish whether the right of neighbouring land owners to insist that local 
authorities enforce compliance with legislation (such as the zoning scheme or the 
Building Standards Act) will constitute property rights for purposes of section 25. 
Arguably, the right of neighbours to enforce compliance with legislation (such as the 
Building Standards Act) amounts to constitutional property worthy of section 25(1) 
protection. Case law has confirmed that neighbouring land owners have the right to 
insist that other owners in the area respect their rights and adhere to statutory 
limitations when developing their properties. For example, in Muller NO and others v 
City of Cape Town (Muller),148 the court explained that an owner has the right to 
develop his property to any permissible optimal level. The owner is, however, still 
                                                            
143 Van Wyk J ‘The nature and classification of restrictive covenants and conditions of title’ (1992) 25 De 
Jure 270-288 at 288. 
144 Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM and Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property 5 ed 
(2006) 321 explain that servitudes are limited real rights. 
145 Van Wyk J ‘The nature and classification of restrictive covenants and conditions of title’ (1992) 25 De 
Jure 270-288 at 288. 
146 Van Wyk J ‘The nature and classification of restrictive covenants and conditions of title’ (1992) 25 De 
Jure 270-288 at 288. 
147 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) para 19. 
148 2006 (5) SA 415 (C). 
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subject to the limitations imposed on him by legislation.149 Neighbouring land owners 
have a right to insist that statutory restrictions are adhered to, ‘inclusive of a right not to 
have plans passed in respect of an adjoining property in circumstances where the 
statute prohibits the passing of such plans’.150 The court also explained that a property 
owner does not have the right to use his property in a manner that conflicts with law or 
that ‘adversely affects the rights of owners of adjoining or neighbouring properties’.151  
Similarly, Walele v City of Cape Town and others (Walele)152 confirmed that the 
local authorities and the courts should, within the framework of the Building Standards 
Act, maintain a balance between the rights of property owners to build on their land on 
the one hand and the rights of neighbouring property owners on the other hand.153 
Moreover, the courts have in a series of cases held that neighbouring land owners, and 
voluntary associations acting on behalf of neighbouring land owners, have the locus 
                                                            
149 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) paras 72-73. 
150 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) paras 72-73 with reference to Paola v Jeeva NO and others 2004 (1) SA 396 
(SCA) para 19. 
151 2006 (5) SA 415 (C) para 74. 
152 2008 (6) SA 129 (CC). 
153 See further Odendaal v Eastern Metropolitan Local Council 1999 CLR 77 (W) 84 where the court 
explained that when approving building plans local authorities are required to protect the interests of 
property owners in the areas of their jurisdiction. 
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standi to force local authorities and other land owners to abide by building and 
development legislation.154  
In Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (the First Certification case),155 the 
Constitutional Court confirmed that there was no universally recognised formulation for 
the right to property.156 The court stated that it would be unwise to ascribe a 
comprehensive meaning to the concept of property as intended in section 25(1) of the 
Constitution.157 Van der Walt notes that most commentators believe that the property 
concept will be interpreted generously for constitutional purposes.158 With reference to 
                                                            
154 Van der Walt AJ The law of neighbours (2010) 341-342. Van der Walt refers to Erf 167 Orchards CC v 
Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council Johannesburg Administration and another 1999 CLR 91 (W) 
and PS Booksellers (Pty) Ltd and another v Harrison and others 2008 (3) SA 633 (C) para 19, where the 
court confirmed the standing of a voluntary association to enforce compliance with conditions of title as 
well as the zoning scheme on behalf of property owners in the township. See also Chairperson, Walmer 
Estates Residents Community Forum and another v City of Cape Town and others 2009 (2) SA 175 (C) 
para 21, where the court explained that neighbouring owners have a right to insist that adjoining property 
owners comply with the zoning scheme. Furthermore, neighbouring land owners have a right to insist the 
neighbours building plans are not approved unless they comply with the provisions of the Building 
Standards Act. Van der Walt further cites Tergniet and Toekoms Action Group and 34 others v Outeniqua 
Kreosootpale (Pty) Ltd and others [2009] ZAWCHC 6 (23 January 2009) para 22, where the court 
confirmed the standing of a voluntary association, acting on behalf neighbouring land owners, to enforce 
compliance with a zoning scheme. 
155 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC). 
156 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) para 72. 
157 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 51. The court 
further explained that it was safe to say that the ownership of land and corporeal movables constitutes 
‘lie[s] at the heart of our constitutional concept of property’. 
158 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 114. 
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the First Certification case,159 Van der Walt argues that the fact that a specific object or 
right was not specifically mentioned in the property clause does not necessarily mean 
that the object or right does not constitute property worthy of constitutional protection.160 
He argues, in light of the general formulation of the property clause and the lack of 
specific references to a category of property, that one can assume that any form of 
property interest that is not expressly excluded or by necessary implication included will 
amount to constitutional property.161 There is therefore a strong argument to be made 
that the rights of neighbouring land owners to enforce compliance with legislation, as 
recognised in decisions such as Walele, amount to property for purposes of section 
25(1).  
In conclusion, Ex Parte Optimal Property Solutions CC162 confirmed that the 
limited real rights sui generis created by conditions of title and registered restrictive 
covenants amount to constitutional property for purposes of section 25. Case law has 
also indicated that neighbouring land owners have standing to ensure that other land 
owners in their area adhere to statutory limitations that protect these rights when 
developing their property. There is a strong argument to be made that these rights will 
also amount to constitutional property. 
 
5 2 3 2 Unconstitutional deprivation of neighbouring land owners’ property rights 
The previous section showed that the limited real rights sui generis, created by 
conditions of title or registered restrictive covenants, amount to constitutional 
                                                            
159 One of the objections to the property clause raised in the First Certification decision was that it did not 
specifically protect intellectual property rights or mineral rights. This objection was rejected by the court. 
See in this regard, Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) paras 74-75. Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 124 explains that the court’s finding in this regard was correct 
because it is unusual to list all the kinds of property that would fall under the broad term ‘constitutional 
property’.  
160 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 125. 
161 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 124-125. 
162 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) para 19. 
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property.163 It was also argued that legislation such as the Building Standards Act, vests 
neighbouring land owners with the right to insist that local authorities enforce 
compliance with legislation. Neighbouring land owners are deprived of their limited real 
rights sui generis in circumstances where a building is constructed in breach of 
conditions of title or restrictive covenants. Similarly, neighbouring land owners are 
deprived of their constitutional property rights in instances where persons erect illegal 
buildings in their area. These deprivations are caused by administrative action when 
building plans are approved in conflict with restrictive covenants, conditions of title and 
legislation or when local authorities fail to demolish illegal buildings.  
A land owner will, for example, build in breach of conditions of title or restrictive 
covenants in two instances. The first instance is where he builds in accordance with 
building plans that were approved even though they conflict with conditions of title or 
restrictive covenants or legislative prescriptions. In this instance, the deprivation of 
neighbouring land owners’ property rights is caused by administrative action, namely 
the local authority’s decision to approve building plans in conflict with these conditions. 
Alternatively, a land owner may build in breach of conditions of title or restrictive 
covenants or legislation when he proceeds with illegal building operations, without or in 
contravention of local authority approval. The deprivation of neighbouring land owners’ 
property rights in this situation is caused by the failure of the local authority to demolish 
the illegal structure.164 Similarly, neighbouring land owners are deprived of their 
constitutional property rights when the local authority approves plans that conflict with 
the zoning scheme, or when the building plans are set aside on review and the local 
authority fails to demolish the subsequently illegal building. The discussion below draws 
a distinction between deprivations that are caused by the approval of building plans and 
deprivations caused by the failure of the local authority to demolish an illegal building. 
Each section determines whether the respective deprivations are unconstitutional 
                                                            
163 Ex Parte Optimal Property Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) para 19. 
164 Section 1(i)(b) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 defines administrative action as 
‘any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by a natural or a juristic person, other than an organ 
of state, when exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering 
provision, which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect....’. 
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because they are unlawful, substantively arbitrary or procedurally unfair. A specific 
deprivation can be unconstitutional on more than one ground and the purpose of this 
section is to delineate the remedies that are available to those neighbouring land 
owners who intend to assert their rights in court. 
In each case, it is necessary to first establish whether the law of general 
application, in this case the Building Standards Act, authorises a particular 
administrative action. If it is found that the local authority had acted within its authority in 
terms of the Building Standards Act, one can proceed to determine whether this 
deprivation is substantively arbitrary because there is insufficient reason for the 
interference with property rights. Finally one can determine whether the deprivation is 
procedurally unfair.165  
Section 7 of the Building Standards Act prohibits the approval of plans unless the 
local authority is satisfied that it complies with the requirements of the Act itself or with 
that of any other law, including servitudes, restrictive covenants or conditions of title.166 
This essentially means that the local authority is not authorised to approve building 
plans that permit the construction of a building in conflict with, for example, limited real 
rights or statutory provisions. The local authority’s decision to approve a building of this 
kind is therefore unlawful and, as a result, unconstitutional because the deprivation was 
not authorised by law of general application. Accordingly, it is unnecessary for 
neighbouring land owners to show that this deprivation is substantively arbitrary on the 
basis of section 25 or procedurally unfair, as proscribed by section 33 of the 
Constitution.  
                                                            
165 The issue of unlawfulness was discussed in section 5 1 3 above. Refer to Van der Walt AJ 
Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 235-237 for a detailed explanation of how the unlawfulness of, for 
example, administrative action will prevent litigants from directly relying on section 25 or section 33 of the 
Constitution to assert their rights. More specifically, refer to Van der Walt’s discussion of Growthpoint 
Properties Ltd v SA Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and others [2010] ZAKZDHC 38 (3 
September 2010), where he argues that the unlawfulness of the picket action in this case meant that it 
was unnecessary for the court to base its judgment on section 25 of the Constitution. 
166 Section 7(1)(a) read with section 7(1)(b) of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards 
Act 103 of 1977 prescribes that the local authority cannot approve building plans unless it is satisfied  
‘that the application in question complies with the requirements of this Act and other applicable law’.  
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Due to the operation of the subsidiarity principle neighbouring land owners will, in 
any event, be unable to directly assert their rights on the basis of either section 25 or 
section 33 of the Constitution. They would rather have to assert their rights on the basis 
of the Building Standards Act itself or, otherwise, on the basis of PAJA. Firstly, 
neighbouring land owners should invoke internal remedies provided for in the 
authorising legislation.167 Section 9(1)(c) of the Building Standards Act states that any 
person who ‘disputes the interpretation or application by a local authority of any national 
building regulation or any other building regulation or by-law’ may launch an appeal to 
the review board.168 It seems as if this section enables neighbouring land owners to 
appeal against the local authority’s decision to approve the building plans. Alternatively, 
neighbouring land owners can approach the court to have the building plans set aside 
on review. In Walele v City of Cape Town (Walele),169 the Constitutional Court explained 
that section 7 of the Building Standards Act ‘creates an adequate self-contained 
protection which safeguards the rights of owners of neighbouring properties’.170 Section 
7(1)(b) precludes the approval of building plans if all legal requirements171 had not been 
complied with, or if one of the disqualifying factors will be triggered.172 If building plans 
are approved despite the existence of a disqualifying factor as set out in section 7(1)(b) 
of the Building Standards Act, the approval process ‘becomes invalid and can be set 
                                                            
167 Section 7(2)(a) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 provides that a court shall only 
review an administrative action if the litigants has first exhausted internal remedies provided for in the 
authorising legislation. This is an extension of the subsidiarity principle. PAJA was enacted to give effect 
to the right to just administrative action enshrined in section 33 of the Constitution. Likewise, when 
legislation authorises administrative action, it is likely that it will also contain provisions to ensure that 
such action complies with PAJA. A litigant must first invoke these internal remedies before launching an 
application for review in terms of section 6 of PAJA.  
168 Section 9(1)(c) of Act 103 of 1977. 
169 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC).  
170 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 56. 
171 Legal requirements refer to those set in section 7(1)(a) read with section 7(1)(b)(i) of the National 
Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 1977.  
172 The disqualifying factors are listed in section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the National Building Regulations and 
Building Standards Act 103 of 1977.  
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aside on that ground’.173 One can infer from Walele that neighbouring land owners will 
not necessarily have to launch review proceedings in terms of PAJA, since the building 
plans can be set aside on the basis of section 7(1)(b) of the Building Standards Act.174 
Litigants will, however, also be able to have the building plans set aside on review in 
terms of section 6 of PAJA. Possible grounds for review can include the fact that the 
decision to approve the plans ‘contravenes the law or is not authorised by the 
empowering provision’175 or that it is otherwise unconstitutional and unlawful176 as well 
as the fact that a mandatory condition prescribed by the empowering provision was not 
complied with.177  
To summarise: the local authority is not authorised to approve building plans that 
are, for example, incompatible with conditions of title. Such a decision causes an 
unlawful and unconstitutional deprivation of affected owners’ property interests. 
Aggrieved land owners can launch an appeal to a review board, as provided for in 
section 9(1)(c) of the Building Standards Act. Alternatively, land owners can approach a 
court to have the plans set aside on review, either on the basis of section 7(1)(b) of the 
Building Standards Act or on the basis of section 6 of PAJA. 
Neighbouring land owners are also deprived of their constitutional property 
interests in circumstances where the local authority fails to demolish an illegal building. 
Section 4 of the Building Standards Act prohibits any person from building unless he is 
in possession of validly approved building plans. This provision should be read with 
section 21, which states that a magistrate will have the jurisdiction, on application of any 
local authority, to order the demolition of a building if he is satisfied that the structure is 
‘contrary to or does not comply with the provisions of this Act or any approval or 
                                                            
173 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 56. 
174 Hoexter C Administrative law in South Africa (2007) 114-116 explains that PAJA is the ‘primary or 
default pathway’ for the judicial review of administrative actions. Litigants can also apply to have an 
administrative action set aside on review in terms of enabling legislation which specifically provides for 
review proceedings. 
175 Section 6(2)(f)(i) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
176 Section 6(2)(i) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
177 Section 6(2)(b) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
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authorization granted thereunder’.178 Section 21 creates the impression that the local 
authority has the discretion to approach the court for a demolition order. The question is 
whether the local authority’s failure to act would result in a substantively arbitrary 
deprivation of property.  
There is no definite indication of when such a deprivation will be substantively 
arbitrary for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. Explained differently, there is 
no per se rule as to when the law of general application will provide ‘sufficient reason’ 
for the deprivation.179  
 Each dispute will have to be analysed with reference to its case-specific 
circumstances. The factors that influenced the court in Camps Bay Ratepayers and 
Resident’s Association v Harrison180 will certainly be relevant when the courts determine 
whether the local authority’s failure to act caused a substantively arbitrary deprivation of 
property. These factors were the seriousness of the respondent’s infraction of the 
zoning scheme; whether her infraction interfered with her neighbours’ rights or impacted 
on the character of the area; and whether her partially illegal building was detrimental to 
the environment or posed a health and safety threat to the public. A further factor was 
the delay of the appellants and the local authority to have her building plans set aside 
and the intent with which the illegal building was constructed. Collectively, these 
considerations indicated that the neighbouring land owners in Camps Bay had not been 
arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional property rights by the decision not to demolish. 
The complete or partial demolition of the respondent’s building would have amounted to 
a substantively arbitrary deprivation of her legal property rights, given the weighing up of 
all the circumstances and considerations. 
 On the basis of the Camps Bay factors one can conclude that failure of the local 
authority to demolish the structures in City of Tshwane v Ghani181 would most likely 
                                                            
178 Section 21 of the National Building Standards and Building Regulations Act 103 of 1977. 
179 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
180 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010). 
181 2009 (5) SA 563 (T). 
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have amounted to a substantively arbitrary deprivation of neighbouring land owners’ 
constitutional property rights. Moreover, the local authority’s failure to act in both City of 
Tshwane v Ghani and Barnett and others v Minister of Land Affairs and others182 would 
have resulted in a substantively arbitrary deprivation of the property rights of the owners 
of the plots on which the illegal buildings were built. Explained differently, there would 
have been – in the words of FNB – insufficient reason to allow the illegal buildings to 
stand. In particular, these deprivations would have been substantively arbitrary because 
the structures were built in blatant disregard of the law and the rights of others. There 
was no specific explanation for why the buildings in these instances should not have 
been demolished, particularly since demolition did not affect any legitimate property 
rights of the illegal builders at all. In fact, demolition of the structures was the most 
effective way in which the court could protect the rights of the owners of the plots, 
neighbouring land owners and the public interest in the conservation of the environment 
and healthy and safe urban areas.  
Likewise, there would have to be compelling reasons to preclude a finding of 
substantive arbitrariness in circumstances where the local authority fails to demolish an 
illegal building that conflicts with conditions of title or restrictive covenants that benefit 
other land owners. The reason for this is that the illegal building directly infringes on the 
limited real rights of other land owners. By contrast, a court would be more reluctant to 
find that neighbouring land owners have been arbitrarily deprived of property when a 
neighbour’s building plans are set aside on review but the consequently illegal building 
is not demolished. When building plans are set aside on review, a local authority will 
typically first determine whether the illegal structure can be altered (which includes 
partial demolition) so that it meets statutory requirements. If an illegal structure is 
brought in line with the Act, it will no longer interfere with the rights of neighbouring land 
owners; pose a threat to the health and safety of the public; or negatively impact on the 
character of the area. In these circumstances, neighbouring land owners will not be 
arbitrarily deprived of their property rights if the building is not demolished. Conversely, 
failure of the local authority to demolish an illegal building that cannot be remedied will 
                                                            
182 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA). 
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probably amount to a substantively arbitrary deprivation of neighbouring land owners’ 
property rights. It is clear from these examples that there is no general rule as to when 
the failure of the local authority to demolish an illegal building will amount to a 
substantively arbitrary deprivation of neighbours’ constitutional property rights. As stated 
above, a range of factors will play a role in the outcome of the substantive arbitrariness 
test in every case.  
Instead of relying on section 25(1), neighbouring land owners can assert their 
rights on the basis of just administrative action as embodied in section 33 of the 
Constitution. The subsidiarity principle requires of litigants to rely on the remedies 
provided for in legislation enacted to give effect to the rights embodied in the Bill of 
Rights. PAJA gives effect to the constitutional right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair. It provides a range of grounds on which neighbouring 
land owners can have the administrative action – the local authority’s failure to demolish 
the illegal building – set aside on review.183 For example, neighbouring land owners can 
argue that the local authority’s decision was procedurally unfair,184 arbitrary or 
capricious,185 or that it was taken in bad faith.186 Crucially, section 7(2)(a) of PAJA 
provides that a court or a tribunal will not hear an application for review unless the 
litigant has first exhausted internal remedies provided for in the authorising legislation. 
As explained above, section 9(1)(c) of the Building Standards Act provides the right to 
launch an appeal to a review board. Finally, neighbouring land owners can also launch 
review proceedings on the basis of section 7(1)(b) of the Building Standards Act. It 
might be preferable for land owners to rely on section 7(1)(b) to have the local 
authority’s decision set aside if a building was, for instance, deliberately constructed 
without building plans, as required by section 4, or in conflict with conditions of title as 
                                                            
183 Section 1(i)(b) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 provides that the definition of 
administrative action includes any decision taken or any failure to take a decision by ‘a natural or juristic 
person, other than an organ of state, when exercising an public power or performing a public function in 
terms of an empowering provision’.  
184 Section 6(2)(c) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
185 Section 6(2)(e)(vi) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
186 Section 6(2)(e)(v) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
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proscribed by section 7(1)(a) of the Building Standards Act. However, in the instance 
where building plans are set aside on review, it could be more advantageous for 
neighbouring land owners to launch review proceedings on the basis of PAJA. The 
reason for this is that PAJA provides a wider range of grounds on which the local 
authority’s decision can be impugned. Nevertheless, the cause of action should be 
tailored according to the unique circumstances of each case. 
In conclusion, neighbouring land owners are deprived of their constitutional 
property rights in circumstances where the local authority fails to demolish an illegal 
building. From the wording of section 21 of the Building Standards Act, one can assume 
that the local authority has the discretion to apply to the court for a demolition order. 
This means that the local authority is authorised to exercise its discretion in favour of 
not demolishing certain illegal buildings. This administrative action can cause an 
unconstitutional deprivation of neighbouring land owner’s property rights. More 
specifically, depending on the case-specific factors, the deprivation can be substantively 
arbitrary as proscribed by section 25 of the Constitution when there is insufficient 
reason for such a decision. For instance, in Camps Bay there was sufficient reason to 
justify a decision to not order the demolition of the illegal building or building works, 
given the fact that demolition would have had excessively negative consequences for 
the land owner; the fact that the illegal parts of the building was so minor that it had 
gone unnoticed for three years and that it had little or no impact on the rights of 
neighbouring land owners; on the character of the area and on the health and safety 
interests of the public. Importantly, there would have to be more compelling reasons to 
justify the local authority’s decision to allow an illegal building to stand if it conflicts with, 
for example, restrictive covenants or conditions of title.  
 
5 3 Limitations on the land owner’s right to demolish historic buildings 
5 3 1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 described the limitations imposed by heritage preservation laws on a land 
owner’s right to demolish existing buildings on his land. More specifically, chapter 4 
distinguished between buildings that are either formally or generally protected under the 
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National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 (the Heritage Resources Act). This chapter 
further explained that a land owner may not demolish, alter or damage a building once it 
is placed under the formal protection of the Heritage Resources Act. Furthermore, the 
land owner has an implied statutory obligation to maintain the listed building, at his own 
expense, so as to avoid a compulsory restoration order.187 
Section 34(1) of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 (the Heritage 
Resources Act), a general protection measure, places significant limitations on the 
exercise of ownership entitlements since it regulates the owner’s right to demolish a 
building even though it is not a formally protected by the Act. More specifically, the 
section proscribes the demolition of buildings that are older than 60 years without a 
permit issued by the heritage authority.188 The focus of this discussion falls on the 
limitations imposed on the land owners exercise of his demolition rights by section 34(1) 
the Heritage Resources Act because this provision provides a more compelling example 
of the nature and extent of the interferences with property rights brought about by 
heritage preservation laws. However, the arguments formulated below are also relevant 
in the instance of listed (formally protected) buildings. 
 Case law indicates that the South African courts have accepted heritage 
preservation as a legitimate exercise of the state’s police power. In Qualidental 
Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another,189 the court held that 
ownership is ‘no longer’ an absolute right and that ownership entitlements ‘can only be 
exercised in accordance with the social function of the law and the interests of the 
community’.190 The court also explained that the Heritage Resources Act contributes to 
                                                            
187 See the discussion of the formal protection measures of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 
1999 in chapter 4, section 4 2.  
188 Section 34(1) of the Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999. Section 34(2) provides that a heritage 
resource authority should, within three months of refusing the demolition permit, consider protecting the 
building under one of the formal protections of the Act. See the discussion of section 34 of the Heritage 
Resources Act 25 of 1999 in chapter 4, section 4 3. 
189 2007 (4) SA 26 (C). 
190 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37. 
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the framework within which ‘the right of ownership in South Africa now functions’.191 
Case law further shows that the courts tend to interpret the provisions of the Heritage 
Resources Act in a manner that bestows wider, rather than narrower powers on the 
heritage authorities to achieve the goals set out in the Act.192 Chapter 4 concluded that 
it would be the exception, rather than the rule, for a property owner to obtain a 
demolition permit if there is the possibility that the building is historically or culturally 
valuable. The public interest in preserving valuable buildings will more often than not 
outweigh the owner’s right to demolish the building. Nevertheless, it is likely that there 
will be circumstances where the preservation of an historic building will impose a 
disproportionate burden on the owner. To date there has not been a South African case 
where a property owner has challenged the effect of section 34 on constitutional 
grounds. As a result, it is still unclear when it would be unconstitutional to deny an 
owner the right to demolish a building that is protected by the heritage preservation 
laws. This issue has been addressed by both the German Federal Constitutional Court 
and the United States Supreme Court.193 The remainder of chapter 4 described the 
circumstances under which these courts would conclude that heritage preservation laws 
impose disproportionate burden on land owners.  
The section below considers the constitutional issues that arise in relation to the 
enforcement of section 34 of the Heritage Resources Act. Specifically, the section 
argues that an owner is deprived of property when he unsuccessfully applies for a 
demolition permit as required by the Heritage Resources Act. This deprivation is caused 
by administrative action, namely the heritage authority’s decision to deny the application 
for the demolition permit. It is argued below that the deprivation is authorised by law of 
general application, namely section 34(1) of the Heritage Resources Act and that it is 
                                                            
191 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37. 
192 In Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37 and 
Provincial Heritage Resources Authority, Eastern Cape v Gordon 2005 (2) SA 283 (E). See the 
discussion of these cases in chapter 4, section 4 3 3 1 and 4 3 3 2. 
193 Refer to chapter 4, section 4 4 for a discussion of the constitutionality of heritage preservation statutes 
in US law and to section 4 5 for a discussion of the constitutionality of heritage preservation laws within 
the German context.  
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therefore lawful. However, this deprivation has the potential to be substantively 
arbitrary, depending on the unique circumstances of the case. There may also be 
instances where the deprivation will fall foul of the administrative justice provisions in 
the Heritage Resources Act or in PAJA. Land owners may in these instances impugn 
the decision to deny a demolition permit on, for example, procedural fairness grounds. 
The section below elaborates on these issues. 
 
5 3 2 Unconstitutional deprivation of property 
As explained above, a land owner is in principle deprived of his property rights when he 
unsuccessfully applies for a demolition permit as required by a heritage preservation 
law. This deprivation is caused by administrative action, namely the exercise of the 
heritage authority’s discretion to deny the demolition permit. The deprivation will be 
invalid and unconstitutional if the law of general application does not authorise that 
specific interference with property rights. In the South African context, the deprivation is 
authorised by the Heritage Resources Act which enables the heritage authority to deny 
demolition permit for a protected building.194 Section 34(1) of the Heritage Resources 
Act goes a step further since it authorises the heritage authority to deny a demolition 
permit for a building that is older than 60 years even though it is not formally protected 
under the Act. This provision therefore meets the law of general application and 
authorisation requirements and it cannot be said that the deprivation is unlawful and, as 
a result, unconstitutional. Accordingly, one can proceed to determine whether the 
deprivation is in conflict with section 25(1) because it is substantively arbitrary.  
FNB195 has confirmed that a deprivation is substantively arbitrary if the ‘law of 
general application’ – in this case the Heritage Resources Act – does not provide 
‘sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in question’.196 As explained above, case 
law has not yet indicated when there will be sufficient reason to justify the limitations 
                                                            
194 See for instance section 27(18) of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999. 
195 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
196 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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imposed on ownership for purposes of historic preservation. However, the general 
principles regarding arbitrary deprivation that were set out in FNB197 apply to historic 
preservation as well and it is possible to deduce guidelines for their application to 
historic preservation cases.  
Importantly, historic preservation is a legitimate exercise of the state’s police 
power. This implies that the state has the power to limit ownership entitlements to 
preserve significant buildings in the public interest. Moreover, ownership has never 
been an absolute right198 and it has to yield to the prevailing needs of society such as 
historic preservation.199 Viewed from this perspective it is clear that the ownership of 
historic structures is accompanied by certain obligations, such as the duty to preserve 
aspects of such buildings that are valued by his community or the broader public.200 
These obligations will not necessarily amount to a substantively arbitrary deprivation of 
property. 
One can for instance deduce that a limitation on the owner’s right to paint his 
historic building a certain colour will generally not amount to a disproportionate 
interference with property rights. In this example there is a strong relationship between 
the deprivation (a limitation on the owner’s right to paint his building) and the purpose of 
                                                            
197 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
198 In his seminal article Visser DP ‘The absoluteness of ownership: the South African common law in 
perspective’ 1985 Acta Juridica 39-52 explains how the notion of ‘absoluteness’ was incorrectly 
incorporated into South African law. See to the same effect, Milton JRL ‘Planning and property’ 1985 Acta 
Juridica 267-288 at 275 and Van der Walt AJ ‘The South African law of ownership: a historical and 
philosophical perspective’ (1992) 25 De Jure 446-457. The concept of ‘absoluteness’ is discussed in 
greater detail in chapter 6, section 6 3 1. 
199 Milton JRL ‘Planning and property’ 1985 Acta Juridica 267-288 at 273-277 explains that ownership has 
always been regulated in the public interest. The earliest example of such a regulation is the common law 
rules pertaining to nuisance law. Industrialisation brought with it a new set of regulations designed to limit 
ownership for the welfare of the general public. See the discussion in chapter 6, section 6 3 1. 
200 Van der Walt AJ ‘The effect of environmental conservation measures on the concept of landownership’ 
(1987) 104 SALJ 469-479 at 478-479 suggests that the law should create a new system of rights to use 
land and it should move away from the emphasis placed on the ownership of land. See the discussion in 
chapter 6, section 6 2.  
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the deprivation, namely the preservation of unique features of an historic building. The 
purpose of the deprivation can only be achieved by restricting the specific land owner’s 
rights – there is therefore a direct link between the preservation of the characteristics of 
the building and the affected land owner. Moreover, a limitation on the owner’s right to 
paint his building a certain colour does not constitute a drastic interference with 
ownership entitlements. Accordingly, one can argue that there is a proportional 
relationship between the preservation of certain external features of the building and the 
interference with property rights. Arguably, there will be sufficient reason to justify such 
an inroad into ownership entitlements.  
Likewise, prohibiting the demolition of the facade or the outer shell of an historic 
building will not automatically result in an arbitrary deprivation of property. In this 
example there will arguably be a direct relationship between the deprivation and the 
purpose of the deprivation, namely preservation of the external features of an historic 
building. Other factors that will weigh against a finding of substantive arbitrariness is 
that, although this is a rather significant interference with ownership entitlements, the 
owner will still be able to use his property to some extent. Moreover, the purpose of the 
deprivation can only really be achieved by placing this restriction on the particular 
owner. There is also a strong relationship between the purpose of the deprivation 
(preservation of external historic features of a building), the extent of the interference 
with ownership entitlements and the nature of the property (a historic building). 
Collectively these considerations indicate that there is a proportional relationship 
between the means (limitation on the owner’s right to demolish or alter the outer shell or 
facade) and end (preservation of cultural and historic treasures). One can conclude that 
generally there will be sufficient reason to justify such an interference with ownership 
entitlements.  
  However, there are instances where the limitation on ownership entitlements for 
the sake of historic preservation might be disproportionate to the purpose of the 
Heritage Resources Act, namely the preservation of historic buildings in the public 
interest. Such a circumstance would arise where the goals of the Heritage Resources 
Act can only be achieved if the owner’s rights in relation to his building are limited to 
such an extent that he no longer derives any benefits from ownership or use of his 
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property. What is more, the goals of the Heritage Resources Act can only be attained if, 
in addition to eroding ownership entitlements, it imposes a positive obligation on the 
owner to maintain the historic property at his own expense. This is more or less the 
position that the land owner in the German Rheinland-Pfälzisches Denkmalschutz-und-
Pflegegesetz case201 found herself in.202 This German case has been discussed in 
greater detail in chapter 4.203 For purposes of this discussion, it suffices to say that the 
owner had unsuccessfully applied for a demolition permit for a decaying Villa, which had 
stood vacant for eighteen years and was no longer suitable to be used for residential 
purposes. The land owner struggled for years to find an alternative use for the building, 
including tenancy and offering the free use of the structure to a museum, subject to the 
condition that it bears the cost of maintaining the property. None of her attempts to find 
a use of the building was successful. She further explained that the cost of restoring and 
maintaining the building would have been prohibitively expensive. The preservation of 
the building resulted in the owner being deprived of all economic use of the building.204  
In particular, the Heritage Resources Act can create a similar situation if the 
heritage authority refuses to grant a demolition permit for a decaying historic building 
which the owner cannot use for any economically viable purpose because the cost of 
restoration and subsequent maintenance is too expensive. This in turn would make it 
increasingly difficult for the owner to sell or to lease the property. In such an instance 
the owner would arguably bear a disproportionate burden on behalf of the public as a 
whole. The FNB substantive arbitrariness test shows that under these circumstances 
the Heritage Resources Act authorises an unconstitutional interference with property 
rights.    
                                                            
201 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999]. 
202 Refer to Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings 
jurisprudence (2006) 119-121 for a discussion of the case. See further Du Plessis E ‘To what extent may 
the state regulate private property for environmental purposes? A comparative study’ 2011 TSAR 512-
526 at 523. 
203 Refer to chapter 4 section 4 5 2 for a discussion of this case. 
204 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] paras 43-46 and 91-93. See the discussion of this case in chapter 4, section 
4 5. 
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FNB states that a deprivation will be arbitrary if the law of general application does 
not provide sufficient reason for the deprivation or is procedurally unfair. Sufficient 
reason has to be established by an analysis of the complexity of relationships involved 
in a section 25(1) dispute.205 The deprivation (the means) in question comprises of two 
elements, namely limiting the owner’s rights to demolish the building, which will have a 
series of knock-on effects, and imposing a positive obligation to maintain the property. 
The purpose of the deprivation is the preservation of historic buildings in the public 
interest. There is a direct relationship between (in the words of FNB) ‘the means 
employed’, namely the deprivation and ‘the ends sought to be achieved’, that is, the 
purpose of the deprivation. 206 However, the effect of the deprivation is that the owner is 
denied the right to demolish a decaying structure because it has historic or cultural 
value, even though he has no reasonable use for the building. The state of the structure 
and the fact that he is unable to obtain a demolition order will dissuade potential buyers 
from purchasing the land for development purposes. Likewise, the building cannot be 
leased without restoring it to a habitable condition at exorbitant expense. Furthermore, 
the continued maintenance of the restored structure will place an additional financial 
burden on the owner. Once the building is placed under formal protection of the 
Heritage Resources Act, the owner can be compelled to restore and to maintain the 
structure at his own expense to avoid a section 45 compulsory restoration order.207 In 
effect, this preservation measure could in certain circumstances not only deprive the 
owner of all economic use of the property, which includes the possibility of developing, 
selling or leasing the land, but might also compel him to maintain the structure at great 
expense. Consequently, the owner is singled out to bear the burden of preserving a 
historically valuable building in the public interest, without deriving any use or benefit 
from it. The degree of the interference with property rights cannot be offset by the 
                                                            
205 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
206 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100 
207 Section 45(1)(a) of Act 25 of 1999. See in this regard the explanation in chapter 4, section 4 3 3 2, 
footnote 104. 
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purpose of the deprivation, namely historic preservation to the benefit of the public as a 
whole. 
Although this deprivation is imposed for an otherwise legitimate purpose, it is 
especially invasive because it has the potential to not only affect the owner’s rights in 
relation to the historic building.  Both Qualidental208 decisions confirmed that, in addition 
to prohibiting the demolition of a historic structure, the heritage authority has the power 
to impose conditions that impact on the use of the property on which the building is 
situated to further heritage preservation goals. These conditions can regulate the extent 
and nature of future developments of the land and it can include a positive obligation to 
maintain other historically relevant aspects of the property, such as the garden. 
Collectively, these statutory interferences will have far-reaching consequences for the 
owner. In fact, one can argue that because of the limitations imposed for heritage 
preservation purposes, the concept of ownership is so watered down that it has become 
meaningless.  
FNB requires more compelling reasons for the deprivation if it relates to the 
ownership of land than in the instance where the affected property right is something 
different, such as a car; and also if it affects all the incidents of ownership rather than 
just some.209 Clearly, this deprivation embraces most of the incidents of the ownership 
of land. The owner may in effect be deprived of all economic use of the building 
because he is unable to obtain a demolition order. Even if the building could be 
restored, the cost of maintaining the property according to the desired standards might 
place an immense financial burden on the owner. The result could therefore, in extreme 
cases, be that the owner is burdened with the cost of maintaining the property to very 
high standards, while not being able to use it, exploit it economically or sell it. 
It is doubtful whether the purpose of the Heritage Resources Act will justify such a 
drastic interference with the ownership of land. An owner cannot be expected to bear 
                                                            
208 Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) and 
Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2008 (3) SA 160 (SCA). 
209 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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the full financial responsibility of preserving an historic building in the public interest 
when he derives absolutely no benefit from the ownership of such a structure. Viewed 
from this perspective, it becomes evident that, at least in extreme cases, there might be 
a disproportionate relationship between the extent of the deprivation and the purpose of 
the interference with property rights. The Heritage Resources Act fulfils an important 
function in the South African society in that it enables heritage authorities – with 
expertise in their respective fields – to identify and preserve cultural treasures for future 
generations. Arguably, the Heritage Resources Act can impose significant limitations on 
ownership to achieve this purpose, limitations which will not necessarily amount to 
unconstitutional interferences with property rights. Nevertheless, the Heritage 
Resources Act cannot authorise a heritage authority to deny a demolition permit if it will 
put an individual owner (or group of owners) in the position where he (or they) must 
maintain a building – which cannot be put to any economically viable use – at exorbitant 
expense. One can conclude that the stated purpose of the Heritage Resources Act, 
namely historic preservation, will not constitute ‘sufficient reason’ to justify the situation 
where ownership is rendered nugatory. Accordingly, the Heritage Resources Act has 
the potential to authorise the imposition of a disproportionate burden on the owner. 
Explained differently, the Heritage Resources Act can potentially authorise a 
substantively arbitrary deprivation of property, in conflict with section 25(1).  
The implication is that, under the correct circumstances, the Heritage Resources 
Act can be declared invalid and unconstitutional on the basis of section 25(1). This is 
regrettable because the Heritage Resources Act was specifically enacted to 
accommodate the public interest in historic preservation. Foreign jurisdictions have 
found ways to prevent legislation that fulfils an otherwise important function from being 
declared unconstitutional because it imposes disproportionate burdens on the owners.  
The US courts have long recognised that they can order the payment of 
compensation in instances where a regulatory measure imposes an excessive burden 
on an individual or group of property owners in the public interest.210 Explained 
differently, the court can order the payment of compensation where a regulatory 
                                                            
210 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 356. 
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measure has the effect of an expropriation. In US law this phenomenon is referred to as 
a regulatory taking or the constructive expropriation of property.211 The doctrine of 
constructive expropriation enables a court to either order the payment of compensation 
or to declare the law invalid in the instance where a regulatory measure goes too far in 
its interference with property rights.212 For example, a court can order the payment of 
compensation to a land owner where the Heritage Resources Act deprives him of all 
economic use of his property. In so doing, a court can prevent a finding that the 
Heritage Resources Act is unconstitutional insofar as it authorises excessive inroads in 
property rights. However, Van der Walt argues that it is undesirable to incorporate the 
doctrine of expropriation into South African law. The reason for this is that expropriation 
can only occur if it is authorised by legislation and ‘implemented by an administrative 
decision to expropriate’.213 Moreover, courts should not have the power to transform a 
regulatory action into expropriation simply because the deprivation disproportionately 
burdens an individual or a group of property owners.214  
The FNB decision has, in any event, probably precluded the possibility of adopting 
the doctrine of constructive expropriation in South African law.215 The reason for this is 
that typically, constructive expropriation is classified as a grey area between deprivation 
and expropriation. It is not a pure deprivation because it does not affect all property 
owners in more or less the same way. It is not a pure expropriation either, because the 
state does not actually acquire or physically destroy the property and, further, because 
the expropriation is not expressly authorised in legislation. The Constitutional Court in 
FNB classified all state interferences as deprivations. By implication, all state 
interferences will first have to meet the two requirements set out in section 25(1), before 
a court can proceed to determine whether an expropriation has taken place. It seems 
                                                            
211 Refer to Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 347-394 for a comprehensive 
discussion of the doctrine of constructive expropriation.  
212 Refer to Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 355-359 for an explanation of how 
the doctrine of constructive expropriation operates in the US context. 
213 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 288. 
214 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 288. 
215 Refer to Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 376-384 for a general discussion on 
the possibility of incorporating the doctrine of constructive expropriation into South African law. 
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unlikely, if not impossible, that a statutory regulation will pass the FNB non-arbitrariness 
test if it goes too far in its interference with ownership entitlements.216 The court will 
consequently not be able to proceed beyond the question of whether the Heritage 
Resources Act imposes an arbitrary deprivation of property.217 In essence, the court will 
not reach the stage where it can order the payment of compensation because a 
regulatory measure has the effect of expropriation. If the FNB methodology218 is 
followed, the regulatory measure will simply be declared invalid and unconstitutional.219 
German law has adopted equalisation measures (Ausgleich) to prevent otherwise 
legitimate laws from imposing disproportionate, and therefore invalid, burdens on land 
owners.220 These measures221 are incorporated in the authorising legislation and they 
are specifically designed to mitigate excessive loss or damage caused by lawful state 
action.222 Stated differently, the payment of an equalisation sum or other compensatory 
measure will soften the overly harmful effects brought about by the statutory regulation 
                                                            
216 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 384. See to the same effect Van der Walt AJ 
‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 41-42. 
217 This is the ‘telescoping effect’ of the non- arbitrariness requirement of section 25(1) that has been 
identified by Roux. See in this regard Roux T ‘Property’ in Woolman S, Roux T & Bishop M (eds) 
Constitutional law of South Africa Volume 3 2 ed (2003 original service: Dec 2003) chapter 46 at 2-5 
and18-19. Refer to section 5 1 2 footnote 23 for an explanation of Roux’s theory.  
218 Refer to section 5 1 2 for an explanation of the FNB methodology. 
219 Furthermore, Roux argues that if the FNB methodology is followed a court will not proceed to the 
question of whether the regulatory limitation is reasonable and justifiable in light of section 36(1) of the 
Constitution. A deprivation, which falls foul of section 25 (1) will arguably also not meet the requirements 
of section 36(1). See in this regard argument in section 5 1 2 footnote 22 above. 
220 Refer to Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 367; Alexander GS The global 
debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 236-239 and Van 
der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 42-47 for a detailed 
explanation of the German equalisation measures.  
221 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 367. See the discussion in chapter 4, section 
4 5 2 2.  
222 Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 47. 
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of property in the public interest.223 Without such a measure the authorising law will be 
declared invalid insofar as it authorises an unconstitutional interference with property 
rights.224 This was the conclusion reached by the German Federal Constitutional Court 
in the Rheinland-Pfälzisches Denkmalschutz-und-Pflegegesetz case.225 More 
specifically, the court decided that relevant historic preservation law was 
unconstitutional because it did not avoid the imposition of disproportionate burdens on 
land owners.226 The law might have been saved from such a finding had the legislature 
incorporated an equalisation measure designed to cater for the circumstance where the 
Act singled out the owner to bear an excessive burden in the public interest.227 A 
general compensation provision could not qualify as an equalisation measure and it 
could not take the place of a demolition order. The court concluded that the legislator 
should provide for the granting of a demolition order where the operation of the heritage 
preservation law leads to extreme hardship, and where an equalisation measure was 
not specifically designed to avoid disproportionate consequences. 
Equalisation-style measures are not uncommon in South Africa. Van der Walt 
explains that the equalisation measures are similar to the constitutional damages 
granted by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni 
City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, 
Amici Curiae); President of the Republic of South Africa and others v Modderklip 
Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae)228 
(Modderklip). Like its German counterpart, the constitutional damages in Modderklip 
were designed to compensate the owner for excessive losses caused by otherwise 
                                                            
223 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 367. See to the same effect, Alexander GS 
The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 118 
and Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 42. See 
further the discussion chapter 4, section 4 5 2 2. 
224 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 367.  
225 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999]. 
226 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 93. 
227 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 96. See the explanation in Alexander GS The global debate over 
constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 120. 
228 2004 (6) SA 40 (SCA). 
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legitimate state action. The constitutional damages awarded in Modderklip differ from 
equalisation payments in the sense that the latter are awarded in terms of the specific 
authorising legislation.229 There are other examples of equalisation-style measures 
that have been incorporated into South African legislation.230 It is, therefore, essential 
to determine whether the Heritage Resources Act contains a similar measure that will 
alleviate the otherwise excessive interference with property rights. Equalisation 
measures in the context of historic preservation need not be limited to an equalisation 
sum (a monetary award). It can also include tax breaks or subsidies for owners who 
preserve historic buildings in the public interest. Equalisation can also refer to a 
statutory provision which authorises the owner to charge the general public entrance 
fees to access the historic site. Furthermore, equalisation can include allowing the 
owner to deviate from zoning restrictions which would normally be imposed on the 
use of his land. Finally, in the US context, the transferable development rights 
                                                            
229 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 277-280 and to the same effect Van der Walt 
AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 42-47. 
230 Section 22(6) of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 is a perfect example of an equalisation measure 
that was incorporated into the law to mitigate the losses caused by lawful state action. This section 
provides that ‘ [a]ny person  who has applied for a licence in terms of section 43 in respect of an existing 
lawful water use as contemplated in section 32 and whose application has been refused or who has been 
granted a licence for a lesser use than the existing lawful water use, resulting in severe prejudice to the 
economic viability of an undertaking in respect of which the water was beneficially used, may subject to 
subsections (7) and (8) claim compensation for any financial loss suffered in consequence’. This 
provision does not compensate a person for the loss of a water-use license but rather for the financial 
loss caused by the lawful state action. The provision makes it clear that any form of financial loss will not 
be compensated. Compensation will only be paid if the state action threatens the ‘economic viability’ of a 
business that has become dependent on its water-use licence.  Explained differently, this provision only 
provides for compensation in the case of overly excessive interferences with property rights. Likewise, 
section 19 of the Animal Diseases Act 35 of 1984 provides for the payment of compensation to farmers 
who had to slaughter their cattle because they have become infected with a contagious disease. The 
amount paid is aimed at reducing the burden that farmers have to bear because of lawful state action. 
See in this regard Minister of Agriculture and others v Bluelilliesbush Dairy Farming and another 2008 (5) 
SA 522 (SCA). See in this regard Van der Walt Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 281. 
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relevant in Penn Central Transportation Company v City of New York231 will also 
amount to equalisation measures. 
The Heritage Resources Act incorporates two provisions that might reduce the 
burden imposed on land owners. In terms of section 40(1) the South African Heritage 
Resources Agency (SAHRA) ‘may provide financial assistance in the form of a grant 
or a loan to an approved body or individual for any project which contributes to the 
purpose, and is in accordance with the principles prescribed’.232 Section 40 also 
determines that the SAHRA must prescribe the procedures for applications for 
‘approval and granting of financial assistance and the criteria for the assessment of 
projects.’233 The second provision, section 42, provides for the conclusion of heritage 
agreements between the owner and the heritage authorities. These agreements may 
provide for ‘financial or other assistance from the heritage authority concerned’;234 
maintenance and management of the place;235 or the payment of any expenses 
incurred by the owner in connection with the maintenance of the property.236 Whether 
or not these provisions will qualify as equalisation measures is open to debate. On 
the one hand, a South African might find that sections 40(1) and 42 provide the 
owner with relief in the circumstance where the Heritage Resources Act authorises 
excessive interferences with his property rights. In this sense both these provisions 
can be seen as equalisation measures. On the other hand, these provisions are very 
general and do not circumscribe the instances when owners would actually be 
entitled to some form of assistance. German law requires that equalisation measures 
should be created to prevent the imposition of disproportionate burdens in specific 
circumstances. However, a general compensation provision will not qualify as an 
Ausgleich measure237 because, if vague and general provisions are considered 
                                                            
231 438 US 104 (1978). See the discussion of this case in chapter 4, section 4 4 3. 
232 Section 40(1) of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999. 
233 Section 40(2) of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999. 
234 Section 42(2) of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999.  
235 Section 42(9)(a) of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999. 
236 Section 42(9)(h) of the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999. 
237 BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] para 98. 
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equalisation measures another problem can arise, namely whether they cover all the 
losses that a land owner can suffer in extreme cases.  
Finally, once a land owner has considered the issue of substantive arbitrariness he 
can proceed to determine whether the heritage authority’s decision to deny the 
demolition permit was fair on administrative law grounds. However, the courts are 
generally unwilling to find that the heritage authority’s decision to refuse a section 34(1) 
demolition permit is wrong.238 This does not mean that the courts will rubberstamp 
unreasonable decisions made by these authorities. A court will review a heritage 
authority’s refusal to grant a demolition permit if a litigant can show that the decision 
does not accord with the goals of the Act, that it is not reasonably supported by the facts 
of the case, or if it was not reasonable in view of the reasons given for that decision.239 
The reason for this is that the court must respect the policy decisions made by the 
heritage authorities that have expertise in the field of historic preservation. 
Nevertheless, the heritage authority’s decision can be challenged on the ground that it 
fails to meet the standards set for just administrative action in section 33 of the 
Constitution as given effect to in the Heritage Resources Act240 and the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.  
The subsidiarity principle requires of an aggrieved land owner to first exhaust 
remedies provided by the authorising legislation before relying on a constitutional 
provision. Section 49 of the Heritage Resources Act enables land owners to launch an 
appeal to an independent tribunal against any decision taken by the heritage authorities. 
                                                            
238 Corrans v Mec for the Department of Sport, Recreation, Arts and Culture, Eastern Cape, and others 
2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) paras 21-22. 
239 Corrans v Mec for the Department of Sport, Recreation, Arts and Culture, Eastern Cape, and others 
2009 (5) SA 512 (ECG) para 22 citing Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and 
others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para 48. 
240 Section 10 of Act 25 of 1999 sets out general principles of procedure that are applicable to any 
decision regarding the administration and management of the national estate including any decision to 
‘formally protect a heritage resource by notice in the Gazette or Provincial Gazette’ or to ‘issue or not to 
issue a permit’ and any decision ‘taken by any person or authority to whom an appeal is made’. The 
principles listed in section 10(2) include that a person who may be affected by a decision has the right to 
appear at a meeting and written reasons must be given for any decision upon request. 
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A land owner can apply for the review of the heritage authority’s decision in terms of 
section 6 of PAJA, once he has exhausted internal remedies.241 Possible grounds for 
review can include procedural fairness,242 rationality243 and that the decision was taken 
in bad faith244 or arbitrarily or capriciously.245 Similarly, in Provincial Heritage Resources 
Authority, Eastern Cape v Gordon,246 the court confirmed that a property owner must 
submit a new application for a demolition permit, where a previous application was 
unsuccessful and where, after the lapse of three months, the heritage authority had not 
placed the building under formal protection as prescribed by section 34(2) of the Act. A 
land owner can challenge the heritage authority’s failure to make a decision247 on the 
basis of PAJA in the instance where the heritage authority continuously fails to grant a 
demolition permit. 
In conclusion, heritage preservation is legitimate exercise of the state’s police 
power and a range of limitations can be imposed on property rights for historic 
preservation purposes. Ownership is not an absolute right and it is accompanied by 
certain obligations, some of which are circumscribed in legislation. The ownership of a 
listed building is for example, accompanied by the obligation to preserve unique 
characteristics of that structure. Viewed from this perspective it is clear that limitations 
imposed on ownership for historic preservation purposes will not necessarily amount to 
an unconstitutional interference with property rights. Nevertheless, there may be rare 
instances where the limitation on the owner’s right to demolish an historic structure will 
amount to an unconstitutional deprivation of property rights.    
                                                            
241 Section 7(2)(a) of the PAJA provides that a court or a tribunal will not review administrative action on 
the grounds of the PAJA unless internal remedies provided for in ‘any other law have first been 
exhausted’. The implication is that land owners would only be able to launch review proceedings in terms 
of the PAJA once he has launched a section 49 appeal. 
242 Section 6(2)(c) of Act 3 of 2000. 
243 Sections 6(2)(f)(ii)(aa)-(dd) of Act 3 of 2000. 
244 Section 6(2)(e)(v) of Act 3 of 2000. 
245 Section 6(2)(e)(vi) of Act 3 of 2000.  
246 2005 (2) SA 283 (E). 
247 Section 6(3)(a) and (b) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 provides that the 
failure of administrator to make a decision is a ground for review.  
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When scrutinising the constitutionality of a deprivation, one must first determine 
whether the specific interference with property rights is authorised by the law of general 
application. Authorisation was not an issue in the discussion above because the 
Heritage Resources Act enables the heritage authorities to deny demolition permits for 
listed buildings or, in the case of section 34(1), buildings that are older than 60 years. 
However, there may be instances where the Heritage Resources Act authorises a 
substantively arbitrary deprivation of property because the effect of the decision to deny 
the demolition permit excessively interferes with property rights, without adequate 
reason. This means that there may be instances where a court can find that the 
Heritage Resources Act is invalid insofar as it authorises the heritage authorities to 
impose substantively arbitrary deprivations of property on land owners. Such an 
outcome is undesirable because the Heritage Resources Act fulfils an important 
function, namely it enables the preservation of the South African heritage. German law 
equalisation measures may prevent an act from being declared unconstitutional insofar 
as it imposes disproportionate burdens on land owners. Equalisation measures, 
specifically incorporated into the authorising legislation, are crafted to alleviate the 
burdens imposed on land owners. The Heritage Resources Act includes two provisions 
which resemble equalisation-style measures. These provisions may, in some instances 
preclude a finding of substantive arbitrariness. However, there also may be instances 
where these provisions are inadequate insofar as they do not cater for the extent of the 
losses suffered by the land owner. Further research is necessary to determine the exact 
nature of equalisation measures in the South African context. 
Instead of following the section 25(1) substantive arbitrariness route, a land owner 
may impugn the heritage authority’s decisions to deny a demolition permit on 
administrative law grounds. For example, if a land owner is concerned with the 
procedural aspects of the decision-making process he may have a remedy in terms of 
the Heritage Resources Act, or alternatively, PAJA.  
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5 4 The demolition of unlawfully occupied buildings 
5 4 1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 described the way in which demolition powers have been abused in the past 
to further the race-based spatial segregation ideals of the apartheid government. That 
chapter specifically referred to legislation, such as the notorious Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act 52 of 1951 (PISA), which required of local authorities and private land 
owners to demolish structures under the auspices of health, safety and planning 
regulation. PISA further inflated land owners’ common law eviction and demolition 
powers by enabling them to raze structures that were erected or occupied on their land 
without their consent, even though they had not obtained a court order. These 
structures were often occupied by poor black South Africans who had moved to urban 
areas in search of employment. The actions of the local authorities and private land 
owners were usually not scrutinised by the courts, since PISA ousted their jurisdiction to 
hear eviction and demolition cases unless it could be shown that the occupier had a 
right or title to the land.248  
Against this background chapter 2 showed that the eviction from, or the demolition 
of a person’s home, is now a constitutional issue. Section 26(3) of the Constitution 
states:  
‘[n]o one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without 
an order of court made after considering all relevant circumstances. No legislation 
may permit arbitrary evictions.’ 
The Prevention of Illegal Eviction of Unlawful Occupiers Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) was 
enacted to give effect to section 26(3). With reference to the series of Olivia Road249 
                                                            
248 Section 3B(4)(a) of Act 72 of 1977. Section 3B(4)(a) formed the centre of the dispute in Vena v George 
Municipality 1987 (4) SA 29 (C); George Municipality v Vena and another 1989 (2) SA 263 (A); Mpisi v 
Trebble 1992 (4) SA 100 (N) and Mpisi v Trebble 1994 (2) SA 136 (A). 
249 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 (1) SA 78 (W); City of 
Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 (6) SA 417 (SCA) and Occupiers of 51 Olivia 
Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and others 2008 (3) 
SA 208 (CC). 
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and Blue Moonlight250 cases, chapter 2 described how section 26(3) and PIE affect a 
land owner’s right to obtain an eviction order and, by implication a demolition order, for 
an unlawfully occupied inner-city building. That chapter concluded that an owner of an 
occupied building will not always convince the court to order the eviction of unlawful 
occupiers, even if all PIE requirements have been complied with. The reason for this is 
that the court will take a range of factors into account when determining whether it 
would be just and equitable to order the eviction of the occupiers. These factors can, for 
example, include the apartheid abuses of eviction and demolition powers and the fact 
that eviction will render occupiers homeless. The delay in the demolition of a decaying 
structure under such circumstances may have serious consequences for a property 
owner who might not be able to afford the cost of restoring or maintaining the building or 
who planned on developing the stand once the old structure had been demolished. 
With reference to the Olivia Road cases, chapter 2 further explained how section 
26(3), read with section 26(1) and (2)251 of the Constitution impacts on local authorities’ 
duties to enforce health and safety legislation in urban areas. Chapter 2 concluded that 
a local authority cannot perform its health and safety duties in isolation from its duty to 
provide the poor and vulnerable with access to adequate housing.252 In particular, local 
authorities must comply with the requirements set for a lawful eviction in PIE before they 
can proceed to demolish unhealthy and unsafe structures. A court has the discretion to 
grant an eviction order if it is just and equitable to do so after it had considered all 
                                                            
250 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another 2009 (1) SA 
470 (W); Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) and City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and another 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA). 
251 Section 26(1) of the Constitution determines that ‘[e]veryone has the right to have access to adequate 
housing.’ Section 26(2) determines that the state must take ‘reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation’ of the right to access to adequate 
housing. 
252 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg and others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) para 44. See the discussion in chapter 2, section 2 3 2 3. 
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relevant circumstances.253 This implies that the court will not necessarily be persuaded 
to order the eviction of unlawful occupiers – to enable the demolition of the decaying 
structure – purely because of unhealthy and dangerous circumstances.254  
The constitutional analysis in this section comprises of three parts. It firstly focuses 
on the interaction between property owners’ section 25(1) rights, which they hold in 
relation to their unlawfully occupied building or land, and the occupiers’ section 26(3) 
rights. This section is written from the land owners’ perspective and it shows that a court 
must conduct a two-stage constitutional enquiry when section 25(1) property rights and 
section 26(3) rights are in conflict. The first stage of the enquiry involves the balancing 
of land owners’ section 25(1) rights with the unlawful occupiers’ section 26(3) rights. In 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers255 the Constitutional Court explained 
that: 
‘[t]he judicial function in these circumstances is not to establish a hierarchical 
arrangement between the different interests involved, privileging in an abstract and 
mechanical way the rights of ownership over the right not to be dispossessed of a 
home, or vice versa. Rather it is to balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in 
as just a manner as possible taking account of all the interests involved and the 
specific factors relevant in each particular case’.256 
A court must proceed to the second stage of the enquiry once it has considered all the 
relevant circumstances as prescribed in PIE and when it finds that it cannot order the 
eviction of the unlawful occupiers. In the second stage of enquiry, the court must apply 
the FNB methodology to establish whether the continued unlawful occupation of the 
owners’ land or buildings amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of the land owner’s 
                                                            
253 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 29. See further, 
section 4 and 6 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction of Unlawful Occupiers Act 19 of 1998. 
254 This was confirmed in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) 
para 25 and Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg and others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) illustrate that a range of factors can influence the courts 
discretion in relation to eviction proceedings. See the discussion of the latter case in chapter 2, section 2 
3 2 3. 
255 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
256 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 23. 
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property. This section applies the FNB methodology to the Blue Moonlight cases to 
determine whether an owner will be arbitrarily deprived of his property if the court delays 
the eviction of the unlawful occupiers. 
Secondly, this section determines when the local authority’s duty to enforce health 
and safety legislation trumps property owners’ section 25(1) rights and occupiers’ 
section 26 rights. Finally, the constitutional analysis considers the rights of the occupiers 
of inner-city buildings. This section specifically considers whether the unlawful occupiers 
of unhealthy and unsafe inner-city buildings possess constitutional property interests in 
those structures, as prescribed by FNB. One can continue to determine whether the 
eviction will cause an arbitrary deprivation of the occupiers’ property if it is found that 
they have constitutional property interests in the structures that they occupy. Case law 
has confirmed that not all the occupiers of buildings destined for demolition are 
unlawful.257 It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether the lawful occupiers will be 
arbitrarily deprived of property when they have been evicted and the building is 
demolished. 
 
5 4 2 The owners of unlawfully occupied buildings 
5 4 2 1 Balancing section 25 and section 26(3) rights 
It is clear that when it comes to the demolition of unlawfully occupied structures, two 
competing constitutional rights become relevant, namely the land owner’s section 25(1) 
rights and the unlawful occupiers’ section 26(3) rights. In the renowned case of Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (Port Elizabeth Municipality)258 the 
Constitutional Court explained how a court should resolve a dispute where private 
property rights clash with the unlawful occupiers’ right not to be arbitrarily evicted from 
their home. The court firstly sketched the historical and constitutional context against 
which evictions disputes should be adjudicated. It explained that homelessness can to 
some extent be ascribed to the apartheid government’s abuse of the demolition and 
                                                            
257 City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 10. 
258 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). Refer to Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law (2005) 424-426 and 
to Van der Walt AJ Property in the margins (2009) 154 for a discussion of this renowned case. 
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eviction powers that were created in legislation such as the Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act 52 of 1951 (PISA). Section 26(3) was adopted to address the injustices 
brought about by apartheid policies259 and PIE was enacted with the ‘objective of 
overcoming the above abuses and ensuring that evictions in future took place in a 
manner consistent with the values of the new constitutional dispensation’.260 PIE has to 
be interpreted against this historical and constitutional background.261 Moreover, PIE 
must be understood and applied within ‘a defined and carefully calibrated constitutional 
matrix’.262 Both section 25 and section 26 of the Constitution form an integral part of this 
constitutional matrix. The court explained in relation to section 25 that racist laws during 
the apartheid era blatantly disregarded property rights. By contrast, the new 
constitutional era requires of the state and private persons to fully respect property 
rights. These rights should also be understood in the context of the need ‘for the orderly 
opening-up or restoration of secure property rights for those denied access to, or 
deprived of them in the past.’263 Section 26(3) confirms that one should have respect for 
a person’s place of abode and it acknowledges that a home is more than just a shelter 
but a ‘place of personal intimacy and family security’.264 The courts must establish a 
constitutional relationship between section 25 (property rights) and section 26 (housing 
rights) of the Constitution.265  
There are three features of the manner in which the Constitution approaches the 
tension between land hunger, homelessness and respect for property rights.266 Firstly, 
the ‘rights of the dispossessed in relation to land are not generally delineated in 
unqualified terms as rights intended to be immediately self-enforcing’.267 Legislation has 
been enacted to gradually strengthen tenure rights, to make land available and to 
                                                            
259 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) paras 8-11. 
260 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) paras 11-14. 
261 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 11. 
262 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 14. 
263 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 15. 
264 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 17. 
265 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 19. 
266 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 20. 
267 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 20. 
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provide adequate housing progressively. The Constitution does not permit the arbitrary 
seizure of land by the homeless or the state.268 Secondly, section 26(3) acknowledges 
that people can be evicted from their homes, even if it results in them becoming 
homeless.269 Finally, section 26(3) emphasises the need for the court to find concrete 
case-specific solutions for the complicated disputes that can arise.270 The Constitution 
essentially imposes new obligations on a court when it comes to adjudicating an 
eviction case where section 25(1) and section 26 rights clash. In particular, the court 
cannot automatically give preference to ownership rights. The Constitution created a 
new and equally relevant right, namely the right not to be arbitrarily evicted from one’s 
home. It is the duty of the court to reconcile and balance section 25(1) and 26 rights 
once it has taken all the relevant circumstances and case-specific factors into 
account.271 PIE is the legislative guide that assists the courts in adjudicating these 
disputes.272 
Port Elizabeth Municipality indicates that, in a dispute of this kind, ownership will 
not necessarily weigh more than unlawful occupiers’ section 26(3) rights and that each 
case has to be determined with reference to its unique set of facts and circumstances. 
The situation can arise where, after considering all the relevant circumstances, the court 
finds that it is not just and equitable to order the eviction of the occupiers. In such 
instances, the court will have the discretion to delay the eviction until a later stage. This 
means that at the moment of the enquiry, the occupiers’ section 26(3) rights outweigh 
the owner’s section 25(1) rights. For example, the high court in Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another,273 held that it 
                                                            
268 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 20. 
269 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 21. 
270 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 21. 
271 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 23. 
272 This approach was set out in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 
(CC) and was followed in City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 2007 (1) SA 78 
(W) and Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and 
others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) (Olivia Road). See the discussion of the latter decision in chapter 2, section 
2 3 2 3. 
273 2009 (1) SA 470 (W). 
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could not even hear the application for eviction, since it would be unable to determine 
whether it would be just and equitable to evict the unlawful occupiers from the 
applicant’s property. This could be ascribed to the fact that the city had not provided the 
court with a report where it explained how it would accommodate the evictees.  
As explained above, the continued unlawful occupation of private property can 
place a great burden on the owner insofar as he is unable to use or to develop that 
property. Moreover, the continued unlawful occupation of a property can impose an 
additional financial burden on the owner. He would not only be unable to use his 
property, either for himself or to generate income, but he would also have to maintain 
that building and perhaps even pay for amenities used by the occupiers. It is necessary 
to determine whether an owner will be deprived of property if he has applied for an 
eviction order, but where the court finds that it is neither just nor equitable to order the 
eviction of the occupiers. Furthermore, if there is a deprivation of property, it is 
necessary to establish whether that deprivation complies with section 25(1).  
 
5 4 2 2 Arbitrary deprivation of property  
In Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and 
another,274 the court explained that section 26 of the Constitution does not permit the 
state to ‘either abdicate or thrust its responsibilities to provide adequate housing onto 
the private sector, nor does it suggest that the private sector is obliged to itself 
indefinitely provide housing without compensation’.275 The court does have the 
discretion under section 4 of PIE to temporarily delay the eviction of the unlawful 
occupiers from private land. The exact period of delay depends on the circumstances of 
the case.276 Apart from Modderklip, there has been no definite indication of when the 
delay in eviction will disproportionately burden the owner. Although Blue Moonlight is 
not a perfect example of substantive arbitrariness in a dispute concerning the unlawful 
occupation of private land, there are certain features of the case that will shed some 
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light on this particular issue. Blue Moonlight is also significant because of the 
controversy surrounding the constitutional damages awarded to the owner of the 
building by the South Gauteng High Court.277 This discussion therefore draws from Blue 
Moonlight to show that an owner is deprived of property when the court delays the 
eviction of unlawful occupiers. Furthermore, with reference to Blue Moonlight the 
discussion below delineates some of the factors that may be relevant when determining 
whether the delay in eviction constitutes a substantively arbitrary deprivation of 
property.  
According to the FNB methodology, one must determine whether a land owner is 
deprived of property when a court delays the eviction of unlawful occupiers because it 
decides that it is not just or equitable to grant the eviction order. One can proceed to 
scrutinise the continued unlawful occupation of land in light of section 25(1), if it is found 
that it amounts to a deprivation of property. This means that one must ascertain whether 
the deprivation is imposed in terms of law of general application, and further, whether 
that specific interference with property rights is, in fact, authorised by that law. Once this 
has been established, one can proceed to determine whether the deprivation is 
substantially arbitrary because the law of general application does not provide ‘sufficient 
reason for the particular deprivation in question or is procedurally unfair’.278 
It has already been explained that, at the first hearing of the Blue Moonlight case, 
the court decided that it could not even hear the application for eviction because the 
city’s housing plan would not accommodate the evictees. The court could only 
determine whether it was just and equitable to evict the occupiers once it was certain 
that the city would at least provide the unlawful occupiers with temporary alternative 
accommodation. This in effect meant that at that stage of the dispute, the owner was 
expected to indefinitely tolerate the occupiers on its property. Stated differently, there 
was not an exact time when the unlawful occupation of the property would come to an 
                                                            
277 Refer to chapter 2, section 2 3 for a comprehensive discussion of this case. 
278 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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end. During the second round of the eviction proceedings,279 the South Gauteng High 
Court emphasised that Blue Moonlight had purchased the unlawfully occupied property 
for redevelopment purposes which required the demolition of the existing structures. 
These structures, consisting of a factory, office block and outbuildings, were in 
particularly derelict state.280 In fact, the owner had received a notice from the local 
authority calling on it to ensure that its property met the health and safety standards set 
in legislation.281 Moreover, Blue Moonlight was forced to forego use of its land at no 
cost, which meant that it could not even make a return on its investment. Essentially, 
Blue Moonlight had been ‘deprived’ of the right to use and to develop its property.282 
The court concluded that ‘without the ability to evict, there is no realistic prospect that 
Blue Moonlight can regain possession of its property. Effectively the property will be 
lost’.283 As a result, the court ordered the eviction of the occupiers, but it suspended the 
operation of the order for a three-month period. It further held that it was bound by the 
Modderklip284 decisions and ordered the city to pay the owner constitutional damages 
equivalent to the loss of rental income for the time that the building was unlawfully 
occupied. 
In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 
(Pty) Ltd and another, 285 the Supreme Court of Appeal postponed the operation of the 
                                                            
279 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010). Refer to chapter 2, section 2 3 3 1 for a discussion of this case.  
280 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 167. 
281 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 21. 
282 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 162. 
283 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 190. 
284 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; (Agri SA and 
Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae); President of the Republic of South Africa and others v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2004 (6) SA 40 
(SCA) and President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). 
285 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA). 
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eviction order for an additional two-month period. The court also set aside the South 
Gauteng High Court’s finding (on the basis of the Modderklip decision) that the city was 
liable to pay constitutional damages.286 Specifically, the court reasoned that the Blue 
Moonlight differed from the Modderklip decision, because in the former case the owner 
obtained an eviction order which would not be difficult to enforce.287 By contrast, the 
sheer number of occupiers and nonchalant attitude of the police and local authority 
made it practically impossible for the Modderklip owner to evict the occupiers. Unlike the 
owner in Modderklip, the owner in Blue Moonlight would have the full use and 
enjoyment of his property once the occupiers were evicted. Another fundamental 
difference was that the Modderklip owner was the victim of blatant land invasion and it 
took immediate steps to procure the eviction order. The owner in Blue Moonlight had 
purchased the property at a time when it was already occupied. It appears as if the 
Supreme Court of Appeal was of the view that on the one hand, the Blue Moonlight 
owner was, to some extent, responsible for its own fate. Modderklip on the other hand, 
had no control over its circumstances and it had no means to protect its property 
interests. The court concluded that it was, as a result, justifiable to order the 
constitutional damages in the case of Modderklip but not in the case of Blue Moonlight.  
One can argue that in the case of Blue Moonlight the land owner was, at least 
temporarily, deprived of a property interest for purposes of section 25(1) because the 
unlawful occupation of the property interfered with the owner’s right to use and to exploit 
the land for commercial purposes. This argument is supported by the fact that the 
property was of an industrial nature, purchased for purposes of redevelopment. 
However, because of the unlawful occupation of its property, the land owner had to 
postpone its demolition and redevelopment plans. This was problematic because the 
owner had received a local authority notice calling on it to remove the dangerous 
conditions that existed on its property by either demolishing the structures or restoring 
                                                            
286 For a discussion of this aspect of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment, refer to chapter 2, section 
2 3 3 2. 
287 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and another 
2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA) paras 70-73. 
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the buildings.288 Failure of the owner to comply with the notice amounted to an offence 
under the relevant by-law.289 The applicant contended that it was economically unviable 
to restore the building so that it met the requisite statutory standards.290 Furthermore, 
the continued unlawful occupation of its property placed a financial burden on the owner 
since it was unable to realise its investment. Finally, the land owner submitted that 
contrary to the arguments laid before the court, it had not received any rental payments 
from the occupiers. Accordingly, it could not be said that the applicant had consented to 
the occupation of the structures.291 Collectively, these factors indicate that the 
temporary unlawful occupation of the land constituted a deprivation of Blue Moonlight’s 
property interests. This deprivation was imposed by the respective courts when they 
postponed the eviction of the occupiers on the basis of PIE.292 The deprivation – the 
delay in the enforcement of an eviction order – was authorised by law of general 
application, namely PIE. The next step is to determine whether, after the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s decision, it can be said that Blue Moonlight was deprived of property 
in a manner that was substantively arbitrary.       
As stated above, a deprivation of Blue Moonlight’s property interests will be 
substantively arbitrary if there is insufficient reason for that deprivation. FNB made it 
explicit that ‘sufficient reason’ has to be established with reference to the complexities of 
the relationships involved in the dispute.293 The Constitutional Court in FNB further 
provided eight contextual factors that are relevant in a substantive arbitrariness 
                                                            
288 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 21. 
289 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 21. 
290 2009 (1) SA 470 (W) para 18. 
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292 Section 4 of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
regulates evictions at the instance of private land owners. Section 4(6) provides that the courts may order 
the eviction if it finds that it is just and equitable to do so after having considered all the relevant 
circumstances. Section 4(8) further enables the court to determine the date when the eviction order 
should be enforced. 
293 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
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enquiry.294 Specifically, one must consider the relationship between the means (the 
deprivation) and the end (the purpose of the deprivation) and further, the relationship 
between the purpose of the deprivation and the person that is affected. As explained 
above, the Blue Moonlight owner was deprived of its right to use and exploit its property 
from the time when he first attempted to obtain an eviction order (October 2007)295 until 
the eviction order was granted and finally enforced (July 2011).296 The purpose of the 
deprivation was to enable the court to give effect to the unlawful occupiers’ section 
26(1) rights as circumscribed in PIE. In particular, the delay in eviction afforded the local 
authority time to show to the court, by way of a report, how it would accommodate not 
only the Blue Moonlight occupiers, but other unlawful occupiers in future once they were 
evicted from private land.297 The intent of the court was to compel the city to reconsider 
and restructure its existing resources and housing policies more actively. This measure 
was necessary to facilitate the dynamic involvement of the city in resolving the inner-city 
housing shortage. The period of delay further enabled the unlawful occupiers to make 
their own attempt at locating alternative accommodation.298   
When considering the relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and the 
affected person, one should take into account that Blue Moonlight purchased the 
property at a time when it was already unlawfully occupied. Blue Moonlight was 
therefore aware of the fact that it would have had to obtain an eviction order, which 
would not necessarily have been a speedy process, before it could proceed with its 
redevelopment plans. In this regard, the court of first instance explained that ‘under the 
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new constitutional dispensation evictions have taken on a new character in that a 
landowner cannot enforce his property rights as and when he likes’.299 Blue Moonlight 
was, in other words, not an ‘innocent victim of land invasion’,300 but rather a property 
developer who bought the property, perhaps bargaining on a reduced price, conscious 
of the fact that it was unlawfully occupied. Accordingly, there is a strong relationship 
between the court’s attempts to protect the interests of the unlawful occupiers and Blue 
Moonlight.  
FNB further requires one to consider the relationship between the purpose of the 
deprivation, the nature of the property and the extent of the deprivation in relation to 
such property.301 The deprivation constituted a considerable interference with property 
rights. However, the unlawful occupation of Blue Moonlight’s property was temporary. 
There was no indication that the owner would have struggled to enforce the eviction 
order. The owner would have been able to continue with its demolition and 
redevelopment plans once the eviction order was executed on the stipulated date. 
Given the significant purpose of the deprivation (protecting the interests of vulnerable 
and poor occupiers) and the circumstances under which Blue Moonlight purchased the 
property, this deprivation – although extensive – does not appear to be an overly 
excessive interference with property rights.  
FNB states that there has to be a more compelling purpose to justify a deprivation 
if it relates to land and corporeal movables than in the instance where the property is 
something else. The deprivation in question did affect the owner’s right to enjoy and 
exploit his land. Nevertheless, taking into account the centrality of the availability of land 
and the concomitant issue of homeless in the post-apartheid context, the purpose 
fulfilled by the deprivation was, under the circumstances, comparatively more important 
that the protection of the land owner’s use entitlement. Likewise FNB provides that there 
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470 (W) para 42. 
300 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and another 
2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA) para 71. 
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will have to be a more compelling purpose for the deprivation if it embraces all the 
incidents of ownership than in the instance where it only embraces some ownership 
entitlements.302 The paragraphs above have already underscored the importance of 
safeguarding the interests of the unlawful occupiers by delaying the eviction 
proceedings. It suffices to say that the deprivation in question, although impacting on 
the ownership of land, did not affect ownership in its entirety. Rather, the deprivation 
temporarily suspended the owner’s right to commercial exploitation of its property. By 
contrast, the immediate eviction of the unlawful occupiers would have resulted in their 
becoming homeless. Alternatively, summary eviction could even have resulted in the 
occupiers seeking shelter in yet another privately-owned building only to face eviction at 
a later stage yet again.  
Finally, FNB prescribes that it might be necessary to conduct either a rationality or 
a proportionality enquiry into the means and ends depending on the interplay between 
the purpose of the deprivation, nature of the property and extent of the deprivation. With 
reference to the arguments set out above, one can argue that in the case of Blue 
Moonlight that, by delaying the eviction process, the respective courts did not impose a 
disproportionate burden on the land owner. Admittedly, the deprivation had far-reaching 
consequences for Blue Moonlight since it had to delay its redevelopment plans for about 
three and a half years. Blue Moonlight was also unable to put its property to any other 
income-producing use during the period of unlawful occupation. However, this burden is 
offset by the fact that Blue Moonlight had known that the property was unlawfully 
occupied when it purchased the land and that it was aware (or should have been aware) 
of the fact that eviction disputes often take years to resolve, especially if, as in this case, 
the unlawful occupiers are relatively settled. By postponing the eviction, the court 
safeguarded the unlawful occupiers’ right to a dignified livelihood. In this case, the Blue 
Moonlight owner’s commercial interests weighed less than the occupiers personal 
interests. Finally, another indication that the deprivation was not disproportional was 
that the owner was not completely deprived of his ownership entitlements since they 
were only deferred for the period of unlawful occupation. Blue Moonlight could presume 
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its commercial activities upon the eviction of the occupiers. To conclude, Blue Moonlight 
was not arbitrarily deprived of its property.  
Blue Moonlight shows that, whether or not an owner will be arbitrarily deprived of 
property when he cannot evict unlawful occupiers will depend on the unique 
circumstances of the case. From Blue Moonlight, one can isolate some of the factors 
that will be relevant in a substantive arbitrariness enquiry. A factor that will weigh in 
favour of a finding of arbitrariness is when there is no clear indication of whether the 
unlawful occupation of the land will ever come to an end, or where it is practically 
impossible to evict the occupiers because of their numbers and the duration of the 
occupation. Such a situation can arise where, as in Modderklip, the owner cannot 
enforce the eviction order because of circumstances beyond his control. Alternatively, a 
court can simply find that it is not just or equitable to order the eviction of the occupiers 
because of their personal circumstances. Another relevant factor is the impact that the 
unlawful occupation of land will have on the land owner. As in the Blue Moonlight case, 
this can refer to the economic or financial implications of the continued occupation of 
the building. In particular, it seems as if a court is more likely to find that the delay in 
eviction imposes an arbitrary deprivation of property if the owner no longer has any 
economic use for the land. Related considerations are the nature of the property and 
the reason why the owner holds that property, as well as the reason for not evicting the 
occupiers before. A court will, for example, take into account that the unlawfully 
occupied property is of an industrial nature which can only be put to more productive 
use once the occupiers are evicted. A court would arguably be less inclined to find that 
the owner was unconstitutionally deprived of property when as in Blue Moonlight the 
owner only holds the property for investment purposes. The same line of reasoning 
applies when the unlawfully occupied property forms part of several properties held for 
purely financial reasons. Other considerations are the duration of the unlawful 
occupation of the property and the circumstances under which the building became 
occupied. Specifically, a relevant factor would be whether the owner initially consented 
to the occupation of his building or chose to turn a blind eye to the unlawful occupiers 
on his land. This factor ties in with whether the owner had taken active steps to firstly, 
prevent the unlawful occupation of his land and, secondly, to secure the eviction of the 
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occupiers. A decisive factor in Blue Moonlight was that the owner purchased the already 
unlawfully occupied building and that it had not fallen victim to deliberate land invasion. 
Finally, a court will take into account that an owner had attempted to abandon his 
property.303 This is not a closed list of factors and any other facet of a case can 
influence the outcome of the substantive arbitrariness test.  
Clearly, there is no per se rule that dictates when the delay in eviction will impose 
a disproportionate burden on the owner. Each case will have to be analysed with 
reference to its case-specific circumstances. One can conclude that in the future there 
will be instances where the delay in eviction will result in an arbitrary deprivation of 
property, just as there will be cases where land owners will be expected to put up with a 
delay in evicting the occupiers. As explained above, Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers304 emphasised that the Constitution does not permit the arbitrary 
seizure of land by the state on behalf of homeless persons or arbitrary eviction of 
occupiers by land owners.305 The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful 
Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) was promulgated to protect both the rights of 
the occupiers and that of land owners. Nevertheless, PIE does not provide for the 
protection of land owners’ interests in instances where it is neither just nor equitable to 
order the eviction of the occupiers, or to permit the continued unlawful occupation of 
private property for a substantial period of time. Stated differently, PIE does not 
incorporate a mechanism that will alleviate the otherwise disproportionate burden that is 
imposed on the owner in some instances when the courts delay the eviction of the 
occupiers. The implication is that PIE can potentially authorise an substantively arbitrary 
deprivation of property that may give rise to a situation similar to what O’ Regan J had in 
mind in Reflect-All 1025 CC v Member of the Executive Council for Public Transport, 
                                                            
303 Refer to Sonnekus JC ‘Abandonnering van die eiendomsreg op grond en aanspreeklikheid vir 
grondbelasting’ 2004 TSAR 747-757 for an overview of the legal implications of abandoning land. 
304 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
305 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 20. 
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Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government (Reflect-All).306 The concomitant 
implication is that there is a possibility that PIE can be impugned in a constitutional 
challenge on the basis of section 25(1). Such a constitutional challenge can only be 
avoided if there is a way to assuage potentially disproportionate burdens that some 
owners will bear when the eviction order is not granted or cannot be enforced.  
In Modderklip the Supreme Court of Appeal attempted to mitigate the excessive 
interference with the owner’s property rights by awarding a constitutional damages 
order. Similarly, the South Gauteng High Court in Blue Moonlight307 attempted to 
alleviate what it perceived to be an unreasonable intrusion into property rights, by 
ordering the city to pay constitutional damages to the owner.308 These compensatory 
awards are similar to the German equalisation measures (Ausgleich)309 referred to in 
chapters 2 and 4, in that they were specifically crafted to ease the extreme interference 
with property rights caused by the continued unlawful occupation of the owners’ land.310 
The German equalisation measures are statutory creations designed to prevent the 
                                                            
306 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). Refer to section 5 1 2 for a discussion of the case. O’ Regan J decided that 
section 10(3) of the Gauteng Transport Infrastructure Act 8 of 2001 section 10(3) imposed an arbitrary 
deprivation of property insofar as it did not make provision for a periodic review process where the 
proposed road network could be scrutinised. O’ Regan was of the view that the inclusion of such a review 
process would prevent the legislative scheme from imposing disproportionate burdens on land owners.  
307 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010). 
308 In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and another 
2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA) the Supreme Court of Appeal set aside the South Gauteng High Court’s 
constitutional damages order because it did not consider Blue Moonlight’s burden disproportionate as 
was the case in Modderklip. 
309 Refer to Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 277-281 and 366-367 for an 
explanation of how German law incorporates equalisation payments to soften the effects of excessive 
regulatory interference into property rights. Van der Walt also explains how the compensatory award 
granted in Modderklip resembles equalization payments.  
310 Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 43-44. 
Chapter 4 referred to the infamous German case BVerfGE 100, 226 [1999] (the Rheinland-Pfälzisches 
Denkmalschutz-und-Pflegegesetz case), where the German Federal Constitutional Court explained how 
an equalisation measures would have prevented a heritage preservation law from imposing a 
disproportionate burden on property owner.  
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imposition of disproportionate burdens on land owners by a specific piece of 
legislation.311 A general compensation provision in legislation does not qualify as an 
Ausgleich measure. An equalisation sum should also be distinguished from 
compensation for the expropriation of property or delictual damages.312 An Ausgleich 
measure prevents lawful state action (taken in terms of legislation), with an otherwise 
important public function, from being declared unconstitutional.313 A properly drafted 
equalisation measure also provides a list of factors which indicates when a land owner’s 
burden will be too excessive. It will also show the court how to calculate the equalisation 
sum. 
The compensatory awards ordered by the South African courts are useful because 
they can be tailored to the specific circumstances of the case. It would, however, be 
more beneficial to incorporate an equalisation-style measure in PIE.314 There are 
several considerations that support this argument. As stated above, PIE should protect 
the rights of both the occupiers and the private land owner. An equalisation measure will 
extend the scope of the protection afforded to land owners and unlawful occupiers by 
PIE. Such a measure will enable the courts to prevent the state from arbitrarily seizing 
private property on behalf of the homeless. This in turn will enable the courts to protect 
the rights of the unlawful occupiers more effectively, since they would be able to remain 
on the property until they can be provided with other accommodation. Alternatively, they 
would be able to remain on the property until the local authority decides to expropriate 
the property for social housing purposes. The courts do not have the power to order the 
expropriation of private property but courts can indirectly compel the local authority to 
                                                            
311 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 366-367; Alexander GS The global debate 
over constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 236-239 and Van der Walt 
AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 43. 
312 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 367. See to the same effect, Alexander GS 
The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings jurisprudence (2006) 118 
and Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 42.  
313 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 278 and 367 and Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation 
of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 43. 
314 There are examples of equalisation-style measures that have been incorporated into South African 
legislation. Refer to section 5 3 2 footnote 230 in this regard. 
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consider the possibility of expropriation when it orders the payment of constitutional 
damages. Moreover, a carefully designed equalisation provision will provide more legal 
certainty. Currently, it is unclear as to when it is justified to order the payment of 
constitutional damages. An equalisation provision will circumscribe the instances when 
the courts would be able to grant a monetary award that will soften the effects of the 
continued unlawful occupation of private land. Finally, PIE fulfils an indispensable 
function as it was enacted to give practical effect to section 26(3) of the Constitution. 
The incorporation of an equalisation measure will prevent PIE from being declared 
unconstitutional insofar as it authorises the imposition of disproportionate burdens on 
land owners. 
In conclusion, private land owners’ section 25 rights and unlawful occupiers 
section 26(3) often clash. An owner would typically apply for an eviction order in terms 
of PIE when his land is unlawfully occupied. A court would conduct a balancing enquiry 
(as prescribed by Port Elizabeth Municipality) to determine whether it would be just and 
equitable to order the eviction of the occupiers. The court has the discretion to delay the 
eviction once it has considered all the relevant circumstances. This delay can, 
depending on the unique circumstances of the case, result in a substantively arbitrary 
deprivation of the land owner’s property rights. Furthermore, PIE has the potential to 
impose a substantively arbitrary deprivation of property insofar as it does not regulate 
the instance where it is neither just nor equitable to order the eviction of the occupiers or 
to permit the continued unlawful occupation of private land. In such instances, the South 
African courts have sometimes ordered the payment of constitutional damages in an 
attempt to protect land owners’ property rights. These compensatory awards are 
comparable to German equalisation payments. It would arguably be more beneficial to 
incorporate a German-style equalisation provision in PIE, since it will extend the 
protection afforded to both private land owners and unlawful occupiers by the Act. It will 
also provide more legal certainty, as it will circumscribe the instances when the delay in 
eviction will impose disproportionate burden on the owner. More importantly, the 
equalisation provision will prevent PIE from being challenged on the grounds that it 
authorises an arbitrary deprivation of property. 
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5 4 3 When will local authorities health and safety duties trump sections 25(1) and 
26(3) rights? 
There are instances where the local authorities’ statutory health and safety duties 
outweigh section 25(1) and section 26(3) rights.315 This would be where, for example, a 
building is so dangerous and dilapidated that it is necessary to request the owner to 
either renovate or demolish the structure. Section 12(1)(a) of the National Building 
Standards and Building Regulations Act 103 of 1977 (the Building Standards Act) 
provides that if a building is dilapidated or in a state of disrepair the local authority may 
by way of written notice request the owner to alter or to secure the building within a 
specified period of time so that it no longer poses a threat to the public. Alternatively, 
the local authority may request the owner to demolish the building.316 If the local 
authority is of the view that the building is so unsafe or dangerous, it can take ‘such 
steps’ without serving a notice and reclaim the costs of repair or demolition from the 
owner.317  
The demolition of a privately-owned structure at the instance of the local authority 
amounts to a deprivation of property. This deprivation does not raise an authority issue 
since section 12 authorises the local authority to take the relevant steps to remove 
health and safety threats caused by decaying buildings and building works, if necessary 
                                                            
315 Van der Walt AJ Constitutional property law 3 ed (2011) 214 explains that it is generally accepted that 
the state has the power to regulate property interests for purposes of public health and safety. The 
regulation can cause extensive losses for the property owner. These losses are not compensated 
because they affect all property owners in more or less the same way. A regulation will be 
unconstitutional in the circumstance when it places a disproportionate burden on the owner.  
316 In terms of section 12(4)(a) of Act 103 of 1977 the local authority can, by way of written notice, request 
the property owner to, within the specified period, remove any persons occupying a dangerous or 
dilapidated structure. 
317 Section 12(1)(a) of Act 103 of 1977. In terms of section 12(4)(b), the local authority can, by way of 
written notice, request any person occupying an unhealthy and unsafe building to vacate the premises 
within the specified time period. It is unclear whether this section should be read with section 21 of Act 
103 of 1977, which prescribes that the local authority can apply to the magistrate’s court for an order 
enabling it to demolish a building, if it is satisfied that the erection of the building ‘is contrary to or does not 
comply with the provisions of this Act or any approval or authorisation granted thereunder’.  
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by demolition. The next step is to determine whether the demolition of a building, at the 
instance of the local authority, amounts to a substantively arbitrary deprivation of 
property. 
A deprivation will be arbitrary if, in terms of FNB’s complex relationships test, it is 
found that the law of general application does not provide sufficient reason for that 
specific interference with property rights.318 FNB states that one must firstly consider the 
relationship between the deprivation and the purpose of the deprivation and further, the 
relationship between the purpose of the deprivation and the effect that it has on the land 
owner.319 There is a direct relationship between the demolition of the property (the 
deprivation) and the purpose of the deprivation, namely to ensure safe and healthy 
urban areas. A decaying building can not only pose a threat to the safety of the public 
and to the owner himself, but it can also disfigure the area where it is situated. 
Demolition is arguably the most effective way to remove this threat if the building cannot 
be altered to comply with health and safety by-laws. The effect that the demolition will 
have on the land owner is context specific. On the one hand, the removal of the 
structure can have far-reaching consequences for the owner; if he lives in the building, 
the demolition of the structure will result in the loss of his home. On the other hand, the 
owner might only hold the land for investment purposes. The demolition of the building 
in these circumstances will not necessarily have such a harsh effect on the owner. 
Importantly, demolition would only be a last resort measure and it is likely that the local 
authority would, on more than one occasion, have called on the owner to maintain his 
property according to the requisite standards. This means that the owner would have 
received prior warnings before his building was demolished. Furthermore, the owner 
does not have the right to use his property in a manner that harms others. The owner 
has an obligation to either maintain his property or, alternatively, demolish dangerous 
structures.  
                                                            
318 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
319 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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FNB further indicates that one should consider the relationship between the 
purpose of the deprivation, the nature of the property and the extent of the deprivation in 
relation to that property.320 If a dilapidated building is situated in a congested urban 
area, such as a central business district, it will pose an imminent threat to the public in 
general and to any person who might take up occupation in the structure. Demolition will 
be an efficient way to remove this danger in instances where the building cannot be 
renovated. The purpose of the deprivation, together with the nature of the property 
(buildings in overcrowded urban areas) weighs heavier than the protection of the land 
owner’s interest by allowing the building to stand. As stated above, it is unlikely that the 
local authority would request the demolition of a structure if it had not previously 
requested of the land owner to remedy the dangerous and unhealthy conditions created 
by his buildings. In overcrowded urban areas, where buildings are likely to become 
unlawfully occupied it is vital for the local authorities to remove the threat posed by 
unsafe and unhealthy buildings. In so doing, the local authorities protect the interests of 
marginalised persons who would attempt to take up occupation in the structure.       
The deprivation in question interferes with the ownership of land and, according to 
FNB321 there will have to be more compelling reasons to justify this deprivation than in 
instances where the property is something less extensive. In this instance there are 
weighty public interest considerations that will trump the land owner’s individual 
interests in the decaying structure. Demolition will significantly interfere with the land 
owner’s entitlements, but he will not neccessarily be deprived of all ownership 
entitlements. The land owner will still have the land available for development or 
speculation purposes. Moreover, the deprivation seeks to protect the lives and property 
of others and in the case of overcrowded urban areas (such as Johannesburg CBD), 
the lives of poor and vulnerable South Africans. By contrast, demolition may only have 
financial implications for land owner and it will not necessarily impact his livelihood in 
any significant way. The purpose of the deprivation, considering all the circumstances, 
                                                            
320 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
321 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
356 
is sufficiently compelling to justify the interference with ownership. These considerations 
ties in with the next FNB factor, namely that the there has to be more compelling reason 
for the deprivation if it embraces all the incidents of ownership. Whether the demolition 
of the structure embraces all the incidents of ownership is contingent on the case-
specific circumstances. If on the one hand, the land is purely held for speculation 
purposes, demolition will hardly impact on ownership entitlements. On the other hand, 
demolition can also encompass nearly all the incidents of ownership. An owner could, 
for example, have owned a flat in a building destined for demolition. In this instance, 
demolition will effectively deprive the owner of everything except a share in the land on 
which the building once stood. This deprivation may nevertheless be justified given the 
important purpose of the deprivation (the health and safety of the owner and the public 
in general), and the fact that demolition is typically a last resort measure. Collectively, 
the abovementioned considerations indicate that demolition will not amount to a 
substantively arbitrary deprivation of property.  
Importantly, a property owner might successfully prove that he was arbitrarily 
deprived of property if he can show that the local authority had previously not requested 
him to renovate his property. In such an instance the land owner may also have a 
remedy on the basis of procedural fairness and PAJA. The deprivation in question – the 
demolition of a dangerous and unhealthy structure – is caused by administrative action, 
the local authority’s decision to demolish the building. If an aggrieved land owner seeks 
an administrative justice remedy, he will have to show that the administrative action did 
not meet the requirements set out in the Building Standards Act or in Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). PAJA and procedural fairness may be the 
preferred remedy, in instances where the local authority failed to request of the land 
owner to remove the unhealthy conditions caused by his building. Similarly, PAJA, 
rather than section 25(1) may provide the basis for a more compelling case in instances 
where the building was demolished despite some procedural shortcoming or irregularity 
in the local authority’s decision-making process.  
As explained above, in Olivia Road the court confirmed that the local authority 
cannot perform its health and safety duties in isolation from its section 26 duties. The 
court further explained that it will no longer automatically grant eviction orders on proof 
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of unhealthy or unsafe circumstances. It will only order the eviction of the occupiers if it 
is just and equitable to do so after it has considered all relevant circumstances. It is 
beyond the scope of this study to determine when a building will be sufficiently 
dangerous for a court to order the eviction of the unlawful occupiers of that structure. It 
suffices to say that the section 26(3) rights of these occupiers will not be infringed if the 
local authority has followed the correct procedures, as set out in PIE, to obtain the 
eviction order. A local authority can specifically apply for an urgent eviction order in 
terms of section 5 of PIE if the continued occupation of the dangerous building poses an 
imminent threat to the lives of the occupiers.322 The unlawful occupiers’ section 26(3) 
rights will be infringed if they were evicted even though the local authority had not 
followed the necessary procedures. In such instances, the unlawful occupiers can have 
the local authority’s decision to evict set aside on review on the basis of one of the 
grounds listed in section 6 of PAJA. 
 
5 4 4 The occupiers of decaying inner-city buildings 
Case law has shown that unlawful occupiers can reside in inner-city buildings for years 
before they are evicted.323 They often invest money and labour to make these 
sometimes dilapidated and dangerous buildings habitable. This raises the question: do 
unlawful occupiers have a constitutional property interest in the building that they 
occupy? It is doubtful as to whether the unlawful occupation of a building will cause a 
                                                            
322 Urgent eviction orders are provided for in section 5 of Act 19 of 1998. Section 5(1)(a) provides that a 
property owner or the person in charge of land can apply for an urgent eviction order if there is a ‘real and 
imminent danger of substantial injury or damage to any person or property if the unlawful occupier is not 
forthwith evicted from the land’. In terms of section 5(2), the court must give written and effective notice of 
the intention of the owner or the person in charge to obtain an eviction order to the unlawful occupier and 
the municipality in whose jurisdiction the land is situated. Section 5(3) states that the notice must, 
amongst other things, indicate that the unlawful occupier is entitled to appear in court to defend the case 
and where necessary the occupier can apply for legal aid. 
323 In Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another 2009 (1) SA 
470 (W) the occupiers resided on the property for two years before the owner initiated eviction 
proceedings. 
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constitutional property interest to vest in the occupier. It is also unclear whether the 
creation of a constitutional property right would actually benefit the occupier. One can 
argue that unlawful occupier will lose the protection afforded to him by PIE if he 
possesses a constitutional property interest in the occupied property. The reason for 
this is that if he holds a constitutional property interest, his occupation of that building 
will become lawful. Furthermore, the onus would fall on the occupier to protect his 
constitutional property rights when he is evicted from the building. PIE, by contrast, 
places the onus on the local authority, or the owner of the building, to show that it would 
be just and equitable to order the eviction of the unlawful occupiers. Arguably, there are 
other provisions in the Bill of Rights (such as section 26 or section 33 of the 
Constitution) that adequately protect the rights of unlawful occupiers. Accordingly, it 
serves no purpose to declare that unlawful occupiers possess constitutional property 
rights in the structures that they occupy because their rights are adequately protected 
by section 26(3) and PIE.324  
One cannot assume that all the occupiers of buildings destined for demolition are 
unlawful occupiers. In City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others,325 
the court explained that at least ‘some’ of the occupiers are unlawful.326 One can 
deduce that the other occupiers were perhaps tenants or even owners of their 
respective units. It is also possible that some of the occupiers had some form of consent 
to remain on the property. Tenants or owners of decaying inner-city structures have 
constitutional property rights in buildings destined for demolition. The local authority’s 
decision to demolish causes a deprivation of these property rights. As explained in 
section 5 4 3 above, this deprivation does not give rise to an authorisation issue. The 
law of general application, section 12 of the Building Standards Act, authorises the local 
authority to take the necessary steps to remove health and safety threats brought about 
by dangerous and decaying structures, if necessary by way of demolition. One can 
accordingly proceed to determine whether the law of general application provides 
                                                            
324 Kellerman M The constitutional property clause and immaterial property interests unpublished LLD 
thesis Stellenbosch University (2010) 97-99. 
325 2007 (1) SA 78 (W). 
326 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 11. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
359 
sufficient reason for the deprivation. This has to be established with reference to the 
complexities of the relationships involved in the dispute. A court would have to analyse 
the interaction between the deprivation (demolition), the purpose of the deprivation 
(public health and safety), extent of the interference with property rights (demolition may 
result in the loss of a home), and nature of the property (residential in overcrowded 
urban area). In essence, the substantive arbitrariness enquiry will take on the same 
form as in section 5 4 3. Factors that will have a bearing on the outcome of this test is, 
for instance, whether the building could be altered or renovated to remove the 
dangerous conditions and, further, the immediacy of the danger posed by the structure. 
Whether or not the decision to demolish will amount to a substantively arbitrary 
deprivation of property depends on the balancing of the unique circumstances relevant 
to the dispute. Importantly, owners’ or tenants’ interests will have to yield to the greater 
public interest in a safe and healthy urban environment if a building cannot be 
renovated or altered (for whatever reason) and if it is so dangerous that it poses an 
imminent threat to the lives of others. In such instances, demolition will not amount to an 
arbitrary deprivation of property because there will be sufficient reason for the specific 
interference with property rights.  
Apart from the substantive arbitrariness enquiry, owners and tenants may have a 
remedy on the basis of administrative justice. The deprivation in question (the 
demolition of the structure) is caused by administrative action, the local authority’s 
decision to remove the threat posed by the building. As in section 5 4 3, an aggrieved 
land owner or tenant will have to show that the administrative action does not meet the 
requirements set out in the Building Standards Act or the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) if they want to attack the administrative action in terms of 
PAJA.  
 
5 5 Conclusion 
The underlying theme of this chapter is that the state has the power to regulate the 
ownership of land and property in the public interest. In so doing, the state can place 
far-reaching limitations on the exercise of ownership entitlements. Ownership is not an 
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absolute right and it has to yield to the prevailing needs of society. For example, 
legislation restricts the owner’s right to build on, or develop, his land. More specifically, 
zoning laws and conditions of title defines the nature of development on land. The 
National Building Standards and Building Regulations Act 103 of 1977 (the Building 
Standards Act) regulates the quality of building works undertaken by the land owner as 
it compels him to submit building plans for approval. Collectively, these mechanisms 
ensure the sustainable and harmonious development of towns and cities. Likewise, 
historic preservation laws curtail the land owner’s right to demolish or alter certain 
buildings because they have historic or cultural value. Furthermore, anti-eviction 
legislation such as the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of 
Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE), limits the owner’s right to obtain an eviction order insofar as 
it requires of him to temporarily tolerate the continued unlawful occupation of his land in 
certain instances. Logically, the unlawful occupation of land can have negative 
consequences for the owner, who would, for example, be unable to demolish buildings 
on the property so that he can continue to develop his land. This interference is 
nevertheless justified in light of the important role that anti-eviction laws play in the 
South African context.  
There are four aspects of this chapter, pertaining to the constitutionality of state 
interferences with property rights, which deserves a final mention. Firstly, it is imperative 
to emphasise that a deprivation will often not raise a constitutional issue because the 
law of general application does not, in fact, authorise the specific interference with 
property rights. This means that there are instances where it is unnecessary for litigants 
to rely on constitutional provisions such as section 25(1) and section 33 to protect their 
property rights from excessive state interferences. This would be where the regulatory 
law does not actually authorise the deprivation or the administrative action, which gave 
rise to the specific deprivation of property. In such instances, it is sufficient to argue that 
the particular interference with property rights was not authorised by the law of general 
application and that it is, therefore, unlawful. For example, section 5 2 3 2  argued that 
the local authority is unauthorised to approve building plans in conflict with conditions of 
title, restrictive covenants or other regulatory laws. The approval of plans under these 
circumstances, results in a deprivation of the neighbouring land owners’ constitutional 
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property rights. However, instead of arguing their case on the basis of section 25(1) or 
section 33, neighbouring land owners can simply show that the local authority acted 
beyond the powers created by the Building Standards Act. In so doing, neighbouring 
land owners can have the decision to approve the plans set aside because it was 
unlawful. In any event, the principle of subsidiarity precludes direct reliance on a 
constitutional right if legislation has been enacted to protect that right.  
Secondly, this chapter underscored the centrality of the FNB non-arbitrariness test 
in a section 25(1) enquiry. The FNB test is a nuanced text, which directs the courts to 
conduct an in-depth analysis of the complexities of the relationships involved in the 
dispute. It further directs the court to balance and reconcile the interests that are 
affected by the specific deprivation. In so doing, the court can determine when a 
regulatory law cannot be applied inflexibly because it leads to unjust and inequitable 
results. The FNB substantive arbitrariness enquiry showed that the demolition of the 
building in Camps Bay Ratepayers and Resident’s Association v Harrison (Camps 
Bay)327 would have disproportionately burdened the owner, even though her building 
was in principle partially illegal. Similarly, with reference to the FNB test, sections 5 3 
and 5 4 showed that the rigid enforcement of the National Heritage Resources Act of 25 
of 1999 (the Heritage Resources Act) and of PIE respectively, can result in the 
substantively arbitrary deprivation of property. The Heritage Resources Act enables the 
heritage authority to exercise its discretion in favour of denying the land owner’s 
application for a demolition permit, even if it deprives the owner of all economically 
viable use of his property. PIE provides that the court can order the eviction of occupiers 
from private land if it finds that it is just and equitable to do so once it has considered all 
the relevant circumstances. The court’s decision to not grant the eviction order can 
result in a substantively arbitrary deprivation of property if there is no clear indication of 
when the unlawful occupation of the land will cease. In both instances, the results of the 
substantive arbitrariness analysis led to the conclusion that PIE and the Heritage 
Resources Act may be vulnerable to constitutional attack on the basis of section 25(1). 
                                                            
327 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010). 
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This is regrettable since both acts address a specific need of society, namely the 
dignified treatment of unlawful occupiers and the preservation of heritage resources. 
Thirdly, this chapter highlighted the valuable role that equalisation measures can 
play in South African law. The Supreme Court of Appeal attempted to mitigate the 
otherwise excessive loss or harm caused by lawful state action when it ordered the 
state to pay constitutional damages to a land owner.328 These constitutional damages 
are comparable to the German equalisation payments which are specifically designed to 
prevent legislation from imposing disproportionate burdens on land owners.329 This 
chapter argued that it would be beneficial to incorporate equalisation provisions in 
legislation such as PIE and the Heritage Resources Act, because it would prevent a 
finding that these acts are unconstitutional on the basis of section 25(1). The courts 
cannot order the expropriation of property when a regulatory measure causes an 
excessive interference into property rights. Arguably, the courts can indirectly compel 
the state to consider or reconsider the possibility of expropriation when they order it to 
pay an equalisation sum to the affected land owner. Moreover, an equalisation measure 
will enable the courts to simultaneously protect the rights of the owner and to meet the 
goals set out in the specific act. For instance, the incorporation of an equalisation 
measure in PIE will allow the courts to better protect the rights of the owner and of the 
unlawful occupiers. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to determine the exact 
nature and scope of equalisation measures, but it suffices to say that there is a 
shortcoming in South African law insofar as it does not often incorporate statutory 
measures designed to mitigate excessive losses caused by otherwise legitimate laws. It 
is vital to develop the South African law so that it expressly addresses the situation 
where disproportionate burdens are imposed on land owners by laws that fulfil a 
significant function in the South African society.  
                                                            
328 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; (Agri SA and 
Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae); President of the Republic of South Africa and others v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2004 (6) SA 40 
(SCA) 
329 Van der Walt AJ ‘Regulation of building under the Constitution’ (2009) 42 De Jure 32-47 at 42-43. 
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Finally, this chapter described the interaction between section 25(1) remedy and 
remedies rooted in administrative justice provisions, incorporated into the authorising 
laws or in PAJA. Specifically, this chapter distinguished between deprivations that are 
caused by legislation and those that are caused by administrative action. It concluded 
that deprivations often occur as a result of administrative action and in such instances a 
land owner will be able to assert his rights either on the basis of section 33 of the 
Constitution (administrative justice) as embodied in PAJA or, alternatively, on the basis 
of section 25(1). A section 25(1) remedy remains preferable if the deprivation (caused 
by administrative action) is substantively arbitrary because of the impact that it has on 
the land owner. However, administrative justice may provide a more compelling line of 
attack if the deprivation is substantively arbitrary because of a procedural shortcoming 
or irregularity. A deprivation of neighbouring land owner’s property rights can, for 
example, be caused by the local authority’s failure to demolish an illegal building.330 
Likewise, a land owner is deprived of his property rights when the heritage authority 
finds that it cannot issue a demolition permit for a historic building.331 These decisions 
can be impugned on administrative justice grounds if they do not meet the standards set 
for administrative justice in the authorising law or in the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). The administrative action can subsequently be set aside 
on review, subject to the condition that the owner first resorted to remedies provided in 
the authorising law. 
 
 
 
                                                            
330 Refer to section 5 2 3 2 in this regard. 
331 Refer to section 5 3 2 in this regard. 
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Chapter 6: 
The social responsibilities of the land owner 
 
6 1 Introduction 
Legislation, statutorily authorised regulation and rights of others can place substantial 
limitations on an owner’s use, enjoyment and exploitation of his land. Conditions of title, 
restrictive covenants and legislation such as the National Building Regulations and 
Building Standards Act 103 of 1977 (Building Standards Act), limit a land owner’s ability 
to develop and use his land. Recent case law has shown the courts’ willingness to order 
the demolition of buildings that have been built in conflict with the law.1 By contrast, the 
National Heritage Resources Act of 25 of 1999 (Heritage Resources Act) not only limits 
owners’ right to demolish historic buildings but also places a positive obligation on 
owners, in certain circumstances, to restore and maintain protected buildings. Similarly, 
within the context of unlawfully occupied buildings, property owners’ right to demolish 
buildings on their land may be subject to obtaining an eviction order, which in turn is 
subject to the provisions of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction of Unlawful Occupiers Act 
19 of 1998 (PIE). Owners of unlawfully occupied buildings must therefore first obtain 
eviction orders in terms of PIE before they can proceed to demolish those buildings. 
Case law has shown that circumstances can prevent owners from evicting unlawful 
                                                            
1 High Dune House (Pty) Ltd v Ndlambe Municipality and others [2007] ZAECHC 154 (29 June 2007); 
Barnett and others v Minister of Land Affairs and others 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA); Van Rensburg and 
another NNO v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and others 2008 (2) SA 8 (SE); Van Rensburg 
NO and another v Equus training and consulting CC and another [2009] ZAECPEHC 50 (25 September 
2009); Searle v Mossel Bay Municipality and others [2009] ZAWCHC 9 (12 February 2009) and Van 
Rensburg NO v Naidoo NO [2010] ZASCA 68 (26 May 2010). 
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occupiers even though they are otherwise entitled to, or had obtained, eviction orders.2 
The implication is that the owners’ demolition (and possibly development) plans could 
be placed on hold for a lengthy, if not indefinite, period of time. 
This chapter investigates the justification for placing certain limitations on land 
owners’ right to use their land. More specifically, this chapter aims to provide a 
theoretical explanation for the reasons why land owners should, on the one hand,  be 
compelled to demolish unlawful and illegal buildings but, on the other hand, be 
prohibited from demolishing historic or unlawfully occupied buildings. The central 
premise of the chapter is that land owners have certain obligations when it comes to the 
use of their land. These obligations include the duty to comply with legislation that is 
designed to ensure the harmonious and sustainable growth of towns and cities. As the 
custodians of historically valuable buildings, land owners have the obligation to protect 
and preserve those buildings for future generations. In some instances owners also 
have a duty to tolerate the temporary unlawful occupation of their land. This in turn has 
a bearing on land owners’ plans to demolish unlawfully occupied structures. Importantly, 
these obligations are not without boundaries and there are instances where it is 
unreasonable to expect of owners to demolish illegal or partially illegal buildings. 
Likewise, there are instances where the burden of taking responsibility for historic 
preservation and for the continued unlawful occupation of buildings might 
disproportionately burden land owners. In such circumstances, the community has the 
duty to mitigate the otherwise excessive interference with property rights.  
This chapter firstly describes the social-obligation norm as developed by 
Alexander.3 The chapter relies on Alexander’s theory to explain why limitations are 
                                                            
2 In Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) the court granted an eviction order but suspended its operation for two 
months to afford the city time to provide the occupiers with alternative accommodation. In Modderfontein 
Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; (Agri SA and Legal Resources 
Centre, Amici Curiae); President of the Republic of South Africa and others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) 
Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2004 (6) SA 40 (SCA) the owner did obtain an 
eviction order. However, the sheer number of unlawful occupiers was one of the factors that prevented 
the owner from enforcing the eviction order. 
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placed on land owners’ rights in specific circumstances. Secondly, the chapter argues 
that land owners have a duty to demolish buildings that have been built in breach of 
conditions of title and legislation. This section also provides a brief overview of the 
arguments raised by law and economics scholars in relation to the enforcement of 
restrictive covenants. The third section applies Alexander’s social-obligation norm to 
explain why land owners have a duty to protect historic buildings. The section on 
historic preservation further outlines other arguments in relation to land owners’ duty to 
preserve culturally valuable buildings. The fourth section aims to explain why land 
owners’ right to demolish unlawfully occupied structures can be limited in certain 
instances. As a point of departure, this section draws on the well-known decision of Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (Port Elizabeth Municipality)4 and applies 
Alexander’s social-obligation theory to explain the limitations on land owners’ demolition 
rights. It also considers the distinction drawn by Radin5  between fungible and personal 
property, which might be useful to explain why land owners’ rights should, in some 
instances, yield to the rights that others have in relation to their land. Finally, each 
section, namely illegal buildings, historic preservation and unlawfully occupied buildings, 
describes the limits of the obligations that the community may impose on land owners. 
 
6 2 Alexander’s social-obligation norm 
With reference to the noxious-use doctrine, Alexander argues that American courts 
have always implicitly given effect to the social-obligation norm, although they have 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
3 See in this regard Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American 
takings jurisprudence (2006) and Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ 
(2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820. Alexander’s social obligation norm is comparable to the German 
constitutional rule that property owners have rights as well as obligations. This is explicitly stated in Article 
14 of the German Basic Law. See the discussion in chapter 4, section 4 5 1. 
4 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
5 Radin MJ developed the concepts of personal and fungible property in ‘Property and personhood’ 
(1981) 34 Stan L Rev 957-1015. 
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never expressly acknowledged its existence.6 In terms of the noxious-use doctrine, 
regulatory action will not be compensated if the statutory regulation is designed to abate 
public nuisances or noxious uses of property.7 Alexander explains that the rationale for 
the noxious-use doctrine is that the ownership of property does not confer on private 
individuals the right to use their property in a way that harms the public.8  
The decision in Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council (Lucas)9 has raised 
uncertainty as to the relevance of the noxious-use doctrine in modern takings law. In 
that case the US Supreme Court reduced the value of the doctrine when it explained 
that the ‘harmful or noxious-use analysis’ was merely a ‘progenitor’ of the court’s more 
modern statements to the effect that the state can regulate land use, without 
compensation, if it ‘substantially advances legitimate state interests’.10 In Lucas the 
court also developed an exception to the per se rule that a regulation will cause a taking 
if it extinguishes all economic use of the land. The court held that the state can resist 
the payment of compensation for a regulation that destroys all economic use of the land 
if it can show that the ‘proscribed use interest’ never formed part of the land owner’s 
title.11  
                                                            
6 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 at 
757 argues that the courts have occasionally employed obligation language in their judgments, but there 
is nothing in US law that resembles a constitutional norm that the owner has a social responsibility to use 
his property in such a manner that he does not undermine the greater well-being of the community.  
7 Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings 
jurisprudence (2006) 76 explains that the noxious-use doctrine has been criticised because it is difficult to 
determine whether regulations are nuisance abating or benefit conferring. If a regulation confers benefits 
on the state, then the per se rule will not be applicable. 
8 Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings 
jurisprudence (2006) 76. 
9 US 505 1003 (1992). 
10 US 505 1003 (1992) 1023-1024. 
11 US 505 1003 (1992) 1027 and 1029-1030. With reference to existing nuisance and property law 
principles, the state can prove that the owner never had the right to use his property in the proscribed 
way. New legislation, which deprives the owner of all economic use of his land, must merely confirm the 
position in existing nuisance and property law principles.  
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Alexander argues that both the noxious-use doctrine and the Lucas nuisance 
exception are rooted in the notion that ownership contains an inherent social 
obligation.12 Furthermore, both these principles recognise that ‘landownership does not 
confer on individuals a privilege to impose harms on the community of such a nature 
                                                            
12 South African authors have also argued that ownership is not an absolute right and that it is 
accompanied by certain obligations. Visser DP ‘The absoluteness of ownership: the South African 
common law perspective’ 1985 Acta Juridica 39-52 at 43-48 argues that ownership in the South African 
context has never been an absolute right and that it has always had to yield to the demands placed on it 
by society. An owner has always had, for example, the duty to use his property in a manner that would 
not cause harm to his neighbours. Lewis C ‘The modern concept of ownership of land’ 1985 Acta Juridica 
241-266 at 243-244; 248-249 and 260-262 argues that the concept of ownership as plena in re potestas 
has been radically altered by the common law and legislation. She explains that the right to use property 
has never been unfettered in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, as is evidenced by the restrictions placed on 
ownership entitlements by neighbour law. The limitations imposed on ownership, and the concomitant 
obligations imposed on the owner, have evolved as the needs of society changed. Lewis refers to Kings v 
Dykes 1971 (3) SA 540 (C) 545, where the court explained that in a ‘modern world’ an owner may not use 
his land in a manner that would be detrimental to his neighbours or to his community. Moreover, the 
owner holds his land in trust for future generations. Legislation, such as town-planning and environmental 
conservation laws, is designed to ensure that the owner does not use his land in a manner that would 
undermine the public interest. Lewis reasons that it is necessary to establish a balance between private 
rights and social responsibility. Likewise, Van der Walt AJ ‘The effect of environmental measures on the 
concept of landownership’ (1987) 104 SALJ 469-479 at 476-479 argues that it seems as if it has been 
accepted that the concept of landownership in South Africa has changed and ‘that change implies the 
limitation of ownership by social duties and restrictions deriving from various interests in society’ such as 
the public interest in the conservation of the environment. Van der Walt explains that it is essential to 
develop a new conceptual framework ‘within which current developments in conservation (and planning) 
legislation may be explained satisfactorily’. It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether ownership in 
South Africa should be viewed as an ‘unbound’ right which can be narrowed down by legislation, or 
alternatively, whether it should be viewed as an inherently limited right. The framework that Van der Walt 
has in mind accommodates the view that the limitations imposed on ownership for conservation purposes 
do not amount to ‘limitations of the owner’s theoretically unlimited right, but as natural duties and limits 
inherent in ownership of land as such’. For example, the duty to preserve historic buildings should be 
seen as flowing from the ownership of that specific property. Van der Walt concludes that to introduce this 
new conceptual framework, it might be necessary to incorporate a statutory principle that has been 
adopted in Western European legal systems. This principle states that ownership of land implies not only 
rights but also duties. 
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that, by social consensus, the common good is substantially undermined’.13 Alexander 
is of the view that the state’s ability to restrict the manner in which owners use their 
property without paying compensation ‘is best explained by the notion that owners 
inherently owe society certain obligations’.14 Accordingly, courts should focus on the 
obligations of ownership instead of relying on limitations that are inherent to the title to 
land.15 
                                                            
13 Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings 
jurisprudence (2006) 227-228. 
14 Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings 
jurisprudence (2006) 77. Singer JW Entitlement: the paradoxes of property (2000) 3-18 makes a similar 
argument in relation to the social obligations of the land owner. He argues that the ownership model, 
which has been accepted by academic scholars and even the courts, encourages land owners to use 
their property without having regard to the interests of other land owners and non-owners. The ownership 
model refers to the notion that generally, owners can do whatever they want with their property. Other 
persons and institutions are always responsible to explain why limitations are imposed on the exercise of 
ownership entitlements. Moreover, other persons or institutions, and even the government, must refrain 
from interfering with property rights. The ownership model ‘abhors’ obligations and it is premised on the 
belief that property rights have a built-in structure and content. Accordingly, it is easy to assimilate when 
regulatory action limits the existing rights of the land owner. However, ownership conflicts, and will always 
conflict, with other legally protected interests. Singer notes that these conflicts raise questions of ‘political 
and moral judgment inside the property system itself’ and instead of determining whether ownership 
should be regulated, one should answer a more fundamental question, namely ‘what kind of property 
system to create in the first place’? A legal system that enables land owners to exercise their rights 
without regard to the rights of others will ‘be a legal system in name only’. Singer explains that land 
owners have rights as well as obligations. A land owner may be morally and legally obligated to use his 
land in a manner that is beneficial to others. More specifically, the land owner has obligations toward 
other owners and to non-owners. Singer concludes that ‘[o]wners have obligations; they have always had 
obligations. We can argue about what those obligations should be, but no one can seriously argue that 
they should not exist’. See also Singer JW Entitlement: the paradoxes of property (2000) 197-216. 
15 Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings 
jurisprudence (2006) 230 and to the same effect Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American 
property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 at 757. In the latter article, Alexander explains that Lucas v 
South Carolina Coastal Council US 505 1003 (1992) represents the thin conception of the social 
obligation norm. 
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Alexander explains that to fully develop a social-obligation norm, society must 
have a ‘social vision’ or a ‘substantive conception of the common good’.16 This 
conception will operate as the ‘fundamental context’ for the exercise of rights and duties 
pertaining to ownership.17 He discusses two conceptions of the social-obligation norm, 
namely a ‘contractarian version of the community-based social obligation norm’18 and a 
conception based on the notion of human flourishing and the social obligation of 
ownership.19 Alexander proposes the adoption of the second, thicker conception of 
community, based on the Aristotelian notion that to flourish human beings need to 
belong to a group.20 He stresses two characteristics of human flourishing. Firstly, human 
beings can only develop the capacity that is essential for a ‘well lived human life’ in a 
                                                            
16 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 757. 
17 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 757. Alexander concedes that there are many competing conceptions that describe what is good for 
society. It is because of this conflict that ‘the substantive scope of the social obligation of ownership is 
highly and inevitably contestable’. 
18 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 758-76. In this regard Alexander relies on a conception of community developed by Dagan H ‘Takings 
and distributive justice’ (1999) 85 Va L Rev 741-804 at 741, in support of his explanation. Dagan’s theory 
strongly supports the notion of individualism. Communities are networks of autonomous individuals who 
are drawn together so that they can realise certain shared goals. The community is only formed so that it 
can maximise the welfare of the individual. In terms of this conception, the community can only make 
demands on the individual if that demand will repay each member of the group. This community cannot 
expect a sacrifice from the individual if he will not be compensated. 
19 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 760-773. See to the same effect Alexander GS and Penalver EM ‘Properties of community’ (2008) 10 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 127-160 at 138-141. 
20 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 760. Singer JW Entitlement: the paradoxes of property (2000) 12-14 also emphasises that owners 
operate within a broader community and that the system of property law governs the relationships 
between people. In fact, the property law system will cease to exist if there are no longer human 
relationships and interests to sustain it. Singer notes that the tensions which inform property law are the 
tensions inherent in social relationships. These relationships evolve as society changes and, as a result, 
the property system is likely to change. Furthermore, the problems in property law are often resolved by 
understanding the connection between property and human relationships.     
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society that is dependent on other human beings.21 Secondly, a human being will 
flourish if he is able to choose ‘among alternative life horizons’ and if he is able to reflect 
and to determine the value in each of the alternatives.22 Alexander argues that a person 
cannot develop the ability to differentiate between all the available life horizons on his 
                                                            
21 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 761 explains that ‘community is constitutive of human flourishing in a very deep sense’ and that 
‘perhaps community even comprises humanity’.  
22 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 762. A person can only develop the capability to distinguish between life horizons through others who 
teach discernment directly or by their example. 
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own. A person cannot secure the capabilities23 or acquire the resources necessary for 
human flourishing on his own either.24 The reason for this is that the process of 
                                                            
23 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 762-765 draws from the ‘capabilities approach’ developed by Nussbaum and Sen as a basis for his 
account of human flourishing on which the thicker conception of community is built. See Nussbaum MC 
Woman and human development: the capabilities approach (2000); Sen AK Commodity and capabilities 
(1985). The ‘capabilities approach’ measures a person’s well-being with reference to what he can do and 
not with reference to what he has. Alexander at 763 explains that a ‘well-lived life conforms to certain 
objectively valuable patterns of human existence and interaction, or what Sen calls “functionings” rather 
than a life characterised by the possession of particular goods, the satisfaction of particular (subjective) 
preferences, or even without more, the possession of particular liberties’. Nussbaum and Sen draw a 
distinction between ‘first-order patterns’ that constitute ‘well-lived human lives’ or ‘functionings’ and 
‘second-order freedom’ to ‘function in particular ways, which they call “capabilities”’.  Alexander GS and 
Penalver EM ‘Properties of community’ (2008) 10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 127-160 at 138 and 148-
149 identify four capabilities which they consider vital to human flourishing. These capabilities are life 
(which includes the subsidiary goods of health and security); freedom (which includes identity and self-
knowledge); practical reason; and affiliation (which include subsidiary goods such as social participation, 
self-respect and friendship). They argue that these capabilities can only exist within a ‘vital matrix of 
social structures and practices’. It is only within a community (which can include the state) that a person 
can obtain the necessary resources to flourish, so that he can become ‘fully socialised’ in the exercise of 
his capabilities. Alexander and Penalver argue that these capabilities prevent the state from excessively 
interfering with an individual’s property rights. A community will prevent the abuse of an individual’s 
property rights if it has proper respect for the capabilities that are necessary for human flourishing. For 
example, proper respect for ‘human freedom’ limits the interferences that the state ‘ought to be permitted 
to make into the sphere of private decision-making’. Alexander and Penalver explain that they cannot 
clearly delineate the boundaries of state action. They can, however, say that the same principles that 
require the creation of an infrastructure where humans can flourish also provide a basis for limiting the 
demands that the state can make on individuals and smaller communities. There are two principles 
relevant to the state’s right to regulate property interests for the common good. Firstly, the principle of 
subsidiarity, which means that the state cannot take on the functions that can be better performed by 
smaller communities. Secondly, it is necessary to prohibit arbitrary state action because doing so will 
protect individual dignity. There must, accordingly, be an objective standard in terms of which state action 
can be evaluated. One can argue that the ‘objective standard’ envisaged by Alexander and Penalver is 
comparable to the substantive arbitrariness test formulated by the Constitutional Court in First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and another; First National 
Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. As explained in 
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development requires dependence on other people so that we can nurture the 
necessary capacity.25 Stated differently, human beings are dependent on their 
communities not only for their physical survival, but also to be able to ‘function as free 
and rational agents’.26 Communities, including the state,27 are the medium through 
which a person is able to attain the resources that are vital to human flourishing.28  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
chapter 5, section 5 1 2, the substantive arbitrariness test provides an objective basis in terms of which a 
court can determine whether a regulatory law imposes a disproportionate and unconstitutional burden on 
a property owner.  
24 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 765. See to the same effect Alexander GS and Penalver EM ‘Properties of community’ (2008) 10 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 127-160 at 138. 
25 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 765 explains that this dependence does not only refer to the physical dependence on others. It 
includes life, freedom, practical rationality and sociality which can only exist in a ‘vital matrix of social 
structures and practices’. 
26 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 766; Alexander GS and Penalver EM ‘Properties of community’ (2008) 10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
127-160 at 139. 
27 Alexander GS and Penalver EM ‘Properties of community’ (2008) 10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 127-
160 at 145-147 explain that the state is also a community. The state does have coercive power which can 
undermine human flourishing if it is permitted to expand without limit. Overly invasive governmental 
powers can have the effect of weakening other social matrices that provide the resources that are 
necessary for the exercise of human capabilities. The role of the state as a ‘community’ has become 
more important in a modern capitalist society. A capitalist system does not provide individuals with all the 
resources they need to develop the capabilities vital to human flourishing. This can be ascribed to the fact 
that a capitalist society is dependent on voluntary sacrifices, which is insufficient to supply all members of 
society with the necessary resources. It is, therefore, desirable for the state to compel individuals to 
contribute to the social structures that are conducive to human flourishing.  
28 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 766.  
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Another important function of the community is that it creates a society that is 
characterised ‘by the just-social relations within it’.29 Moreover, the community 
recognises that all persons are entitled to flourish. This means that all persons must 
have access to the resources and capabilities that enable them to prosper.30 A member 
of such a community has a duty to assist others in obtaining these resources.31 The 
reason for this is that if a person, as a rational agent, considers his own right to flourish 
‘valuable’, he will be ‘committed’ to help others to flourish insofar as they are also 
rational human beings.32 Rationality compels a person to acknowledge that all human 
beings should have access to the capabilities necessary to flourish and that this 
                                                            
29 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 767 explains that ‘just social relations’ refers to a society where persons can interact with one another 
in a manner that is in accordance with the values of equality, dignity, freedom, respect, justice and 
autonomy. Communities create just social-relations by ‘shaping social norms not just individual 
preferences’. See to the same effect Alexander GS and Penalver EM ‘Properties of community’ (2008) 10 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 127-160 at 140. 
30 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 768. See to the same effect Alexander GS and Penalver EM ‘Properties of community’ (2008) 10 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 127-160 at 140-141. 
31 Cowen DV New patterns of landownership: the transformation of the concept of landownership as 
plena in re potestas (1984) 71-80 argues that the owner has certain obligations when it comes to the use, 
exploitation and enjoyment of his land. The owner has these obligations because he is a member of a 
community or of several communities. In this regard, Cowen at 80 explains that ‘no man is an island; and 
membership of a community involves certain obligations’. Importantly, the obligations that the owner has 
in relation to his property vary according to the nature of the object owned. Cowen reasons that the owner 
will have the right to destroy a leg of mutton or a piece of firewood. By contrast, the owner has a social 
obligation to refrain from destroying land. He explains at 71 that ‘land-hunger or the hunger and thirst for 
the loveliness of a nature area, cannot be adequately satisfied by dwelling upon a theoretical right to 
destroy land. Here the power to enjoy and to use sensibly, and here the social obligations of ownership, 
are of the essence.’  
32 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 769. See to the same effect Alexander GS and Penalver EM ‘Properties of community’ (2008) 10 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 127-160 at 140-142. 
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imposes obligations on the individual to ‘foster’ the development of others.33 Alexander 
explains that  
‘[t]he major claim here, in short, is that our (and others’) dependence creates, for us 
(and for them), an obligation to participate in and support the social networks and 
structures that enable us to develop those human capabilities that make human 
flourishing possible’.34 
Alexander cautions that reciprocity does not necessarily accompany this social 
obligation.35 The only form of reciprocity that can operate with the obligation is that the 
person, who gives to society, needs society and its related structures to continue his 
own development.36 This raises the question: what can the community expect the 
                                                            
33 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 769. See to the same effect Alexander GS and Penalver EM ‘Properties of community’ (2008) 10 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 127-160 at 142-143. Similarly, Singer JW Entitlement: the paradoxes of 
property (2000) 18 argues that property owners are both morally obligated to share the wealth with 
marginalised persons and to use their property in a way that is compatible with the interests of non-
owners. In so doing, property owners assist non-owners to enter the system so that they too can become 
owners. This argument is justified on moral grounds and it is supported by the ‘very arguments that 
support the recognition of property in the first place’. In this regard, Singer explains that the norms that 
justify the protection of property also justify the limitations imposed on property, which enables non-
owners ‘to become owners on relatively equal terms with those who can already claim legitimate property 
rights’. Singer’s argument explains why, for example, it can be expected of land owners to temporarily 
tolerate the unlawful occupation of their land. See the discussion in section 6 5 3 below.  
34 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 770. 
35 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 770 provides the following reasons: firstly, the persons to whom we are expected to give are not 
always the persons from whom we have received. Secondly, even if the persons to whom we give are the 
same persons who gave to us, we will not necessarily receive the same amount that we gave.  
36 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 771 explains that individuals have social obligations because they are dependent on the community to 
which they give. What an individual gives is often determined by the needs of others and not necessarily 
by what he has given. Moreover, the person to whom an individual is obligated to give is not always a 
person who gave to that individual. See to the same effect Alexander GS and Penalver EM ‘Properties of 
community’ (2008) 10 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 127-160 at 143-144. 
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property owner to give for the greater good? Alexander holds the view that the owner is 
morally compelled to give to society, of which the owner is a member, ‘those benefits 
that society reasonably regards as necessary for human flourishing’.37 These benefits 
must, firstly, be a necessary prerequisite to enable the members of the community to 
flourish as moral agents and, secondly, ‘have some reasonable relationship with 
ownership of the affected land’.38 Alexander applies his theory to explain why, amongst 
other things, the government should have the power of eminent domain and regulatory 
powers to limit the rights of owners in relation to the use of his land. To summarise, 
Alexander argues that the social obligation norm may in some instances require of 
individuals to ‘sacrifice some property interest to the community in exchange for 
monetary compensation’.39 In such circumstances, Alexander reasons, ownership is 
protected by a liability rule instead of a property rule. Furthermore, there are some 
instances where (due to the operation of the social obligation norm as circumscribed in 
legislation) a land owner cannot use his property in manner that is detrimental to the 
broader community.  
Singer, like Alexander, is also of the view that ownership is accompanied by 
certain obligations. He makes an argument, similar to the social obligation norm, to 
explain how the courts should resolve disputes concerning the taking of property. Singer 
refers to three models in terms of which takings disputes could be analysed, namely the 
castle model; the investment model and the citizenship model.40 In terms of the castle 
model, ownership entitlements are clearly defined and protected from state 
interferences. These entitlements are fixed and their scope does not change according 
                                                            
37 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 774. 
38 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 774. 
39 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 774-775. 
40 Singer JW ‘The ownership society and takings of property: castles, investments and just obligations 
(2006) 30 Harv Envtl L Rev 309-338. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
377 
to social conditions or evolving values.41 The investment model requires of the courts to 
determine whether a specific regulatory action interferes with the investment-backed 
expectations of the owner.42 An owner is expected to factor in risks such as changing 
social values or new government-imposed obligations on, for example, development. 
Any regulatory measure that interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations 
constitutes a taking of property. Singer criticises both these approaches because they 
can lead to different results, depending on the assumptions factored into the model. 
Essentially, these models do not assist in resolving takings disputes. Singer suggests 
that the third approach, the citizenship model, enables the courts to resolve takings 
disputes effectively.43 This model accepts that property owners, as members of society, 
have inherent obligations as well as rights. These obligations can entail that the owner 
should refrain from doing certain things. It can also mean that the owner must act 
positively. For example, it can be expected of a land owner to adapt his building so that 
it is more accessible to disabled persons. Importantly, all obligations are not necessarily 
justified because they are demanded by the state or the community. The role of the 
court is to determine whether a specific obligation is fair and just. Singer emphasises 
that the owner should not be singled out to bear a burden that should be borne by the 
public in general. Singer concludes that every takings enquiry should start with the 
following question: is the obligation imposed on the owner just and fair? Arguably, in the 
South African context, the FNB substantive arbitrariness test enables the court to 
determine whether the land owner is disproportionately burdened by the statutory 
interference with his property rights. Explained differently, the FNB substantive 
arbitrariness test enables the court to determine whether, under the specific 
circumstances, an obligation imposed on the property owner is – in the words of Singer 
– just and fair. 
                                                            
41 Singer JW ‘The ownership society and takings of property: castles, investments and just obligations 
(2006) 30 Harv Envtl L Rev 309-338 at 314-316 and 325-328. 
42 Singer JW ‘The ownership society and takings of property: castles, investments and just obligations 
(2006) 30 Harv Envtl L Rev 309-338 at 314-316 and 325-328. 
43 Singer JW ‘The ownership society and takings of property: castles, investments and just obligations 
(2006) 30 Harv Envtl L Rev 309-338 at 314-316 and 325-328 and 328-338 
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This chapter draws from Alexander’ social obligation norm, with additions from other 
authors like Singer, to explain why an land owner can be compelled to demolish illegal 
and unlawful buildings and why certain limitations are imposed on the owner’s right to 
demolish historic or unlawfully occupied structures. This chapter will also, with reference 
to Alexander and others, describe the boundaries of the regulation of demolition in the 
context of building and development controls, historic preservation statutes and anti-
eviction laws. 
 
6 3 Reasons for forcing a land owner to demolish unlawful and illegal buildings 
6 3 1 Social obligation of the owner 
Milton, like Alexander and Singer, recognises that an owner has certain obligations in 
relation to the use of his land.44 These obligations are especially relevant in the field of 
planning law. The importance of planning law became evident during the Industrial 
Revolution when the influx of human beings into urban areas resulted in overcrowded, 
unhealthy and disease-ridden cities.45 These circumstances were not conducive to 
human flourishing and it became necessary to improve the quality of life of everyone, 
including the urban poor, by eliminating nuisances and developing new towns that were 
specifically designed to avoid the deficiencies of the cities. Milton explains that planning 
law directly challenged the laissez-faire concept of ownership and as a result, the 
premise of this field of law became ‘not the rights of ownership but its duties’.46 Milton 
argues that due to the pervasiveness of land-use planning, property owners have come 
to expect that their rights can be limited by the state in the public interest.47  
                                                            
44 Milton JRL ‘Planning and property’ 1985 Acta Juridica 267-277. See to the same effect, Cowen DV 
New patterns of landownership: the transformation of the concept of landownership as plena in re 
potestas (1984) 71-80 and Van der Walt AJ ‘The effect of environmental measures on the concept of 
landownership’ (1987) 104 SALJ 469-479 at 476-479. 
45 Milton JRL ‘Planning and property’ 1985 Acta Juridica 267-277 at 267-268. 
46 Milton JRL ‘Planning and property’ 1985 Acta Juridica 267-277 at 275. 
47 Milton JRL ‘Planning and property’ 1985 Acta Juridica 267-277 at 276. 
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In light of the rapid rate of urbanisation, one can argue that land-use and building 
controls have become central to the creation of urban areas where human beings can 
flourish. This means that even more stringent demands are placed on the ownership of 
land in cities.48 When using or developing their land, urban property owners have the 
duty to comply with legislation specifically designed to ensure the healthy and 
sustainable development of towns and cities. This duty is born from the social obligation 
of the owner to use his land in a manner that would not cause harm to his neighbours 
and to the greater community within which he functions.49 One can further argue that a 
                                                            
48 Cowen DV New patterns of landownership: the transformation of the concept of landownership as 
plena in re potestas (1984) 71 argues that the social obligations imposed on owners depend on the 
nature of the property owned. The ownership of, for example, a tractor will be subject to fewer restrictions 
than the ownership of land. Arguably, the ownership of a tractor will only be accompanied by the 
obligation to not use it in a manner that would cause harm to the life and property of others. The 
ownership of land, by contrast, will include a range of obligations. These obligations can arguably include 
the duty to preserve historic buildings or the environment; to develop the land in a safe and sustainable 
manner; or even to temporarily tolerate the unlawful occupation of land. See to the same effect Van der 
Walt AJ ‘De onrechtmatige bezetting van leegstaande woningen en het eigendomsbegrip: een 
vergelijkende analyse van het conflict tussen de privaat eigendom van onroerende goed en dakloosheid’ 
(1991) 17 Recht en Kritiek 329-359 at 352-354. See also Odendaal v Eastern Metropolitan Local Council 
1999 CLR 77 (W) 84, where the court explained that the power that a person has in relation to his 
property has never been unfettered. However, ‘rapid urbanization’ and the ‘inevitable need for regulation 
that has accompanied it has had the effect of restricting full dominium even further than the common law 
ever did’.  
49 Singer JW Entitlement: the paradoxes of property (2000) 210 and 216 explains that property confers 
power on individuals but it also creates obligations towards other property owners and non-owners. 
Obligations limit the power that is conferred on the owner. Power, in turn, limits the obligations imposed 
on property owners. The two concepts go hand in hand and one cannot have the one without the other. 
Singer reasons that to determine the entitlements of the land owner one must first ascertain the 
obligations he owes to society. This, Singer explains, is the paradox of property. Importantly, the 
obligations can change over time as the relationships between owners and non-owners evolve. Within the 
context of building and development law it is clear that the owner’s entitlements are always subject to the 
limitations embodied in law. Singer’s argument suggests that land owners must first determine the limits 
that are imposed on them by, for example, zoning laws so that they can ascertain what their right of 
ownership actually entails. The right to build in a manner proscribed by law (which delineates the 
obligations of the land owner) does not form part of the owner’s entitlements.  
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land owner has a duty to remove the harm that he has caused to society. In Reflect-All 
1025 CC v Member of the Executive Council for Public Transport, Roads and Works, 
Gauteng Provincial Government50 O’ Regan J explained that ownership is not an 
absolute right and that owners do not have the power to develop their land as they 
choose. She further explained that  
 ‘[i]n our constitutional order, we recognise the social value of land to the community 
as a whole and accept that by affording people the right to own land, their rights are 
necessarily limited by the rights of the broader community’.51  
In circumstances where the source of the harm is an illegal or unlawful building, the 
owner has a duty to either alter the building to bring it in line with the law or to demolish 
that building.  
Likewise, a land owner will cause harm to his immediate neighbours and to other 
land owners in the township if he builds in breach of a restrictive condition. Van Wyk 
explains that restrictive conditions are inserted into the title deeds of properties to 
preserve the unique character of the neighbourhood.52 The owner changes the 
character of the neighbourhood when he builds in breach of restrictive conditions. This 
in turn may lead to the diminution of property values in the area. On a more general 
level, the land owner undermines the public interest in the sustainable, orderly and 
harmonious development of neighbourhoods and towns if he interferes with these 
rights.  
Illegal buildings are often unsafe and structurally unsound, which can pose a threat 
to the health and safety of the community. The illegally constructed shopping centre in 
                                                            
50 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC). 
51 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 106. 
52 Van Wyk J ‘The nature and classification of restrictive covenants and conditions of title’ (1992) 25 De 
Jure 270-288 at 287; Van Wyk ‘Removing restrictive conditions and preserving the residential character 
of a neighbourhood’ (1992) 55 THRHR 369-385 at 372; Van Wyk J ‘Revaluation of conditions of title: 
Camps Bay Ratepayers Association v Minister of Planning Western Cape 2001 (4) SA 294 (C)’ (2002) 65 
THRHR 642-649 at 646 and Van Wyk J ‘Contravening a condition of title can result in a demolition order’ 
(2007) 70 THRHR 658-662 at 660-661. 
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City of Tshwane v Ghani53 posed a threat not only to the members of the public, but 
also to the employees who were working in the building. Illegal buildings can, as in the 
case of Barnett and others v Minister of Land Affairs and others (Barnett),54 also cause 
permanent damage to the environment. Furthermore, when owners construct illegal 
buildings, they deprive their community, their neighbours and the general public of their 
right to safe and proper planned urban areas. Likewise, if his building plans have been 
set aside on review, the land owner has the responsibility to alter the building so that it 
does not adversely affect the rights of neighbours. If the building cannot be altered to 
comply with the law, the owner would have to demolish the illegal structure. Illegal and 
unlawful buildings hinder the creation of an environment where human beings can 
prosper. Accordingly, neighbours and members of the community have a direct interest 
in the development of property within the framework created by law.55  
There is authority for the notion that a court has the discretion to order the 
payment of damages, instead of demolition, when buildings have been erected in 
                                                            
53 2009 (5) SA 563 (T). 
54 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA). 
55 Reflect-All 1025 CC v Member of the Executive Council for Public Transport, Roads and Works, 
Gauteng Provincial Government 2009 (6) SA 391 (CC) para 106. In Walele v The City of Cape Town and 
others 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 2 the Constitutional Court explained that it was necessary to 
strike a balance between the rights of land owners to develop their land and the rights of neighbouring 
land owners. Such a balance must be maintained within the framework provided by the National Building 
Standards and Building Regulations Act 103 of 1977. The Constitutional Court in Minister of Public Works 
and others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and another (Mukhwevho intervening) 2001 (3) 
SA 1151 (CC) had to determine whether it was permissible for the state, in its capacity as a private land 
owner, to establish a temporary transit camp for flood victims in an residential area (Kyalami) outside of 
Johannesburg. Kyalami was located in the vicinity of the Leeukop prison complex, where the government 
intended to accommodate the flood victims. The Constitutional Court held that, like other land owners, the 
state had to comply with environmental or town-planning legislation. These regulatory measures protect 
the rights of other land owners and the broader community and the state must apply for consent to 
establish the transit camp if it is required to do so by legislation. The rights of neighbouring land owners 
will be adequately protected provided the state, as a private land owner, adheres to the restrictions 
placed on it by the law.   
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conflict with conditions of title or restrictive covenants.56 However, there are strong 
arguments favouring demolition of the building as the default remedy in these instances. 
Firstly, the payment of damages will not remove the deleterious effects of the illegal use 
of land.57 Secondly, the payment of damages will not necessarily serve as an efficient 
deterrent to other land owners who want to put their properties to similar illegal uses. 
Thirdly, it might be problematic to determine who the beneficiaries of a damages order 
would be, since these types of restrictive conditions are only registered against the title 
deeds of the servient tenements.58 Finally, a compensation award may only benefit 
immediate neighbours and not the entire affected community. Arguably, the demolition 
of the building would be the most effective way to restore the original qualities of the 
neighbourhood and, further, to protect the property rights of all the owners in the 
township.59  
Van Wyk has argued that planning tools play an integral role in ensuring the 
orderly development of towns and cities. These tools can only be effective if adequate 
                                                            
56 Van Wyk J ‘Contravening a condition of title can result in a demolition order’ (2007) 70 THRHR 658-662 
at 661, with reference to Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Co Ltd v Mitchmor Investments (Pty) Ltd 
1971 (2) SA 397 (W) 405-407. 
57 Van Rensburg and another NNO v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and others 2008 (2) SA 8 
(SE) paras 9-11; Van Wyk J ‘Contravening a condition of title can result in a demolition order’ (2007) 70 
THRHR 658-662 at 661. Van Wyk explains with reference to the Van Rensburg case that a damages 
order would not remove the illegal use of the building and the character of the neighbourhood would 
change permanently. The changed character of the neighbourhood could lead to more illegal 
developments. 
58 Van Wyk J ‘The nature and classification of restrictive covenants and conditions of title’ (1992) 25 De 
Jure 270-288 at 284f explains that restrictive covenants and conditions of title cannot be classified as 
praedial servitudes. One of the reasons for this is that restrictive covenants and conditions of title are only 
registered against the title deeds of servient tenements. There is no indication in the title deed of the 
servient tenement as to which erven constitute the dominant tenements. According to Van Wyk restrictive 
covenants in South Africa were developed in such a way that they were only registered against the title 
deeds of the servient properties without identifying the dominant tenements. Likewise, conditions of title 
are registered against the title deed without identifying the beneficiary of the condition. 
59 In Van Rensburg and another NNO v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and others 2008 (2) 
SA 8 (SE) para 11 the court explained that the payment of damages will not restore the character of the 
neighbourhood. 
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enforcement mechanisms are available. One such enforcement mechanism is the 
demolition order.60 In concurrence with Van Wyk, one can argue that a demolition order 
would be a particularly effective remedy to ensure that the rapid development of 
suburban and urban areas takes place within the framework created by the law.61 
Moreover, as in the case of restrictive conditions, demolition is the most efficient way in 
which the owner can begin to repair the damage that his illegal or unlawful building may 
have caused. In Barnett the surrounding environment could only be rehabilitated once 
the illegal cottages were demolished.62 In High Dune House (Pty) Ltd v Ndlambe 
Municipality and others,63 the court confirmed that demolition or partial demolition might 
be the only practical solution in instances where the building has been built in 
contravention of the Building Standards Act and where the position could not be 
regularised.64  
It may sometimes seem exceptionally harsh to require of an owner to demolish an 
illegal or an unlawful building. The situation is best explained with reference to 
Alexander’s social-obligation norm. As a member of a community the property owner is 
morally obliged to provide everything that is within his power to enable his community to 
flourish. A community can only flourish if all property owners in the area adhere to the 
limitations placed on their property rights by land-use and building controls such as 
conditions of title or zoning laws. When exercising his ownership entitlements, a land 
                                                            
60 Van Wyk J ‘Revaluation of conditions of title: Camps Bay Ratepayers Association v Minister of Planning 
Western Cape 2001 (4) SA 294 (C)’ (2002) 65 THRHR 642-648 at 649. See to the same effect Van Wyk 
J ‘Contravening a condition of title can result in a demolition order’ (2007) 70 THRHR 658-662 at 662. 
61 Van Wyk J ‘Contravening a condition of title can result in a demolition order’ (2007) 70 THRHR 658-662 
at 662 argues that the ‘pressure to develop and redevelop land is gaining momentum’ and that this 
‘invariably places pressure on the legal and administrative processes’. This situation is exacerbated when 
people illegally change the use of properties in disregard of conditions of title. She explains that 
development can only take place within the framework created by conditions of title and land-use plans. 
However, planning tools can only be effective if proper enforcement mechanisms such as the demolition 
order are available. 
62 2007 (6) SA 313 (SCA) para 16. 
63 [2007] ZAECHC 154 (29 June 2007). 
64 [2007] ZAECHC 154 (29 June 2007) para 5. 
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owner is morally compelled not to harm the community of which he forms part.65 This 
means that the owner has a duty to develop his land in such a way that does not 
compromise the sustainable and healthy development of his neighbourhood or town. 
Moreover, the property owner has a responsibility to maintain the communal structures 
that have enabled him to flourish. In essence, a land owner is obliged to demolish 
unlawful and illegal buildings situated on his property, because their existence frustrates 
the development of urban areas that are conducive to human flourishing. Additionally, 
the owner benefits from the limitations placed on other land owners in his 
neighbourhood, who are also compelled to demolish illegal and unlawful structures. All 
land owners in the community are equally responsible to create a community where all 
the members can thrive. To this extent, it is not unfair to impose regulatory restrictions 
on all land owners, even if they impose relatively harsh limitations on the owners’ 
entitlement to use their property. 
This conclusion also finds support in the comparable argument of Underkuffler.66 
She provides a model to explain why, in some instances, property rights should be 
protected more stringently from state intervention and why, in other instances, property 
rights should yield to the greater need of the public as circumscribed in legislation. This 
model is premised on what Underkuffler refers to as the operative conception of 
property. The operative conception of property does not strongly protect individual 
property interests. Rather, this conception of property reflects both the outcome of 
individual and collective tensions, which are determined and re-determined as 
circumstances change. Underkuffler’s model has two legs, namely tier one and tier two. 
Tier one prescribes that property rights will have a presumptive power over a competing 
public interest, provided that the core values underlying the property interests and the 
public interest are different in kind. Stated differently, property rights will weigh stronger 
if they protect core values that are different from the values that underlie the public 
interest. Tier two provides that property rights will not have presumptive power over the 
                                                            
65 Community, within this context, can refer to the neighbourhood where the owner’s property is located 
but it can also refer to a national community. A property owner would form part of a national community if 
he is a citizen or if he owns property in the country. 
66 Underkuffler LS The idea of property: its meaning and power (2003) 62, 84-87 and 97-98.  
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public interest if the core values that underlie the property interest and the public 
interest are the same in kind. Underkuffler applies her model to show why the public 
interest in zoning laws trumps property rights. She explains that zoning laws regulate 
the owner’s right to develop his land in a way that is harmful to the character of the 
area, ‘or to the kind of community that the public (through elected representatives) has 
expressed a desire to become’.67 When an owner opposes the limitations imposed by 
zoning laws two rights come into conflict, namely the ‘property-rights claim of the owner’ 
and the ‘property-based interests of other owners, asserted through the public-interest 
control’.68 Both claims are based on the physical use of land or the economic protection 
of the investment that land owners in a township have in their property. Underkuffler 
argues that because the core values that underlie these interests are the same in kind, 
there is no basis for assuming that the individual land owner’s rights should trump the 
rights of other land owners in the area. The individual land owner’s rights will therefore 
have to yield to the interests of the collective. Underkuffler explains that one cannot, in 
such instances, protect individual rights because the legal protection would depend 
solely on whether the rights are asserted by the individual or the collective. 
Furthermore, Underkuffler notes that:  
‘[t]here is no reason why the property interests of one person should be 
presumptively superior to the property interests of many persons, simply because 
the interests of the many are asserted “publicly” or “collectively”’.69  
Underkuffler’s reasoning also explains why illegal and unlawful buildings should be 
demolished. As in the instance of the zoning example, the Building Standards Act 
protects land owners’ interest in healthy and safe development. When an owner 
constructs an illegal structure two rights are in conflict, namely the individual land 
owner’s right to build and develop and the collective interest in healthy urban 
development. These underlying values are, as Underkuffler puts it, of the same kind. 
There is generally no justification for protecting the individual’s interests above the 
                                                            
67 Underkuffler LS The idea of property: its meaning and power (2003) 98.  
68 Underkuffler LS The idea of property: its meaning and power (2003) 98.  
69 Underkuffler LS The idea of property: its meaning and power (2003) 97. 
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interests of other land owners in the area. Accordingly, it is necessary to demolish an 
illegal structure as a measure to protect the interests of the collective. 
One can further argue that the owner’s rights pertaining to his right to use, enjoy 
and exploit his property are inherently limited by legislation. Visser convincingly argues 
that ownership has never been an absolute right and that it has always had to conform 
to the prevailing needs of society.70 Lewis in turn argues that the concept of ownership 
has been eroded by legislative restrictions to the point that it can no longer be described 
as plena in re potestas.71 In a similar line of reasoning, the court in PJ Ruck v Makana 
Municipality72 explained that legislation informs the content of the right of ownership.73 
Collectively, these sources indicate that owners must accept that their right will always 
be subject to the limitations imposed by legislation. An owner can only exercise his 
entitlements within the framework of the law.74 The right to build an illegal structure has 
never formed part of his ownership entitlements and the subsequent demolition of such 
a structure will therefore not necessarily constitute an unjustifiable interference with 
property rights. What is more, section 25(1) of the Constitution recognises that it is 
within the state’s power to regulate property rights in the public interest. Regulatory 
measures will be valid provided they are exercised according to the law of general 
application, are not arbitrary and are imposed for a legitimate public purpose. 
Legislation such as the Building Standards Act has an invaluable function in modern 
society since it regulates the quality and nature of building development. In so doing, it 
ensures the healthy and sustainable growth of urban areas. Limitations – including the 
duty to demolish illegal structures – imposed in terms of the Building Standards Act will 
generally be constitutionally valid on this basis. Importantly, the FNB methodology and 
specifically the substantive arbitrariness test assist the courts in determining when the 
regulatory interference with property rights disproportionately burdens the land owner. 
                                                            
70 Visser DP ‘The absoluteness of ownership: the South African common law perspective’ 1985 Acta 
Juridica 39-52. 
71 Lewis C ‘The modern concept of ownership of land’ 1985 Acta Juridica 241-266. 
72 [2010] ZAECGHC 111 (24 November 2010). 
73 [2010] ZAECGHC 111 (24 November 2010) para 20. 
74 Walele v The City of Cape Town and others 2008 (11) BCLR 1067 (CC) para 2. 
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Land owners’ rights are, therefore, safeguarded since overly excessive limitations on 
property rights will be declared invalid and unconstitutional on the basis of section 25(1) 
of the Constitution. 75 
Section 25(1) acknowledges that the land owner’s obligations are not without 
boundaries. Likewise, the land owner’s obligation to demolish illegal and unlawful 
buildings may be limited in some instances. In Camps Bay Ratepayers and Resident’s 
Association v Harrison (Camps Bay)76 the court relied on the Oudekraal77 delay 
principle to find that in certain circumstances it would not set aside building plans on 
review. This meant that in the case under discussion the appellants (neighbouring 
property owners) were not able to obtain a demolition order, even though parts of the 
respondent’s building technically contravened certain zoning provisions. This decision 
was justified because the applicants had delayed to enforce compliance with the zoning 
laws, which created the impression that ‘this infraction was not their primary concern’.78 
Moreover, the respondent’s contravention of the zoning law was slight and it was clear 
that there was no ‘prospect that the infraction will impact in any meaningful way on the 
aesthetics or future development of Camps Bay’.79 From the Camps Bay decision one 
can infer that there will be instances where a land owner should not be compelled to 
demolish an illegal or an unlawful building.  
                                                            
75 Singer JW ‘The ownership society and takings of property: castles, investments and just obligations 
(2006) 30 Harv Envtl L Rev 309-338 at 329-330 argues that owners have obligations as well as rights. 
The takings clause requires of the courts to determine whether the limitation imposed on an owner 
amounts to a just obligation. Singer essentially argues that ownership is an inherently limited right, but 
adds that the obligations imposed on the owner may not be disproportionate.  
76 (560/08) [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010). 
77 In Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town and others 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) at 249H-I and 
242E it was confirmed that in proceedings for judicial review, the court has the discretion to order the 
setting aside of administrative action. Typically, in exercising its discretion the court will consider the 
length of time that has lapsed since the administrative action has first taken place, the need for finality 
and the consequences ‘for the public at large, and, indeed for future generations, of allowing the invalid 
decision to stand’.  
78 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010) para 55. 
79 [2010] ZASCA 3 (17 February 2010) para 62. 
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Several considerations could induce the court to refuse to order demolition of 
illegal building works. One such a circumstance would be where the building is illegal 
because it conflicts with conditions of title, which have been rendered obsolete as a 
result of changed circumstances in the neighbourhood. A land owner cannot be 
compelled to demolish a building that has been built in contravention of a condition of 
title when, for instance, the character of the neighbourhood has already changed to 
such an extent that the condition is rendered meaningless.80 Under these 
circumstances, it cannot be said that the owner caused his community harm by using 
his property in a prohibited manner. It would also be unreasonable to require an owner 
to demolish a building if its existence causes negligible or no harm to the community 
and the extent to which it contravenes the law is very small. Likewise, an owner should 
not be compelled to demolish his building where, as in Camps Bay, the community took 
an unreasonably long time to vindicate their rights in court or where rights of the 
objectors are not affected significantly by the illegality, while demolition would have 
excessively unfair implications for the owner. Singer explains that obligations are not 
necessary justified just because they are demanded by society.81 Section 25(1), and 
specifically the FNB82 substantive arbitrariness test, also directs the court to establish 
when the demands of society (the demolition or partial demolition of illegal structure) 
amount to an unconstitutional deprivation of property rights, prescribing a nuanced text 
that allows for a complex weighing up of all the relevant factors in their context. 
 
6 3 2 Alternative perspective: restrictive covenants 
Law and economics scholars adopt an alternative approach in relation to the 
enforcement of restrictive covenants. Restrictive covenants are in their view essentially 
contracts, concluded between land owners in a neighbourhood, designed to place 
                                                            
80 Van Wyk J ‘Removing restrictive conditions and preserving the residential character of a 
neighbourhood’ (1992) 55 THRHR 369-385 at 371. 
81 Singer JW ‘The ownership society and takings of property: castles, investments and just obligations 
(2006) 30 Harv Envtl L Rev 309-338 at 329-330. 
82 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
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limitations on a person’s use of his land.83 These contracts are registered against the 
title deeds of the properties to ensure that subsequent land owners are bound by the 
covenant.84 The restrictive covenants described by law and economics theorists are 
similar to the restrictive covenants adopted in South African law from English law.85  
Posner explains that restrictive covenants have two shortcomings as planning 
tools. Firstly, they are inflexible in instances where the character of the neighbourhood 
has changed. Secondly, they are only applicable in an initial single-ownership setting.86 
He argues that the problem of obsolete restrictive covenants will not be as serious if the 
courts are willing to grant damages for the breach of those restrictive covenants, instead 
of an interdict (demolition).87 Posner believes that a damages order is superior to an 
interdict (demolition) because it will not prevent the breach of the covenant that 
‘increased the value of the defendant’s property by more than it diminished the value of 
the other properties in the tract, since by hypothesis, his liability would be smaller than 
                                                            
83 Ellickson has recommended consensual systems of land-use regulation as an alternative to 
government regulation. More specifically, he argues that restrictive covenants and nuisance rules are a 
more effective way to solve land-use conflicts than state regulation. See in this regard Ellickson RC 
‘Alternative to zoning: covenants, nuisance rules, and fines as land use controls’ (1973) 40 U Chi L Rev 
681-781. 
84 Posner RA Economic analysis of law 6 ed (2003) 64. 
85 Van Wyk J ‘The nature and classification of restrictive covenants and conditions of title’ (1992) 25 De 
Jure 270-288 at 271 explains that restrictive covenants were received in South African law from English 
law during the nineteenth century. The term ‘covenant’ refers to an agreement or contract in terms of 
which limitations are placed on a land owner’s use of the land. Restrictive covenants, in the South African 
sense, are constructed as contracts for the benefit of a third party (stipulatio alteri). This construction 
makes the contract binding and beneficial to all owners in the township. For more information on the 
stipulatio alteri, refer to Van Wyk AMA Restrictive conditions as urban land-use planning instruments 
unpublished LLD thesis Unisa (1990) 85-93. 
86 Posner RA Economic analysis of law 6 ed (2003) 64-65. The restrictive covenant referred to by Posner 
is created by the original township developer, who registers the restrictive covenant against the title 
deeds of all the properties. Posner argues that restrictive covenants can only be applicable in initial 
single-ownership settings because the original developer (who owns the entire plot of land) has to create 
the restrictive covenants before he sells the plots. 
87 Posner RA Economic analysis of law 6 ed (2003) 65. 
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his gain from the breach’.88 In instances where an injunction (demolition) is granted, the 
violator will have to negotiate with every other land owner to allow the breach of the 
covenant. In some instances, the violating land owner might have to pay excessive 
amounts to those property owners who are holding out for a better price and this in turn 
may lead to the transaction never being completed.89 Explained differently, an interdict 
for the breach of a restrictive covenant increases transaction costs, which can prevent a 
land owner from obtaining a use of his property that he values more than the other land 
owners in the neighbourhood.  
Posner’s approach is based on Calabresi and Melamed’s distinction between 
property rules and liability rules as methods for protecting property rights.90 A property 
rule refers to the situation where a property owner can only be deprived of his property 
right with his consent.91 This means that when it comes to restrictive covenants, land 
owners have a right to enforce their rights under the covenant by way of a demolition 
order. They can only be deprived of the demolition order if they consent to such a 
deprivation. A liability rule implies that a person can be deprived of property rights 
without his consent and at a price determined by the court.92 The expropriation of 
property serves as an apt example of when property rights are vindicated by a liability 
rule.93  
                                                            
88 Posner RA Economic analysis of law 6 ed (2003) 66. 
89 Posner RA Economic analysis of law 6 ed (2003) 66. 
90 The concept of property rules and liability rules was coined by Calabresi G and Melamed AD in their 
seminal article ‘Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: one view of the cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harv L 
Rev 1089-1128. 
91 This chapter draws from Miceli’s explanation of property rules and liability rules: Miceli JT ‘Property’ in 
Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics 2 ed (2005) 246-260 at 249. Where 
necessary reference is made to Calabresi G and Melamed AD ‘Property rules, liability rules and 
inalienability: one view of the cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089-1128. 
92 Miceli JT ‘Property’ in Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics 2 ed (2005) 246-
260 at 249. 
93 Calabresi G and Melamed AD ‘Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: one view of the cathedral’ 
(1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089-1128 at 1106-1108. 
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Calabresi and Melamed argue that when transaction costs are low, it would be 
economically efficient to vindicate property rights by way of a property rule. Conversely, 
when transaction costs are high, it would be more efficient to vindicate property rights 
by way of a liability rule.94 The reason for this is that when transaction costs are low 
property owners would be able to negotiate a beneficial arrangement.95 In 
circumstances where an owner has built in contravention of a restrictive covenant, 
Calabresi and Melamed would argue that a demolition order should be granted where 
there are only a few owners who have the right to enforce compliance with the 
covenant. If a property owner believes that his non-compliant use of his property is 
more valuable than the other property owners’ right to enforce the covenant, he will 
attempt to negotiate an agreement. Since there are only a few property owners, which 
reduces the possibilities of hold-outs, there is a real possibility that a mutually beneficial 
agreement can be reached. For example, the property owners might agree to sell their 
right to enforce the demolition order (in other words, accept payment for not using it). 
However, when the restrictive covenant is registered against the title deeds of an entire 
                                                            
94 Miceli JT ‘Property’ in Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics 2 ed (2005) 246-
260 at 249. 
95 Calabresi G and Melamed AD ‘Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: one view of the cathedral’ 
(1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089-1128 at 1106-1108 at 1115-1118; Miceli JT ‘Property’ in Backhaus JG (ed) 
The Elgar companion to law and economics 2 ed (2005) 246-260 at 249. Calabresi and Melamed 
identified four rules that they apply with reference to the problem of pollution. In terms of this problem, 
person A pollutes and person B dislikes the pollution. A court could apply any one of the four rules to 
solve the problem of competing interests. Rule one provides that B can prevent A from polluting by way of 
an interdict. This is a property rule in favour of B. Rule two provides that A can pollute, but only if he pays 
damages to B. This is a liability rule in favour of B. Rule three provides that A can pollute and that B must 
buy the pollution right from A if he wants to prevent it. This rule is a property rule in favour A. Finally, rule 
four provides that B can prevent A from polluting, provided that he pays A an amount of damages 
determined by the court. If transaction costs are low the court can apply either rule one or three to protect 
property rights. The reason for this is that if rule one is applied, A (if he considers his right sufficiently 
valuable) can approach B to buy the right to pollute. Similarly, if rule three is applied, B (if he considers 
clean air sufficiently valuable) can approach A to negotiate an agreement where A will stop polluting. 
Accordingly, if transaction costs are low the granting of an interdict will result in the most economically 
efficient outcome.   
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neighbourhood, transaction costs increase dramatically. The owner would then have to 
obtain the consent of every other owner in the township to prevent his building from 
being demolished.96 In such circumstances, the property owner might not be able to 
conclude an agreement with the other property owners, even though such an 
agreement would be desirable.97  This analysis means, by way of summary, that a land 
owner, who wants to building in conflict with a restrictive covenant, may either be forced 
to negotiate a satisfactory solution with a small group of affected land owners (failing 
which they can enforce the covenant) or be allowed to proceed with building operations 
in conflict with the covenant, subject to a compensation payment to a large number of 
affected land owners (who would then be precluded from enforcing the covenant).  
Law and economics analysis can in some instances be contradictory. Hansford98 
argues that denial of a demolition order for breach of a restrictive covenant will, from an 
economic perspective, not necessarily yield the best results. Hansford relies on the 
decision in Prime Bank, Federal Savings Bank v Galler99 (Prime Bank) to illustrate his 
point. In Prime Bank the court refused to order the demolition of a building built in 
conflict with a restrictive covenant. In so doing, the court enabled the parties to bargain 
for the value that should be attributed to the restrictive covenant. Hansford explains that 
one can presume that the plaintiff would be willing to allow the house to stand in its 
                                                            
96 Calabresi G and Melamed AD ‘Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: one view of the cathedral’ 
(1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089-1128 at 1119. 
97 Calabresi G and Melamed AD ‘Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: one view of the cathedral’ 
(1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089-1128 at 1106 and 1119 explain, with reference to the pollution example, that 
if person A had to negotiate with many persons to obtain his right to pollute, it is likely that an agreement 
will never be reached as a result of high transaction costs. In such circumstances, it is best to impose a 
liability rule. Miceli JT ‘Property’ in Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics 2 ed 
(2005) 246-260 at 249 explains that the choice in favour of a liability rule when transaction costs are high 
is not unqualified because the court does not know what the subjective value of the property right is. 
There is a possibility that the court can undervalue the property right, which means an incorrect damages 
sum might be awarded. Miceli further explains at 249 that ‘the cost of potentially inefficient exchanges 
under liability rules needs to be weighed against the cost of forgone transactions under property rules’.  
98 Hansford DW ‘Injunctive remedy for breach of restrictive covenants: an economic analysis’ (1993) 45 
Mercer L Rev 543-556. 
99 263 Ga 286, 430 SE 2d 735 (1993). 
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position, without alterations, for a certain price. Likewise, the bank would be willing to 
modify the house to a certain extent. This situation can lead to a bilateral monopoly, 
which in turn creates higher transaction costs.100 Transaction costs will be higher 
because the parties will bargain over the price. Bilateral monopolies result in negative 
social costs because as parties bargain to extract the most profit, possible social waste 
occurs. Social waste refers to the situation where parties incur high transaction costs to 
conclude an agreement in terms of which the covenant will not be enforced or where 
they could not reach an agreement to relax the covenant. The author argues that the 
ability to rely on a restrictive covenant to protect your property right is worth far more 
that a court’s attempt to prevent the demolition of a structure in individual cases. The 
court’s refusal to enforce restrictive covenants by way of an interdict will result in social 
waste because transaction costs are higher.101 
Law and economics analysis therefore does not provide a conclusive answer to 
the question whether it is preferable to enforce restrictive covenants by way of a liability 
rule (compensation) rather than a property rule (demolition). It should be emphasised 
that this analysis preferably operates in a private-law setting and restricts the state’s 
regulation of property to instances where high transaction costs makes state 
intervention inevitable, in which case law and economics theory does consider it 
necessary to rely on a public remedy to protect property rights.102 Miceli reasons that a 
public remedy should be employed to protect property rights in circumstances where an 
individual owner acts in a manner that negatively impacts on a large group of people.103 
The negative impact on an individual owner might not be enough to prompt that owner 
to take action against the wrongdoer. However, the aggregate harm will outweigh the 
benefit that the wrongdoer obtains from his action. In such instances, the government 
                                                            
100 Hansford DW ‘Injunctive remedy for breach of restrictive covenants: an economic analysis’ (1993) 45 
Mercer L Rev 543-556 at 554-555. 
101 Hansford DW ‘Injunctive remedy for breach of restrictive covenants: an economic analysis’ (1993) 45 
Mercer L Rev 543-556 at 554-555. 
102 Miceli JT ‘Property’ in Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics 2 ed (2005) 246-
260 at 250. 
103 Miceli JT ‘Property’ in Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics 2 ed (2005) 246-
260 at 250. 
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acts as an agent of the victims by regulating the outcome of the offending action. 
Government regulation of property rights is justified if transaction costs among victims 
are high, which precludes a private remedy.104  
One can argue that the construction of an illegal building will cause harm to, for 
example, all the land owners in the township. The potential aggregate harm caused by 
illegal building therefore justifies the enactment of regulatory laws such as the Building 
Standards Act. This Act protects the rights of others by firstly, imposing fines on land 
owners who are in the process of constructing illegal buildings105 and secondly, by 
prescribing the demolition of offending buildings. Law and economics theory therefore 
supports the regulation of building and development in the public interest. The 
protection mechanisms incorporated into regulatory laws include property rules 
(demolition) and liability rules (fines) or even both. Explained differently, there may be 
instances where the regulatory law protects property rights by requiring the demolition 
of illegal and unlawful structures. Likewise, there may also be instances where the 
regulatory law protects property rights by way of a liability rule. It is therefore too 
inflexible to argue that regulatory laws will always protect property rights by ordering the 
demolition of unlawful and illegal structures. Nevertheless, one can argue that for policy 
reasons it might be beneficial to protect property rights by demolishing unlawful and 
illegal buildings (a property rule) rather than compensation (liability rule) in the majority 
of cases. As explained above, demolition – as opposed to compensation – effectively 
protects the rights of all the land owners in the area. Demolition also restores the unique 
character of the neighbourhood and it removes the unlawful and illegal use of land, 
which means that it could serve the public interest in ways that surpass the mere 
aggregate of individual interests. Moreover, compared to compensation, demolition 
arguably has more deterrent value.  
 
                                                            
104 Miceli JT ‘Property’ in Backhaus JG (ed) The Elgar companion to law and economics 2 ed (2005) 246-
260 at 250. 
105 See in this regard section 4 (4) of the National Building Standards and Building Regulations Act 103 of 
1977. 
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6 3 3 Conclusion 
A land owner has more obligations and responsibilities than the owner of, for example, 
a bicycle. The very nature of the object indicates that the land owner’s rights in relation 
to his property will necessarily be more limited. Doctrinal literature confirms that 
ownership has never been an absolute right and that it has to accommodate the 
prevailing needs of society. This is also reflected in section 25(1) of the Constitution 
insofar as it implicitly recognises that the state has the power to regulate property rights 
in the public interest. Land owners should accordingly expect that their rights will be 
limited by legislation such as zoning laws, town-planning ordinances, building and 
development controls and health and safety statutes. Typically, demolition is one of the 
ways in which these laws are enforced, as is evidenced by section 21 of Building 
Standards Act. Land owners should therefore be aware of the fact that they face the 
possibility of a demolition order in instances where their illegal buildings cannot be 
altered to comply with the relevant law and when it is found that compensation does not 
adequately protect the interests affected by the illegal use of land.  
There are in any event compelling arguments favouring the demolition of buildings 
that are irremediably unlawful or illegal. The demolition of an illegal structure (property 
rule) protects the rights of all the owners in a residential area, while a compensation 
award (a liability rule) is likely to benefit adjacent neighbouring land owners only. The 
argument in favour of demolition is even stronger if the harm caused by the illegal or 
unlawful use of land cannot be rectified by compensation or if the aggregate harm 
caused to the community as a whole cannot be translated into or reflected adequately in 
monetary terms. Demolition is also an appealing solution when buildings have been 
constructed in conflict with conditions of title or restrictive covenants. These restrictive 
conditions are only registered against the servient tenements and it is accordingly 
problematic to establish which erven are dominant tenements. By implication, it will be 
problematic to establish which land owners should receive compensation when a 
neighbour has constructed an unlawful building in conflict with such a condition.  
The social obligation theory requires the owner to contribute to the social 
structures that have enabled him to flourish. An owner is also obliged to refrain from 
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causing his community harm when he uses, enjoys and exploits his property. Illegal 
structures have the potential to change the character of neighbourhoods and they may 
pose a threat to the health and safety of the community. Evidently, illegal structures 
create urban environments that are not conducive to human flourishing. On this point it 
can be expected of the land owner to compensate those members of his community 
negatively affected by his illegal use of land if legislation provides for such a remedy. 
However, the land owner owes it to his community to demolish illegal structures if 
compensation is not a viable option and if the buildings cannot be brought in line with 
the law. The owner is in this sense morally compelled to remove the harm that he has 
caused to his community, if necessary by demolishing the illegal building.  
There are, however, circumstances where it would be unjust and unreasonable to 
compel the owner to completely or partially demolish an illegal structure because it will 
result in an excessive interference with the land owner’s other legitimate property 
interests in the legal parts of the building, while demolition would not enhance the social 
interest significantly or at all. This is illustrated by the Camps Bay decision, where 
demolition would have disproportionately burdened the owner, without making much 
difference to the interests of neighbours or of the community. Factors that support this 
decision in the case were that the neighbouring land owners and the local authority had 
failed for a long time to challenge the respondent’s infraction of the zoning scheme and, 
further, that the illegal aspects of the building would not have impacted on the character 
of the area or have affected the rights of others significantly. It was clear that the 
demolition of the building would have served no real purpose. Moreover, it would have 
been prohibitively expensive for the land owner to bring her building in line with the 
zoning scheme, and the infraction was caused by an error of which the owner was 
unaware. The complete or partial demolition of the Camps Bay building in these 
circumstances would have fallen foul of section 25(1) on the ground of substantive 
arbitrariness.  
In conclusion, land owners normally have an obligation to develop their property 
within the confines of the law. The owner is responsible to demolish illegal structures, 
partially or wholly, whenever their negative impact on neighbours or the public cannot 
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be rectified adequately by a compensation order. This obligation is not unlimited and in 
exceptional circumstances owners cannot be compelled to demolish their illegal or 
partially illegal structures. There is no clear indication when such a circumstance would 
arise and each case has to be assessed according to its unique set of facts. The FNB 
substantive arbitrariness test indicates when the demolition of an illegal structure might 
disproportionately burden the owner. In particular, the FNB substantive arbitrariness test 
directs the court to consider the complexity of relationships involved in the dispute to 
ensure that there is sufficient reason for the demolition of the unlawful or illegal building. 
This means that the court will not sanction the demolition of an illegal building if it will 
amount to a substantively arbitrary deprivation of the land owner’s legitimate property 
interests. Likewise, the court will not order the demolition of the illegal structure if it finds 
that the authorising law is procedurally unfair. One can conclude that section 25(1), as 
interpreted and applied in FNB, delineates the extent of the land owner’s obligation to 
demolish illegal and unlawful buildings. This obligation is specifically limited to instances 
where demolition will not result in the unconstitutional deprivation of the land owner’s 
other legal property interests. More specifically, the FNB substantive arbitrariness test 
requires of the court to consider the complexity of the relationships involved in the 
dispute and to balance the interests of the affected land owner, the neighbours and the 
public. Chapter 5 showed, with reference to the Camps Bay decision, that demolition 
amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of property if the result is that the land owner is 
deprived of most, if not all, of her legitimate property interests in a structure while the 
neighbouring land owners and the public in general derives no benefit from the 
demolition of the illegal structure or building works. In the Camps Bay example, the FNB 
analysis showed that there was a disproportionate relationship between the purpose of 
the deprivation (public health and safety and the protection of neighbouring land 
owners’ interests) and the deprivation in question, namely demolition of illegal building 
works. This meant that there would have been insufficient reason for the deprivation 
(demolition).   
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6 4 Reasons for preserving historic buildings 
6 4 1 Social obligation of the owner 
Chapter 4 described the extensive limitations that historic preservation laws106 can 
place on ownership. Alexander argues that the limitations created by historic 
preservation laws are best explained with reference to the social-obligation norm. He 
further argues that when it comes to limitations that are placed on ownership by 
legislation, one should ask: what obligations does a land owner owe to his community in 
relation to the use, condition and care of his property?107 Alexander reasons that the 
social-obligation theory recognises that humans can only operate as free and rational 
agents within a specific type of culture. Accordingly, a person owes it to his community 
to support the ‘institutions and infrastructure that are part of the foundation of that 
culture’.108 This means that the individual might sometimes be required to sacrifice 
personal preference-maximising uses of his land.109 An example of such a sacrifice is 
where the owner is compelled to protect a historic building even though this prevents 
him from putting the land to a more profitable use.110 A property owner’s obligation in 
relation to a building includes not only the duty to ensure that it is a healthy and safe 
structure, but also the duty to preserve aesthetic qualities that are valued by the 
community.111  
                                                            
106 For an historic account of the development of the notion that it is the broader public’s responsibility to 
protect cultural property refer to Sax JL ‘Heritage preservation as a public duty: the Abbe Gregoire and 
the origins of an idea’ (1990) 88 Mich L Rev 1142-1169. 
107 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 794. 
108 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 795. 
109 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 795. 
110 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 795. Alexander relies on Penn Central Transportation Company v the City of New York 438 US 104 
(1978) (Penn Central) in support of his argument.   
111 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 795. 
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Alexander reasons that a building is ‘obviously special’ or ‘nearly unique’ if it has 
been designated as a landmark or where an application for a demolition permit for the 
historic building has been turned down.112 In such circumstances, the owner has a 
responsibility towards the community to not permanently destroy an exceptional 
building. Alexander concedes that not all aspects of the community’s infrastructure are 
necessary ‘to maintain the kind of culture that enables development of those qualities 
without which no individual can experience meaningful freedom or practice personal 
responsibility.’113 However, some buildings are indispensable because they form part of 
the civic culture of specific communities.114 Unique historic buildings play a vital role in 
forming an urban community’s identity as well as the identity of its inhabitants.115 
Accordingly, a property owner has the duty to protect the buildings that are deemed to 
be part of his community’s civic culture. Where a local authority decides to protect a 
building from destruction or alteration, this obligation may require the owner to protect 
that building without any form of compensation. After all, compensation should not be 
paid to an owner to prevent him from causing harm to his community, if the right to 
cause harm never formed part of his entitlements.116   
                                                            
112 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 795. 
113 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 795. Underkuffler LS The idea of property: its meaning and power (2003) 110 explains that cultural 
property (which includes artefacts and historic buildings) is a legal recognition of the interests that certain 
groups have in specific tangible or intangible things. These interests should be protected even if it 
conflicts with the bundle of rights that property owners usually enjoy. 
114 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 795. In this regard, Alexander argues that the Grand Central Terminal (the historic building relevant in 
Penn Central) plays an indispensable role in the community of New York. 
115 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 795 further explains that historic landmarks build a collective urban memory and that destruction of a 
valuable building will erase such a memory. Erasure of collective urban memory ‘destabilizes a society 
and its cultures, with potentially severe political consequences’.  
116 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 796. 
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In effect, Alexander argues that property owners have a social obligation to 
maintain unique or historic buildings because they form part of the community’s culture 
and heritage. Property owners should not be compensated for preserving historic 
buildings because the owner never had the right to cause harm to his community by the 
destruction of historic buildings.117 Property owners should be aware of the fact that 
ownership of an historic building is accompanied by the social obligation to preserve 
that building for the benefit of the community.  
However, Alexander qualifies this argument by suggesting that it may be beneficial 
to incorporate German equalisation-style measures into US law.118 These measures will 
cater for instances where ‘there are good reasons to hold that that the regulation is not 
a taking but where unfairness exists because the regulation disproportionately burdens 
one or a small number of owners’.119 Alexander reasons that equalisation measures in 
the US context are not necessarily limited to compensatory awards. He explains his 
argument with reference to Penn Central Transportation Company v City of New York 
(Penn Central),120 where the land owner was in possession of valuable transferable 
development rights because of its building’s landmark status. Alexander is of the view 
that the transferable development rights to some extent mitigated the burden brought 
about by historic preservation. These transferable development rights therefore had the 
                                                            
117 This view is supported by Nivala J ‘The future for our past: preserving landmark preservation’ (1996) 5 
NYU Environmental Law Journal 83-119 at 110 and 117. Nivala reasons that the destruction of a 
landmark or historic building is detrimental to the public because it causes physical, financial and 
psychological harm to the community. When a government acts to protect landmarks and historic 
buildings it is not to ensure reciprocity of advantage for neighbouring property owners. Rather, historic 
preservation is designed to prevent the community from being harmed and further to preserve the 
buildings for future generations. As a result, the owner can be required to protect and maintain the 
building without compensation. Nivala further explains that landmark and historic preservation safeguards 
the qualities of a civilised community. The only reciprocal advantage to which the owner is entitled to is 
the right to live within the confines of the civilised community.  
118 Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings 
jurisprudence (2006) 236. 
119 Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings 
jurisprudence (2006) 236. 
120 438 US 104 (1978). See the discussion of this case in chapter 4, section 4 3 3. 
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function of an equalisation measure. It seems as if Alexander suggests that there may 
be instances where it is necessary to assuage the otherwise excessive burden that is 
imposed on a land owner by regulatory laws such as historic preservation statutes.121  
With reference to her model (tier one and tier two) described in section 6 3 1 
above,122 Underkuffler argues that it can be expected of land owners to preserve 
historic structures in the public interest.123 Underkuffler’s argument extends to buildings 
situated in historic districts as well as to individual landmarks. Historic districts are 
comparable to zoning schemes and it is relatively easy to see why the individual land 
owner’s right to alter or demolish his historic structure should not trump the public 
interest in historic preservation in this instance. When a land owner challenges a historic 
district ordinance, he essentially asserts his right to use and control his building. The 
land owner also seeks to protect both his investment in the land and expectations that 
he may have in relation to the property.124 Historic district ordinances protect similar 
values held by the collective. More specifically, historic district ordinances protect the 
investments and expectations of all land owners in the area. The core values that 
underlie these competing claims are, therefore, the same in kind. Accordingly, there is 
no basis for protecting the individual’s rights in relation to his structure over and above 
the public interest. Explained differently, the individual land owner does not have 
presumptive power over the interests of other members of his community.125  
When the community requires the protection of an individual historic landmark, 
their claim is rooted in ‘intellectual or emotional or psychological interests, rather than 
economic ones’.126 Underkuffler argues that the core values that underlie the individual 
land owner’s and the community’s claims are, nevertheless, similar in kind. The land 
owner, for example, values his right to control his property. He also has a desire to 
                                                            
121 Alexander GS The global debate over constitutional property: lessons for American takings 
jurisprudence (2006) 236- 239. 
122 See in this regard section 6 3 1. 
123 Underkuffler LS The idea of property: its meaning and power (2003) 110-116. 
124 Underkuffler LS The idea of property: its meaning and power (2003) 114. 
125 Underkuffler LS The idea of property: its meaning and power (2003) 114. 
126 Underkuffler LS The idea of property: its meaning and power (2003) 115. 
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protect his investment in the land and the expectations that he may have in relation to 
the building.127 Likewise, the community values its right to control a building to which it 
attaches cultural and historic relevance. In this regard, Underkuffler explains that ‘[t]he 
state of affairs that the public interest asserts is, thus, of a kind that we readily associate 
with property rights’.128 Furthermore, humans want to protect cultural property because 
it is critical to their attempt to ‘construct cultures, preserve memories, inspire wonder, 
embody aspirations, and ultimately understand – in some way – the place of individuals 
in the human and natural world.’129 Underkuffler reasons that these considerations have 
for a long time been associated with property rights and claims. Therefore, there is no 
basis for protecting the rights of the individual to demolish the structure over the interest 
of the public in historic preservation.130  
 Some authors recognise the importance of historic preservation but are of the 
view that some land owners should not be singled out to bear the cost of preserving 
historic landmarks and buildings. Fischel argues that it is not necessary to compensate 
an owner for the limitations placed on his ownership by historic preservation legislation 
if his building forms part of an entire neighbourhood that is designated as a historic 
area, or where a number of buildings are subject to heritage preservation laws. The 
reason for this is that the benefits obtained by the owner from the designation of the 
neighbourhood or the protection of other buildings in the area are roughly the same as 
the limitations that are placed on his rights by historic preservation laws.131 However, it 
is unfair in his view to expect of the single owner to carry the cost of preservation in 
circumstances where he owns an isolated landmark that is not situated within a historic 
district or in the vicinity of other protected buildings.132 The owner provides a public 
                                                            
127 Underkuffler LS The idea of property: its meaning and power (2003) 115. 
128 Underkuffler LS The idea of property: its meaning and power (2003) 116. 
129 Underkuffler LS The idea of property: its meaning and power (2003) 116. 
130 Underkuffler LS The idea of property: its meaning and power (2003) 116. 
131 Fischel WA ‘Lead us not into Penn Station: takings, historic preservation, and rent control’ (1994) 6 
Fordham Envtl LJ 749-754 at 753. 
132 Fischel WA ‘Lead us not into Penn Station: takings, historic preservation, and rent control’ (1994-1995) 
6 Fordham Envtl LJ 749-754 at 753 and to the same effect Fischel WA Regulatory takings: law, 
economics and politics (1995) 51. 
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benefit by protecting and maintaining the historic building. Fischel argues that this 
position is unfair and that the owner should at least be provided with some form of 
reciprocal benefit.133 This benefit does not necessarily have to be monetary 
compensation. An alternative for monetary compensation would be the transferable 
development rights possessed by the owners in Penn Central.134  
Rose is also of the view that the protection of an individual landmark or historic 
building raises some equity issues because that building is singled out for ‘special 
treatment’.135 More specifically, she argues that historic preservation laws place severe 
limitations on a property owner’s rights in relation to his building. These restrictions can 
result in a diminished property value, with the concomitant implication that the owner 
pays for the community’s ‘preservation preferences’.136 In Penn Central it was decided 
that historic preservation laws do not bring about a taking of private property for which 
the owner should be compensated.137 Nevertheless, it is still necessary to provide some 
form of consent or compensation scheme to property owners, developers and builders 
‘to whose creative endeavours the community must look for future contributions to the 
                                                            
133 Fischel WA ‘Lead us not into Penn Station: takings, historic preservation, and rent control’ (1994) 6 
Fordham Envtl LJ 749-754 at 753 and to the same effect, Fischel WA Regulatory takings: law, economics 
and politics (1995) 51. For an economic perspective of heritage preservation, refer to Gold A ‘The welfare 
economics of historic preservation’ (1975) 8 Conn L Rev 348-369 at 368-369. Gold argues that there is 
no economic justification for piling all the costs of preservation on the single owner and that there should 
rather be a form of cost sharing. The author suggests that the property owner should be compensated for 
the limitations placed on his rights in relation to the historic building.  
134 Fischel WA ‘Lead us not into Penn Station: takings, historic preservation, and rent control’ (1994) 6 
Fordham Envtl LJ 749-754 at 753 with reference to Penn Central Transportation Company v the City of 
New York 438 US 104 (1978). 
135 Rose CM ‘Preservation and community: new directions in the law of historic preservation’ (1980) 33 
Stan L Rev 473-534 at 497. 
136 Rose CM ‘Preservation and community: new directions in the law of historic preservation’ (1980) 33 
Stan L Rev 473-534 at 497. 
137 Rose CM ‘Preservation and community: new directions in the law of historic preservation’ (1980) 33 
Stan L Rev 473-534 at 502, with reference to Penn Central Transportation Company v the City of New 
York 438 US 104 (1978). 
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urban environment’.138 Rose further suggests that it might be better for ‘a community-
conscious preservation ordinance’ to rather delay alterations to a protected building, 
instead of an outright ban on demolition or alteration.139 She supports this proposition by 
explaining that a delay in the demolition will place the owner in a ‘weaker moral position 
from which to complain of caprice or special burden’.140 Moreover, delay will enable the 
parties involved to educate each other in relation to the stakes involved. Delay will also 
allow the parties to reach a compromise and it will make historic preservation a function 
of community pressure and education.141  
Finally, to summarise, Alexander is of the view that the owner generally has the 
obligation to maintain aspects of his community’s civic culture, which includes historic 
buildings, without the payment of compensation. He argues that the right to demolish an 
historic landmark was never a right that the owner actually had in relation to his building. 
However, there may be instances where it would be necessary to mitigate the otherwise 
excessive burden caused by historic preservation by way of an equalisation-style 
measure. Other authors argue that land owners should generally not be compelled to 
bear the burden of historic preservation without some form of reward. The reward does 
not have to be monetary compensation and it can be something else such as 
transferable development rights.  
 
6 4 2 Conclusion 
In South Africa the state has the power to regulate property rights in the public interest 
without the payment of compensation. Case law has confirmed that ownership 
entitlements can only ‘be exercised in accordance with the social function of the law and 
                                                            
138 Rose CM ‘Preservation and community: new directions in the law of historic preservation’ (1980) 33 
Stan L Rev 473-534 at 502.  
139 Rose CM ‘Preservation and community: new directions in the law of historic preservation’ (1980) 33 
Stan L Rev 473-534 at 503. 
140 Rose CM ‘Preservation and community: new directions in the law of historic preservation’ (1980) 33 
Stan L Rev 473-534 at 503. 
141 Rose CM ‘Preservation and community: new directions in the law of historic preservation’ (1980) 33 
Stan L Rev 473-534 at 504. 
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the interests of the community’.142 Furthermore, ‘inherent responsibilities of ownership 
towards the community in the exercise of entitlements have been increasingly 
emphasised’.143 The National Heritage Resources Act of 25 of 1999 (the Heritage 
Resources Act) forms part of the framework within which ownership should function.144 
One can conclude, in line with Alexander’s social obligation theory, that the ownership 
of land in South Africa is accompanied by the obligation to preserve culturally or 
historically valuable buildings situated on the property. ‘Preserve’ means that the owner 
must refrain from demolishing or altering the building unless he has obtained the 
requisite consent. It can also mean that the owner should maintain the historic building 
to a prescribed standard.  
 That being said, this obligation is not unlimited. Chapter five, section 5 3 2, 
describes the circumstances where denial of the demolition permit for an historic 
building will amount to a substantively arbitrary deprivation of property. The chapter 
concluded that it would be unconstitutional to deny the demolition permit where the 
owner has, in effect, been deprived of all economic use of the property and where he 
has been saddled with the duty to maintain the building at his own expense. This would 
be the case when the owner cannot use the property for any reasonable purpose and is 
also required to bear the financial responsibility of maintaining the building. The 
Heritage Resources Act, and by implication the community, imposes a disproportionate 
burden on the owner in these circumstances. Explained differently, a land owner carries 
a disproportionate burden in the public interest when, in addition to imposing the duty to 
maintain the historic property at his own expense, the historic preservation statute 
causes the owner to lose all economically viable use of the property, including the 
possibility of selling, leasing or using the property in any other way. Chapter 5 argues 
that the disproportionate burden on the land owner can be mitigated by an equalisation 
measure, an example of which has indeed been incorporated in the Heritage Resources 
Act. Viewed from this perspective, one can argue that the owner’s rights can be 
protected by a liability rule in the instance where the Heritage Resources Act imposes a 
                                                            
142 Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37. 
143 Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37. 
144 Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and another 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 37. 
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disproportionate burden, but where the preservation of the structure is nevertheless still 
desirable. Importantly, equalisation includes but is not limited to compensatory awards. 
Chapter 5, section 5 3 2 explains that ‘equalisation’ can also refer to subsidies, tax 
breaks, consent use of property in conflict with the zoning scheme and, in the US 
context, transferable development rights. The liability rule can therefore take on different 
forms – it is not necessarily limited to monetary compensation. However, chapter 4, 
sections 4 5 2 and 4 5 3 argue that there may be instances where the right to demolish 
an historic structure (a property rule) cannot be replaced by a liability rule. This will 
typically be the case where the authorising law does not provide for a liability-rule like 
remedy to protect property rights. In such instances it would be necessary to allow the 
demolition of the structure if the preservation of a building would result in an excessive 
and unconstitutional interference with property rights. 
   
6 5 Reasons for limiting a property owner’s right to demolish an unlawfully 
occupied building 
6 5 1 Introduction 
In chapters two and five it was shown that the courts will not always order the 
immediate eviction of unlawful occupiers from inner-city buildings to enable the owners 
to proceed with the demolition of those buildings and the subsequent development of 
the property. This section aims to explore the reasons for placing a temporary or even 
permanent ban on a land owner’s right to demolish an unlawfully occupied building for 
the sake of protecting the affected occupiers’ access to housing rights. The point of 
departure will be the ‘defined and carefully calibrated constitutional matrix’ described by 
Sachs J in the famous decision of Port Elizabeth Municipality.145 This matrix consists of 
two main elements, namely the historic context of evictions, forced removals and 
demolitions during apartheid and the constitutional and statutory reform dimension, of 
which section 25, section 26 and legislation promulgated to give effect to them form 
                                                            
145 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 14. 
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part.146 A corollary of the operation of section 25 within the framework of the matrix is 
the social responsibilities that accompany the ownership of especially land in the 
constitutional era. 
Alexander’s theory can be applied to explain the land owner’s constitutional 
obligations embodied in section 26(3) of the Constitution. As explained in section 6 2 
above, the social obligation theory provides that the land owner, as a member of a 
community, has a duty to provide those things that are necessary to enable his 
community to flourish. The focus of this discussion falls on the social obligations that the 
land owner has as a member of an urban community. More specifically, it is argued that 
in some circumstances the owner has a duty to temporarily tolerate the continued 
presence of unlawful occupiers on his land even if it interferes with his demolition and 
development plans. The section below briefly refers to the constitutional matrix 
developed in Port Elizabeth Municipality and expands on the notion that the owner has 
certain obligations in relation to his building. The third section refers to Radin’s147 
distinction between fungible and personal property since it provides a useful tool for 
explaining why the rights of the unlawful occupiers place limitations on the owner’s 
rights to demolish his building in specific circumstances. 
 
6 5 2 The constitutional matrix developed in Port Elizabeth Municipality  
As explained above, the constitutional matrix described in Port Elizabeth Municipality 
consists of two main elements, that is, the historical context and the constitutional and 
statutory dimension, of which section 25 and section 26 form part. The court first 
sketched the historical context that led to the inclusion of section 26(3) in the 
Constitution. In so doing, the court stressed the political nature of evictions and 
                                                            
146 The historic and constitutional context described by the court has far-reaching implications for the 
relationship between section 25 and section 26 of the Constitution. In Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) paras 19-23, the court provides an intricate explanation of 
exactly how the matrix affects the relationship between these two constitutional provisions. This aspect of 
the judgment is discussed in chapter five.  
147 Radin MJ ‘Property and personhood’ (1981) 34 Stan L Rev 957-1015.  
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demolitions and explained that many poor South Africans today are homeless as a 
result of the apartheid government’s abuse of the demolition and eviction powers that 
were created by apartheid legislation. Legislation such as the Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act 52 of 1951 (PISA) enabled ‘grave assaults on the dignity of black 
people’148 and facilitated the ‘creation of large, well-established and affluent white urban 
areas co-existing side by side with crammed pockets of impoverished and insecure 
black ones’.149 The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) was enacted to give effect to the values embodied in section 26(3) 
of the Constitution, namely to rectify the injustices of the past and to regulate the 
manner in which future evictions will take place.150 The court explained that PIE is not 
only a mechanism to restore common law property rights by freeing them from the racist 
and authoritarian effects of apartheid.151 PIE should not be viewed as a mechanism 
solely designed to promote ‘judicial philanthropy in favour of the poor [either], though 
compassion is built into its very structure’.152 Rather, PIE should be understood and 
interpreted ‘within a defined and carefully calibrated constitutional matrix’.  
In determining the scope of constitutionally protected rights, such as property in 
section 25, a court should start and end its analysis by affirming the values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom.153 Furthermore, when interpreting section 25 of the 
Constitution, it is important to keep in mind that property rights were often disregarded 
during the apartheid era. Property rights should be respected ‘in the new dispensation, 
both by state and private persons’.154 However, these rights should also be interpreted 
within the ‘context of the need for the orderly opening-up or restoration of secure 
property rights for those denied access to or deprived of them in the past’.155 The court 
emphasised that property rights have never been absolute and that it is subject to 
                                                            
148 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 10. 
149 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 10. 
150 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 11. 
151 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 14. 
152 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 14. 
153 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 15. 
154 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 15. 
155 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 15. 
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societal considerations.156 It further explained, with reference to Van der Walt,157 that 
section 25 contains an inherent tension between individual rights and social 
responsibilities. A court should employ this tension as a guideline when interpreting and 
applying section 25 rights in a property dispute.158 Moreover, the purpose of section 25 
is to protect private property rights as well as the public interest.159 When interpreting 
the property clause one should move away from a  
‘typically private-law conceptualist view of the Constitution as a guarantee of the 
status quo to a dynamic, typically public-law view of the Constitution as an 
instrument for social change and transformation under the auspices of entrenched 
constitutional values’.160 
In relation to section 26 of the Constitution, the court stated that it underscored the 
transformative public-law view of the Constitution envisaged by Van der Walt.161 The 
court further emphasised the substantive interests that section 26(3) of the Constitution 
was designed to protect. Section 26(3) affords special protection to a person’s ‘place of 
                                                            
156 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 16, with reference to First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) (FNB) para 49. In FNB, Ackermann J explained that section 25(4)-(9) 
emphasises the need to rectify the vastly unequal distribution of land in South Africa. These provisions 
must be kept in mind when interpreting section 25 because they emphasise that property is not an 
absolute right and that it is subject to societal considerations.  
Van der Walt AJ The constitutional property clause: a comparative analysis of section 25 of the South 
African Constitution of 1996 (1997) 11. 
158 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 16, with reference to Van der Walt AJ The constitutional property 
clause: a comparative analysis of section 25 of the South African Constitution of 1996 (1997) 15-16, as 
quoted in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 50. 
159 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 16, quoting from First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) paras 50-52. 
160 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 16, with reference to Van der Walt AJ The constitutional property 
clause: a comparative analysis of section 25 of the South African Constitution of 1996 (1997) 15-16, as 
quoted in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 52. 
161 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 17. 
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abode’, and it acknowledges that a home provides more than just a roof over one’s 
head.162 A home is a place of personal intimacy and family security, and it is often ‘the 
only relatively secure space of privacy and tranquillity in what (for poor people in 
particular) is a turbulent and hostile world.’163 The court concluded that the Constitution 
recognises that land rights, the right to have access to housing, and the right not to be 
arbitrarily deprived of a home ‘are closely intertwined.’164  
 
6 5 3 Social obligation of the owner 
One of the themes running through the Port Elizabeth Municipality judgment is that 
under the Constitution it is expected of property owners to exercise their rights in a 
socially responsible manner and in a way that advances rather than undermines the 
public interest. There is a strong argument to be made that ownership of an inner-city 
building is accompanied by a range of social obligations, including the duty to prevent a 
building from falling into a state of disrepair.165 This duty should be understood with 
reference to Alexander’s social obligation norm. When exercising ownership 
entitlements, the land owner has a duty to refrain from causing harm to the community 
of which he forms part. A dilapidated building can pose a threat to the safety of the 
public and can contribute to the general decay of inner-city areas. One can argue that a 
property owner has a social obligation to prevent his buildings from being injurious to 
                                                            
162 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 17. 
163 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 17. 
164 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 19. 
165 In Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and another; Bisset and others v Buffalo 
City Municipality and others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng, and others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curiae) 
2005 (1) SA 530 (CC) paras 58-59, the Constitutional Court explained that it was reasonable to expect of 
the owner of to pay for water and electricity debts incurred by even unlawful occupiers of his land. The 
court reasoned that it was the responsibility of the owner to ensure that his property was not unlawfully 
occupied, or alternatively, to secure the eviction of unlawful occupiers. From this decision one can infer 
that the owner also has the duty to maintain an unlawfully occupied building. The duty must ensure that a 
building meets the health and safety standards set in legislation even if it is unlawfully occupied.  
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society.166 In addition to his social obligation to maintain a building, the property owner 
has a statutory duty to ensure that the building complies with legislation such as health 
and safety by-laws. This means that the property owner has a duty to ensure that the 
building is properly maintained and meets the standards set in legislation, even if it is 
unlawfully occupied. One can therefore conclude that the owner has the responsibility to 
maintain his building so that it does not pose a threat to the lives and property of others.  
In light of the current housing shortage, one can further argue that owners have a 
social obligation to ensure that their buildings are not left vacant and that they are put to 
good use. In fact one can even go as far as saying that it is careless of an owner to 
allow his inner-city building to stand empty and unused in circumstances where he has 
no intention to use the building in the near future and where that building could provide 
much needed housing to the homeless. This notion might seem drastic. However, this 
was more or less the line of reasoning adopted in the Netherlands during the 1970s and 
1980s when the kraker movement prompted the enactment of legislation, the 
Leegstandwet 1986, designed to deter land owners from allowing their inner-city 
property to remain unused and unoccupied in areas where there was a housing 
shortage. This act enabled the local authorities to take control of vacant buildings that 
could be used for social housing purposes. The rationale for the Act was that it was 
considered socially irresponsible of land owners to allow buildings, which were held for 
speculation or development purposes, to remain vacant when there was an acute 
housing shortage. Accordingly, the owners’ rights in relation to their property would not 
have been protected so strictly in circumstances where they acted recklessly.167 
                                                            
166 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 795 explains that the owner has an obligation, in addition to the social obligation to ensure that his 
building is safe and healthy, to ensure that the aesthetic features of the building are preserved.  
167 See in this regard Van der Walt AJ ‘De onrechtmatige bezetting van leegstaande woningen en het 
eigendomsbegrip: een vergelijkende analyse van het conflict tussen de privaat eigendom van onroerende 
goed en dakloosheid’ (1991) 17 Recht en Kritiek 329-359 at 334-339 and Van der Walt AJ Property in the 
margins (2009) 137-141 for a discussion of the kraker movement, the Leegstandwet 1986 and the most 
prominent Dutch cases from that era.  
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Port Elizabeth Municipality explained that in the South African milieu the owner’s 
responsibility in relation to his building should be understood within the context of 
apartheid forced removals and demolitions that contributed, in part, to widespread 
homelessness. This responsibility can also be relayed back to Alexander’s social-
obligation theory. Access to housing is one of the elements that are essential to human 
flourishing.168 A land owner can only flourish within the structures that are provided by 
the community. As a rational and moral member of the community the land owner 
should recognise that everyone has the right to flourish and this may mean that the 
owner must, to some extent, contribute to the structures that would at least facilitate 
                                                            
168 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 790. 
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human flourishing.169 Importantly, this argument is subject to the qualification that the 
social obligation of the owner (as described in this dissertation) does not mean that the 
owner must contribute some of his land for social housing purposes, although it can be 
expected of the land owner to temporarily tolerate the continued unlawful occupation of 
his land while socially inspired eviction procedures take their course. It remains the 
state’s duty to provide housing for the poor. The social obligation theory serves as a 
justification for imposing regulatory laws (such as PIE) that compel the land owner to 
endure continued unlawful occupation of his land, if he recklessly allowed his property 
to stand vacant in the midst of a housing shortage, while the law of eviction takes its 
course. In view of the accommodating nature of post-apartheid anti-eviction laws, these 
                                                            
169 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 790 made this argument in relation to Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae); President of the 
Republic of South Africa and others v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources 
Centre, Amici Curiae) (Modderklip) 2004 (6) SA 40 (SCA). In Modderklip the court ordered the state to 
pay compensation to the owner instead of ordering eviction of the unlawful occupiers. Compensation was 
an appropriate remedy because it reimbursed the owner for the temporary but extended loss of the use of 
his land and it enabled the squatters to remain on the land while the local authority made alternative 
arrangements. Alexander argues that the property owner had a social obligation to allow the occupiers to 
remain on his land until they could be accommodated properly on another suitable site. At 790 Alexander 
explains that ‘[a]s a large landowner, Modderklip is under an obligation to contribute from its own property 
in order to assist in providing the squatters with the opportunity to obtain the resources they need to 
flourish’.  In the meantime, the court would protect the owner’s property rights by means of a liability rule. 
Compare the Modderklip decision with the more recently decided Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v 
the occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) (Blue Moonlight) 
and City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and another 
2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA). See further the discussion in chapter 2, section 2 3 3 and chapter 5, section 5 4 2 
2. It should be noted that Alexander’s argument on 790 (based on his interpretation of the Modderklip 
decision), that the social obligation norm requires of a ‘large’ land owner to contribute ‘from its own 
property’ to assist with providing the structures necessary for the community to flourish goes beyond the 
arguments raised in this dissertation. This chapter purely argues that the social obligation norm explains 
why it can, in some instances, be expected of land owners to tolerate the temporary unlawful occupation 
of their property. In so doing, land owners contribute in part to create an environment where the 
community can at least start to address the current housing shortage.  
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processes will place a high value on justice and human dignity and the land owner may 
therefore have to endure continued occupation of his land for longer than he may have 
anticipated. In certain extreme cases, the owner may not be able to obtain an eviction at 
all. 
The continued occupation of the affected land owner’s land or building in such 
instances will not necessarily go uncompensated. Compensation can take on the form 
of rental income or the costs of renovations borne by the state in the course of the 
regeneration of the building. Chapter 5, section 5 4 2 2 explained that the continued 
unlawful occupation of property does amount to a deprivation of property and the FNB 
substantive arbitrariness test will show when such as deprivation results in an excessive 
interference with property rights. However, generally the temporary unlawful occupation 
of land will not amount to arbitrary deprivation of property. Furthermore, the land 
owner’s rights can be protected by a liability rule (constitutional damages) in 
circumstances where this interference with property rights becomes unjustifiable. A 
compensatory award will alleviate the otherwise disproportionate burden imposed on 
the land owner. Finally, the regulatory scheme can also make provision for the 
expropriation of the unused land – perhaps at a reduced price – to provide low cost 
housing to indigent persons.  
 Singer argues that there are instances where land owners are morally and legally 
compelled to use their property in a way that benefits other persons.170 Owners are 
entitled to use their land to further their own interests but they cannot ignore how the 
use of their property will impact on others. Moreover, the tensions and conflicts in a 
property system can sometimes encourage owners to act in the interests of non-owners 
and other land owners rather than in self-interest.171 The arguments raised by Singer 
are more extensive than the arguments put forward in this dissertation. There may be 
support for the notion that land owners may have to actively use their land in a way that 
is beneficial to others. Likewise, there may be support for the view that owners can (and 
should) be encouraged to use their land to promote the interests of others rather than 
                                                            
170 Singer JW Entitlement: the paradoxes of property (2000) 16-18. 
171 Singer JW Entitlement: the paradoxes of property (2000) 16-18. 
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their own self interests. However, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to explore 
the nature, extent and consequences of Singer’s arguments in this regard. It suffices to 
say that Singer’s reasoning supports the argument that owners have the obligation to 
refrain from allowing their buildings to become vacant when there is a housing crisis. It 
is expected of owners to consider how their use of their property, or even the non-use of 
their property, will affect others.  
Case law has confirmed that the owner is not entitled to an immediate eviction 
order in circumstances where his building has become unlawfully occupied, irrespective 
of whether he was negligent in allowing the occupation to take place.172 Arguably the 
owner has the obligation to temporarily tolerate the continued unlawful occupation of his 
land until the occupiers can be accommodated suitably elsewhere. Singer reasons that 
there are some instances where the owner has an obligation to share his wealth with 
indigent persons.173 In so doing, the owner contributes to the structures that are put in 
place to relieve poverty and, which will hopefully enable poor persons to also become 
property owners. Singer’s line of reasoning goes beyond the arguments raised in this 
dissertation. It should be emphasised that this dissertation does not suggest that the 
land owner should share his wealth with the poor. This dissertation simply argues, on 
the basis of decisions such as Blue Moonlight174 and Modderklip,175 that there are 
instances where one can expect of a land owner to temporarily tolerate the unlawful 
occupation of his land.  
                                                            
172 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 103. 
173 Singer JW Entitlement: the paradoxes of property (2000) 17-18. 
174 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another 2009 (1) SA 
470 (W); Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) and City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and another 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA). 
175 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; (Agri SA and 
Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae); President of the Republic of South Africa and others v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2004 (6) SA 40 
(SCA) and President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC). 
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Singer also argues that there are instances where the moral obligations of the 
owner should be made legally compulsory.176 Arguably this is essentially the function of 
PIE, which enables the courts to postpone the eviction of unlawful occupiers. Land 
owners are accordingly legally (and morally) obligated to temporarily tolerate the 
continued unlawful occupation of their land if the courts find that they cannot order the 
immediate eviction of occupiers because eviction has to be carried out in a way that 
satisfies the constitutional demand for justice and respect for human dignity.  This was 
confirmed in Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the occupiers of Saratoga Avenue 
and another (Blue Moonlight),177 where it was emphasised that PIE affords a court the 
power to delay the eviction of unlawful occupiers.178  This means that the owner will not 
necessarily obtain an eviction order, even though he has followed all the correct 
procedures. Essentially, the court can compel the owner to bear the burden of the 
continued unlawful occupation of his land until it is just and equitable to grant an eviction 
order. What is more, the court indirectly obliges the owner to postpone the demolition of 
the unlawfully occupied building and the subsequent development of the land. In so 
doing, the court can at least facilitate the orderly opening up of secure property rights to 
those who were denied them in the past and it can ensure that eviction takes place in a 
fair manner and ‘preferably with a specific plan of resettlement in mind.’179 The 
obligation of the owner to temporary tolerate the continued unlawful occupation of his 
land is born from the community’s desire to provide the occupiers with alternative and 
more secure accommodation. This social obligation is further a response to the era of 
apartheid forced removals and evictions, when unlawful occupiers were treated in a 
cruel and undignified manner. The owner is, in essence, forced to postpone his 
demolition plans because this affords the local authority time to obtain and provide the 
necessary resources (alternative accommodation or temporary emergency 
                                                            
176 Singer JW Entitlement: the paradoxes of property (2000) 17-18. 
177 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010). 
178 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 103. 
179 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 34 with reference to 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and others 2000 (2) SA 1074 
(SECLD) 1087. 
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accommodation), which is a step towards creating an environment where the occupiers 
can prosper. As a member of the community the land owner is morally obliged to play a 
role in rectifying the apartheid injustices. In this regard, the owner is expected to endure 
the temporary continuation of the unlawful occupation of his land in some instances.180 
A weighing of interests (as required by the FNB substantive arbitrariness test) will show 
when the delay in eviction will have a smaller negative impact on the land owner 
compared to the detriment suffered by the unlawful occupiers if they are evicted 
immediately. Explained differently, the FNB substantive arbitrariness test will show 
when there will be sufficient reason for the deprivation caused by the delay in the 
eviction process. The land owner will not be arbitrarily deprived of his property if there is 
                                                            
180 Penalver EM and Katyal SK ‘Property outlaws’ (2007) 155 U Pa L Rev 1095-1186 at 1097-1104 and 
1122-1128 argue that intentional property law breakers (referred to as property outlaws) such as urban 
squatters are vital in legal systems because they are the driving force behind legal change. Urban 
squatters challenge existing property regimes and they force society to re-evaluate why certain property 
interests should be protected. Law breaking is also an informal way for some people to access property 
regimes from which they have previously been excluded. In so doing, law breakers can bring about a 
change in an otherwise stagnant legal system. This change can include formal and legal recognition of 
the law breakers’ rights. Penalver and Katyal refer to an urban squatting movement that operated in US 
cities during the 1970’s and 1980’s. The purpose of the movement was, amongst other things, to draw 
attention to the derelict state of certain poor urban areas and to express dissatisfaction with the failure of 
the government to provide low-income housing in the cities. Some of the squatters also intended to 
become the owners of the mostly abandoned properties which they occupied. The squatting movement 
was successful to some extent since in certain cities, such as New York, the buildings were restored and 
title was transferred to the squatters. This movement described by Penalver and Katyal is comparable to 
the unlawful occupation of some buildings in South African cities. Currently, there is a massive housing 
shortage in especially urban and peri-urban areas. The unlawful occupation of vacant structures draws 
attention to the dire circumstances of marginalised South Africans. It also highlights the fact that the 
ownership of land and property in South Africa is still, more or less, divided along racial lines. Finally, the 
unlawful occupation of vacant inner-city buildings, in particular, may prompt local authorities to restore the 
structures for social housing purposes. In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main 
Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC), the court explained that 
some of the abandoned properties should be restored instead of demolished. These buildings had 
become the homes of hundreds of occupants and it would be beneficial to allow them to remain on the 
property temporarily or even permanently. 
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sufficient reason for the delay in the eviction of the occupiers. Essentially, the FNB non-
arbitrariness test directs a court to balance the owner’s interests that are affected by the 
delay in eviction with the benefit that the occupiers will draw from the delay (time to find 
alternative accommodation and treated in a more dignified manner). The delay in 
eviction will not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property if the balancing enquiry 
shows that the occupiers’ interests outweigh the owner’s interest in speedy eviction. 
One can further argue that from a planning perspective it makes sense for a court 
to force the owner to either postpone demolition of the building or, in some 
circumstances, to abandon his demolition plans altogether. The planning stage of the 
eviction process is crucial because local authorities have the duty not only to find 
alternative accommodation for unlawful occupiers, but also to ensure that they do so in 
a way that promotes the sustainable and healthy growth of the city.181 Moreover, there 
is a real possibility that the local authority will decide that it would be preferable to 
expropriate and upgrade the building instead of removing the occupiers. One of the 
factors that the court in City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd and others 
(Rand Properties)182 took into account in denying the application for an eviction order 
was the fact that the occupiers had attempted to render the building safer and more 
habitable. The court held that this was an example of where the residents (of the 
building) and the city could ‘improve their respective lots in a mutually constructive 
fashion’.183 In light of the Rand Properties decision, one cannot preclude the possibility 
that once it has considered all the relevant circumstances the city will decide to 
incorporate the building into its housing scheme.184 
                                                            
181 In Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg and others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC) para 16 it was stated that a city has constitutional 
obligations towards the occupants of Johannesburg. These obligations include promoting social and 
economic development and the duty to improve the quality of life for all citizens.  
182 2007 (1) SA 78 (W).  
183 2007 (1) SA 78 (W) para 61. 
184 In the later decision, Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, and 197 Main Street, 
Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and others 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) paras 24-26, the city and 
the occupiers reached an agreement that the former would take steps to render the building more 
habitable. 
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The land owner’s obligation to tolerate the continued unlawful occupation of his 
land is not without limits. As explained above, the FNB substantive arbitrariness test 
requires the balancing of the land owner’s and unlawful occupiers’ respective interests. 
Once a court has considered the complexities of the relationships involved in the 
dispute, it would be able to determine whether law of general application (most likely 
PIE) provides sufficient reason for the deprivation (the delay in eviction) and further, 
whether that law is applied in a procedurally unfair manner. In some instances the court 
will find that the delay in eviction disproportionately burdens the land owner, especially if 
it endures for too long and if it deprives the owner of all use of the land. Chapter 5 
section 5 4 2 2 explains that apart from Modderklip, case law has not yet indicated when 
the continued unlawful occupation of private land will amount to an unjustifiable 
interference with property rights. With reference to the series of Blue Moonlight185 
decisions, section 5 4 2 2 delineates some of the factors that may have a bearing on a 
substantive arbitrariness enquiry. This section concludes that indefinite continuation of 
unlawful occupation of land or buildings will probably constitute a disproportionate 
burden on the land owner. In such circumstances the land owner is deprived of all 
economic use of his property and he is singled out to bear a burden that should be 
spread over the community as a whole. In Blue Moonlight186 the South Gauteng High 
Court stressed that the state cannot abdicate its section 26 housing duties and shift 
them onto the private sector. It remains the duty of the state to provide unlawful 
occupiers with access to adequate housing.187 Even in cases where the state attempts 
to provide alternative accommodation the owner cannot be expected to bear the brunt 
of the burden in the form of indefinite postponement of the eviction.  
                                                            
185 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another 2009 (1) SA 
470 (W); Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) and City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and another 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA). 
186 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 97. 
187 Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] 
ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) para 97. 
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The South African courts have previously protected property rights in 
circumstances of this kind by ordering the state to pay constitutional damages when it is 
neither just nor equitable to order the eviction of the occupiers or to allow the continued 
unlawful occupation of land, with the effect that the land owner was burdened with the 
seemingly indeterminate obligation to endure the continued unlawful occupation of his 
land.188 Explained differently, the courts have in some instances elected to protect 
property rights by way of a liability rule (compensation) instead of a property rule 
(eviction) when it became clear that the property rule (eviction) was practically not 
feasible and that the land owner cannot simply be expected to endure the unlawful 
occupation indefinitely.189 The purpose of such a compensatory award was, as 
illustrated in Modderklip, to alleviate the otherwise excessive burden imposed on the 
land owner. Chapter 2, section 2 3 4 argues that the constitutional damages ordered in 
                                                            
188 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; (Agri SA and 
Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae); President of the Republic of South Africa and others v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2004 (6) SA 40 
(SCA); President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) and 
Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] ZAGPJHC 
3 (4 February 2010). 
189 Alexander GS ‘The social obligation norm in American property law’ (2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 745-820 
at 791 explains, with reference to the Modderklip decision, that the best solution in circumstances where 
squatters have resorted to self-help to obtain a form of housing is for a court to craft a remedy that clearly 
outlines the rights and obligations of all the parties involved. Such a remedy can include a liability rule 
instead of a property rule to protect property rights. This means that the owner would be compensated for 
the loss of the use of his land, but he will not obtain an eviction order to regain possession of his property. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s finding in Modderklip was followed in Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) 
Ltd v the occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and another [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010) (Blue 
Moonlight) when the court ordered the city to pay the applicant constitutional damages equivalent to the 
loss of rental income for the time period that the building was unlawfully occupied. This decision was set 
aside in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and 
another 2011 (4) SA 337 (SCA) where the court held that Blue Moonlight differed from Modderklip in 
various respects. The gist of the court’s findings was that the interference with the land owner’s rights in 
Modderklip was far more drastic than in the case of Blue Moonlight. It was therefore justifiable to grant 
constitutional damages in the case of Modderklip but not in the case of Blue Moonlight. See the 
discussion in chapter 5, section 5 4 2 2. 
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Modderklip is comparable to German equalisation measures that are designed to 
mitigate disproportionate but legitimate and socially desirable regulatory interferences 
with property rights. Modderklip is therefore authority for the argument that if the 
regulatory interference with property rights goes too far, it is possible to protect property 
rights by way of an equalisation-style liability measure instead of declaring the 
regulatory law invalid. This is desirable because it can prevent a law, with an otherwise 
legitimate and important function, from being declared invalid and unconstitutional on 
the basis of section 25(1). In sum, a court can restore an imbalance by way of an 
equalisation measure, if the FNB substantive arbitrariness test shows that there is no 
longer a proportional relationship between means (deprivation) and ends (the purpose 
of the deprivation). Importantly, there may be instances where even a compensatory 
award will alleviate the disproportionate burden imposed on the land owner by the 
continued unlawful occupation of its property. Port Elizabeth Municipality provides that 
in such instances, the court may order the eviction of the occupiers.190 
Section 5 4 2 2 argues that PIE does not currently adequately protect the land 
owner when the unlawful occupation of land amounts to an excessive interference with 
his property rights. This implies that PIE is open to a constitutional attack on the basis of 
section 25(1). Arguably, it is necessary to incorporate a German-style equalisation 
measure into PIE which will enable the courts to protect land owners from otherwise 
disproportionate burdens imposed in terms of the Act. It is true that the necessity for 
such a measure in PIE is reduced somewhat by the possibility of awarding constitutional 
damages, as was done in Modderklip. Importantly, there is one fundamental difference 
between the German equalisation measure and the Modderklip constitutional damages. 
German equalisation measures are written into legislation to mitigate excessive burdens 
that can be caused in very specific circumstances. Constitutional damages are awarded 
by the court and there is some uncertainty as to when it would be justified to grant such 
a remedy and how it should be calculated. One can conclude that it is imperative to 
develop the South African law so that it caters more clearly and explicitly for excessive 
loss or damage caused by lawful state action. 
                                                            
190 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC) para 21. 
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6 5 4 Alternative perspective 
Radin’s distinction between fungible and personal property is an alternative way to 
explain why the unlawful occupiers’ interests should be protected more strongly than the 
right of the owner to demolish his building.191 She explains that certain objects are 
closely linked with personhood because ‘they are part of the way we constitute 
ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world’.192 One can measure the strength 
of a person’s connection with an object by considering the pain that he will suffer if he is 
deprived of the object. An object will constitute property for personhood if its loss results 
in pain that cannot be relieved by the replacement of the object. This kind of property is 
referred to as personal property.193 Radin argues that an object or property is held for 
instrumental reasons if it can easily be replaced with another good such as money.194 
Property held for instrumental reasons is described as fungible property.195 The 
‘personhood perspective’ provides a dichotomy that can accurately explain why certain 
forms of property should be protected above others.196  
                                                            
191 Radin MJ ‘Property and personhood’ (1981) 34 Stan L Rev 957-1015. For a critique of Radin’s work 
refer to Schnably SJ ‘Property and pragmatism: a critique of Radin’s theory of property and personhood’ 
(1993) 45 Stan L Rev 347-407. The distinction drawn by Radin is comparable to the distinction drawn in 
German law between property that is owned to ensure personal autonomy and liberty and property that is 
held for other purposes. Property held for reasons other than personal autonomy and liberty will be 
subjected to more severe regulations and limitations. See the discussion in chapter 4, section 4 5 1. 
192 Radin MJ ‘Property and personhood’ (1981) 34 Stan L Rev 957-1015 at 959. 
193 Radin MJ ‘Property and personhood’ (1981) 34 Stan L Rev 957-1015 at 961 explains that it does not 
necessarily follow that property ‘deserves moral recognition or legal protection’ once it has been 
established that it is of a personal nature. The reason for this is that a person can have a bad personal 
connection with property. Radin reasons that a person should not ‘invest oneself in the wrong way or to 
too great an extent in external objects’. She uses the example of a fetishist who has an abnormally strong 
connection with property. A person will first have to show that the connection that he has with property is 
good rather than bad or excessive in order to have a moral claim for the protection of that property. 
194 Radin MJ ‘Property and personhood’ (1981) 34 Stan L Rev 957-1015 at 959-960. 
195 Radin MJ ‘Property and personhood’ (1981) 34 Stan L Rev 957-1015 at 960. 
196 Radin MJ ‘Property and personhood’ (1981) 34 Stan L Rev 957-1015 at 979. 
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Radin suggests that to justify the more stringent protection of certain forms of 
property one should visualise a continuum from personal to fungible property. Property 
that falls closer to the personal side should be more strictly protected than property that 
is closer to the fungible side of the continuum. The implication of this approach is that if 
two parties hold interests in the same property, one a personal interest and the other a 
fungible interest, the personal interest should probably override the fungible interest. 
Therefore, the ‘personhood perspective’ creates a hierarchy of entitlements.197 The 
closer the property is to personal property, the stronger the entitlement.198 In the final 
paragraph of her article Radin states that there is a prima facie case to be made that 
personal property interests should, at least to some extent, be protected from 
government intervention and competing fungible property interests of other people. She 
concludes that 
‘[t]his case is strongest where without the claimed protection of property as 
personal, the claimants’ opportunities to become fully developed persons in the 
context of our society would be destroyed or significantly lessened...’199 
Radin’s work is not entirely unrelated to Alexander’s social-obligation norm, because 
she essentially argues that certain forms of property enable human beings to prosper. 
She acknowledges that these forms of personal property are not always owned by the 
persons who have come to rely on it for their survival. The implication of Radin’s theory 
is that when faced with a conflict between personal and fungible property interests, the 
court may in some instances afford more protection to personal property interests. For 
instance, in an eviction dispute the unlawful occupier has a personal interest in the 
building, unlike the owner whose interest falls closer to the fungible side of the 
continuum. The occupier stands to lose much more than the owner once he is evicted 
                                                            
197 Radin MJ ‘Property and personhood’ (1981) 34 Stan L Rev 957-1015 at 986. 
198 Radin MJ ‘Property and personhood’ (1981) 34 Stan L Rev 957-1015 at 986 explains that fungible 
property is not necessarily unrelated to personhood but ‘distinctions are sometimes warranted depending 
upon the character or strength of the connection’. 
199 Radin MJ ‘Property and personhood’ (1981) 34 Stan L Rev 957-1015 at 1015. 
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and the building is demolished.200 The only consequence for the land owner would 
perhaps be that he no longer has the financial burden of maintaining the building. By 
contrast, the demolition of the building will cause the occupiers to lose their physical 
shelter, which can result in homelessness. The demolition of the building can further 
result in the occupiers being forced to leave the neighbourhood where they earned a 
livelihood, fostered community networks and made use of amenities such as schools, 
clinics and churches.201 Moreover, the occupiers possibly also invested some money in 
making the building their home. Clearly, the demolition of the building will result in 
losses suffered by the occupiers that are disproportionate to the benefits obtained by 
the owner.202 
Radin’s theory suggests that in a dispute of this kind, the court may protect the 
unlawful occupiers’ personal property interests over the fungible property interests of 
the land owner. The distinction between personal and fungible property interests 
                                                            
200 The occupiers’ relationship with the building can also be explained with reference to the ‘home interest’ 
as developed by Fox L Conceptualising home: theories, laws and policies (2007) 128-129. The central 
premise of Fox’s theory is that the ‘home interest’ is an under-developed concept in legal discourse and 
that more often than not this interest, when posed against the commercial interest in a property, will be 
disregarded by legislative and judicial policy makers. This could be attributed to the fact that home is a 
subjective interest that is not easily measured or easily proved in a court room. 
201 Fox L Conceptualising home: theories, laws and policies (2007) 15 and 79-80 explains that to the 
occupiers, a home has, amongst other things, a financial, emotional, social and psychological facet. 
Unfortunately, these facets are difficult to present relative to the commercial interests of the property 
owner.  
202 Fox L Conceptualising home: theories, laws and policies (2007) 15,28 and 145-146 argues that one 
should have a clear understanding of the nature of all the respective interests, and especially the home 
interest involved in a dispute, so as to effectively balance the rights of the occupiers and property owners. 
She proposes that the concept of a home should be evaluated with reference to this formula: home= 
house +x. The ‘house’ in the equation refers to the physical structure whereas ‘x’ refers to the intangible 
feelings that a person can have in relation to his home. Within the context of unlawfully occupied 
buildings, the building owner’s interest will only comprise the physical structure and the investment value. 
By contrast, the unlawful occupier’s interest refers to the physical structure as well as all the other facets 
of his life that he was able to build as result of his occupation of that structure. Viewed from this 
perspective it is clear that the occupier’s home interest should outweigh the property owner’s right to 
demolish the structure.   
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accordingly explains the purpose of legislation such as PIE, which authorises the court 
to delay the eviction of unlawful occupiers if, after considering all the circumstances, it 
finds that it is not just or equitable to grant (or to enforce) the eviction order. In such 
circumstances the property owner’s fungible demolition rights should, at least 
temporarily, yield to the unlawful occupiers’ personal interests in the building. This 
means that the land owner will not necessarily be compensated for the continued 
unlawful occupation of his land. 
However, there may be instances where it is vital to protect the land owner’s 
fungible property interests by way of a liability rule (an equalisation measure). Typically 
this would be where the court cannot order the eviction of the occupiers (or where the 
eviction order cannot be enforced) but where it is found that the continued unlawful 
occupation of the land owner’s land amounts to a disproportionate interference with his 
property rights. Under these circumstances an equalisation measure (monetary 
compensation) will adequately protect the land owner’s fungible interests. Radin’s 
theory supports this line of reasoning because it suggests that the court can protect the 
unlawful occupiers’ personal property interests by awarding the land owner a 
compensatory award (liability rule) rather than an eviction order (property rule). 
  
6 5 5 Conclusion 
The section above described the range of obligations that an owner has in relation to his 
inner-city building. It should be emphasised that the nature of the property, in this case 
land, and its locality (congested urban area) impacts on the responsibilities that the 
owner has towards his community. These responsibilities should also be understood 
against the background of the relevant historical and constitutional context described in 
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers.203 Although it is not a closed list, the 
above discussion identified three obligations that the owner has in relation to his land. 
Firstly, the land owner must maintain the building situated on his property so that it 
complies with legislation. This obligation exists even if the building is unlawfully 
                                                            
203 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
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occupied, since the owner does not have the right to allow his property to cause harm to 
others. Secondly, it is irresponsible of the owner to allow his building to stand vacant 
and unused simply because he does not have any use for that building and where it 
could be used for social housing purposes. The section above argued that the social 
obligation theory may justify the enactment of legislation which regulates that land 
owner’s rights (and specifically his use entitlement) in relation to such a building. It is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation to determine the exact scope and inner workings 
of this type of legislation. It suffices to say that a law of this kind may authorise the local 
authority to take control of the building so that it can be used for social housing 
purposes. This may mean that the local authority will possibly have to bear the costs of 
renovations and management of the building. Furthermore, a land owner will not 
necessarily go uncompensated since the law can provide that the land owner will be 
entitled to rental income generated from the use of the building or some other form of 
compensation. The law can also authorise the expropriation of the land – perhaps at a 
reduced price – for the purposes of social housing. Importantly, as Singer suggests, 
land owners should consider how the use or non-use of their buildings affects other 
members of their community.   
Thirdly, the owner has a negative obligation to temporarily tolerate the continued 
unlawful occupation of his land if, at that moment in time, the court finds that it is not just 
or equitable to grant an eviction order. The court does have the power to postpone the 
eviction of the unlawful occupiers and this will by implication affect the owner’s plans to 
demolish the unlawfully occupied building so that he can proceed to develop the land. 
This sense of obligation expresses the broader goal of a well-functioning society where 
the gap between poor and rich is addressed, at least in a defensive manner. It is 
furthermore desirable from a planning perspective that unlawful occupiers temporarily 
continue to be accommodated on the land which they have made their home. This 
would give the relevant officials time to make appropriate plans to accommodate the 
occupiers in other suitable accommodation. Generally, this would be a more efficient 
process than forcing the occupiers to find alternative illegal accommodation, which 
would further exacerbate the problem. The owner’s obligation to temporarily bear the 
continued unlawful occupation of his land can be explained with reference to the social-
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obligation theory and Radin’s distinction between fungible and personal property. An 
owner is obliged to contribute to the structures that will enable his community to flourish. 
Currently, there are hundreds of thousands of South Africans who do not have access 
to adequate housing and it can be expected of land owners not to use their property in a 
way that would exacerbate this crisis. This does not mean that the land owner must 
contribute parts of his land for social housing purposes. The courts have confirmed that 
the state cannot abdicate its housing duties and shift them onto the private sector. 
However, there may be instances where the land owner would not be entitled to an 
immediate eviction order when his building is unlawfully occupied. The courts are 
authorised to delay the eviction of unlawful occupiers in certain instances. This means 
that it can be expected of land owners to temporarily tolerate the continued unlawful 
occupation of their land without compensation. The social-obligation theory provides a 
basis for understanding why it can be expected of land owners to make these sacrifices. 
By tolerating the temporary continued unlawful occupation of his land, a land owner 
contributes in some way to the social structures that help his community to flourish; at 
the very least, he does not exacerbate the problem. Radin’s theory also finds 
application in eviction disputes. In the South African context, housing remains a 
contentious issue and practically speaking, the delay in the eviction process will not 
magically resolve the homelessness issue. Nevertheless, the delay in eviction at least 
affords local authorities time to determine whether it can accommodate the unlawful 
occupiers elsewhere, once evicted. If nothing else, the delay in eviction is an attempt to 
treat the unlawful occupiers in a more dignified manner.  
Finally, the obligation to tolerate the continued unlawful occupation of private land 
is not absolute. There are instances where the continued unlawful occupation of private 
land will disproportionately burden the owner. However, apart from eviction and 
demolition there are other ways to protect the owner’s rights when an eviction order 
cannot be granted, namely equalisation measures (liability rules). Radin’s theory is 
useful since it helps one to understand why, in some instances, private land rights are 
protected by liability rules rather than property rules. Radin’s theory suggests that in the 
example of the unlawful occupier personal property interests are at stake. Often the 
courts will protect these personal property interests by granting the land owner (who has 
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fungible property interests) a compensatory award (liability rule) instead of eviction 
(property rule). It is also possible that the state will in some instances elect to order the 
expropriation of the unlawfully occupied property. In so doing, the state protects both 
the interests of the land owner and the occupier. 
In conclusion, the FNB substantive arbitrariness test provides a framework within 
which one should assess the extent to which a regulatory measure interferes with the 
land owner’s right to use, enjoy and exploit his property. This test specifically provides 
that one should determine whether the law of general application provides sufficient 
reason for the deprivation or is procedurally unfair. The FNB substantive arbitrariness 
enquiry indicates when the social obligation of the land owner amounts to a burden that 
should be borne by the community in general. It is imperative to engage with the 
complexities of the various interests affected by the regulation of property rights in a 
specific instance. In so doing, one will be able to establish whether a particular 
obligation of the land owner (a deprivation authorised by legislation) amounts to an 
overly excessive interference with property rights. A regulatory measure can be 
declared unconstitutional and invalid if the FNB substantive arbitrariness test shows that 
there is insufficient reason for the deprivation of property rights. More specifically, the 
FNB arbitrariness test shows when there is no longer a proportional relationship 
between the deprivation (the delay in eviction and the concomitant consequences for 
the land owner) and purpose of the deprivation, namely enabling the local authority or 
unlawful occupiers to find alternative accommodation and the dignified and respectful 
treatment of those occupiers. Explained differently, this test shows when the land 
owner’s interests outweigh the interests that are protected by the delay in eviction. 
Alternatively, the non-arbitrariness test might indicate where it would be necessary to 
alleviate the otherwise disproportionate burden of the land owner by way of an 
equalisation measure. An equalisation measure, incorporated into the authorising law, 
will prevent a finding that the law is invalid and unconstitutional on the basis of section 
25(1).  
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6 6 Conclusion 
The ownership of land comprises rights as well as duties. This has on more than one 
occasion been confirmed by the courts204 and South African legal scholars.205 These 
duties are often codified in legislation enacted in response to a specific need of the 
South African community. Zoning laws, for example, have been promulgated to ensure 
the orderly and healthy development of urban areas. Authors have also emphasised 
that the scope of the owner’s obligations varies according to the nature of the 
property.206 The obligations that the owner has in relation to his urban property, for 
example, differ from his obligations in relation to rural land. Furthermore, these 
obligations are contingent on socio-economic circumstances and they are likely to 
change as society evolves and circumstances change. There is therefore a strong 
argument to be made that the ownership of land is an inherently limited right. Stated 
differently, the ownership of land will always be subject to the restrictions that stem from 
the right itself or from legislation. An example of a limitation originating from ownership 
itself is that the owner does not have the right to use his land in a manner that will harm 
others. Legislation will also regulate the owner’s use, enjoyment and exploitation of his 
property. Generally, land owners do not have the right to use their land in a way that is 
proscribed by legislation. Ownership entitlements are always subject to the limitations 
imposed by the law. This is implied by section 25(1) of the Constitution.  
Importantly, section 25(1) also safeguards the rights of land owners by requiring 
that a deprivation must be authorised and imposed in terms of law of general application 
and it may not be arbitrary. A deprivation will be arbitrary if the law of general 
                                                            
204 See for instance Kings v Dykes 1971 (3) SA 540 (C) 545 and Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v 
Heritage Western Cape and another 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) 27. 
205 Cowen DV New patterns of landownership: the transformation of the concept of landownership as 
plena in re potestas (1984) 71; Milton JRL ‘Planning and property’ 1985 Acta Juridica 267-277 at 275; 
Van der Walt AJ ‘The effect of environmental measures on the concept of landownership’ (1987) 104 
SALJ 469-479 at 476-479 and Van der Walt AJ ‘De onrechtmatige bezetting van leegstaande woningen 
en het eigendomsbegrip: een vergelijkende analyse van het conflict tussen de privaat eigendom van 
onroerende goed en dakloosheid’ (1991) 17 Recht en Kritiek 329-359 at 352-354. 
206 Cowen DV New patterns of landownership: the transformation of the concept of landownership as 
plena in re potestas (1984). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
430 
application does not provide sufficient reason for the particular interference with 
property rights or is procedurally unfair.207 In FNB the Constitutional Court prescribed a 
nuanced test – the substantive arbitrariness test – to determine whether there is 
sufficient reason for a particular deprivation. The test directs the court to consider the 
complexity of relationships involved in a dispute and to weigh up all the contextual 
factors to determine whether the law of general application imposes (or authorises) 
excessive interferences with property rights. Essentially, the FNB non-arbitrariness test 
enables the court to ascertain when an individual land owner, or a group of land owners, 
are singled out to bear a disproportionate burden in the public interest. This test directs 
the court to balance the opposing interests involved in the dispute. In particular, the 
court should consider the purpose served by the deprivation and the extent of 
interference with property rights, A deprivation will be arbitrary, if considering the 
complexity of the relationships in the dispute and all relevant circumstances, the land 
owner’s interests outweighs the outweigh the purpose served by the deprivation. In 
South Africa, a law will be declared invalid and unconstitutional insofar as it authorises 
or imposes an arbitrary deprivation of property. Explained differently, if the statutory 
interferences with property rights are deemed too excessive, and therefore arbitrary, the 
law can be set aside on the basis of section 25(1).  
This approach may in some instances be problematic since it can result in the 
situation where a law, which fulfils an important function in society, is declared invalid 
because it authorises overly severe interferences with property rights. The South 
African courts have employed a remedy, constitutional damages, in instances where 
otherwise lawful state action results in the disproportionate interference with property 
rights, but this remedy is still in its infancy.208 Constitutional damages are comparable to 
German equalisation measures, which are specifically incorporated into legislation to 
                                                            
207 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 100. 
208 Modderfontein Squatters, Greater Benoni City Council v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; (Agri SA and 
Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae); President of the Republic of South Africa and others v 
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd (Agri SA and Legal Resources Centre, Amici Curiae) 2004 (6) SA 40 
(SCA). 
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mitigate disproportionate loss or damage authorised by legitimate regulatory laws. One 
of the dominant themes in this dissertation is that provision for and use of equalisation-
style measures is a useful and, in fact, necessary development in South African law 
because it enables the courts to better protect the land owner’s rights in instances 
where a law imposes excessive interferences with property rights in the public interest, 
and where it is undesirable to declare that law invalid and unconstitutional for allowing 
arbitrary deprivation of property. The courts do not have the power to order the 
expropriation of property. Equalisation is not only an alternative way for the courts to 
protect property rights, but it can also indirectly force the state to consider (or 
reconsider) the possibility of expropriating the affected land owner’s property because 
expropriation could be more cost effective. Moreover, properly drafted equalisation 
provisions could have a direction-giving function since they delineate the circumstances 
where the courts should mitigate otherwise disproportionate burdens imposed on land 
owners by the authorising law. Finally, equalisation measures are exceptional remedies 
that are not always available whenever property rights have been infringed. Rather, 
equalisation measures will become operative when laws impose excessive and 
potentially arbitrary limitations on an individual’s (or specific group of land owners) 
exercise of ownership entitlements in the public interest. 
This dissertation distinguished between three types of statutory interferences with 
property rights pertaining to demolition. Chapter 2 referred to limitations indirectly 
imposed on the owner’s right to demolish unlawfully occupied buildings by the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
(PIE). The central premise in this chapter is that land owners are not always entitled to 
an immediate eviction order when their property is unlawfully occupied. There are 
instances where it can be expected of land owners to tolerate the temporary continued 
unlawful occupation of their land. This interference with property rights will generally not 
amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property. However, there may be instances where 
the continued unlawful occupation of land results in an excessive and arbitrary 
interference with ownership entitlements. In such instances it may be necessary to 
protect ownership by way of a liability rule (a monetary award) to mitigate the 
disproportionate burden imposed on the land owner.  Chapter 3 referred to the National 
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Building Standards and Building Regulations Act 103 of 1977 (the Building Standards 
Act), which authorises the local authority to apply to the court for a demolition order for 
unlawful and illegal buildings. The central premise in chapter 3 is that the land owner 
can only develop his property within the framework of the law. Buildings that conflict 
with legislation (illegal structures) should generally be demolished if they cannot be 
altered to comply with the standards set in the relevant laws. Likewise, buildings that 
conflict with the property rights of others should be demolished if they cannot be altered 
so that they no longer encroach on legitimate property rights of others. Chapter 4 
referred to the limitations on the owner’s right to demolish historic structures imposed by 
the National Heritage Resources Act of 25 of 1999 (the Heritage Resources Act). This 
chapter raised the hypothesis that the limitation imposed on the owner’s right to 
demolish historic structures by historic preservation laws will in most instances not 
amount to an arbitrary deprivation of property. Nevertheless, there may be rare 
instances where the regulatory denial of the right to demolish a historic structure 
coupled with the financial duty to maintain an historic structure results in an excessive 
interference with ownership entitlements. In such instances it may be necessary to 
assuage the otherwise disproportionate burden imposed on the land owner (by the 
Heritage Resources Act) by way of an equalisation measure. Furthermore, it might be 
necessary to allow the demolition of a structure if there is no possibility of mitigating the 
disproportionate burden imposed on the land owner for purposes of historic 
preservation. 
These three categories of interferences with property rights share certain 
similarities. Firstly, each of these regulatory measures can impact – to some extent – on 
a land owner’s use entitlement, specifically his plans to develop his land. Legislation 
such as the Building Standards Act or zoning laws regulates the extent and nature of 
developments on a land owner’s property. These regulatory controls are common and 
land owners are generally aware of how these measures affect their ownership 
entitlements. Similarly, historic preservation statutes, although not as common as 
building and development controls, can also interfere with the land owner’s 
development plans. Compelling examples of this kind of interference are the famous 
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decision in Penn Central Transportation Company v City of New York209 and, in the 
South African context, Qualidental Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Heritage Western Cape and 
another.210 Both land owners in these cases were required to drastically curb their plans 
to develop their properties because of historic structures (protected by historic 
preservation laws) situated on their land. Anti-eviction legislation can indirectly authorise 
perhaps the most unforeseeable interference with ownership entitlements. Decisions 
such as Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd v the Occupiers of Saratoga Avenue and 
another211 show that land owners may have to tolerate the temporary continued 
unlawful occupation of their land, which implies that they would have to postpone the 
demolition of the occupied structures and the further development of their properties.  
Secondly, chapters 2-4 showed that in each of the instances, the regulatory laws 
cannot be applied inflexibly because it may result in too excessive interferences with 
property rights. Explained differently, the limitations imposed on ownership by building 
and development controls, historic preservation statutes and anti-eviction laws are not 
without boundaries. The FNB substantive arbitrariness test shows when the inflexible 
application of the law results in an arbitrary deprivation of property. Chapter 2 concluded 
that the strict enforcement of PIE can, in extreme cases, cause a situation where the 
continued unlawful occupation of land effectively deprives the land owner of all 
economic use of his property. Chapter 5 suggested that an equalisation-style measure, 
incorporated into PIE, can relieve the otherwise excessive burden imposed on the land 
owner in this instance. Moreover, an equalisation provision can prevent PIE from being 
impugned on the grounds of section 25(1). Chapter 3 illustrated that there are 
circumstances where one cannot force a land owner to demolish illegal structures, as 
required by law, because it can cause an arbitrary deprivation of her legitimate property 
interests, for instance in lawful parts of the building. Chapter 4 showed that the Heritage 
Resources Act can – like PIE – cause the land owner to bear a disproportionate burden 
in the public interest insofar as he is required to maintain an historic structure that he 
cannot use for any economically viable purpose, including selling the land. As in the 
                                                            
209 438 US 104 (1978). 
210 2007 (4) SA 26 (C) and 2008 (3) SA 160 (SCA). 
211 [2010] ZAGPJHC 3 (4 February 2010). 
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case of PIE, chapter 5 argued that equalisation measures could mitigate the excessive 
burden that could potentially be caused by the Heritage Resources Act. In so doing, it 
could prevent the Heritage Resources Act from being set aside insofar as it authorises 
an arbitrary deprivation of property. However, chapter 5 explained that the Heritage 
Resources Act already incorporates measures that can arguably have an equalisation 
function.  
There are also differences between these three categories of statutory 
interferences with property rights. Firstly, unlike historic preservation laws and anti-
eviction legislation, building and development controls are more closely related to the 
traditional purpose of the state’s police power, namely public health and safety. Historic 
preservation and anti-eviction laws are further removed from this core function and 
deprivations authorised by these laws will therefore be subjected to stricter scrutiny. 
This explains why equalisation measures were relevant in the case of unlawfully 
occupied structures (chapter 2) and historic buildings (chapter 4) but not in the case of 
unlawful and illegal buildings (chapter 3). Typically, equalisation measures alleviate 
excessive burdens than are imposed on an individual land owner (or group of land 
owners) by laws that fulfil an otherwise important function in society. Explained 
differently, equalisation comes into play if land owners are singled out to bear a 
disproportionate burden in the public interest. When a land owner builds an unlawful or 
illegal building, he automatically exposes himself to the potential demolition of the 
structure. Essentially, the land owner had put himself in the position where he is singled 
out to bear the burden on demolition. Given the underlying purpose of building and 
development legislation – safety and health – it seems illogical to protect the land 
owner’s interests by an equalisation measure. By contrast, historic preservation laws 
and anti-eviction legislation often singles out land owners to bear a specific burden in 
the public interest. Equalisation is relevant in these instances because it protects the 
individual from having to bear excessive burdens which, in all fairness, should be borne 
by society as a whole. Furthermore, equalisation is necessary in thbese cases because 
historic preservation and anti-eviction laws promote causes further removed from the 
core function of police power, namely health and safety. Evidently, it is necessary to 
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protect land owners’ rights more fiercely in the context of historic preservation and 
unlawfully occupied buildings than in the instance of unlawful and illegal structures. 
Thirdly, the deprivations identified in chapters 2, 3 and 4 are imposed by different 
parties. PIE authorises the court to grant an eviction order if, after considering all the 
relevant circumstances, it finds that it is just and equitable to evict the occupiers. This 
means that the deprivation – the delay in the eviction of unlawful occupiers and the 
subsequent postponement of demolition and development plans – is imposed by the 
court order. The Building Standards Act authorises the local authority to apply for a 
demolition order for unlawful and illegal buildings. In this instance the deprivation is 
caused by administrative action - the local authority’s decision to apply for a demolition 
order. Likewise, in the case of historic preservation the deprivation is a result of the 
heritage authority’s decision to deny a demolition permit and, further, to protect the 
historic structure under the Act.  This means that in the case of deprivations caused by 
building and development controls and historic preservation laws, land owners may 
have administrative law remedies available.  
Finally, when it comes to disputes concerning the eviction from, and the demolition 
of, unlawfully occupied buildings, two constitutional rights are in conflict, namely section 
26(3) and section 25(1). Chapter 2 explains that section 26(3) was expressly 
incorporated into the Constitution in response to the apartheid abuses of eviction and 
demolition orders. PIE was in turn promulgated to give effect to the values enunciated in 
section 26(3). Deprivations authorised by PIE are therefore unique in the sense that 
they should be understood and analysed within the relevant apartheid and constitutional 
contexts.  
Almost a century ago, the Black Land Act 27 of 1913 became one of the first laws 
that indirectly authorised the demolition of dwellings along racial lines. By the mid-
twentieth century, apartheid policies were proactively pursued. Apartheid laws such as 
the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 expressly employed private land 
owners and local authorities’ eviction and demolition powers to further apartheid ideals. 
These laws operated from the assumption that ownership is an absolute and inviolable 
right. One of the consequences of these discriminatory practices was the major socio-
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economic inequalities still in existence in contemporary South African society. The 
Constitution seeks to redress these inequalities through a number of provisions. In 
terms of demolition, the most important provisions, as shown in this dissertation, are 
section 25(1) and 26(3) of the Constitution. The watershed case FNB gave content and 
structure to a section 25(1) challenge. Similarly, Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers set out the interaction between section 25(1) and section 26(3). In so doing 
the Constitutional Court emphasised, in contrast to the apartheid era, that ownership will 
sometimes have to yield to the rights of others, such as the section 26(3) rights of 
unlawful occupiers. Both FNB and Port Elizabeth Municipality illustrate that demolition is 
a constitutional issue.  
The past 100 years have seen drastic changes from a dispensation that protected 
the interests of a selected few to a constitutional regime that aims to safeguard the 
rights of all citizens. This dissertation has highlighted two developments that may have 
significant implications for South African law. The first development is the more active 
pursuance of the duties that accompany the ownership of property and especially the 
ownership of land. The second development is the possibility of incorporating 
equalisation measures to protect land owners from excessive losses caused by 
otherwise lawful state action. Embracing these two developments could set in motion a 
century of positive change, rooted in the values of the Constitution, as far as demolition 
orders are concerned. 
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